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AMERICA AND THE NEW POLAND



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TORONTO

AMERICA AND THE NEW POLAND

BY
H. H. FISHER

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

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H. H. F.

S. B.

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- 960 Mieszko I, of the Piast Dynasty, the first historical King of Poland.
- 966 Poland accepts Christianity.
- 968 The first bishopric established in Poznan.
- 981 Poland loses the territory of Red Ruthenia (Galicia).
- 995 Boleslas I conquers Pomerania.
- 1002 Sixteen-Years' war with the Germans begins.
- 1018 Treaty of Peace with Germany concluded at Bautzen by which Poland regains Polish provinces previously conquered by Germany. Boleslas I reconquers Red Ruthenia.
- 1038 Casimir, the Restorer, ascends the throne of Poland (1038-1058).
- 1069 Boleslas II conquers Kiev.
- 1182 War against Ruthenia (1182-1205). Poland establishes her sovereignty over Volhynia and Red Ruthenia.
- 1226 Conrad of Masovia invites the Teutonic Knights of the Cross to settle in Kujavia.
- 1241 First Mongol invasion of Poland.
- 1267 Prince Boleslas, the Pious, gives privileges to the Jews, establishing their autonomy.
- 1333 Accession of Casimir, the Great (1333-1370).
- 1334 Casimir, the Great, confirms the privileges of the Jews and extends them over the whole Kingdom.
- 1335 Treaty of Wyszehrad by which Casimir cedes Polish Silesia to Bohemia.
- 1340 Red Ruthenia incorporated with Poland.
- 1347 The Statute of Wislica establishes the first code of laws in Poland.
- 1364 The foundation of the University of Cracow.
- 1370 Death of Casimir, the Great, the last King of the Piast dynasty. Louis d'Anjou, King of Hungary, becomes King of Poland (1370-1384).
- 1374 Pact of Koszyce limits the powers of the Crown for the benefit of the nobility.

- 1384 Jadwiga of Anjou, daughter of Louis, becomes Queen of Poland (1384-1386).
- 1386 Marriage of Jadwiga with Ladislas Jagello, Grand Duke of Lithuania. Ladislas II becomes King of Poland (1386-1434), thus effecting a dynastic union of Poland and Lithuania.
- 1410 Ladislas Jagello defeats the Teutonic Knights at Grunwald (Tannenberg).
- 1413 Union of Horodlo, by which certain privileges of Polish nobility are granted to the nobility of Lithuania.
- 1473 Nicolas Copernicus, the astronomer, born (1473-1543).
- 1493 Convocation of the first Polish Parliament.
- 1499 Wars with Moscow begin (1499-1537).
- 1505 The new constitution, *Nihil Novi*, voted by Parliament at Radom, establishes the ascendancy of Parliament over the Crown.
- 1518 Beginnings of Reformation in Poland.
- 1528 Monetary union of Poland, Lithuania and Prussia.
- 1561 Courland, Livonia and Esthonia united with Poland.
- 1565 The introduction of the Order of Jesuits in Poland.
- 1569 Union of Lublin definitely unites Poland and Lithuania into one State.
- 1572 Death of Sigmund II, August, and end of the Jagellon dynasty. Interregnum (1572-3). Poland becomes an elective monarchy.
- 1577 War against Russia (1577-1582).
- 1578 High Courts of Justice established in Poland. University of Vilna founded.
- 1595 Union of Brest between the Greek and Roman Catholic Churches of Poland. University of Zamosc founded.
- 1601 Wars with Sweden begin (1601-1629).
- 1609 War with Russia.
- 1610 Occupation of Moscow (1610-13).
- 1648 Rebellion of the Ukrainian Cossacks.
- 1654 Treaty of Pereyasavl.
- 1657 Frederick William of Brandenburg ceases to be vassal of Poland.
- 1658 Poland regains the Ukraine by the Convention of Hadziacz.
- 1661 Foundation of the University of Lwow (Lemberg).
- 1667 Peace with Russia concluded at Andruszow. Poland cedes the trans-Dnieper Provinces.

- 1674 John Sobieski elected King of Poland (1674-1696).
1676 The Eastern Ukraine passes under Russian domination.
1683 King John III (Sobieski) defeats the Turks at Vienna and saves the capital of Austria.
1686 Kiev ceded to Russia.
1717 Reduction of the Polish Army under the pressure of Russia.
1732 Treaty of Berlin between Russia, Prussia and Austria against Poland.
1764 Stanislas August Poniatowski elected King of Poland (1764-1795).
1768 Confederation of Bar unites all patriots in defense of the independence of Poland (war with Russia, 1768-1772).
1772 First partition of Poland.
1773 Establishment of a Board of Education.
1788 Great Parliament assembles (1788-1792).
1791 Constitution of the 3rd of May. Reform of Government, equality of rights granted to burghers and peasants. Abolition of the *liberum veto*, suppression of elective monarchy.
1792 War against Russia declared. Prince Joseph Poniatowski appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army.
1793 Second partition of Poland.
1794 The Insurrection of Kosciuszko.
1795 Third partition of Poland.
1797 First Polish Legions under Generals Dabrowski and Kniaziewicz rally to Napoleon Bonaparte.
1806 Insurrection in Polish provinces of Prussia.
1807 Treaty of Tilsit. Creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw as a constitutional state.
1808 Polish Legions take part in the campaign of Spain.
1809 The Duchy of Warsaw declares war on Austria. Conquest of the Polish provinces of Austria.
1813 Prince Joseph Poniatowski appointed Marshal of France. His death in the Battle of Leipzig.
1815 Congress of Vienna. Creation of the Kingdom of Poland under the Tsar of Russia, as Polish King. Creation of the free Republic of Cracow. Constitution granted to the Kingdom of Poland. Parts of Poland retained by Prussia and Austria.

RUSSIAN POLAND AND LITHUANIA, 1798-1914

- 1798 Adam Mickiewicz born (1798-1855).
- 1825 Death of Alexander I. Accession of Nicholas I.
- 1826 Foundation of Polish Land Bank.
- 1828 Tsar Nicholas I of Russia crowned King of Poland in Warsaw.
- 1830 November 29th—national insurrection against Russia (1830-1831).
- 1831 Abolition of Constitution. Incorporation of Kingdom of Poland in Russia as the Vistula Governments.
- 1832 Abrogation of the Constitution in the Kingdom of Poland.
- 1832 Suppression of the University of Vilna.
- 1838-9 Suppression of the Uniate Church in Lithuania and Ruthenia.
- 1840 Abrogation of the Lithuanian Statute. Establishment of the Russia Code.
- 1846 Insurrection of Cracow. Austria annexes Cracow.
- 1848 Insurrection in Poznan, Lwow, Cracow. Polish Legions participate in the struggles for liberty in Italy, Hungary, Germany.
- 1854 The Crimean War. Polish Legions fight in the ranks of the Coalition against Russia.
- 1861 Liberation of serfs in Russia.
- 1863 National insurrection against Russia. Military convention between Russia and Prussia against Poland.
- 1864 Emancipation of Peasants in Russian Poland. Beginning of systematic persecution of Polish language and religion.
- 1867 Abolition of Council of State and complete end of all Polish autonomy.
- 1869 Russian made the official language of instruction in secondary education. Emancipation of peasants in Lithuania.
- 1876 Russification of the Judicature in Poland.
- 1883 Foundation of *Ausra*, the first Lithuanian newspaper.
- 1885 Russian made the official language of instruction in primary education.
- 1905 Revolution in Russia. Meeting of first Lithuanian National Assembly.

- 1906 First Duma. Beginning of Polish electoral representation.
- 1907 Renewed reaction in Russia. Concessions granted in 1905 revoked. Second and third Dumas. Reduction of number of Polish delegates from 36 to 12.
- 1912 End of third Duma. Formation of new Russian Government of Chelm out of parts of the Polish Governments of Lublin and Siedlce. Beginning of fourth Duma.

PRUSSIAN POLAND, 1806-1914

- 1806 Insurrection in Polish provinces of Prussia.
- 1815 Treaty of Vienna. Decree of Annexation of Poznanian by Prussia.
- 1831 Repressions against Poles in Germany begin.
- 1840 Conciliatory policy of Frederick William IV.
- 1846 Abortive insurrection in Poznanian.
- 1848-9 Revolution and anarchy.
- 1864 Teaching of Polish prohibited.
- 1870-1 Franco-Prussian War. German Empire formed.
- 1871 *Kulturkampf* begins in German Poland.
- 1885 Mass expulsions of Poles from Prussian Poland.
- 1886 Bismarck creates the Prussian Colonization Commission to deprive Poles of their land.
- 1898 Prussian Government grants 200 million marks to the Colonization Commission to carry on expropriation of Poles.
- 1902 Prussian Government grants another 150 million marks for the colonization of Prussian Poland.
- 1904 Prussian Parliament passes extraordinary laws against Poles.
- 1906 Prussian Government prohibits religious teaching in the Polish language. School strike of 100,000 Polish children.
- 1908 Prussian Government prohibits the use of Polish at public meetings. Further 275 million marks granted to the Colonization Commission.
- 1908 Expropriation Law passed.
- 1913 The creation of the "Temporary Commission", representing all Polish secret military organizations in preparation for the struggle for independence.

AUSTRIAN POLAND, 1815-1914

- 1817 Estates of Galicia created by Austria.
- 1846 Peasants' rising. Cracow annexed to Galicia.
- 1846 Insurrection of Cracow. Austria annexes Cracow.
- 1859 Austria defeated at Magenta and Solferino. Austria grants first concessions to Poles in Galicia.
- 1860 October Constitution with promise of autonomy.
- 1861 February Constitution adopted. First Galician Diet.
- 1864 Teaching of Polish prohibited.
- 1867 Teaching of Polish readmitted in Galician schools.
- 1867 Dual Monarchy established.
- 1868 Galician Resolution submitted to the Emperor.
Administration begins to pass into Polish hands.
- 1869 Polish recognized as official language in Galicia.
- 1873 Introduction of direct voting for Reichsrat elections.
- 1907 Universal suffrage introduced.
- 1908 Pilsudski organizes Polish "sharpshooters," nucleus of Legions.
- 1914 Enlargement and reorganization of Diet.

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918

- 1914 *August 1st.*—Germany declares war on Russia. *6th.*—Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia. Pilsudski leads Polish Sharpshooters across the Russian frontier. *14th.*—Publication of the Grand Duke Nicholas' Proclamation to the Poles. *16th.*—Polish Supreme National Committee organized at Cracow, favoring cooperation with Austria.
September 2nd.—Lemberg (Lwow) occupied by Russians.
September-October—Polish Central Relief Committee organized in the United States.
November 15th.—First Brigade of Polish Legions formed under Pilsudski's command. *26th.*—Polish National Committee formed at Warsaw, favoring cooperation with Russia.
- 1915 *January*—Beginning of Rockefeller Foundation investigations for Polish relief.
May 1st.—Beginning of the Central Powers' great offensive in Galicia. Battle of Gorlice-Tarnow.
June 22nd.—Lemberg recaptured by Austro-German

troops. *24th.*—Russo-Polish committee formed at Petrograd.

August 1st.—Russian government promises full Polish autonomy. *5th.*—German occupation of Warsaw. *10th.*—Polish law courts established at Warsaw.

September 10th.—Polish law courts suppressed by German authorities.

November—Relief investigation in Poland by Dr. Vernon Kellogg of the Commission for Relief in Belgium.

December 22nd.—Hoover begins negotiations with British Government for relief of Poland.

1916 *January 1st.*—Day designated by President Wilson for giving aid "to the stricken Polish people."

July—Conflict between Legions and Austro-German command. *25th.*—Pilsudski resigns his command. *26th.-29th.*—Final refusal of British and German Governments to agree on Hoover's relief plan.

August 12th.—German-Austro-Hungarian protocol.

November 5th.—Proclamation of rulers of Germany and Austria-Hungary establishing an independent Polish Kingdom. *16th.*—Death of Henryk Sienkiewicz at Vevey, Switzerland.

1917 *January 22nd.*—President Wilson's statement regarding a free and united Poland as a condition of peace.

March 12th.-15th.—First Russian revolution. *30th.*—Recognition of Poland's right to independence by Russian Provisional Government.

April 6th.—United States declares war with Germany.

April-May—Organization by Polish-Americans of the Polish National Department to support American and Polish interests in the war.

May 28th.—Declaration by Polish representatives in Austrian *Reichsrat* for independent and united Poland with access to the sea.

June 5th.—French government's authorization of formation of Polish army in France.

July 2nd.—Pilsudski resigns from Temporary Council of State in Warsaw. *9th.*—Legionnaires refuse to take oath prescribed by occupation authorities. *21st.*—Arrest and imprisonment of Pilsudski by the German authorities.

August 25th.—Polish Council of State in Warsaw resigns.

- September 12th.*—Rulers of Germany and Austria proclaim the establishment of a Council of Regency for the Polish Kingdom.
- October 12th.*—Recruiting of Polish-American army for service in France begins in the United States.
- 15th.*—Prince Z. Lubomirski, Archbishop Kakowski and J. Ostrowski appointed regents. *16th.*—Supreme National Committee (Cracow) dissolved. *19th.*—Recognition of the Polish National Committee at Paris by the Allies.
- November 7th.*—Bolshevik revolution in Russia.
- December 8th.*—First Polish cabinet formed by J. Kucharzewski.
- 1918 *January 8th.*—President Wilson's Fourteen Points include special reference to an independent and united Poland with access to the sea.
- January-February.*—Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations from which Poland is excluded.
- February 9th.*—Dual Monarchy cedes Chelm to the Ukraine. *16th.*—Haller's Polish brigade revolts against Austrian command and escapes to Russia.
- May 6th.*—Haller's troops in battle with Germans at Kaniów.
- June 3rd.*—Allied Supreme Council makes creation of united and independent Poland a war aim.
- July.*—Polish troops take part in offensive on Western Front.
- October 6th.*—Haller appointed commander of Polish army in France. *31st.*—Polish troops occupy Cracow.
- November 1st.*—Ukrainian-Polish conflict for possession of Lemberg and Przemyśl. *4th.*—Austrian Poland cleared of Austrian troops. *7th.*—I. Daszynski forms socialist government in Lublin. German revolution. *10th.*—Pilsudski released from German prison. *11th.*—Armistice on the Western front.
- November 14th.*—Pilsudski assumes supreme authority in Warsaw. Regency Council resigns. *16th.*—Pilsudski announces the existence of an independent Poland. *19th.*—Moraczewski cabinet formed. *23rd.*—Hoover arrives in Europe to take charge of American relief work.

- December 25th.*—Paderewski arrives at Danzig. *27th.-28th.*—Polish uprising in Poznanian.
- 1919 *January 4th.*—American Food Mission (A.R.A.) arrives in Warsaw. *16th.*—Paderewski becomes Premier. *18th.*—Peace Conference meets in Paris, Paderewski and Dmowski, Polish representatives. *26th.*—General elections (in Congress Poland and Western Galicia) for the constituent Diet.
- February 17th.*—First ships with American food for Poland reached Danzig. 14,000 tons of American food reached Poland in February. *20th.*—Polish Diet adopted a temporary constitution and confirmed Pilsudski as Chief of State and Paderewski as Premier. *24th.*—Congressional Appropriation of \$100,-000,000 for European relief approved.
- March 1st.*—A.R.A. Children's Bureau established. *3rd.*—American Red Cross Mission in Warsaw. *25th.*—American railway experts leave Paris for Poland. *30th.*—A.R.A. and Polish Ministry of Health agree on establishment of relief committee later named State Children's Relief Committee (P.K.P.D.).
- March-April*—Negotiations for delivery of American Army surplus food and clothing to Poland.
- April 15th.*—Polish National Committee in Paris dissolved. *19th.*—Polish troops take Vilna from Bolsheviks. American gift food for children reaches Poland. *28th.*—Hoover placed in charge of coal production in former Austria-Hungary and Poland. *30th.*—A.R.A. child feeding in Poland begins in Brest-Litovsk.
- May*—Polish troops win control of Eastern Galicia. *18th.*—Polish-Czech clash in Teschen.
- June*—American gift clothing distributed in Dabrowa, Teschen and Upper Silesia. *28th.*—Treaty of Versailles signed. Minority Rights Treaty signed.
- July 16th.*—Col. Gilchrist, U. S. A., ordered to report to Hoover for typhus relief in Poland. *17th.*—American Technical and Food Advisers for Poland appointed.
- August 18th.*—Polish uprising in Upper Silesia.
- September 10th.*—Treaty of St. Germain (with Austria) signed.

- December*—Distribution of 500,000 clothing and shoe outfits, gifts from America through the A.R.A.
- 1920 *January*—Reorganization of the Polish American Child feeding Committee (P.K.P.D.).
- March 7th.-11th.*—Polish-Czech conflict in Teschen.
- April 26th.*—Polish advance on Kiev begins.
- May 7th.*—Polish occupation of Kiev.
- June 1st.*—A.R.A. child feeding reaches maximum 1,315,490. *13th.*—Polish evacuation of Kiev. *15th.*—Bolsheviks occupy Vilna. Polish Diet passes agrarian reform bill. *25th.*—Gen. Weygand's military mission reaches Warsaw. *28th.*—Council of Ambassadors decides on partition of Teschen.
- August 15th.*—Polish counter offensive begins. Battle of Warsaw. Children's relief reorganized as Polish-American Children's Relief Committee (P.A.K.P.D.) under government statute. *25th.*—Vilna evacuated by Russians and occupied by Lithuanians.
- September 21st.*—Polish-Russian armistice negotiations begin at Riga.
- October 9th.*—Gen. Zeligowski seizes Vilna. *12th.*—Preliminary peace signed.
- 1921 *February 19th.*—Treaty of alliance with France.
- March 3rd.*—Treaty of alliance with Rumania. *17th.*—Constitution adopted. *18th.*—Riga Treaty signed. *20th.*—Upper Silesian plebiscite held.
- April*—Completion of A.R.A. food draft operation in Poland.
- October 12th.*—League of Nations' decision on the partition of Upper Silesia.
- 1922 *February 28th.*—*Sejm* unanimously votes to maintain children's relief after withdrawal of A.R.A.
- June 20th.*—A.R.A. completes its program of Polish relief.
- July 29th.*—Diet passes electoral law.
- November 5th. and 12th.*—Elections under new constitution.
- December 18th.*—Assassination of President Narutowicz. *20th.*—Election of S. Wojciechowski as President.
- 1923 *March 15th.*—Council of Ambassadors recognizes Poland's eastern frontiers.
- August 11th.*—*Sejm* passes Property Tax Act,

- December 6th.*—Stabilization of Taxes Act passed.
- 1924 *January 11th.*—Emergency Powers Act gives Grabski powers for financial reform.
- April 1st.*—Bank of Poland becomes bank of issue. Polish State Loan Bank liquidated.
- July 10th.*—Minorities legislation passed.
- December 15th.*—Poland's debt to United States government funded.
- 1925 *February 10th.*—United States and Poland agree to accord each other most favored nation treatment in customs and commerce.
- March.*—\$35,000,000 Polish loan floated in the United States.
- June 15th.*—Expiration of Upper Silesia coal agreement. German-Polish economic war begins.
- July 4th.*—Polish-Jewish declaration.
- July.*—Expulsion of Polish and German optants.
- October.*—Locarno conference.
- December 28th.*—Agrarian reform bill passed.
- May 12th.-14th.*—The Pilsudski *coup d'état*.
- May 15th.*—President Wojciechowski and Premier Witos resign.
- June 4th.*—I. Moszicki becomes President.
- 1926 *July.*—An American commission, headed by Dr. Kemmerer, visited Poland to advise government on financial matters.
- August.*—Constitutional reforms passed by the *Sejm*.
- October 2nd.*—Pilsudski becomes Premier.
- 1927 *June 7th.*—Assassination of Russian Minister Voikov in Warsaw.
- October 18th.*—\$72,000,000 stabilization loan floated, of which \$47,000,000 was taken in New York market. The Federal Reserve Bank, Bank of England and other banks joined in credit of \$20,000,000 for protection of Polish exchange.

AMERICA AND THE NEW POLAND

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INTRODUCTION

THREE things have determined the character of America's part in the restoration of Poland:

The relation of the status of the Polish Nation to the political system of Europe:

The bond of sympathy between Poland and America established by Kosciuszko and Pulaski and strengthened by the participation of hundreds of thousands of Poles in our national life; and

The world economic situation, and particularly conditions in Poland and the United States, during the first critical years after the restoration.

These circumstances explain our moral and material support of Polish nationalism during the years of its oppression despite our traditional detachment from European political questions. They explain our continual efforts to ameliorate the suffering of Polish war victims and our open championship—a year in advance of any other great power—of the Polish program of unity and independence. They explain our steadfast support of Poland's just claims at the Paris Conference and, still more important, our collaboration in the battle against famine and pestilence and in the succeeding campaign of social and economic reconstruction.

No post-war political settlement involved such sanguinary conflict, such bitter and persistent controversy as did the establishment of the Polish State. It brought Polish-German conflict in Poznan (Posen) for the low reaches of the Vistula in West Prussia and at Danzig, and along the Oder in Upper Silesia. It precipitated bloody and wordy battles

between Czechs and Poles in the ancient Duchy of Teschen; between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia; between Lithuanians and Poles for Vilna. It started armies of Russians and Poles marching back and forth across the border lands of Volhynia, Polesie and White Russia, and it revealed once more the tragic aspects of the Jewish problem.

During the heat of conflict it was commonly assumed that the cause of these troubles was in contemporary events; the greed of the Poles for lands to which they had no valid claim; the greed of their opponents for territories that were rightfully Polish. These assumptions, like many others of that time, were unsound, for the roots of these controversies weave back through a thousand years of history. Since the Tenth Century Pole and Teuton have struggled for the possession of the regions which they disputed in 1919-1920. The Thirteenth Century records the beginning of the conflict for Upper and Teschen Silesia. The Eastern Galician question dates from the Eleventh Century and is merely another episode in the Russian-Polish conflict which, except for the interval of the Tartar invasions, is a recurrent feature throughout the history of the two peoples. The Lithuanian problem goes back to the Fourteenth Century when the two peoples were first united under a single ruler; the Jewish question is a hundred years older.

These political difficulties which made the first years of the restored state so troubled, were of course deeply affected by the war and by those forces which so powerfully influenced the history of the Nineteenth Century—industrialism, democracy and, above all, nationalism, and they affected and were involved in the social and economic conditions already suggested. Consequently in order to see the conditions and events with which this book is primarily concerned in proper prospective, it is necessary to view them against a background of history.

It is now a common-place to stress the influence in European history of natural boundaries or the lack of them, of rivers as the bearers of commerce, of ports as the gateways of trade and mountains as barriers of defense. Polish history provides a particularly good example of the effects of this geographical influence. The Polish state which emerged on the European scene in the middle of the Tenth Century, to play a significant part for over eight hundred years, took its place near the western limits of the great European plain which stretches from the Urals to the North and Baltic Seas. The political consequences of their geographical situation have been brought home to the Poles to their heavy cost since the beginning of their history. "From all sides," wrote Peter Grabowski in the middle of the Sixteenth Century, "the plains and ways to Poland are open and broad to the enemy. In our hands only, in our breasts and throats only, is our armory—these are our mountains, our waters, these the castles, walls and ramparts of Poland."

Except the Carpathians, which in general mark the boundaries in the south, there are no mountains to stand between the Poles and their neighbors. Instead of natural boundaries the Slav tribes which constituted the basis of the later Polish nation were surrounded by other tribes largely Slavonic and Teutonic. This lack of a definite geographical frontier and the presence of these other tribes led inevitably to a continual shifting of the frontiers of the emerging state with a consequent mingling of races, and produced those twilight zones of nationality which provide in our day one of the most serious problems of European politics.

The great rivers in Polish lands, it is true, have played a great part in Polish history. Legends which tell of the achievements of the peasant Prince Piast, the founder of the first dynasty, center about the western rivers, the Vistula and the Warta, which water the Polish plain and

which like the Niemen, farther north, are arteries of trade and travel to the Baltic, rather than barriers to expansion. In the eastern districts the Dnieper and the Dniester, which flow into the Black Sea, have, like the Dvina in the north, flowing to the Baltic, been the path of Polish conquest. The Dvina and the Dnieper at one time or another have marked the limits of Polish lands, but they were not sufficiently effective barriers to set definite limits between the Polish and Russian peoples. Polish geographers, however, have customarily regarded these rivers, with the Baltic and the Carpathians, as the limits of geographic Poland, a matter some political significance.

Across these plains and up and down the rivers, the frontiers of Poland for eight hundred years moved back and forth according to the fortunes of war and the marriage of princes. The Czechs and Magyars from the south, the Tartars from the east, and the Swedes and lesser tribes from the north provided from time to time the forces by which or against which men moved these boundaries. But from the very beginning of the recorded history of these regions to our own day two other peoples, with brief intermissions, have been pressing forward or were being pressed back in conflict with the Poles; the Germans from the west, the Russians from the east.

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Hostility to Germany is embedded in Polish legends from the time of the Princess Wanda, the daughter of Krakus, the legendary founder of the venerable city of Cracow, who preferred death in the waters of the Vistula to marriage with a German prince, and it is a characteristic of the more authentic history of the Middle Ages. In the very dawn of Polish history the struggle began with the Teutons for the control of the Baltic coast from the Oder to the Niemen, a region then inhabited by Slavonic tribes and later the cradle of the Prussian nation. In the great days of Boleslas

the Brave (992-1025), who presumably for patriotic rather than personal reasons drove his German stepmother and her sons out of the country and waged successful wars against their supporters, and again in the days of a later King Boleslas, the Wry Mouthed (1102-1138), Polish arms controlled this coastal territory as far as the present city of Stettin, despite the claims to over-lordship of the Romano-German emperors.

This Polish control did not last, nor did the lands remain Slavonic. In the Eleventh Century the German *Drang nach Osten* was definitely under way with the Teutonic Knights, organized at Acre in 1191, providing the driving force. It was a fateful decision when a Polish Duke of Masovia accepted the aid of the Knights in a war against the heathen Prussians and promised them rewards in land. The Poles and the Knights completely overwhelmed these original Prussian tribes, but for the Poles it was a costly victory, for the Germans appropriated the Prussian name along with the lands along the Baltic, where they have since remained and where their tenacious hold on the mouths of the Vistula and Niemen, the natural outlets of Poland and Lithuania, constitutes a political problem of serious importance.

The vigorous expansion of Germanism by the conquests and colonization of the knightly orders contributed to the organization of the Lithuanian and Polish realms and later to the dynastic union of the two states. This dynastic union became in 1401 a political union, laying the foundation of a great eastern power which decisively defeated the Knights at Tannenberg, in 1410 and endured as one of the largest states in Europe until the Eighteenth Century. Tannenberg celebrated by generations of Slavs as the great victory over the Teutons, broke the force of the first drive to the east, but a half a century of intermittent fighting followed before the Knights were forced to surrender (in 1466) West Prussia, the cities of Elbing, Marienburg,

Danzig and Thorn and other territories to the Poles. East Prussia became a fief of the Polish Crown, but it remained the German nucleus from which grew the Kingdom of Prussia. In 1526 the Grand Master, Albert, accepted Lutheranism, the duchy was secularized and joined to the dominions of the Hohenzollerns though it remained a fief of Poland until 1656 when the Great Elector, Frederick William I of Brandenburg, bought its independence by aid to Poland, then hard pressed by the Swedes.

It is not surprising that this kingdom of Prussia, born in the conflict with the Poles for the valleys of the Niemen, the Vistula and the Warta, should have resumed the struggle when opportunity offered. That opportunity came later in the Eighteenth Century when the Polish power crumbled. By the First Partition of 1772 Prussia annexed the Polish half of West Prussia (the present Polish Corridor). Twenty-one years later by the Second Partition she took Danzig and Poznan and the last Polish window on the Baltic was closed for a hundred years.

Another scene of centuries of Polish-German conflict is Silesia, which became a Polish possession in the year 1054. During the Thirteenth Century, a period of civil strife in Poland, German influence began to penetrate Silesia and though Polish control was re-asserted temporarily, it ended definitely in 1335 when Casimir the Great, in the interests of external peace and the internal consolidation of his kingdom, ceded his liege lordship over Silesia to the Kingdom of Bohemia, which later became a part of the Habsburg domains. In 1742 Maria Theresa ceded all of Silesia except Teschen to Frederick II of Prussia; and from that time to 1919 Silesia remained under German, and Teschen under Austrian rule. Western Silesia became definitely German but in Upper Silesia and Teschen, Polish peasants, through six hundred years of foreign rule, clung tenaciously to their religion, their language and their land. They responded eagerly to the current of nationalism of the Nineteenth

Century and were in the forefront of the fight for Polish independence.

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The theory which accounts for the Polish-German conflict of medieval and modern times by regarding it as a later phase of the struggle precipitated by the Slavic migration into Central Europe cannot be used to explain the centuries of antagonism between the Poles and their Slavic kinsmen of Russia. The Polish-Russian antagonism is of later origin and is attributable partly to the lack of intercourse between the regions where the Polish and Russian nations were nurtured and even more to the circumstances of their conversion to Christianity. The fact that the rivers of Russia flow south and north and those of Poland west and northwest discouraged the contacts of peace, if not of war, and determined that foreign influences should be from different quarters. The greatest of the foreign influences was Christianity, which came to Russia in the Tenth Century from Byzantium by way of the Black Sea, and to Poland from Rome, whose missionaries traveled along the trade routes through Prague or across Germany and the Baltic. In Russia the Greek Orthodoxy early became identified with Russian nationality and was a powerful force in the integration of the Empire. In Poland although Roman Catholicism was at first an implement in the external rather than the internal policies of the rulers, it became eventually as closely woven in the texture of Polish nationalism as Orthodoxy in Russian. The religious breach thus established widened as the Russian and Polish civilizations developed under the influence of the respective cultures of Byzantium and Rome. Russia became the most oriental of western nations, while Poland shared with the Teutonic and Latin nations the culture of Rome.

The scene of the secular and religious Polish-Russian conflict is the borderland regions lying between the Dnieper

and the Polish river Bug. In the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries a wave of Polish conquest swept across those areas—known in our day as Eastern Galicia and the Ukraine—as far as Kiev. Then followed two hundred years of Polish dissension, and the disaster of the Tartar invasion, which finally halted on the borders of Germany. With the consolidation of the Kingdom under Casimir the Great in the Fourteenth Century, the Poles returned to eastern conquest and established their rule in Eastern Galicia and portions of Podolia and Volhynia, supplanting the authority of the Lithuanian Empire which had spread its bulk across the borderlands. The union of Poland and Lithuania (1386) and later wars pushed the Russian frontier still farther east beyond Smolensk and Briansk and to the Donetz before the offensive passed over to Moscow. This long conflict is of particular interest in our day because for four hundred years the borderlands, disputed by arms and diplomacy in 1919-1921—White Russia, Volhynia, Podolia and the Western Ukraine—were under Polish rule, were subject to Polish colonization and were the battleground of the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox Churches. The effect of this four hundred years of occupation was not a complete but only a partial Polonization, which emphasized the “borderland” character of the White Russian and Ukrainian ¹ people who in race and language represent the shadowy division between eastern and western Slavs. The White Russians barely survived the successive processes of Polonization and Russianization, and thus White Russian nationalism has never been a serious political force, though at the present time some effort is being expended on it. The Ukrainians, however, are in quite a different category.

¹ The term “White Russian” is used throughout this book in preference to “White Ruthenian,” and “Ukrainian” in preference to “Ruthenian” or “Little Russian.” Despite the fact that “Ruthenian” has a more venerable history and is more generally used in the literature on this people, the “Ukrainian” nationalists appear to prefer the term which identifies them with the geographical region in which a majority of their people live.

The origin of these warlike, freedom-loving people who established their colonies in the steppes of South Russia after the recession of the Tartars has been the subject of voluminous controversy. Whether they are the original Russians, a minor division of Russians, or a distinct branch of the Slavic family, is less important than the recognized fact that under the conditions of frontier life they developed institutions, customs and traditions which were neither Russian nor Polish. The rulers of Poland and the rising Muscovite empire recognized the value of the Ukrainian Cossacks as defenders of their open frontiers and the richness of the Black Earth lands on which they lived. This acquisitive interest of powerful neighbors presaged the end of free existence of the Ukrainians. In the Sixteenth Century the Ukrainians of the east—the Don Cossacks—were brought by the Tsar Ivan the Terrible under the rule of Moscow, and the Russian predominance was never seriously challenged in the regions of the Don. It was the Western Ukraine, the land of the Dnieper Cossacks, which became the battle-ground of Polish and Russian ambitions.

Stephen Bathory, Prince of Transylvania and one of the greatest of Polish kings (1576-86), organized and gave self-government to the Ukrainian communities of the Dnieper. Polish colonization, begun in the time of Casimir the Great and continued by his successors, is responsible for the diffusion of the Polish race among the Ukrainians west of the Dnieper, particularly in the most accessible districts such as Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. The Poles, like the Germans in Silesia, where a similar process took place, became the dominant element in the towns and the landlords of the rural districts. With the Polonized Ukrainian gentry they dominated political and social life; commerce fell largely into the hands of the Jews and Armenians; while the Ukrainians made up the peasant population interspersed with islands of Poles.

Religion, which in Eastern Europe as in the Balkans has

often been more important in determining nationality than blood or language, has accentuated social and racial differences. The Roman Catholic Poles did not uproot the Byzantine institutions of the Eastern Church which they found in Eastern Galicia in the time of Casimir, but two hundred years later (1596) the Polish King Sigismund III with Papal approval, formed the Uniate Church which retained the Slavonic ritual but recognized the supremacy of Rome. This move, by which Sigismund hoped to detach definitely the Ukrainians from the influence of the Patriarchs of Moscow and of Constantinople, and to weaken the political influence of Russia, did not produce a real union in any sense with the Roman Catholic institutions of Poland. This was largely the result of the myopic policy of the Polish prelates who denied equality to the priests and followers of the Uniate Church, which became definitely the church of the peasant in contrast to Roman Catholicism which was the religion of the gentry. Thus the Uniate Church failed to unite the Ukrainians with the Poles or to make any serious gains at the expense of Russia and Orthodoxy. In a later day when nationalism began to attack the stability of empires, the Uniate Church became identified with Ukrainian nationalism and is today one of the chief forces of the Ukrainian movement.

In the Seventeenth Century the efforts of Polish nobles to consolidate their position in the Ukraine, to deprive the Cossacks of the rights which they enjoyed and to win them from the Orthodox faith, provoked desperate revolts against Polish authority which reached their climax under the leadership of Bohdan Chmielnicki in 1648. Supported by Turks, Crimean Tartars, and even by Polish peasants, the Ukrainians smashed the authority of the Commonwealth, and Chmielnicki became independent ruler of Little Russia. But independence was short-lived. Subsequent defeat by the Poles led to an appeal to the Tsar Alexis as the protector of the Orthodox faith and thirteen years of exhausting war

between Russia and Poland. The Peace of Andrussowo (1667) divided the control of the Ukraine between the two powers, establishing the eastern Polish boundary on the Dnieper where it remained until the First Partition in 1772. Aside from its influence on Polish-Russian relations, the interlude of Ukrainian Cossack independence is of interest as revealing the germ of a Ukrainian national consciousness which in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries became a political force of significance in Eastern Europe.

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Because of its position between Poland in the west and Russia in the east and because of its later conversion to Christianity (in the Thirteenth Century), Lithuania became another battle-ground of Polish and Russian cultures. Since these early days this struggle between the west and east in Lithuania has gone on, and the end is not yet.² Down to the end of the Fourteenth Century, the period of Lithuania's greatest territorial expansion, the Russian language and culture prevailed among the Lithuanian nobility. Polish supremacy began in 1386 when the Lithuanian Prince Ladislas Jagello married the young Queen Hedwiga, and became the joint ruler of the two states. External pressure and the obvious internal advantages maintained this dynastic union for nearly two hundred years until in 1569 at the Congress of Lublin, the two states formed a permanent political union.

At the time of the original union the Lithuanian state was larger and in a military sense more powerful, but in the years that followed it was Polish culture rather than the Russo-Lithuanian that prevailed. One of the first acts of Jagello was to accept the Roman Catholic faith for himself and his whole people. Gradually the nobility and the gentry adopted Polish language and manners and became

² The Revolution in Lithuania in December, 1926, was, it would appear, a phase of this conflict.

merged with the Polish race. Vilna, the ancient capital of Lithuania, became in 1580, through the establishment of the university, a center of Polish culture, second only to Cracow and Warsaw. The Lithuanian and White Russian peasants, like the gentry, became Roman Catholics, but they never became Poles, for they retained their own language. Thus the linguistic distinction was added to class distinction and the ground was prepared in which nationalism in the Nineteenth Century could take root and where it flourishes most prosperously today.³

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Next to the Ukrainians the 3,000,000 Jews are the most numerous racial minority in the restored Poland. Unlike the other minorities they are not segregated in one region though the proportion of Jews to Christians is considerably higher in the east than in the west. Like the other minorities problems, the Jewish goes far back in Polish history. During the Thirteenth Century Jews persecuted elsewhere in Europe came to Poland where they were welcomed, as were other foreigners who came in to re-populate the towns after the Tartar invasion. Large numbers of Germans came at the same time and presently became the great merchants of the towns. The Germans and also the Armenians, who began to appear in the eastern cities after the acquisition of Eastern Galicia were in the course of time assimilated. In the case of the Jews in Poland, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, assimilation did not take place.

Since the Middle Ages there have been other great waves of Jewish migration to Poland. During the Thirty Years War in the Seventeenth Century, Jewish refugees came in

³ The complementary processes of Polonization and colonization accounts for the existence of eminent Polish families in the country districts and towns in which Polish supremacy is contested. These borderlands, in fact, have given Poland many of her greatest names: Kosciuszko from Lithuania; Mickiewicz from White Russia; and in our own day Pilsudski from Lithuania; Paderewski and Joseph Conrad from the Ukraine,

great numbers from Germany, and during the Nineteenth Century Russia's enforcement of the Pale of Settlement and the May Laws of 1882 drove more Jews into what are now Polish lands. Different religious and social customs, the power exercised by the Jews in commerce and the anti-semitism of certain Polish parties have established a tradition of mistrust and hostility which is not easily forgotten.

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It is vastly significant, though perhaps not surprising, that Polish assimilation so thoroughly achieved among the gentry of the borderlands and the Germans of the towns failed to penetrate the dark and stolid masses of the peasantry. Had the Polish Commonwealth retained its vigor in the late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, when the foundations of great European national states were being laid, the promising intellectual, political and social revival of the last decades of the Eighteenth Century might have carried through the unfinished work of assimilation. The Commonwealth never recovered the vitality lost in the Russian and Swedish war or recovered the strength sapped by internal wounds. Except for the glorious feat of John Sobieski and the Polish knights, who saved Vienna and Europe from a Turkish visitation in 1683, the fortunes of Poland steadily declined from the Peace of Andrussowo in 1667 to the disaster of 1772. Then, just as invigorating revolutionary forces began to be felt, Poland ceased to be a state. The decline of the Polish state which rendered it incapable first of integrating its possessions and then of resisting dismemberment is a tragic story and a long one; but certain causes and circumstances of the decline and fall should be mentioned for the light they throw on the surviving spirit of nationalism.

Under the discipline of a strong perception of public interest the individualism which characterized the political life of Poland in the period of its greatness produced indi-

vidual liberty, tolerance, and a type of government considerably in advance of other continental European states. By the end of the Fifteenth Century the center of gravity of political power had shifted from the great lords,—the *pans*—to the numerous gentry—the *szlachta*—who met periodically in free regional assemblies called *Sejmiki*, with wide powers in all matters from taxation to war. Occasional meetings of delegates from the *Sejmiki* in a national assembly in time became the *Sejm*, the national parliament of the commonwealth, in which the bourgeoisie of the towns were represented. The tenacious retention of their prerogatives by the provincial *Sejmiki* gave to the *Sejm* the character of a Federal Congress rather than of a national parliament. The perils of such a condition, which were experienced many years later in America, could be overcome only by the cohesive force of nationalism, which did not exist in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, or by the strengthening of the central authority at the expense of individual liberty and regional autonomy. Thus, while the rest of Europe built autocracy on the ruins of feudalism, Poland went forward with an interesting, though unsuccessful experiment of a gentry democracy based on the federalism of the ancient clans.

The *szlachta* democracy of Poland depended for its success, as do modern democracies, on the enlightenment and public spirit of its constituency. Until that enlightenment was dimmed by religious obscurantism, the Polish republican constitution worked and Poland was the freest state in Europe. The Reformation which in Western Europe followed a savage course of persecution and bloody wars made a notably peaceful progress in Poland,⁴ where both the

⁴ Poland received from Western Europe heretics of every known variety and of Italian, French, English and Scotch nationalities, and in contrast to other states where persecution and execution for heresy were common, in Poland they were practically unknown. According to Dr. Paul Fox, while hundreds of persons were being executed in England for religious convictions "in Poland there was only one such execution." *The Reformation in Poland*, p. 82.

reformers and their ideas were well received. The possibility that Protestantism would become the religion of the state was destroyed by the decision of Sigismund II to accept the decrees of the Council of Trent and his invitation to the Jesuits to reestablish the faith in the Commonwealth. Sigismund's decision had important political consequences since it maintained the religious barrier between the Poles and their Protestant neighbors of Germany and in later times became a fundamental factor in the defense of Polish nationalism. Among the other fruits of the counter-reformation, however, were religious intolerance, the decline of education, which, combined with certain economic developments, strengthened the disintegrating forces inherent in the *szlachta* democracy. Liberty became license and local autonomy became selfish particularism. Economic changes increased the power of the great lords, reduced the prosperity of the towns. The Third Estate ceased to play a part in political affairs, to preserve a balance between king and gentry and to bridge the gap between nobles and peasants. Growing out of these conditions were the abuses of constitutional privileges which checked the necessary evolution of political institutions. The *liberum veto* by which a single deputy could wreck any legislative measure by simply saying, "I object," and the right of Confederation by which a faction could form a league to resist by force if necessary the decrees of the state reduced the legislature to impotence and destroyed the authority of the executive. The fact that Rousseau approved both as great constitutional weapons against despotism is interesting as a comment on the political systems of other states, rather than as an indication of the value of these institutions to Poland.

With this cultural, economic and constitutional decline came oppression of the peasants and religious minorities, bitter revolts and the Ukrainian Cossack wars. Factional strife between groups of magnates invited the intervention

of powerful neighbor states whose interest in the affairs of Poland came to be identified with the maintenance of a state of anarchy against efforts—neither very strong nor well directed—of Polish reformers to purge the government of its evils. Foreign pressure and corruption came to determine the elections of Polish kings, while the great Polish lords covered their opposition to reform, their retention of privileges and their base commerce with foreign courts under the husks of the once living principle of liberty and personal freedom. By the middle of the Eighteenth Century Russian influence manipulated the Polish government and nominated its king, while Prussia became more solidly entrenched on the Baltic and Austrian influence penetrated Galicia.

The ostensible reason for the open intervention of Catherine and Frederick the Great in Poland was the protection of the Dissidents—the Orthodox and Protestant minorities—who were deprived of rights and privileges they had once enjoyed before the shadow of intolerance fell across the country. The Confederacy of Bar in 1768—a revolt against religious reforms introduced at Catherine's command—was the occasion of Russian intervention in force. The revolt⁵ was crushed, Austria occupied Spisz (a point of controversy between Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1919) and Frederick pressed the Empress to consent to partition of Polish territory. Catherine after a discreet hesitancy agreed and determined the division of the booty and treaties, "*Au nom de la Très—Saint Trinité,*" were drawn awarding to Russia parts of Livonia and White Russia with a non-Polish population; to Prussia the Warmia enclave and Polish West Prussia (except Danzig and Thorn); and to Austria all of Galicia except Cracow.

The drastic surgery of the three great powers did not

⁵ Count Pulaski, who later went to America where he met his death in the struggle of the colonies for independence, was one of the leaders in this war against the Russians.

cure Poland of her ills, but it helped to create a state of affairs in which the Poles themselves were able to treat with vigor and success the political and social disease that had sapped the strength of the Commonwealth for over a hundred years. The Partition weakened the prestige of the magnates whose rivalries and selfishness had brought so many disasters and at the same time aroused the reformers to greater efforts to avert more serious consequences. The following years were free from foreign and civil wars, and in the eighties the perennial Eastern Question arose to divert the attention of Russia, Austria and Prussia to another part of Europe, relaxing the pressure on Poland. Polish intellectual life quickened with the stimulating forces of the era of Enlightenment, and the Commonwealth came to the threshold of the new age. The suppression of the Jesuit Society by Clement XIV in 1773 gave the educational system into the hands of the newly established Educational Commission—the first modern Ministry of Education in Europe—which under the inspiration of Konarsky and Kollataj introduced the study of Polish language, literature and history, of science and the ideals of nationality and citizenship. These educational reforms rescued Polish nationalism and gave it spirit to endure the long years of oppression in the Nineteenth Century. The immediate effect of the enlightenment was the Constitution of May 3, 1791.

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In the Great Parliament which produced the new Constitution the program of the reformers encountered a strong opposition from those who feared to lose the privileges they enjoyed and abused and who quoted Rousseau in praise of the theoretical excellencies of the old order. A bloodless parliamentary coup d'état ended the three years of tumultuous and often sterile debate and the Constitution was adopted. It was a notable document, as well adapted to

meet the difficulties of the Polish State passing from medievalism into the new age, as was its contemporary, the Constitution of the United States, to guide a people passing from dependency to independence. It was, moreover, a remarkable document in that it signalized a political and social revolution of great significance. It became, as Professor Dyboski says, "the Magna Charta of Modern Polish democratic thought," and its influence is apparent in the Constitution of the reborn republic.

The new Constitution provided for a government with executive, legislative and judicial departments. It strengthened the executive by making the crown hereditary and by increased powers. It established a cabinet responsible to the *Sejm*—the popular assembly; and it liberated the *Sejm* by the abolition of the *liberum veto* and the Confederation and by freeing its members from the mandates of the *Sejmiki*. The gentry gave up their immunity from taxation, the middle class were enfranchised and the towns received autonomy. The first step toward freeing the peasants was taken when they were placed under the protection of the law and allowed to purchase freedom by agreement with their lords. Catholicism remained the state religion, but complete toleration was guaranteed for other faiths.

Liberal Europe greeted the new Constitution with applause, Burke contrasted Polish methods of reform with the violence of the French, and described the document as "the most pure . . . public good which has ever been conferred on mankind." In Poland there was general popular approval, but the opposition, which had failed to kill reform in the Great Diet, remained intransigent and found comfort and support in nearby courts, where Polish liberalism was no more popular than French Jacobinism. From an attitude of approval and mild support, Prussia and Austria, influenced by events in Western Europe and by Catherine's diplomacy, acquiesced in the Empress' determination to

destroy the new and restore the old Constitution. The Polish opposition formed the Confederation of Targowica, protested in the language of Rousseau and the French Revolution and called upon the Autocrat of the Russias to save them. The Poles appealed vainly to Prussia⁶ and Austria and soon the armies of Prince Joseph Poniatowski and Kosciuszko were overwhelmed by Catherine's veterans of the Turkish and Swedish wars. By January, 1793, the Russian forces, now joined by the Prussians, had broken the last resistance and on the 23rd of that month the two powers signed the Second Partition Treaty. Prussia took Danzig and Thorn and all of Great Poland—the cradle of the Polish nation; Russia took about half of Lithuania, all of White Russia not previously taken, Black Russia and the Ukraine west of the Dnieper. Poland was left with a third of her original possessions—95,000 square miles and about 3,500,000 inhabitants—and the appetites of her neighbors were by no means satiated. To give the transaction an appearance of legality, a Polish Diet was called at Grodno, where, surrounded by a Russian army corps, it accepted in silence, first a Russian treaty, then a Prussian treaty, and finally the repeal of the Constitution.

A revolt of Polish regiments in Warsaw in 1794, which spread rapidly, forced the Polish leaders prematurely to attempt the recovery of the liberties lost. Kosciuszko took command of the national forces and called to arms not only the gentry, but the whole Polish nation. The peasants joined his forces in great numbers and armed with scythes and sticks, fought bravely in the first victorious encounter with the Russians at Raclawice. This battle was of no great military significance, but it is celebrated in Polish song and story, for here the most numerous, and today the most powerful, class of the Polish people, like the French at

⁶ By a treaty, signed March 29, 1790, Prussia had agreed to defend by arms the hereditary Polish monarchy which was established by the Constitution of May 3, 1791.

Valmy, became conscious of their nation and their place in it. "The blood shed at Raclawice fertilized the Polish soil for the undying crop of national life throughout a hundred years of captivity." Kosciuszko not only recognized the peasants as a part of the Polish nation, but went beyond the Constitution of May 3rd in the direction of emancipation. His own peasants were absolutely freed.

The revolt, though it achieved a remarkable revival of the Polish spirit and a temporary military success, was doomed to failure, because Kosciuszko had not only to fight the Russians but in time the Prussians and the Austrians as well. The revolutionary forces became scattered and battered, Kosciuszko himself was wounded and made a prisoner, and Warsaw, after a heroic defense, fell into the hands of the enemy. King Stanislas Augustus surrendered and placed the fate of Poland in the hands of the Empress. The three powers, after bickering and threats of war, agreed on a division of the remaining Polish territory. A treaty in the autumn of 1795 consummated the Third Partition, and Poland disappeared from the map of Europe.

The destruction of the Polish state put an end to its constitutional development and deprived the Polish people of the experience of self-government for a century, during which profound political changes occurred. It is well to remember this in considering the vicissitudes of the restored state.

PART I
THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

CHAPTER I

THE CAPTIVITY

THE Poles were by no means the only people whom the Nineteenth Century found under the rule of an alien race, nor were the Poles the only people who during this century labored, fought and suffered for the right of self-determination. There are, however, certain features of the Polish case which distinguish it from such other nationalist movements as, for example, the Italian, the Serbian or the Czech, and which have considerable bearing on the course of events during the period of the restoration of national independence.

The existence of an independent state with a great cultural heritage down to the end of the Eighteenth Century and the political and social changes inspired by the age of enlightenment, placed Polish nationalism far in advance of that of those people whose national life had been submerged for two or three or more centuries. Polish nationalism was a living force comparable to the nationalism of those states whose independence had survived the wars of the Reformation and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. Moreover not one power, but three took part in the extinction of Poland's independence and the annexation of her lands. Thus Polish nationalism was in conflict with the nationalism of three great states which, though their methods were dissimilar, had, as far as Poland was concerned, a common object. A battle on three fronts is obviously more difficult than on one and though Polish nationalism survived, it still bears the marks of that conflict.

Besides the political consequences of the threefold par-

tition of Poland there were economic effects which became increasingly important with the progress of industrialism in the second half of the century. Protectionism etched the arbitrary political boundaries deeper in Polish life, and the movement for economic self-sufficiency, which powerfully supported political unity in most continental states, was for the Poles another force hostile to the national ideal. The economic development of the three partitioning powers, which regulated the character and tempo of the economic progress of the parts of Polish territory each controlled, produced divergencies which added another serious problem for the reunited state to solve.

The establishment of influential and numerous Polish colonies in Western Europe and America is another product of conditions under the partition which had a sustaining influence on Polish nationalism. During the first half of the century the emigres kept aloft the flame of patriotism, which in the homeland was smothered by the weight of military law. During the later years of the century, when the character of the conflict had changed, the new colonies of Poles, particularly in America, contributed a less striking but none the less vital support to the new nationalism stirring among the masses of the peasantry. Only in the final struggle for independence during the World War was the full significance of the support of the emigrant colonies revealed.

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Polish leaders did not accept the loss of independence in humble resignation. They recognized, however, that the recovery of their liberties depended on securing foreign support for their own broken forces. The eventful years of 1795-1815 with their kaleidoscopic military and political changes gave the Poles opportunities to invoke this foreign aid in payment for services rendered. But Polish leadership was divided, as it was in the World

War a hundred years later. There was a pro-Russian party and an anti-Russian party which looked to France, as in the later period it looked to Austria, for the championship of its cause. The hopes of the pro-French party rose with the fortunes of the Republican armies. In 1796 Generals Dabrowski and Kniazewicz formed in Cracow a Confederation which recognized Kosciuszko's Polish Committee in Paris as the supreme authority of the Polish nation. The following year Dabrowski organized a Polish Legion as the nucleus of a new national army. In the belief that the campaigns of the French would defeat Austria and liberate Galicia, the Legion joined Bonaparte, then in Italy in command of the Republican army. The exploits of the Legions in the Napoleonic campaigns added another brilliant page to Polish history. They inspired the greatest of Polish patriotic songs, "Jeszcze Polska Nie Zginela," and their memory was revived in the legions which Pilsudski organized and led in 1914. But their gallant service in various parts of the world from Egypt to the West Indies¹ brought Polish national hopes no nearer realization. In 1798 France made a peace with Austria which ignored the Poles, and in 1801 a treaty with Russia which put an end to Polish patriotic propaganda in France. The Duchy of Warsaw, which Napoleon formed after his victories of 1806, contained only a fragment of the Polish race and was never more than an eastern dependency of the Empire. It had, moreover, no outlet to the sea, for Danzig became a free city, establishing the precedent for the settlement at Paris in 1919. In internal affairs the Emperor replaced the unwieldy Polish legal system with the Code Napoleon, which remained in force in the provinces of the Grand Duchy through subsequent political changes. He abolished serfdom and restored religious liberty, but these gains were later lost.

¹ After the Peace of Luneville, Napoleon sent some of the Legions across the Atlantic to Santo Domingo. They never returned.

The statesmen who gathered in 1814 at the Congress of Vienna could not ignore the Polish Question, nor could they settle it. The defeat of Napoléon had ended the influence of the pro-French Poles, and such recognition as was given to Polish nationalism was the fruit of the labors of the pro-Russian group, especially Prince Adam Czartoryski, and of his friend and patron, the young Tsar, Alexander I.

The principle of nationality was dimly recognized by statesmen and articulate public opinion in 1815, and Alexander used it as an argument to support his plan for a constitutional Polish Kingdom with himself as King. The British Parliament showed some sentiment for a restoration of Polish unity, but at Vienna Lord Castlereagh opposed a Polish restoration lest it increase the power of Russia, which he was determined to prevent. With the support of Metternich and Talleyrand, he tried to bring about a new partition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but in this he failed. Russia acquired most of the Grand Duchy, but Prussia and Austria retained shares of Polish lands, and the iniquitous principle of partition was preserved. The aim of Polish nationalism—unity and independence—was seemingly no nearer realization in 1815 than in 1795, but its vitality was attested by the fact that all the powers at Vienna had been forced “to recognize in theory the principle of Polish independence, though they never had the slightest intention of sacrificing their national interests to it.”²

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During the hundred years from 1815 to 1914 nearly 70 per cent of the present Poland was under Russian control.

² C. K. Webster, *The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815*, p. 120. Despite the fact that they were made for political reasons, Castlereagh's prophecy that the Polish settlement would not endure and his warning that the Poles should be treated by the partitioning powers as Poles, are interesting. Talleyrand was also moved to prophesy that the Polish nation would survive this artificial division and ultimately be emancipated and united

Russian Poland was more frequently in the forefront of European politics than Austrian or Prussian Poland because of the desperate but unsuccessful revolts against Russian rule. The autonomous Congress Kingdom ended in bloody disaster after fifteen years of experiment, for Polish aspirations and Russian autocracy were wholly incompatible. The Tsar and the Warsaw Parliament were soon at loggerheads; secret societies like the Italian Carbonari were formed as nuclei of the anti-Russian movement. In 1825 Poles were involved in the Decembrist uprising against the autocracy and only the conciliatory policy of the Grand Duke Constantine maintained the fragile peace. The explosion came in 1830 when Warsaw learned of the uprising in Paris against Charles X, and rumors were circulated that the Tsar planned to use Polish troops to put the Bourbon back on his throne. An insurrection broke out in Warsaw and a secretly prepared revolutionary government came into being. The revolutionary establishment at once revealed a fatal division among the Poles, a division which disrupted every subsequent Polish drive for independence. Personal ambitions and petty jealousies were involved, but fundamentally the division was a reflection of the social conflict which agitated all Europe, from the Congress of Vienna to 1848. The moderates desired no revolutionary disturbance of the social order, but a greater degree of self-government which they hoped to secure from Russia by negotiation. The radicals, drawn by the currents of democracy and nationalism, scorned such half measures. The first objective in their program was complete independence, and their first step was to bring the Warsaw Diet to depose the Tsar as King and appeal to the world for aid. The world was interested, but not sufficiently to give the Poles any help.

Circumstances, however, played into the hands of the insurrectionists. The movements of the Russian army were at first slow and indecisive, and a ghastly epidemic of Asiatic

cholera raged among the Russian hosts. The Poles, however, were unable to take advantage of the misfortunes of the enemy, or even to employ effectively their own military resources. Internal dissensions grew more bitter. Conservatives and radicals could not agree either on general aims or on leadership, and half-hearted, indecisive measures failed to rally the peasants who had responded to Kosciuszko's leadership forty years before. As the disciplined power of Russia crushed the insurrection, Palmerston, whose interest in liberal movements on the Continent never included Poland, wrote, "So there is an end of the poor Poles! I am heartily sorry for them." The revolt had lasted nearly a year and ended with the loss of such liberties as Poland had enjoyed under the Vienna Constitution. The Tsar in 1832 granted a new constitution called the Organic Statute, but he ruled the country by military law and a constitution meant little. The Polish leaders who survived left the country in the Great Emigration. Paris became the intellectual capital of Poland, and there the exiles kept alive the ideal of independence and reminded Europe of their country's plight. The Polish factions meanwhile continued with new violence their bitter dispute. The conservatives played high politics, haunting European foreign offices in a vain pursuit of western intervention. The radicals, who held the conservatives responsible for the failure of 1831, labored for a social as well as a national revolution. They put their faith not on intervention of western governments, but in general social revolution in Europe, which should have as a by-product the restoration of Polish independence. In Poland itself the radicals gained considerable popular support, for they advocated the complete enfranchisement of the peasant and the free ownership of the land he tilled. Their emissaries came secretly to preach this doctrine and had many romantic adventures in keeping out of the hands of the Russian police.

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After the failure of 1831, Russia's stern pacification kept the peace for thirty years. Martial law prevailed until 1856; Warsaw University, the Polytechnic Institute and the Scientific Society were suppressed, and Vilna University closed. Russian was introduced as the language of instruction in secondary schools, and in 1839 the Uniate Church was incorporated in the Orthodox. So strong was the Russian hand that even in the great year 1848, when all Europe was in turmoil, there was no serious disturbance in Russian Poland. Russia's difficulties in the Crimean War in 1853 gave the Poles an opportunity, which they let slip because they could not agree among themselves. When the Congress of Paris of 1856 met under the presidency of Count Walewski, Napoleon III's Minister of State, son of Napoleon I and a Polish mother, the Polish question was never raised.

The uprising of 1863, like that of 1831, was preceded by a Russian attempt to conciliate the Poles. The policies adopted by Alexander II and applied by his agent, the pro-Russian Marquis Wielopolski, achieved some relaxation in the domain of education, but did not satisfy either the conservative or radical Poles, who were encouraged by these concessions to demand more than the Tsar had any intention of granting. The conciliation policy collapsed, and when Russian authorities began to conscript Polish political suspects for military service in far parts of the empire, the country blazed in revolt. The Russian troops quickly smashed the ill-equipped, hastily gathered Polish force, but the struggle continued through a year of terror until the last resistance was put down. The insurrection confirmed the Russian conservatives in their opposition to conciliation and convinced Europe, including the Poles, of the futility of revolt. The reactions of the uprising in Western Europe showed how deeply the dismemberment of Poland was enmeshed in the political fabric of the Continent. Bismarck had promptly notified the Tsar that Prussia

was the natural ally of Russia in opposing aspirations, while England and Austria declined to join Napoleon III in putting strong pressure on Russia, because of a suspicion that the Emperor cherished other designs than the liberation of the Poles. As in the time of the Congress of Vienna, the presumed national interests of the Great Powers were so balanced that there could be no strong championship of the cause of Polish restoration. That situation continued until 1918.

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The year 1864 marks the beginning of a new era in the social and economic as well as the political life of the Congress Kingdom. Among the more significant of these developments are:

The improvement in the condition of the peasants and the increase in their influence, dating from the establishment of peasant proprietorship in 1864;

The diversion of the increasing peasant population into industry in Poland, and in Germany and the United States;

The decline in the economic power of the gentry and the direction of the energies of this class into engineering, industry and trade; and

The growth of industry, particularly in the vicinity of Lodz and the Dabrowa coal basin, and with it the foundation of a capable middle class and a proletariat.

The failure of '63 marked also the end of the romantic period of the Polish nationalism. Polish leaders put aside the Messianic idea, inspired by Mickiewicz,³ which dominated the policy of Lelewel and other revolutionary radicals between 1830 and 1850. They abandoned the tactics of plot

³ The influence of Mickiewicz was by no means confined to his contemporaries. Thousands of copies of his books were distributed to Haller's Polish Army in 1919, and to Polish exiles and prisoners in Russia and Siberia.

and intrigue and accepted the fact of partition and alien rule, but with a determination to preserve Polish nationality and to reconstruct the national life on the foundations of existing conditions. The romantic inspiration of national memories did not lose its force, but for a number of years it was subordinated to the new program whose prosaic watchword was "organic work."

An early manifestation of the new nationalism was the founding in 1886 of a secret society called the Polish League, reorganized in 1895 as the National League. This movement began in Russian Poland, but it was essentially Pan-Polish in its aim. It fought the doctrine of triple loyalty which had gained considerable headway, roused the peasants and workers to resist Prussianization, Russification and international socialism, and educated them in the traditions of Polish nationalism. The movement swiftly spread to Poznan and Galicia, where it became a powerful force in the resistance to hostile nationalisms. By the time of the Russian Revolution of 1905 it had revealed a natural cleavage between the right and left wings. On the extreme right were the conservative Realists who went back to Wielopolski's policy of conciliation with the Russian autocracy. More representative of the new nationalism and far more powerful were the National Democrats, brilliantly led by Ramon Dmoneski. They also looked to Russia, but to its liberal elements, aiming at Polish autonomy in a liberalized Empire. This program fitted in with the doctrines of Neo-Slavism, which before the World War were making great headway among Russian liberals. In contrast to the Pan-Russian attitude of the old Slavophiles, the Neo-Slavs and the Polish National Democrats favored a federalized Slav Empire after the British model, with a liberal Russia at the head of a family of autonomous Slav states. They regarded Germany as the chief enemy of Poland, as of all Slavdom, and Austria was held to be Ger-

many's tool.⁴ Anti-Semitism increased among the National Democrats, whose growing conservatism and pro-Russianism widened the breach between themselves and the left wing of the new nationalism, the radical, anti-Russian Socialists.

Shortly after the Revolt of 1863, socialism began to take root in Polish soil, prepared by the beginnings of industrialism. Until the end of the Nineteenth Century this movement followed the conventional course, combining the class struggle with internationalism. It was, therefore, opposed to the new nationalism of the Polish League, though it demanded an independent Poland. It was, moreover, bitterly hostile to the Russian autocracy, for it was allied to the Russian revolutionary socialism and had been deeply influenced by Herzen and Bakunin. But with the beginning of the Twentieth Century the character of Polish socialism had changed. At the head of the new National Socialists appeared a romantic and resourceful personality—Joseph Pilsudski. For his inspiration and technique Pilsudski went back to the Polish radical revolutionists of the first half of the Nineteenth Century. Like them he had no faith in high politics, but only in a new revolution in which the masses of the people should take part. To rouse the masses he emphasized the social struggle—particularly against the Russian autocracy—fusing class aims with the energizing force of nationalism. In this position part, at least, of the inspiration of the Socialists came from the same source as that of the National Democrats, for both drew support from the new national literature, the novels of Kraszewski, Sienkiewicz, and Zeromski, and particularly from the dramas of Wyspianski.

⁴ The National Democrats and certain Galician Polish parties took part in the Pan-Slav Congress organized at Prague in 1908 by Dr. Kramarz, the Czech leader. Several Russian parties were also represented, and Neo-Slavism and Russian-Polish reconciliation were promoted. There were setbacks to this conciliation, but the basis on which it was to be achieved was, under pressure of war, stated by the Grand Duke Nicholas in his proclamation to the Poles in August, 1914.

In the furtherance of his policy of *faits accomplis*, Pilsudski organized at Cracow in 1912 the "Provisional Commission of Federated Polish Parties for the Independence of Poland." The Commission secured funds for the coming struggle from sympathizers in the three parts of Poland and in America. Because of Pilsudski's hostility to Russia, the Viennese government and the conservative Austrophil Poles tolerated the National Socialists, but in Russian Poland the organization was outlawed by the Tsarist authorities and opposed by the middle class Polish groups.

As a consequence of these developments, the Poles of Russian Poland were as divided on the eve of the World War as in 1830 and 1862. But, as before, though personalities and small politics were involved, the fundamental differences were those which separated socialist and bourgeois parties in other European states. The aspect of the Polish division which was most prominent was the attitude toward Russia: the National Democrats were convinced that a Russian victory in the coming struggle was essential; the National Socialists thought it would be fatal for the Polish cause.

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In the Congress Kingdom the Russian assaults on Polish nationalism lacked nothing in vigorous ruthlessness, but they were spasmodic and inefficient. Things were managed differently by Prussia. There, once the movement was well under way, the drive was ceaseless and efficient. There is testimony to Prussian efficiency in the fact that while there were Polish parties to advocate cooperation with Russia or with Austria, there was none that dreamed of cooperation with Prussia.

Almost before the ink was dry on the Treaty of Vienna, plans had been made for the Prussianization of the Polish provinces. In 1816 General Karl Grolmann suggested to King Frederick William III the expropriation of the estates

of the Polish gentry, the Germanization of the Polish clergy, and the colonization of Polish lands with former soldiers. All these proposals were applied at a later date, but for a time the procedure was less thoroughgoing. An attempt to win over the Polish gentry came to a sudden end in 1830, when 12,000 Prussian Poles crossed the frontier to aid their kinsmen in the insurrection that year. Although there was no uprising in Prussian Poland, the Berlin authorities made very natural deductions from this event, and from 1830 on, with slight interruptions, they followed a vigorous policy of Prussianization. Their aim, as summarized by the new Oberpräsident, Flottwell, was to realize the complete fusion of the two nationalities by the decisive hegemony of German culture. The application of this policy, initiated by Flottwell in 1830 and resumed by Bismarck and Bülow, involved an attack on two fronts: on the Polish language and religion; and on the Polish land.

Flottwell's measures, designed to replace the Polish language with German and to break the power of the Polish Catholic clergy, were ineffective. Prussia, however, returned to the attack at a later date, under the leadership of a much abler man. Bismarck believed that the Catholic clergy furnished the chief strength of Polish nationalism. In 1864 he discussed with Gorchakov the necessity of a common anti-Catholic policy by Prussia and Russia, but for the time being was too busy with other matters to undertake it. In 1871, however, he began his famous *Kulturkampf*, which he later said was principally determined by the Polish side of the Catholic question. This is perhaps not wholly true, but the fact remains that the Polish clergy bore a heavy share of the weight of Bismarck's attack. The control of elementary education was transferred from the clergy to the state. The Jesuits were expelled from the Empire. The state took control of the appointment and training of priests; it forbade the use of Polish in primary and secondary schools, except in the case of religious in-

struction. In 1875 German became the only language in government and law courts. Ten years later Polish was forbidden in the municipal councils. Bismarck, in time, abandoned the *Kulturkampf* and made his peace with the German Catholics, but his battle against Polish nationalism went on. It reached its climax under one of Bismarck's successors in the first decade of the Twentieth Century. In 1900 religious instruction in Polish was abolished, and in 1901 the authorities resorted to corporal punishment to compel Polish children to answer questions on the catechism in German. In 1906 more than one-half the Polish school children in Prussian Poland went on a strike which lasted the whole year. Finally the Expropriation Bill of 1907 forbade the use of the Polish language at public meetings. These measures strengthened rather than weakened the Polish cause, particularly among the Polish peasants. At first the peasant was not particularly alive to the significance of the struggle, but he became an active partisan when his religion was attacked, and was twice as determined to resist German efforts to drive him from the lands so long held by his race.

The purpose of the campaign to dispossess the Poles of their lands was political rather than economic. Germany could not be secure, it was said, so long as an alien race held the eastern marches. The German nationalists, therefore, demanded that the Poles either submit to Germanization or surrender their lands to the German race. This agitation became acute after the census of 1880, which showed that the Polish population in the eastern provinces was growing faster than the German. It received further impetus from the growing Polish immigration, temporary⁶ and permanent, into East Prussia, Poznania, Silesia, and Westphalia. The first land measure adopted by Bismarck

⁶ Great numbers of Polish peasants each spring left their homes for work on German farms until autumn, when they returned to their own land. These temporary immigrants were known as *Sachsengänger*.

was sudden and violent. The Ordinance of the Minister of the Interior, Prittkamer, of March 26, 1885, expelled 30,000 Poles of all ages who had migrated across the Prussian frontiers from Russia and Austria during the preceding few years. In reply to a resolution of protest by a German Catholic deputy in the Reichstag, Bismarck launched a bitter attack against the Poles, charging that they had always supported the enemies of the King and of Prussia, and concluding with the declaration that the "fight for existence still goes on between Prussia and Poland."

A much more serious and methodical procedure began in April, 1886, when the Prussian Landtag set up a Colonization Commission and appropriated 100,000,000 marks to assist the German settlers to acquire Polish lands. The Commission based its activities on political considerations, endeavoring to establish German colonists in those regions of West Prussia and Poznanian where it was desired especially to have German majorities.⁶ In the course of the next fifteen years some six hundred square miles in the two provinces were transferred from Poles to Germans. Later the Poles won back much of this, but there remained larger enclaves and new islands of Germans among the Poles. The existence of these German colonies was used in 1919 as an argument against restoring these districts to Poland.

The onslaught of the Colonization Commission provoked no violent outbreak by the Poles. In contrast to such methods, the Poles met the attack with the economic weapons chosen by their adversaries. They organized a Land Bank and small holding societies to place Poles on German land. They founded a Land Association to manage

⁶ In 1833 a ministerial decree had authorized the Prussian Minister of Finance to acquire Polish properties and turn them over to Germans. A million thalers was appropriated for this purpose. This colonization policy was, however, not systematically followed until after 1886. The Danes of North Schleswig and the people of Alsace-Lorraine were affected by these same exceptional laws.

neglected estates and keep them out of German hands. Cooperative societies and credit associations strengthened the position of the Polish peasants and gave them a great advantage in competition with the German colonists. Under the leadership of Father Wawryzniak, who was both a great political leader and a great organizer and administrator, the economic associations greatly prospered, the peasants made progress, both economic and cultural, and a capable middle class closely allied to the peasants became solidly established.

Except from 1890 to 1894 during the Chancellorship of Caprivi, when Polish votes were wanted for the army bills, Germanization became progressively more severe as German nationalism became more extravagant and as the political tension of Europe increased. The Pan-German League, formed in 1894, had in its platform an anti-Polish plank. The same year another society, which in 1897 became the *Deutscher Ostmarkenverein*, was founded in Poznan to maintain Germanism in the eastern provinces. The agitation of the *Ostmarkenverein*, called by the Poles, "Hakat-ism," from the initials of the three chief leaders, aimed at creating a violent anti-Polish opinion in German political circles. Authors and newspapers talked of the Polish menace up and down the land. In 1905 the Kaiser declared that it was no more permissible for a German to leave the eastern provinces than for a soldier to desert his post. German liberals courageously opposed coercive measures, but in vain. Bülow, who became Chancellor in 1900 and shared Bismarck's ideas of the Polish menace, adopted policies which reflected the Pan-German agitation. In 1904 the Prussian Landtag passed a law which forbade the Poles to establish new peasant farms on land they had legally purchased from the larger estates. Even more severe than this was the law of Expropriation, passed in 1908, which authorized the government to expropriate land owned by Poles in "the districts in which the safety of the endangered German

element could be only insured by additional allotments to German settlers." There was considerable opposition to this law by German land owners, who saw a dangerous precedent established, and there was no attempt to apply the measure until 1912, and then in only relatively few cases. As late as five months before the outbreak of the war, the government of Bethmann-Hollweg asked the Landtag for the right to prevent the parcelling of large estates to Polish settlers and to authorize the government to maintain the unity of these large estates. The outbreak of the war prevented any attempt to apply this decree.

As the assaults of the Prussian administration on the Polish language and religious institutions strengthened the influence of these bodies as defenders of nationalism, so the economic measures merely compelled the Poles to adopt methods, many of which were German, that enabled them to compete successfully with their rivals. The social effects of this struggle are important. Prussia abolished serfdom in the Polish provinces in 1823, and provided for the emancipated peasants much more systematically and effectively than did Austria, where serfdom was abolished in 1848, or Russia after 1864. From this excellent beginning the Prussians promoted the development of an independent peasantry as a part of their campaign against Polish nationalism. But the dispossessed gentry, driven to the towns where they devoted themselves to professional or commercial interests, formed the basis of the new middle class which has been and is one of the strongest elements in Prussian Poland, while the peasants, through the organizations already mentioned, developed independence and self-sufficiency, and thus became a stronger bulwark of Polish nationalism than the gentry whom they had succeeded. The material progress of the peasantry was tremendously facilitated by the public works and the intelligent administration of the Germans in the first half of the century, notably in the reclamation of waste land, the construction of roads and other com-

munications, and finally in the application of science to agriculture.

Although the most obvious effects on the Prussian Poles of their resistance to Germanization were social, there were important political by-products. The German drive against Polish culture and land ownership coincided with and stimulated the revival of the nationalism fostered by the National League and the National Democratic Party. Democratization and the bitterness of the cultural struggle made the Poles of West Prussia and Posen particularly receptive to the national democratic ideas, and Prussian Poland soon became and has remained a stronghold of the National Democratic Party.

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West Prussia and Posen were not the only regions where the tactics of the Pan-Germans helped to spread the new Polish nationalism. Upper Silesia had been separated from the rest of Poland since the Fourteenth Century, and during this time the Polish peasants had been externally Germanized. They retained, however, their language—though not in its pure state—and remained staunch Catholics. Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* and the cultural campaigns of his successors roused the Silesian Poles to the defense of their language and religion. They began to cooperate with the Poles of Poznań and soon were drawn into the rising current of the national revival. They elected deputies to the Reichstag, revived the study of the Polish language and history, and built up a national spirit that was to play an important part in the restoration of the Polish state.

Prussian policy in Poznań is perhaps the best example of an aggressive nationalism and its futility. The survival of Polish national sentiment in these regions is the most brilliant instance history affords of the vitality of national spirit under oppression. The conflict was the bitterest chapter in the struggle of centuries between Teuton and

Slav along the Vistula, and the marks of that conflict will long remain to influence German-Polish relations.

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The first fifty years of Habsburg rule in the Austrian portion of dismembered Poland did not differ fundamentally from that of the Hohenzollerns in West Prussia and Poznań, or of the Romanovs in the Congress Kingdom. But during the second fifty years the Poles of Galicia lived under a régime which had little in common with that which their kinsmen knew in Prussia and Russia. The Austrian Poles battled with a hostile nationalism, not, however, the dominating nationalism of a partitioning power⁷ but the rising nationalism of the Ukrainians for the hegemony in Eastern Galicia. The special conditions in Austria—political liberty which gave to the Polish nobility a significant position in the affairs of the Dual Monarchy; economic backwardness, which retarded the advancement of the peasants and prevented the growth of a strong middle class; and the Ukrainian conflict, which had international as well as local implications—all had the greatest bearing on the events which attended the restoration of independent Poland.

During the period of the Metternich supremacy (1815-1848) the Viennese government by opposing all proposals to lighten the burdens of the peasantry kept alive the hatred of the serfs for the *szlachta*, and thereby promoted a class conflict that all but destroyed Polish nationalism. But in Cracow, which had been left independent by the Vienna Congress, several secret Polish societies found shelter. The most notable of these, the Union of the Polish People, founded for the enlightenment of Galician peasants, was suppressed by the Austrians before its influence could be felt. When therefore the *szlachta* rose in revolt in 1846,

⁷ After 1867 the Germans were no longer the dominating nationality in the Habsburg dominions.

they were opposed not only by the Austrian troops, but by infuriated Polish and Ukrainian peasants, who terrorized the country with fire and sword. The Austrian authorities, whose position had not been seriously disturbed by the rising, encouraged the butchery with offers of rewards for the heads of Polish insurgents. The Polish rising, needless to say, quickly subsided, but it served as an excuse for the Habsburgs to extinguish the last vestige of Polish independence by the annexation of Cracow.

The revolutionary year of 1848 brought the abolition of serfdom and seemed to promise a relaxation in Austrian policy in other directions, but, as elsewhere, this liberal tide receded into a reactionary calm. During this time, however, the Viennese government began to see the possibility of using the Poles in the internal politics of the Empire and in its external relations with Prussia and Russia. A conciliatory policy incurred no religious hazards, for of the three partitioning powers Austria alone was Roman Catholic. She, moreover, lacked the homogeneity of Prussia, and hence the presence of one more alien nation merely facilitated application of the policy of imperial opportunism.

Defeat at Solferino and Magenta led the Habsburgs to start hesitatingly on the road of Constitutionalism. In 1860 appeared the October Diploma, which provided measures of self-government for the different nationalities of the Habsburg dominions and was the first great step toward Polish autonomy. The appointment of Count Goluchowski as Minister of State signaled the beginning of the participation by individual Poles in the government of the Monarchy. The conservative Polish nobility—the only class then politically active—adopted a policy of loyalty to the Habsburgs and of Polish national evolution within the Monarchy, pending the restoration of Polish independence in a misty, distant future, and to this policy they faithfully adhered until 1917.

In return for political concessions the Poles supported

the compromise of 1867, which established the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Galicia remained a part of the Austrian portion of the Monarchy, with Polish representatives in the Reichsrat, where they bartered their support of the Government for greater concessions to Polish nationality. Steadily from 1870, the Poles of Galicia increased their political liberties and developed their national culture with less and less interference from the Austrians, while during these same years the Poles of Russia and Prussia were becoming constantly more oppressed. This period of evolution in Polish relations with Vienna witnessed also notable changes in education, in political organization, in economic conditions, and in the Ukrainian problem.

In the realm of higher education the ancient university at Cracow, which celebrated its five-hundredth birthday of uninterrupted activity in 1900, and the younger university at Lemberg were notable leaders. Among the students were many from Russia and Germany, where similar privileges were denied them. In this manner Galician universities fostered the spirit of Polonism in Russia and Prussia as well as in Austria.

Secondary and elementary education in Galicia made even more notable progress. The 14 secondary establishments which existed in 1850 had grown to 100 in 1910, and to 157 in 1914, with over 50,000 students. The primary schools had increased their enrollment from 103,000 in 1858, to 1,128,000 in 1912. The Popular Education Society, founded by the poet Asnyk in 1891, grew rapidly in strength and in the influence which it carried to the Poles in Teschen, Moravia, Bukovina, and Vienna. This society remains today a great force for education in the restored Poland.

The spread of popular education coincided with significant changes in party politics in Galicia. The conservative landlords, loyal to the Austrian state and opposed to radical change in economic or political institutions, dominated

Polish political activity in Austria from 1820 to 1900. A democratic party, made up of town intelligentsia inspired by the ideas of liberalism of western Europe, provided a short-lived, feeble opposition which disintegrated without a middle class in which to find support. In the eighties and nineties the National Democratic movement began to make slow but steady progress in Galicia. With its Pan-Polish propaganda it combatted the Austrophil tendencies and the conservatism of the older Galician parties. Later, like its counterpart in the Congress Kingdom, it drifted to the right, accepting the Neo-Slavist program of a united, autonomous Poland in the great Slavic federation. Socialism took root in Galicia about the same time as in the Congress Kingdom, but since Austrian Poland had barely felt the touch of industrialism, there was an insignificant proletarian class to which the Socialists could look for converts. They did, however, acquire some strength in the towns, and like Pilsudski's party in the Kingdom, with whom they were closely allied, the Galician Socialists soon abandoned their international affiliations and became primarily a nationalist party of the proletariat. The Austrian electoral reforms of 1906 benefited them greatly, and they exercised an increasing influence from that time to the World War. When the war came, they were the first of the Polish parties to raise the flag of a Polish military organization when Pilsudski led his legions into Russia. Between the Socialists on the left and the Conservatives on the right there grew up a Peasant Party which, thanks to the extension of the franchise, was by 1905 a vigorous organization with deputies in the Galician Diet and the Austrian Parliament. It represented not the landless and radical peasants, but middle and well-to-do, and was, therefore, conservative and individualist. Because Galicia is a peasant country, it has and still does exercise a great influence in Polish politics.

That Galicia made no such progress in economic development as it did in education and political experience was

partly, though not entirely, due to Austrian policy. The peasants received their freedom in 1848, but there was little improvement in their condition until the beginning of the Twentieth Century. Even in the first years of this century, although Galicia was a predominantly agricultural country, about one-fourth of the grain consumed was imported from Hungary. In general, the condition of the Galician peasant was analogous to that of the Russian. The Austrian Decree of Emancipation left a rich legacy, and Polish landowners stood in the way of a more enlightened policy. They clung to their privileges, blocking the development of agriculture, and doing little to remove the causes of the bitter hostility of the impoverished peasantry. In spite of resources of coal, petroleum and water-power, in spite of salt mines and potash, Galician industry made even less progress than agriculture. The land-owners formulated an economic policy in the interest of their class and are partly responsible for this condition. The peasants, engrossed in their struggle for land, took no interest in other economic matters. Galicia itself lacked the necessary finance, and the Viennese Government, which might have supplied both the finance and the leadership, preferred to have Galicia remain agricultural and hence a market rather than a rival for Austrian industry.

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In the last decades before the World War the Ukrainian question had achieved an importance in Eastern European politics which added a further tension to the rocking structure of European peace. The war and the peace altered but did not abolish this question, which remains a momentous issue for Europe, no less than for Poland. It is too complicated for extended treatment here, but a brief reference to some of its features is necessary for an understanding of the events with which this book is concerned.

The Ukrainian problem derived its international com-

plications from the fact that this people were scattered among several nations. The largest bloc, about 26,000,000, inhabited the southern and southwestern districts of Imperial Russia. Over 3,000,000 in Eastern Galicia, and some 50,000 in the Bukovina were under Austrian rule, and about 700,000 lived in the sub-Carpathian districts of Hungary.⁸

The extinction of the Ukrainian Cossack independence in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries and the Polonization and Russification of the Ukrainian nobility left the spark of nationalism submerged and apparently extinguished in the mass of unlettered peasants. The spark, thanks largely to the Uniate Church, remained alive, to be fanned into a considerable flame when the wind of nationalism swept across Europe in the Nineteenth Century. As elsewhere, the movement was at first intellectual, reviving the language and giving literary form to folklore and legends. It then became political, with the twin ideals, nationality and democracy. In Russia it encountered an implacable hostility. The Guild of Saints Cyril and Mehodius, founded at Kiev in 1846 by a group of Ukrainian writers to promote the movement, was suppressed within a year by the government of Nicholas I. From then on the Tsarist authorities treated the use of the Ukrainian language in literary or historical publications as a dangerous political activity to be ruthlessly suppressed. "The Ukrainian language," said Valujev, the Minister of the Interior in 1863, "never has existed, does not exist, and must not exist." But oppression, the Russian Slavophil answer to all nationalist movements in the Empire, was no more successful with the Ukrainians than with the Finns, the Poles, or the Lithuanians. The songs of Taras Chevtchenko stimulated the national feeling,

⁸ Ukrainian population estimates vary greatly. The figures used here are those of Dominian, *Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe*, 130-132, who also estimates that there are some 2,000,000 Ukrainians scattered through Siberia. There has been a considerable emigration of Ukrainians to the United States—between 200,000 and 300,000, chiefly from Eastern Galicia and Hungary.

and the political activities of the Ukrainians across the border in Galicia kept the question constantly before the watchful eyes of the chancellories of Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna.

From 1815 to the middle of the century the Austrian Government was more benevolently disposed toward the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia than to the Poles, and in 1848 it encouraged the newly formed Ukrainian National Council to oppose the demands which the Poles were then making on Vienna. After 1870, however, Austria found it convenient to turn away from the Ukrainians in order to win the useful support of Polish magnates. The Ukrainian peasants, oppressed as were the Poles of the same class, agitated against the landowners for economic and political rights. At Vienna and at Lemberg, the Ukrainians demanded a greater representation in the Reichsrat and the Diet, and equal rights for the Ruthenian language in education and administration. The struggle became more intense when others besides the peoples immediately involved became interested in the outcome. As Germany drew away from Russia and into closer relations with the Dual Monarchy, the theory was evolved that the partition of Russia was necessary to the peace of Europe and the security of the Central Powers. From this partition there was to emerge an Ukrainian state under Austrian guarantee.^o This project and the growth of Neo-Slavism among the Poles tended to revive Austrian interest in Ukrainian nationalism.

In the early nineties an Ukrainian Nationalist Party had sufficient prestige to be regarded as worthy of encouragement from Vienna and subsidies from Berlin, where its program of making Eastern Galicia the Piedmont of the Great

^o Edward Hartmann, a friend of Bismarck, developed this theory in the *Gegenwart* in 1888. The idea was attractive to German nationalists and was actively but secretly supported not only by the nationalists but by the Ostmarkenverein from the nineties on. Besides the new Ukraine there was to be a Baltic state under a German Prince and an independent Congress Poland. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 1918 between the Central Powers and Russia approximated these lines.

Ukrainian state, stretching from the San to the Don, was favorably received. There was, however, another Ukrainian party—the Old Ruthenians, known also as the Moscalophils—who were disturbed by the radicalism of the Ukrainophil agitation, who were Russian in their sympathies, and were rewarded, it is said, by generous subsidies from St. Petersburg. This party joined the conservative Poles in opposing the Ukrainophils and became a part of the Neo-Slavist movement, with the Russian and Polish middle class parties.

The Revolution of 1905 became in the southern Russian provinces an expression of Ukrainian nationalism as well as of democracy. Periodicals and literary and historical publications, nationalist in character, appeared, and there were evidences of this Ukrainian sentiment in the first Duma. The reaction of the following year ended the Ukrainian influence in the Duma, suppressed the press and national organizations, and drove the movement under ground, where it remained to burst forth again when the Revolution of 1917 loosed its bonds.

In Galicia after the Pan-Slav Congress of 1908 (which the Ukrainian Nationalists did not attend), the alliance of conservative Poles and Moscalophils carried on an active Russian propaganda, largely through the "Galician-Russian Society," founded by Count Vladimir Bobrinsky, who after the Russian occupation in 1914 returned as Governor-General of Galicia, and was an ardent apostle of Russification. The Ukrainophils were equally active; and the Uniate Church under the leadership of Count Andrew Szeptycki, the Metropolitan of Lemberg, waged an energetic campaign to win over the Orthodox Ukrainians of Podolia and Volhynia.

The year 1914 found the Ukrainians divided, with the Nationalists committed to the support of the Central Powers and the Moscalophils still faithful to Russia. There were similar differences among the Poles. The loyalty to

Austria had greatly weakened, and there was a drift toward Russia among the National Democrats and the landowners of the eastern districts, where the Ukrainian menace was greatest. Many conservatives, however, still believed that Poland's interests were best served by support of the Habsburgs, while the parties of the left, including the Pilsudski Socialists, found themselves allies of the Monarchy, not for any feeling of loyalty to the Habsburgs, but in the conviction that a free Poland could be won only after the hand of the Russian autocracy had been shaken off.

CHAPTER II

THE POLES IN AMERICA

SHORTLY after the restoration of Poland's independence a well-known British student of Polish affairs wrote: "The greatest friend of Poland has been the United States of America."¹ This friendship of which he writes was not the result of expediency or the chance coincidence of political interests. It is as old as the western Republic itself, a tradition deeply rooted and secure. Like the tradition of friendship for France, it began during the War for Independence when sons of Poland gave their devotion and fine ability to the Revolutionary Army. Unlike the French tradition, that of friendship for Poland had no embittered interludes. It has on the contrary been sustained by a common hostility to the political form and philosophy of the partitioning powers, and it has been strengthened by the participation of many thousands of Poles in the national life of the United States.


If one accepts as authentic an entertaining legend, the Poles began to come to America sixteen years before Columbus discovered the continent. According to the tale, in 1476 John of Kolno, a Pole, commanded Danish ships which touched the coast of Labrador. Somewhat later, and more authentic, are the reports that in 1659 the Dutch colonists of Manhattan hired a Polish school-master to teach their children. Albert Soborowski, said to be a descendant of the Polish hero, John Sobieski, was a settler in the middle of the Seventeenth Century in northern New Jersey, where he was renowned as an interpreter with the Indians. There

¹ Bruce Boswell in *Poland and the Poles*, p. 41.

are also records of Polish settlers in Virginia, of indentured servants in the southern states, and of a small colony of Polish Protestants who settled in the valleys of the Passaic and the Raritan at the beginning of the Eighteenth Century. There was a Sodowsky said to have settled in what is now New York City in the days of Queen Anne, whose pioneer sons took part in the winning of Kentucky.

Better known are the Revolutionary heroes, Kosciuszko and Pulaski, who, with Lafayette, gave the most distinguished service to the American cause. A third representative of Poland who is less known in American history, but who has a prominent place in that of Poland, is Niemcewicz, a friend and biographer of Washington. Both Kosciuszko and Pulaski came to America bearing letters from Franklin, recommending them for service in the Revolutionary Army. Pulaski joined the American forces as a volunteer and presently had command of four regiments of cavalry. Later he resigned this command to organize a mixed body of light infantry and cavalry armed with lances. These troops, "Pulaski's Legion," became the model of Lee's and Armand's Legions and performed valuable service in the southern campaigns. In the defense of Savannah Count Pulaski was severely wounded and died on board the U. S. brig *Wasp*, to which he had been taken for treatment.

Kosciuszko's career was in many respects similar to that of Lafayette. Like Lafayette, he was both the military associate and the personal friend of Washington, and like him, on returning to Europe he became the trusted leader of the liberal revolutionary movement in his own country. Kosciuszko brought to the Continental Army both a splendid capacity for leadership and a professional training gained in the military schools of Poland and France. After service as aide on Washington's staff, he was appointed Colonel of Engineers and sent to the northern army. There he organized the defenses of Ticonderoga, at Mount Inde-



POLISH SETTLERS IN AMERICA
EACH DOT REPRESENTS 500 POLISH RESIDENTS

pendence and at West Point and contributed to the decisive victory over Burgoyne by his construction of the defenses at Bemis Heights. When General Greene became commander of the Southern Army, Kosciuszko went with him as Chief of Engineers. Kosciuszko's distinguished service won him promotion to the rank of Brigadier-General, and at the end of the war he received the thanks of Congress with the brevet of Major-General.

On his return to Poland he became, in 1789, a Major-General of the reorganized Polish army, and when the struggle over the Constitution of the 3rd of May, 1791, broke out Kosciuszko supported the Constitution, holding the rank of Lieutenant-General in the Polish forces. The powerful, veteran armies of Catherine overwhelmed the Polish forces, King Stanislaus Augustus agreed to the abrogation of the Constitution, the second partition of Poland followed, and Kosciuszko left the country. The Revolution of 1794 to restore the Constitution and Polish independence brought Kosciuszko back to his native land, where he became Commander-in-Chief of the army and virtually dictator. In this revolt Kosciuszko, as has already been noted, appealed not to one class, but to the Polish nation—gentry, townsmen, and peasants. It is reasonable to assume that his experience in America and his knowledge of revolutionary France influenced him to break an ancient tradition and lay the foundation of later Polish nationalism. The Polish forces were again defeated by more numerous and better equipped armies, and when Kosciuszko was wounded and made prisoner, Poland lost its inspiring and capable leader. After two years of captivity, he was released by the young Tsar Paul and given an extensive estate. He immediately left Russia, however, going first to England and then to America. In 1798 the United States Congress employed him on a mission to France. Back in Europe, Kosciuszko became the head of the Polish National Committee under whose auspices the Legions were organized,

but he took no part in the military operations of the Napoleonic period. He died in Switzerland in 1817. His final resting-place is fittingly beside that of John Sobieski in the ancient Polish city of Cracow.



The fact that the United States shares with Poland the greatest of her modern heroes is perhaps enough in itself to establish a strong bond of friendship between the two peoples. This sentimental tie, however, has been much strengthened by sympathy for the Poles in the loss of their independence and admiration for them in their struggle against the old world autocracies, which were of such evil repute in the democracy of the west. From the time of Jefferson who denounced the partition as a crime and an atrocity, and Henry Wharton who called it "the most flagrant violation of national justice and international law which has occurred since Europe emerged from barbarism," America has given repeated evidence of this feeling.

At the time of the revolt of 1831 committees were formed in the United States to raise funds to aid the Polish cause. They sent the funds to General Lafayette to be turned over to the representatives of the Polish Revolutionary Government in Paris. By the time the money reached Lafayette the revolutionary forces were broken, and the hope of European intervention was dead. Lafayette and a committee of American friends of Poland in Paris, which included among others J. Fenimore Cooper, S. F. B. Morse, and Ralph Emerson, cousin of the Concord philosopher, decided to apply the funds to the relief of Polish refugees in France. The committee soon found that only a small portion of its resources could be used in this fashion, since a majority of the Poles who reached France were men of means or too proud to accept charity. The committee learned, however, that less fortunate refugees who had fled from the Congress Kingdom into Prussia, were being forced back

by the Prussians across the frontier into the hands of the Russians. Dr. Samuel G. Howe, of Massachusetts, who had recently come from America with contributions, undertook to aid these refugees. As soon as the Prussians discovered what Dr. Howe was about, they arrested him, and after a month's detention sent him back to France under police escort. The money which Dr. Howe was unable to disburse in Prussia was used to help Poles who wished to go to America.²

The sympathy for the Poles which actuated the American Polish committees was further manifested by violent criticism of Russia's policy in the American press and by public men, including President Jackson. The Russian government was considerably irritated, and Count Nesselrode insisted to James Buchanan, the American Minister at St. Petersburg, that the Jackson Administration put a stop to these hostile comments. Buchanan replied that the Administration could not interfere with the expression of opinion in the press, but Nesselrode objected that this explanation could scarcely apply to the utterances of the President and the Jackson organ, the *Washington Globe*.

² The following paragraphs occur in a letter from the Polish representatives in Paris to Fenimore Cooper:

"The day of Poland's liberation will come. Though we may not, our descendants will see that hour—and let it come, sooner or later, we can never forget those who have joined their efforts to our efforts, their prayers to our prayers! We remember, with affection, the meeting at which you presided in July last, and the offering then made in our behalf. We thanked you at the time, and we thank you now, both for your countrymen here and in America, for what you have done, and what you have wished, in the cause of Liberty and Justice! The flags and the donations last received have a sacred character in our eyes, for they reach us as the last organs of a country that ceases to exist!

"Assume the office, we beg of you, sir, to transmit to your great and noble nation this expression of Polish gratitude. Let our thanks be known over the whole of the vast extent of your States; they come in the voice of a people mute within their own borders. May America, the model for all free countries, preserve the remembrance of our efforts and of our wrong; the recollection of her spontaneous and generous sympathy will ever be dear to the Pole."

(Signed) THE GENERAL KNIAZIEWICZ.
L. PLATER.

Paris, October 21, 1831.

As the armies of Nicholas I stamped out the last obstinate fires of the revolt of '31, the Polish patriots who had sought asylum in France began to realize that the timid gentlemen in the government of the Citizen King did not regard them as altogether desirable guests. The French people, mindful of the comradeship in arms in the days of the Napoleon, welcomed the exiles from the Vistula, but the government, anxiously seeking the policy of the *juste milieu*, adopted measures affecting the refugees which they regarded as persecution. In the face of an indifferent or hostile Europe, the Poles turned to America. On May 9, 1832, the historian and revolutionary leader, Lelewel, wrote to President Jackson in the name of the Polish National Committee to inquire if the United States would receive three or four thousand Poles, what their duty to the states of the Union would be, and how far their nationality could be guaranteed without interfering with the institutions and interests of this country.

Between two and three hundred were deported by Austria to the United States, and Congress made a grant of land of thirty-six sections, and two townships were surveyed for the exiles in Illinois. An organized emigration, however, such as contemplated by Lelewel and his friends did not take place. The persecution of the July Monarchy proved to be less serious than was feared, and America in those days was too far away to serve as a base for the revolutionary struggle which the Polish emigrés were intent on continuing. The episode, nevertheless, established the idea of America as an asylum, and the thin stream of emigration which began after 1832 continued to flow with rising volume for the next seventy-five years. The presence, moreover, of the Polish exiles kept alive American interest in Poland's fate. One of these exiles, Major Tochman, between 1840 and 1844 delivered lectures on Poland before the legislatures of ten states, and at seventy-five public meetings. The eloquence of the speaker or the popularity

of his cause appears to have produced a very sympathetic response and large crop of complimentary resolutions.³

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The political troubles of the years 1846-48 which sent many Germans and Czechs to the United States, also increased the Polish emigration, especially from Poznan, West Prussia and Silesia. By 1860 there were Poles in every state and territory in the Union except Dakota, the largest numbers being in New York, Texas, California and Wisconsin. An interesting characteristic of Polish emigration from 1848 to 1880 was its participation in the "winning of the West" through the settlement of Polish pioneers on western lands. As a part of this westward movement the first considerable Polish settlement grew up at Panna Marya in Texas, where three hundred Polish families from Prussian Silesia settled in 1854. Other settlements followed in Texas, and by 1906 the Polish population of that state was estimated between 16,000 and 17,000. In 1858 a Polish family from West Prussia came to Portage County, Wisconsin, where one of the most interesting and

³ Major Tochman later published his lecture in a pamphlet *Poland, Russia, and the Policy of the Latter Towards the United States*, Baltimore, 1844. Two paragraphs from a resolution adopted by the Senators and Representatives of the New Hampshire Legislature indicate the foundations of American sympathy for Poland.

"Resolved, that Americans and as freemen, our feelings and best wishes are always with man in his contests against tyranny, and particularly are our sympathies enlisted in behalf of that brave and generous people, who have for centuries been battling, though as yet unsuccessfully, against the sceptered plunderers of Europe and tramlers upon the common rights of man, and that the land which in the war of the American revolution gave Pulaski and Kosciuszko to fight side by side with Washington and Greene, *our* battles for freedom is now, in her present depressed condition, entitled to our fullest sympathies, and in the event of another struggle with her oppressors, would merit, and we trust *receive* the aid and cooperation of our grateful countrymen.

"Resolved, that the cause of Poland is the common cause of the friends of freedom throughout the world,—that might does not sanctify wrong, and that though now humbled, dismembered and trampled under the iron heel of military despotism, we trust in the God of Justice, that the time will ere long come when she shall rise, break her fetters and be free."

prosperous of Polish rural communities grew up. Farther west Polish settlers joined in the conquest of the last frontier on the Pacific slope. These adventurers in a strange land endured all the hardships which fill the annals of the pioneers. The fortitude shown by this tenacious people in resisting political and economic oppression in Europe enabled the Polish-Americans to endure and prosper in their new environment.

With their European memories, it is natural that the Polish-Americans should have sympathized with the anti-slavery movement and have given many good soldiers to the Union ranks in the Civil War. One of these soldiers, General Kryzanowski, served with General Carl Schurz, an emigrant from Germany, a comradeship in arms not likely to occur in Europe. While this great conflict was still undecided came the Polish revolt of 1863. The people of the United States were too deeply involved in their own affairs to pay much attention to the tragic drama in Poland. Officially the United States declined the invitation of Napoleon III to join in a protest against Russian policy in Poland, on the ground that it was contrary to American policy to intervene in purely European affairs. Despite the national preoccupation and this official attitude, meetings of sympathy were held in different parts of the country and funds raised to aid the revolutionists.

Bismarck's anti-Polish policy after 1871 was responsible for a slight increase in emigration from German Poland, but in general, economic rather than political conditions motivated the greatly increased emigration to America after 1880. From this time the emigration from the provinces controlled by Prussia declined, while that from the Congress Kingdom and Galicia increased. European economic conditions explain this development. Despite their conflict with German nationalism, the Prussian Poles shared to some extent in the tremendous economic progress of the German Empire after 1880. In the Congress Kingdom and

Galicia on the other hand agriculture was backward and peasant land was insufficient to support the increasing population. Galicia had no industry to absorb the surplus population, and emigration grew enormously. In Russian Poland the notable expansion of industry in the last few years of the Nineteenth Century took care of part of the surplus, but an acute economic crisis in 1901-03, prolonged to 1908 by the revolutionary disturbances of 1905, accelerated emigration during those years.

Polish authorities⁴ give the following data relative to emigration to the United States during the three or four decades before the World War. Between 1871 and 1911 the four Polish provinces of Prussia sent about 430,000 Poles to this country. Galicia during the thirty years before 1914 sent about 856,000. In 1890 there were 19,323 emigrants from the Congress Kingdom. There was a decrease in the emigration from their region for a few years, but between 1901 and 1913 the United States received 596,950 Poles from the Russian Empire.

This later wave of emigration reached the shores of a New America. The last frontier had been mastered, and the energies formerly employed in its conquest were now turned to the tremendous process of industrialization which in a half century transformed American civilization. Industry hungered for men, and from Poland and other lands of Eastern Europe they came to feed the mines and factories of Pennsylvania and the Middle West. The life into which these peasant immigrants came was no less arduous and unfamiliar than that which their predecessors had encountered in the West. The nature of urban life and of their employment made the problems of social readjustment vastly more difficult. The success of the Polish colonies, which grew up in Pennsylvania, Connecticut and

⁴ In *Poland, Her People, History, Industries, Finance, Science, Literature, Art and Social Development*, pp. 261-263, the English version of the *Petite Encyclopedie Polonaise* edited and compiled by E. Piltz, E. Woroniecki, S. S. Zaleski and J. Perlowski.

Massachusetts, at Chicago, New York, Detroit, Milwaukee, Cleveland, Buffalo and elsewhere, in meeting these problems of readjustment is due to the parishes which were quickly organized in every Polish group and to the Polish-American associations of which more will presently be said.

Industrial America, like frontier America of an earlier generation, gave to a large number of Poles an opportunity to improve their condition and to escape from a degrading political and economic environment. This emigration, moreover, benefited the Poles who remained in Europe, for it relieved the pressure of over-population in economically undeveloped communities, and the remittances of the emigrants helped families and groups and constituted an important item in the credit balance of the country. Finally the earnings of the emigrants and the influence of those who returned to their villages supported and quickened the spread of nationalism among the peasants.

This American influence on Polish nationalism is an interesting phenomenon. It is true undoubtedly that many Poles born under the imposed rule of another people became more conscious of their nationality after their arrival in America, despite the fact that the Government of the United States made no effort, as did the German or Russian governments, for example to denationalize the Poles. The explanation is that the emigrant colonies, rural and urban, found themselves surrounded by other peoples of different language and customs, which intensified the consciousness of their national cultural heritage. Their consciousness of difference was fortified against the pressure of assimilation by the parishes mentioned and by the associations formed to serve the social, cultural and material interests of the emigrants.

Those who had composed the "Great Emigration" to Western Europe after the revolt of 1831 had also formed associations for a somewhat similar purpose, but there were interesting differences. The emigrés of the thirties regarded

their foreign residence as temporary, and their associations, therefore, strove to keep the Poles from developing a patriotic feeling for the country in which they happened to be living. Their primary object was the restoration of Poland's political independence, and they urged their constituents to ignore the politics of the country of exile, except insofar as these politics might contribute to the realization of the great objective. Finally the emigrés were more conscious of the significance of nationalism than many of the later emigrants in the United States.

It is likely that the first Polish-American associations, established on the model of the earlier emigré societies, had similar political objectives, but circumstances soon changed the character of these organizations.⁵ The later arrivals in America had in a great majority of cases come to this country for economic rather than political reasons; their residence here was permanent, not temporary; they had had less of political experience; and America was a long way from Poland and outside of and little concerned with European political questions. The Polish-American societies, therefore have been active in preserving Polish culture and in stimulating a consciousness of nationality, but there has been neither occasion nor effort to discourage loyalty to the adopted country. Their activities have been focused on the problems of Polish-American society rather than with the national problems of Poland or of the United States. The outbreak of the World War temporarily caused the national issues of Poland and America to overshadow local problems of Polish-American life, but the fundamental character of the Polish-American societies did not change. They remained American organizations, providing

⁵ An association of Poles in America was organized in 1842 by Dr. H. K. Kalussowski among the emigrés who had participated in the revolt of 1830 was obviously of this character. The members, however, soon became identified with American life. Dr. Kalussowski, for example, served with distinction in the Civil War and was later an official of the United States Treasury.

the media through which the cause of Polish independence was supported and through which the Polish-American participation in the war effort of the United States was mobilized. Space does not permit any considerable discussion of these numerous societies, but a brief reference to three of them, the Polish National Alliance, the Polish Roman Catholic Union and the Alliance of Polish Socialists, will indicate some of their characteristics and differences.

The National Alliance was formed in 1880 in Philadelphia as a result of the initiative of Polish emigrés from the revolt of 1863, who had come together in the Polish National League, the Polish National Treasury of Paris, and the Polish National Museum of Rapperswil, Switzerland. The original idea seems to have been that the Polish National Alliance should canalize the dispersed energies of the Poles in this country in order that they might not be lost to Polish nationalism. The promoters appear to have believed that although the Poles in America might become deeply involved in American life, they could still be kept as a part of the Polish nation, which according to the theory at this time popular among Polish social scientists, would continue to live, although it did not exist as an independent state. The new organization accepted the theory that the Polish colonies in America should form an autonomous part of the Polish nation through a super-territorial organization of federated local groups. The National Alliance was recognized in Poland as the official representative of what the nationalists liked to consider the fourth province of Poland. Because of the conditions which have been mentioned, it was inevitable that as the Polish society in America played a more important part in American life, the idea of the fourth province should weaken, and the Alliance should become more concerned with the problems of the Poles in this country than of those in Europe.

The organizers of the Roman Catholic Union were priests who had settled in America and who intended to stay here.

They were more concerned with the affairs of the Polish parishes in this country than with the larger questions of Polish nationalism in Europe. The Catholic Church did not encourage them to push the struggle for Polish independence, and in America this attitude was interpreted as favoring the preservation of the cultural integrity of the colonies in this country, but not necessarily participation in the political life of Poland. The Roman Catholic Union came into being at about the same time as the National Alliance in the parish of St. Stanislas in Chicago.

Of quite a different character is the Alliance of Polish Socialists, which unlike the two societies already mentioned, is not a self-sufficient, independent organization. It was formed as a branch of the Polish Socialist Society, which became, under Pilsudski's leadership, the most powerful socialist organization in Poland and the active exponent of nationalism among the Polish proletariat.⁶ The principal interest of this organization was, therefore, the independence of Poland. Like the parent body, it is intensely nationalistic and its principal object in America has been to prepare its members for participation in the political and social life of a restored Poland. The Socialist Alliance thus more closely resembled the old emigré associations in Europe than the other Polish-American bodies. Moreover, a number of the leaders of this society were themselves political exiles from Russian, German or Austrian Poland. The Alliance of Polish Socialists, with between one and two thousand members, was much smaller than many other Polish-American organizations, especially the National Alliance with about 130,000, and the Roman Catholic Union with about 100,000.

The activities of these and numerous other societies and the organizations directly affiliated with the parishes are

⁶ There is a Polish section of the American Socialist Party. This group is interested primarily in American political problems and is not to be confused with the Alliance of Polish Socialists.

varied and interesting. They have mutual benefit and building-and-loan associations, along with social, musical, educational, charitable, gymnastic, agricultural and industrial departments. They maintain libraries and scholarships and publish books and periodicals of all descriptions.

There are about eighty periodicals of various descriptions published in the Polish language in the United States. Many of these periodicals are the organs of the societies, others represent political groups or serve the interests of a locality. The largest circulations are naturally to be found in the centers with the greatest Polish colonies, Chicago, Detroit, Buffalo, Milwaukee, Cleveland, the New York metropolitan area and the mining regions of Pennsylvania. Among the periodicals of large circulation and influence are the following: In Baltimore, *Jednosc Polonia* (weekly)—in Bayonne (N.J.), *Nowiny* (weekly)—in Boston, *Kuryer Codzienny* (daily)—in Buffalo, *Dziennik Dla Wszystkich* (daily); *Telegram* (daily); *Rekord* (daily)—in Chicago, *Dziennik Chicagoski* (daily); *Dziennik Zwiazkowy* (daily); *Zgoda* (weekly)—in Cleveland, *Monitor* (daily); *Ameryka Echo* (daily and weekly); *Kuryer* (weekly); *Wiadomosci Codzienny* (daily)—in Detroit, *Dziennik Polski* (daily); *Rekord Codzienny* (daily); *Ognisko Dumowe* (weekly); *Robotnik Polski* (weekly)—in Milwaukee, *Kuryer Polski* (daily); *Nowiny Polski* (weekly)—in Newark, *Kronika* (weekly)—in New Britain (Conn.), *Przewodnik Katolicki* (weekly)—in New York City, *Nowy Swiat-Telegram Codzienny* (daily); *Czas* (daily); *Kuryer Narodowy* (daily)—in Perth Amboy (N. J.), *Polak Amerykanski* (weekly)—in Philadelphia, *Jednosc* (weekly); *Patryota* (weekly)—in Pittsburgh, *Sokal Polski* (weekly)—in Schenectady, *Gazeta Tygodniowa* (weekly)—in Scranton, *Republika Gornik Pennsylvanski* (weekly); *Straz* (weekly)—in South Bend, *Goniec Polski* (weekly)—in Stevens Point (Wisc.), *Rolnik* (bi-weekly)—in Toledo, *Ameryka Echo* (daily)—in Utica, *Slowo Polski* (weekly)—

in Wilkes Barre, *Gornik* (weekly); *Niedzielny Gornik* (weekly).

These activities and institutions give the Polish-Americans a peculiar and interesting position in American society. Their national group is culturally autonomous though by no means immune to the influences of the American environment. Assimilation is inevitable, but since there has never been a serious attempt to force the denationalization of the Poles in America, there has been no Polish national problem in this country. Polish-Americans are to be found in both the Republican and Democratic parties and among the Socialists, but there is no "Polish" party devoted to the defense or promotion of the interests of nationality. This is in part due to the dispersion of the Polish colonies and the consequent lack of a "national" majority in any important locality. It is also due to that acceptance of the distinction between cultural and political nationalism which characterizes the relationship of Polish and other national groups to American society.


Within the Polish-American group there is no lack of controversial issues to stimulate divisions. Many of the issues are of local origin and have no bearing on the events which are the subject of this book, except in their effect on the organization of Polish-American aid in the struggle for Polish independence. Other causes of division originated in the political divisions of the Poles in Europe and to these we shall later revert.

CHAPTER III

POLAND IN THE WAR: FIRST PHASE, 1914-1916

To most of the European peoples involved, the events of August, 1914, meant that the armies marched to the defense of some possession greatly prized—independence, security, land. For the Poles it was the beginning of the “war of liberation of peoples” foretold by Adam Mickiewicz in the *Book of the Pilgrims*—not an obligation to defend, but the opportunity to recover what had been lost for more than a century. The movement for national independence had grown in strength and momentum during the last two decades before 1914, but this growth had revealed sharp differences as to how independence could best be secured. The alignment of the belligerents emphasized these differences, for there were enemies of Polish independence in both camps. No one could foresee the defeat of all of these enemies, and hence the Poles were forced to decide which enemy it was in their national interest to oppose.

The necessity of making this decision produced many shades of disagreement, but two tendencies stand out. On one side were grouped those who believed that independence could be won only after unity had been achieved, and that unity depended on the defeat of Germany and Austria. Those who held this view were, therefore, pro-Entente and hence pro-Russian in varying degrees—and vigorously anti-German. The National Democrats were the strongest party in this group, and Ramon Dmowski the most influential leader. On the other side were those who held that the first step in the realization of Polish aspirations was the defeat of Russia, the power which ruled by far the greatest



By courtesy of The Polish Economist.

WAR OPERATIONS IN POLAND, APRIL-SEPTEMBER, 1915

portion of Polish territory. This implied cooperation with Austria and, by virtue of the German-Austrian alliance, with Germany, though no Polish group advocated collaboration with the latter state or believed that Germany, of her own volition, would ever promote the interests of Poland. Though the two principal groups cooperating with Austria were united in their anti-Russian views, they were divided both in social politics and in the rôle they assigned to the Monarchy in the solution of the Polish problem. The Austrophil conservatives, led by Professor Jaworski, looked forward to the union of Russian Poland with Galicia to constitute an autonomous Polish state united in some fashion to the Habsburg domains. Pilsudski's Polish Socialists, on the other hand, desired merely to use Austria as "the sword against Russia and the shield against Germany" and to take advantage of the Habsburgs' lenient Polish policy to organize a Polish national army as the instrument of independence.

In Russian Poland the preponderant weight of articulate public opinion supported the Russian solution of the Polish problem, although there was underground a very considerable anti-Russian sentiment. In Austrian Poland, likewise, Polish opinion generally favored cooperation with Austria, but here also there was opposition in the National Democratic group, Neo-Slavist in tendency, which went openly to the support of the Russian cause when Eastern Galicia fell into the hands of the Tsar's armies. For the Poles of the Prussian provinces there was nothing to hope for in a German victory but further oppression, but whatever their sympathies, they had no choice but to perform, with a minimum of efficiency, such service as the German Empire imposed on them.

For apart from those Poles who could choose whom they would support, there were a million and a half who had no choice. The 700,000 Polish conscripts in the Russian armies and an equal number in the German and Austrian forces

were compelled not only to offer their lives in the battles of their oppressors but to fight against their kinsmen.¹ The situation of the Polish conscripts is without parallel in the tragic annals of this war.

The Poles in America were not obliged to choose between Russia and Austria or to serve in their armies, but they were deeply interested in making their contribution to the Polish cause as great and effective as possible. There were differences of opinion warmly expressed here as in Europe as to whether cooperation with Russia or Austria was more in the Polish interest; but the American Poles, being under no necessity of actively supporting either power, came more rapidly to the position of demanding the complete unity and independence of Poland without the limitations inherent in the Russian and Austrian solutions.² Under these circumstances the Poles in America under the inspiring leadership of Paderewski devoted themselves first to raising funds for the relief of those made destitute as the eastern battle line shifted back and forth across the plains of Congress Poland and Galicia; and second, to promoting in America and Europe a sympathetic understanding of Poland's case.

Because of the conditions sketched above, there were during the first two years of the war three spheres in which the supporters of the Polish cause carried on their activities. First, in Russia where the Tsar's government was pressed to accept as a war aim the union of Prussian and Austrian Poland to the Congress Kingdom and the formation of an autonomous Polish state under the sceptre of the Tsar. Second, in Austria where Pilsudski sought to create an

¹ There are different estimates of the number of Poles mobilized in the Russian, German and Austrian armies. Smorgorzewski gives 700,000, 300,000 and 300,000 *La Pologne Restaurée*, p. 49. R. Bailly gives 770,000, 481,000 and 457,000, *La Pologne Renait*, p. 19.

² This position was formally stated through the Polish Central Relief Committee early in 1916: "We demand the union of all parts of Poland under its own independent government, without any alien protectorate." *Free Poland*, March 1, 1916.

army of Poland, and the Austrophil Poles urged the Vienna government to support a program of uniting the Congress Kingdom to Galicia to form an autonomous Polish state under the Habsburgs. And third, in America, where the campaigns for Polish relief and the appeals of Paderewski not only created great sympathy for the people of Poland, but created a public opinion favorable to the Polish cause which was of the greatest importance in the following critical years.

The campaign for Russian recognition of Polish aims began with what appeared to be a very considerable achievement. On August 16 the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies, issued the following proclamation to the Polish nation:

Poles! The time has come when the dream of your fathers and forefathers will at length be realized. A century and a half ago the living body of Poland was torn in pieces, but her soul has not perished. She lives in the hope that the time will come for the resurrection of the Polish nation and its fraternal union with all Russia. The Russian armies bring you the glad tidings of this union. May the frontiers which have divided the Polish people be united under the sceptre of the Russian Emperor. Under this sceptre Poland will come together, free in faith, in language and in self-government. One thing Russia expects of you; an equal consideration for the rights of those nations with which history has linked you. With open heart, with hand fraternally outstretched, great Russia comes to you. She believes that the sword has not rusted which overthrew the foe at Tannenberg. From the shores of the Pacific Ocean to the Polar Sea the Russian War-hosts are in motion. The morning star of a new life is rising for Poland. May there shine resplendent in the dawn the sign of the Cross, the symbol of the Passion and Resurrection of nations.³

The Poles were quite unaccustomed to pronouncements of this character from the Russians, and it aroused great

³ This document was written at the direction of S. D. Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, by G. Troubetskoy and translated into Polish by Count S. Wielopolski, President of the Polish group in the Council of the Empire. Smogorzewski, *op cit.*, p. 31.

enthusiasm. Representatives of the right parties in Warsaw drew up a loyal address in reply, and Sienkiewicz, the novelist, appealed to the Poles of Prussia and Austria to support Russia. The proclamation was accepted at its face value by the Polish National Committee (known as the K.N.P.) which was organized on November 25, 1914, in Warsaw under the leadership of Dmowski, and it represented in general the ideas of the liberal Neo-Slavists of Russia.

The Russian reactionaries felt differently. They recognized the military value of the Proclamation, since it might win the Poles of the Congress Kingdom to support Russia and might encourage the Poles of Poznan and Galicia to cause trouble for Germany and Austria, but they had no intention of allowing the policy actually to be put into effect. Except for Sazonov, the Ministers, and particularly Goremykin, the President of the Council, and Maklakov, Minister of the Interior, opposed taking any immediate steps to put into effect the policy indicated by the Proclamation. In fact Maklakov issued a confidential circular to Russian officials in Congress Poland stating that the Grand Duke's Proclamation did not apply to the Vistula provinces, but only to the territories which were to be conquered.⁴ Even Sazonov, it would appear, had ideas respecting the territories to be included in the "united" Poland which did not at all conform to the hopes of the Poles. In a conversation on September 14, 1914, with Paléologue, the French Ambassador, Sazonov suggested that in the event of an Allied victory Russia should annex Eastern Galicia (now a part of Poland) and the lower course of the Niemen (i.e. the Memel region, now a part of Lithuania), while Poznan, Silesia, and Western Galicia should be annexed to the Kingdom of Poland.⁵ Moreover the policy adopted

⁴ This circular is quoted in full by Filasiewicz, *La Question Polonaise pendant la guerre mondiale*, p. 14, No. 8.

⁵ Pokrovski, *Tsarskaia Rossia i voina*, p. 74. F. A. Golder, *Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917*, p. 56-58.

by the Russian administration after the occupation of Eastern Galicia, where both Poles and Ukrainians were subjected to Russianization and Lemberg (Lwow) was declared "old Russian soil," disclosed Petrograd's intentions and disillusioned the Poles. Even the Grand Duke Nicholas complained that Petrograd appeared to be more interested in converting the population to Orthodoxy than in supporting his operations against the Austrians.

There was further disillusionment as months passed without any sign of change in the Russian system of government of Congress Poland. Military events in the summer of 1915 deprived Russia of the possibility of making administrative changes. The great German-Austrian offensive began on the Dunajec on the first of May, and in the next few weeks the Russians lost control of most of Eastern Galicia, while Hindenburg's armies from the north and west pushed on toward Warsaw. The Grand Duke ordered a general retreat, abandoning the defenses of the Polish Triangle of Warsaw and eventually practically all the Congress Kingdom. By way of hindering the German advance, the Russians devastated the Polish territory across which they retreated and drove thousands of peasants and townsmen into exile. Similar tactics had been effective against Napoleon, but against Hindenberg they were as out of date as lances and sabres. The social and economic effects of these harsh and antiquated measures are of first importance, but a word must be first said of the political results, which were also significant.

The failure of the Tsar's ministers to fortify Polish sentiment for the Russian solution by liberalizing the administration of the Vistula governments and the failure of his armies to hold Polish territory against the enemy, deprived the Pro-Russian Polish program of most of its force. In order to save some of the support won by the Grand Duke's Proclamation, Sazonov, on the eve of the abandonment of

Warsaw (July 29, 1915), proposed to his colleagues that an Imperial Manifesto be issued at once, definitely granting autonomy to the Poles, and that the manifesto be posted on the walls of Warsaw before the Russian troops evacuated the city. This would, he urged, restore the hopes of the Poles, who were losing faith in the earlier Russian promises, and also make an excellent impression on the Allies, who were disturbed by Russia's wavering Polish policy. This excellent proposal the Council of Ministers decisively rejected.⁶ The most the Ministry could bring itself to do was to make a futile gesture in the form of a statement by Goremykin to the Duma that the Tsar had ordered the Ministry to elaborate a project for giving autonomy to Poland—after the war.

At intervals until it disappeared in the turmoil of revolution, Tsardom reiterated its good intentions, but without appreciably reviving the faith of the Poles in the sincerity or ability of the autocracy to carry them out. The Russian solution of the Polish problem never went beyond the Grand Duke's Proclamation and an anemic plan for self-government which was never enacted into law. The Russian failure in Poland was only one of the most notable of a series of failures, for as President Masaryk has said, "In the whole Slav policy of Tsardom nothing was realized save that St. Petersburg became Petrograd."⁷ The Polish National Committee, however, continued its activities in Petrograd until August, 1917, when the political situation had been profoundly changed by the Russian Revolution and the American entrance in the war. At that time one section of the National Committee, led by Dmowski, transferred its operation to Paris, and another section, known as the Polish Council of the Union of Parties, presided over by S. Wojciechowski,⁸ had its headquarters in Moscow. The

⁶ *Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii*, XVIII, 22, in F. A. Golder, op. cit. p. 67-8.

⁷ *The Making of a State*, p. 147.

⁸ Elected President of the Polish Republic in December, 1922.

later activities of these groups relate to the events described in next chapter.

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Polish collaboration with Austria proved to be as unproductive politically as collaboration with Russia, but in the military sphere the Polish cause made gains, though at great cost, which were later highly important. Having consented to the formation of a Polish contingent, neither Austria nor Germany was able to prevent the expansion of that contingent into an army determined to serve the interests of Poland regardless of the interests of the Central Powers. The origin of this Polish military force goes back to 1905 when Pilsudski, who had established his residence in Cracow after his escape from his second Russian imprisonment, founded a secret "Organization of Combat" (*Zwiazek Walki Czynnej*). A little later the Vienna government, understanding that Pilsudski hoped to use his forces against Russia, gave the project its blessing, and the organization was legalized as the "Union of Societies of Riflemen" (*Zwiazek Towarzystow Strzeleckich*) with membership which spread beyond the boundaries of Galicia. Funds for the support of this military project came from all parts of Poland and from America and were controlled by the Provisional Committee of Federated Parties for the Independence of Poland, which was established in 1912. On the day Austria declared war on Russia, Pilsudski with his tiny force of a few thousand men crossed the frontier to give battle to the Russian Goliath.

Though Pilsudski's raid, which "liberated" the town of Kielce on August 12, had no serious military significance, it was an important event. To attack a vast empire with a handful of men was in the romantic tradition of the Polish revolutionary movements; the name Legion adopted by Pilsudski's force revived the memories of the days of

Dabrowski and Poniatowski; and it caught the imagination of Poles in every land, for once again a Polish force was on the march. Pilsudski was no longer the obscure leader of a fanatical band of desperate revolutionists, but the captain of a national force which struck the first blow in the new struggle for independence. The imagination of the Polish people was stirred and the foundation laid for the great prestige which Pilsudski acquired among the masses and particularly the soldiers of Poland. As far as the partitioning powers were concerned, Pilsudski had taken an important step in his policy of *faits accomplis*. A Polish force was not only in existence, but it was actually in the field as an independent unit, and it had to be given some sort of recognition. This recognition came through the Polish political committee immediately formed in Galicia.

On August 16 decidedly incompatible groups—the Austrophil conservatives and the anti-Russian revolutionary followers of Pilsudski,—formed a union of convenience represented by the Supreme National Committee. This body assumed authority in all financial and political matters pertaining to the Legions, which, it declared in its first manifesto, would “under Polish command and in close connection with the chief direction of the Austro-Hungarian army . . . enter the struggle in order that they may also throw upon the scales of the greatest war a deed worthy of the Polish nation, as a condition and a beginning of a brighter future.” The Vienna government was ready to give certain guarantees demanded by the Supreme Committee to confirm the national character of the Legions, and on August 27 the Archduke Frederick, Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Dual Monarchy, directed two Austrian generals of Polish origin to organize two Polish Legions for the duration of the war. Polish was to be the language of command for these troops, but they were not permitted to use Polish flags or other national insignia. The troops under Pilsudski already in the field were to remain under

his command and constitute the first regiment of the first Legion.⁹ Vienna further agreed that the Legions should be used only against Russia, and on October 2 issued a note establishing their legal status as a combatant force. As to the political future of Poland, the government of the Monarchy did not commit itself, but recognizing the propaganda value of the Grand Duke Nicholas' Proclamation, it issued in September a manifesto of its own which contained nothing but flourishes: "Poles! The moment of your liberation from the Muscovite yoke is nearing. . . . We come to you as your friends! Trust us! . . . We bring you liberty and independence for which your fathers suffered so much. Let eastern barbarism step back before western civilization, common to you and us! . . ."

The Supreme National Committee had little better success in promoting the Polish cause at Vienna than Dmowski's National Committee had at Petrograd, for the political leaders of Germany and the Monarchy were as fixed in their opposition to Polish unity as the Russians were to independence. After the conquest of Russian Poland in the summer of 1915, it became imperative for Berlin and Vienna to consider what they should do with the nation, rescued as they said, from eastern barbarism, but they found no basis for agreement. Meanwhile the precedent of partitioning Polish territory still prevailed at the Hohenzollern and Habsburg courts, and by a convention signed at Teschen on December 14, 1915, Russian Poland was divided between the Empire and the Monarchy, and a German general government under von Beseler set up in Warsaw with an Austrian, under von Kuk in Lublin.¹⁰ This arrangement, though it actually remained in effect until the end of

⁹ Conrad von Hötzendorff, Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian armies until March, 1917, was consistently hostile to Polish aspirations and was particularly opposed to giving the Legions autonomy. He accepted them as "kanonenfutter." *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, IV, note of Sept. 28, 1914, p. 877-8.

¹⁰ The northeastern districts of the present Poland were under a third administration, that of the German Eastern Command.

the war, was supposedly a temporary expedient while the Central Powers were agreeing on how the Polish problem could be solved in the interest of Germany and the Dual Monarchy.

Of the many plans and their variants that were advanced and rejected little need be said beyond this,—that none contemplated the relinquishment by Prussia of her Polish provinces or the granting of real independence to the territory “liberated” from Russian rule. The project on which the fortunes of the Austrophil Poles were staked—a Polish kingdom consisting of Congress Poland and Galicia to be held in the Habsburg orbit by dynastic ties—was unacceptable in Germany except under conditions which were unacceptable in Vienna. The compromise, proclaimed by the independence Manifesto of November 5, 1916, was a makeshift affair adopted under pressure. A considerable part of this pressure was furnished by the Legions.

Within a few months after their official recognition the Legions consisted of two brigades, the first commanded by Pilsudski and the second by Haller.¹¹ Late in 1915 a third brigade was organized¹² and the three brigades under General Puchalski distinguished themselves in the battles of June, 1916, when the Russians under Brussilov resumed the offensive. In this, as in previous engagements during the two years that had passed, the Legions had with heavy losses contributed very considerably to the military success of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front. But only the Central Powers had benefited. Congress Poland had been freed from Russian rule only to be partitioned by Austria and Germany. The Legions were being used by the German and Austrian commanders while the Berlin and

¹¹ General Joseph Haller, who later commanded the Polish army in France, had served fifteen years as an officer in the Austrian army, but had resigned before 1914. On the outbreak of the war he took an active part in the organization of the Legions. The story of his career is told by E. Elgoth-Ligocki in *Jozefie Hallerze*.

¹² Commanded at first by General Grzesichi and later by General Roja.

Vienna governments debated the Polish question as if it were an academic affair to which the sacrifices of the Legions were remotely related. As time passed without any action, bitter resentment spread among the Legionnaires. Determined to force this issue, Pilsudski made a dramatic and dangerous gesture. Disregarding his superior German commander he withdrew his brigade from the front¹³ and on July 25 offered his resignation. Five days later the Council of Colonels of the Legions demanded through the Supreme National Committee the recognition of the Polish volunteers as a Polish army under the command of a Pole responsible to his fellow-citizens and his own government. The Austrian High Command refused to concede so much independence, but instead, on September 20, 1916, transformed the Legions into the *Polnische Hilfskorps*, an auxiliary corps of the Austro-Hungarian army. In the meantime, however, the Legions were on the verge of disintegration. When on August 27 the Austrians accepted Pilsudski's resignation, there were violent demonstrations, and officers and soldiers demanded to be released from service. These disturbances convinced the German and Austrian commands that the Poles could no longer be used in the lines until their national demands were in some measure met. The contingents were therefore withdrawn from the front to Baranowicze where they were stationed when the new Kingdom of Poland was proclaimed.

It is doubtful if the action of Pilsudski and the Legionnaires was in itself sufficient to force the Central Powers into action on the Polish question. It showed, however, that unless something were done to appease Polish opinion, their conquest of the Congress Kingdom would become a heavy liability. The problem, therefore, was to turn this potential liability into an asset. The German military hierarchy saw in Russian Poland a million men of military age, and if

¹³ The Legions in 1916 were in the army of von Bernhardi which was part of the army group commanded by von Linsingen. A court-martial ordered for Pilsudski was abandoned.

half of them could be induced to take up arms for a Poland ostensibly independent, but actually controlled by the Central Powers, Germany's shortage of manpower would be taken care of. The civilian officials realized the importance acquired by the Polish Question in world opinion as a result of the relief discussions of 1915-1916 (to be described presently) and hoped presumably to gain credit particularly in America by assuming the rôle of the champions of Polish independence. When, therefore, late in July, 1916, Governor General von Beseler urged Berlin to set up a Polish state under Germany's thumb and argued that by so doing the Central Powers could recruit 800,000 men in Russian Poland, the idea was favorably received. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg worked out the details with Baron Burian, the Foreign Minister of the Monarchy, and on August 12 a secret protocol was signed which provided:

- a. That Poland should be an independent hereditary kingdom.
- b. That the Polish-German frontier should be changed for the benefit of Germany.
- c. That the district of Suwalki (part of Lithuania) should not be included in the new kingdom.
- d. That Poland should have no independent foreign relations.
- e. That the Polish army should be commanded by Germans.
- f. That no Polish territories of Germany or Austria (*i.e.*, Poznan, West Prussia, Galicia, etc.) should be added to the new kingdom.¹⁴

The *zweikaiser Manifesto* issued by the Governors-general at Warsaw and Lublin on November 5, 1916, could not, in view of the secret protocol, promise enough to arouse any great enthusiasm among the Poles. It did not promise unity, for it made no mention of Prussian Poland or Galicia,¹⁵ and the independence so loudly claimed was on

¹⁴ The negotiations leading to this decision are shown in various aspects by Count Burian, *Austria in Dissolution*, pp. 100-112; Ludendorff, *Ludendorff's Own Story*, v. 1, pp. 470-1; Th. von Bethmann-Hollweg, *Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg*, v. 2, pp. 87-106.

¹⁵ The Austrians promised an enlargement of Polish self-government in Galicia, which annoyed the Germans considerably, since they had no intention of conceding anything to their Polish subjects. See Helfferich, *Der Weltkrieg*, v. 3, pp. 53-4.

examination a pale dilution. Nevertheless the Manifesto was important, for in spite of its omissions, it recognized Polish independence as an international issue. It brought from the Russian government on November 16, a statement reiterating the intention to unite all Polish lands and to permit the Polish state to organize its national life under the rule of the Tsar. From the point of view of the Central Powers the Manifesto was a failure, for it encouraged Polish nationalism but it did not go far enough to produce loyalty or gratitude to the sponsors of the new kingdom. Moreover the Poles could not fail to see that with Russia out of the way the Central Powers were the chief foes of Polish nationalism. This tended to eliminate one of the causes of division among the Poles, and, although numerous Polish leaders cooperated with occupying powers, there was a steady drift toward opposition, a drift accelerated as this fundamental clash of interests was revealed. Short of an announcement of intention to divide Congress Poland between themselves (and there were advocates of this), the Central Powers could scarcely have made a more disastrous choice of policy than that of the autumn of 1916.

* * * * *

The efforts of the Polish National Committee in Warsaw and Petrograd, of the Supreme National Committee in Cracow and Vienna, and the gallant campaigns of the Legions on the bloody fields of Volhynia and Galicia were the most notable phases of the progress toward the restoration of Poland during the first two years of the war, but they were not the only ones. The friends of Poland in Western Europe were busy, but the latent friendship of the British, French and Italians could not be energized into activity, partly because these nations were fully engrossed in their own stupendous problems and partly because their governments were the allies of Russia, and Russia left no doubt that she regarded the Polish problem as exclusively

her affair.¹⁰ These factors were not operative in the case of the United States, which began to take an active part in Polish affairs early in 1915. During the period covered by this chapter that activity pertained to relief and was therefore largely unofficial, but political questions were involved, and the way was prepared for the political intervention in 1917-1919.

Although the great devastation of Congress Poland did not occur until the summer of 1915, there was need of relief in the centers of population of the south and west before the end of 1914. Across these regions moved the battle lines of the Eastern Front. Villages and crops were destroyed, factories closed and looted of their machinery, and the people left helpless and in distress. When the Eastern Front stabilized in the winter of 1914-15, the old political frontiers had been overrun, and lines of barbed wire and entrenchments marked new divisions of the Polish land. On the German side were the eastern districts of Congress Poland, including the industrial city of Lodz, the mining regions of Czestochowa and Sosnowiec; on the Russian were central Poland with Warsaw, nearly all of Eastern and half of Western Galicia. In central and eastern Poland behind the Russian lines there was destitution, particularly in Warsaw, and local citizens' committees with funds raised locally or sent in by Polish or Russian organizations did much to alleviate suffering. Behind the German lines the Polish communities were worse off, for they had endured military operations and were cut off by the battle lines from their sources of finance, food and raw materials. To give aid to these communities a Committee of Relief for Victims of the War was organized in Cracow under the leadership

¹⁰ For example, Sazonov's instruction (March 9, 1916) to Russian ambassadors to discourage all tentatives for placing the future of Poland under the control and guaranty of the Powers. See Filasiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 42, Doc. 27. Also, his warning to Paléologue that the Polish problem is "un terrain dangereux pour un ambassadeur de France." Paléologue, *op. cit.*, I, p. 222. The attitude of the Allies as revealed by the secret treaties and the secret peace negotiations is discussed in the following chapter.

of the Prince-Bishop Adam Sapieha. In January, 1915, Paderewski and Sienkiewicz, the most widely known of living Poles, established in Switzerland the *Comité General du Secours pour les Victimes de la Guerre en Pologne* for the promotion of relief propaganda in western Europe.

Meanwhile the Poles in America had been busy raising funds and coordinating the separate relief efforts of the numerous national and local Polish-American associations. A large number of these associations united their relief activities under the Polish Central Relief Committee¹⁷ which had connections with the Sienkiewicz Committee at Vevey, the Central Press Agency at Lausanne, and other agencies in London, Paris and Rome. Other organizations, affiliated with the Polish Committee of National Defense, appealed to different sections of the Polish-American community, while Paderewski's Polish Victims' Relief Fund and the American Polish Relief Committee solicited support from the American public in general. All these bodies applied their relief funds through organizations of Polish origin in Europe. Their endeavors received general and official support in the United States. During the winter of 1915-1916 resolutions expressing sympathy and urging relief were introduced in Congress, and President Wilson by proclamation designated January 1, 1916, as a day for making donations "for the aid of the stricken Polish people."

The value of Paderewski's devoted labors in the interests

¹⁷ The officers of this committee were: Honorary President, Ignace J. Paderewski; Presidents, T. M. Helinski, John F. Smulski; Vice-Presidents, K. Zychlinski, Mrs. Anna Neuman; Secretaries, S. Osada (1914-1915), Henry K. Setmayer (1915-1919), T. Wilde (1919-1921); Treasurers, P. Rostenkowski, J. Magdziarz, N. S. Piotrowski. The cooperating societies included: Polish National Alliance of America; Polish Roman Catholic Union of America; Association of Polish Clergy of America; Polish Falcons' Alliance, Pittsburg, Pa.; Polish Women's Alliance of America; Polish National Council, Chicago; Polish Alma Mater of America; Association of Poles in America, Milwaukee, Wis.; Polish Union of St. Joseph, Pittsburgh, Pa.; Polish Union of America, Buffalo, N. Y.; Polish Union of America, Wilkes-Barre, Pa.; Alliance of Poles in America, Cleveland.

of his native land in these years cannot be overstated. His renown as an artist, his eloquence and his splendid devotion qualified him as no other was qualified to carry the message of Poland's cause to the hearts of millions.

Of a different character were the proposals for Polish relief made by American citizens at the beginning of 1915 and the subject of negotiations with the belligerent governments for nearly two years. The precedent on which these proposals were based was the Commission for Relief in Belgium, organized and directed by Herbert Hoover under guarantees secured by him from both groups of belligerents. The C.R.B., which became responsible for the provisioning of 9,000,000 people in the occupied regions of Belgium and Northern France, received its financial support from charitable gifts from all parts of the world and from advances made by the British, French, and Belgian Treasuries. The supplies were distributed through local organizations—the *Comité National de Secours et d'Alimentation de la Belgique*, and the *Comité d'Alimentation du Nord de la France*—with American representatives to supervise the carrying out of the international guarantees.

In January, 1915, the Rockefeller Foundation War Relief Commission, which had recently completed a tour of observation in Belgium, investigated conditions in the districts of Russian Poland then held by the Germans. Returning to Berlin, the representatives of the Foundation¹⁸ with the collaboration of the American Ambassador, James W. Gerard, negotiated an agreement with the German government for the organization of an International Commission for Relief in Poland. The Rockefeller Foundation agreed to contribute \$10,000 a month for administrative expenses, and a German cooperating committee, backed by the Government, pledged a minimum

¹⁸ Dr. Wickliffe Rose, Director-General of the International Health Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation; Ernest P. Bicknell, National Director of the American Red Cross; Henry James, Manager of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research; and Colin Herrle, Secretary.

of two million marks a month for the purchase of supplies.¹⁹

The next thing was to get the supplies. As Germans and Austrians alleged that the Allied blockade made it impossible for them to furnish the foodstuffs, the representatives of the International Commission approached the Rumanians, who said they had no more bread than they needed for themselves, though they were selling large quantities to the Germans. The Dutch, the Danes, the Swiss, and the Swedes were successively appealed to, with the same result. Finally the Russians were asked to sell grain from the Volga, but the Grand Duke Nicholas, to whom the request was referred, said that railway equipment could not be spared to move it. From Russia the representatives of the International Commission went back to Rumania, where they found the wheat situation as before, but were offered considerable quantities of corn. They immediately telegraphed their German committee to send funds, but the committee replied that people who ate corn became victims of serious diseases. The corn remained in Rumania. Finally the Rockefeller committee appealed to the British government to allow overseas imports to Poland via Rotterdam. The British consented, but only on condition that the United States assume official responsibility for the work and for the observance of the agreement between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Germans. The *Lusitania* controversy then raging had put such a strain on German and American relations that the project was dropped.

Shortly after the International Commission's negotiations broke down, the Polish committees in Poland and America informally asked the C.R.B. to undertake diplo-

¹⁹ Headquarters of the International Commission for Relief in Poland were established in Berlin. Ambassador Gerard was made Chairman, Eliot Wadsworth, Director-General, and the Dresdener Bank of Berlin, Treasurer. The organization of the Commission and its subsequent history are described by E. P. Bicknell in "The Battlefield of Poland," *The Survey*, Dec. 2, 1916, and "Begging Bread for Poland," *ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1917.

matic and financial negotiations with the belligerents, and to accept the responsibility for the purchase, transport and distribution of supplies. The German authorities, meanwhile, notified Hoover that they hoped he would establish relief in Poland as he had in Belgium. He did attempt to do so, but by this time the situation in Poland had radically changed. On May 1 the Central Powers had begun with the Battle of the Dunajec, the great drive which brought the Germans into Warsaw on August 1, 1915, and established their control, as previously described, over virtually all of Congress Poland by the middle of October. In the autumn of 1915, therefore, the problems of Polish relief had been vastly increased. There was a much greater area and a much greater population in need of relief than a few months before. The people, moreover, were in relatively greater need, for the industrial population was without work, without money and without food, while the rural regions were brought to the verge of starvation by the destruction of crops and animals incidental to military operations and by the deliberate devastation carried out by the Russian armies in their retreat.

Western Europe and America never realized the savage devastation visited on Poland in 1914-1915. Belgium, Northern France, Serbia and Rumania suffered devastation in varying degrees at the hands of enemy invaders. Poland suffered this too, but even greater destruction and misery came from the defenders of the country in their retreat. In the campaigns of 1914, the Russians in their invasion of Galicia besieged and bombarded Lemberg and Przemysl and burned the equipment of the petroleum fields. The Austrians in their first incursions in Russia wrought havoc in the districts of Lublin, Chelm, Rovno, and Kowel, while the Germans bombed Kalisz, dynamited mines in the Dabrowa basin, and laid waste the regions about Sochaczew, Lodz, Bolunow, Warsaw and the Narew Valley.

In May, 1915, after the greatest concentration of artillery

the world had up to that time seen, the German-Austrian forces broke through the Russian lines on the Dunajec, and the long Russian front began to sag deeply at its center. From the north Hindenburg and Ludendorff returned to their campaign for the prize of Warsaw. German victories in the north followed those in the south, and the Grand Duke, pivoting his long line on its extreme left, drew back his armies on the right from the Polish and Lithuanian districts, destroying food and other supplies, razing 1,900,000 buildings, and hurrying away from their homes over three millions of dazed and terrified peasants. Allied propaganda at the time represented this retreat as a masterly manoeuvre which deprived the Germans of the chief fruits of their campaign. As a matter of fact, the campaign from the Russian point of view was a disaster from which the Tsar's armies never recovered. The policy of wholesale devastation did not, of course, seriously impede the progress of the Germans, but it laid on the Polish people a burden of misery, unparalleled and enduring.

The deportations, moreover, were certain to have serious consequences in Russia. This was recognized at the time, and Krivoshein protested against the Grand Duke's policy at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on August 17, 1915. "Of all the consequences of this war," he said, "this one (enforced migration) is the most unexpected, the most serious and the most difficult to remedy. . . . Misery, sickness, poverty, go with them all over Russia. . . . Their trail is like that of the flight of locusts or the bands of Tamerlane on the warpath. The railways are choked, and pretty soon it will be impossible to move war freight and food supplies. . . . In my capacity as member of the Council of Ministers, I should like to say that this undertaking of Headquarters to bring about a second migration of peoples will lead Russia into darkness, revolution, and ruin."²⁰

In the abundant testimony of foreigners who visited the

²⁰ F. A. Golder: *Documents of Russian History*, 1914-1917, Ch. IV, No. 3.

devastated regions after the military campaigns of 1915, there may be disagreement as to whether Russia or Germany was chiefly responsible for these horrors, but there is no difference of opinion regarding the sufferings of the Polish people. "Nowhere," wrote an American journalist, "have the blows fallen so hard—nowhere is the after-suffering of the civilians so great, and nowhere are they so helpless to aid themselves. . . . All that are left are the graves of the dead, the emaciated bodies of the living, and the shell-scarred land, denuded of almost every trace of vegetation."²¹

Local Polish committees worked desperately to check the wave of misery that engulfed the people. Of special interest were the efforts to ameliorate the condition of the most miserable of all—the deportees. Even if it had been carefully organized, the deportation of such a number of people would have entailed great suffering. But there was no organization, no preparation, and the railways, already breaking down under the strain of war, were overwhelmed by a mass of humanity ruthlessly driven eastward, without direction and without the means of self-support. About 40 per cent of the deportees who reached Central Russia alive were children under fourteen. Committees of Polish residents in Russia organized schools for the children, established medical and sanitary units and created a special bureau to place deported peasants on the estates of Polish landowners in south Russia. The Polish orphanages, schools, workshops and medical detachments continued their work in Russia until after the Bolshevik Revolution, when, like many Russian institutions of similar character, they were forced to close. Many of the refugees who ultimately reached the distant steppes beyond the Volga were cared for by American and British Friends who established a mission at Buzuluk in 1916.

In Congress Poland volunteer committees supported

²¹ H. B. Swope: *Inside the German Empire*, pp. 261-2.

refuges for orphaned children and as far as their resources would permit operated free soup kitchens for the destitute. The Citizens' Relief Committee of Warsaw in the autumn of 1915 was aiding, in one way or another, some 300,000 people in the Warsaw district. Their funds came from private donations, from the Warsaw city administration, from the Russian Government and private Russian societies, and from Polish, Jewish²² and other societies abroad. These funds were sufficient for the program which the Citizens' Committee was carrying on, but the program was not enough. Moreover, money was not what was most needed in Poland, and it was not primarily to secure more funds for relief that the Polish organizations appealed to the Commission for Relief in Belgium. "Materials," Dr. Vernon Kellogg, of the Commission, reported to Hoover, "are more valuable than money because of the actual inability to buy necessities in Poland, and because of the enormous prices of the few available commodities. But more than the charity of actual gifts are needed the permission and the means of importing food and clothing from the outside world. The Poles ask the world for this rather than for money. . . . They ask, in a word, for exactly the kind of assistance the Commission for Relief in Belgium is now giving in Northern France. That is the reason they address specifically to the Commission what is really a petition to the world."

The attempt to bring relief to Poland on the same large scale as in Belgium and Northern France was actually under way in the autumn of 1915, when Hoover sent Kellogg to Poland to investigate. His report, quoted above, confirmed the earlier accounts of conditions which had come from other sources. Hoover, thereupon, attacked the difficult

²² The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, organized in 1915, provided relief to Jews in Poland and Jewish refugees in Russia through *Das Jüdische Hilfscomite* of Berlin and through the Jewish Colonization Commission (ICA) and the Russian Jewish Committee for the Relief of War Sufferers (EKOPO) in Russia.

task of working out an arrangement which both groups of belligerents would approve. In a conference on December 2, 1915, he discussed with representatives of the German General Staff²³ some of the requirements which the Allies would be likely to demand as a precedent to giving permission to the Commission to bring food through the blockade. He said that the Allies would undoubtedly expect Germany to furnish supplies equivalent to those which the German army absorbed in Poland. Furthermore, since the needs of the Polish people were obviously beyond the resources of private charity, some other financial arrangement would have to be worked out with the approval of the German government. He suggested that the local governments and municipalities formulate obligations to be taken up by the German Reichsbanks to the amount of twenty million francs per month. In addition, if the Commission undertook the relief, it would be necessary to set up an organization with the cooperation of the Germans, as had been done in Belgium. Moreover, some new arrangements for shipping would have to be made, and the Germans would have to furnish shipping for the Baltic Sea, if not part of that required for overseas transport.

The Germans promised to take up the financial questions with their government, and assured Hoover that they would give their complete cooperation in the matter of food-supply and in the organization of distribution in Poland, that the Baltic shipping could be arranged, and probably overseas shipping as well, subject, of course, to a satisfactory arrangement with the Allies.

On December 22, 1915, Hoover formally placed the proposal before the British government in a letter to Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary. He said that the Commission could not undertake the task "without the approval and cooperation of the Allied governments. In

²³ Major von Kessler, Count Wengerski, and Captain Uhl. Dr. Vernon Kellogg and W. B. Poland of the C.R.B. were also present.

the provision of food supply for these people we should need, not only to rely on charity but to assemble all the economic resources of Poland and its institutions, in much the same manner as has been done in Belgium, and we should need the permission of His Majesty's Government to facilitate exchange and banking operations.

"The painful gravity of the situation in Poland cannot be gainsaid, nor need I apologize for the interest this organization has taken in the Polish people, in addition to our other very grave responsibilities. We have no desire to add to our burdens, but if the fourteen months of service in Belgium has commended us to the various belligerent governments, it is our duty to use the confidence thus acquired on behalf of the Polish people, and I wish to add, if the Allied Governments are prepared to assent to such relief measures, and if any other institution can be summoned to undertake their execution, this Commission would be glad to give any advice arising out of its experience, or, alternatively, we should be glad to incorporate such other body in any organization we might set up."

No reply whatever came from Grey until February 5, 1916. In the meantime Hoover and his associates had become fully aware of the hostility in Allied circles, especially military, to the project of Polish relief. The military authorities had objected to the relief of Belgium on the ground that it gave a military advantage to the Germans, by relieving them of the necessity of feeding the Belgians out of their own food stocks. The opposition to Polish relief was strengthened by reports that both Germany and Austria were extracting food from Russian Poland. Grey's letter, however, was not an absolute veto. He stated that before negotiations could be started the German and Austrian governments must prohibit the export of food from Russian Poland and guarantee that native supplies would not be used to maintain the occupying forces. The British government might then permit the

C.R.B. to import food, if the Central Powers agreed to these requirements and would give the C.R.B. a free hand in the distribution of the relief and local supplies. Hoover sent the British reply to Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador at Berlin, for presentation to the German government.

A few days later, February 21, 1916, Mr. Page, the American Ambassador at London, laid before Sir Edward Grey a definite proposal drawn up by Hoover for the relief of Poland. According to this plan the Commission would undertake the feeding of about 4,000,000 people in Warsaw, Vilna, Kovno and other cities where the situation warranted. For the carrying out of this project Hoover proposed that the following measures be taken: About half the minimum adult ration would be imported, the German authorities being asked to provide a supply of potatoes, salt, sugar and tea sufficient to make the ration adequate for all the occupied territory. The German government was to devise financial means for providing current exchange to pay for the foodstuffs purchased by the C.R.B., permission for these operations to be granted by the Allies. The German government was further to provide ships, to agree not to interfere with imported food supplies and to give the Commission every facility for the control of the feeding in the cities in question. The destitute were to be fed without cost, but the well-to-do would be required to pay for the food which they received. Finally, the letter noted that the German government had signified its willingness to give free railway transportation over the occupied areas and one half railway rates over the German state railroads.

Since in all matters affecting Poland the British and French were careful not to offend their Russian ally, the British government referred the relief proposal to Petrograd. Recognizing the necessity of securing Russian approval, Hoover took the matter up with the Tsar's ambassador in London, Count Beckendorff, to whom he

gave the reports of Kellogg and F. C. Walcott,²⁴ and an outline of the Commission's plan of relief. He appealed for a favorable decision on the part of the Russian government and urged the ambassador to take the matter up with Petrograd by cable in order to prevent delay in getting diplomatic consent for the initiation of the relief measures.

In the United States, meanwhile, representatives of the Commission, in cooperation with the Polish-American societies, were working to build up a strong public opinion favorable to Polish relief in order to bring pressure on the belligerents to accept the Commission's proposal. On January 8, 1916, a group of Polish societies²⁵ cabled Premier Asquith, urging that Hoover's proposal be accepted and that the C.R.B. be given full charge of the relief work. Asquith's reply (January 14) did not commit his government to anything except to the theory that Germany was responsible for Poland's woes.

The British Foreign Office did not reply until the 5th of May to Hoover's plan of February 21. It then appeared that there were many objections to the proposed agreement. In the first place, it was made only in the name of the German government and hence did not bind the Dual Monarchy, nor apply to those Polish provinces in the east which were under the control of Austro-Hungarian author-

²⁴ F. C. Walcott of the Rockefeller Foundation. Representatives of the Foundation cooperated with the C.R.B. in these negotiations. Walcott had worked out a tentative agreement with the German authorities in Warsaw, which provided that in case the Commission was able to begin work in Poland the following principles would be adopted: The Americans would have the same degree of control as in Belgium and France, and the food would be actually distributed by Polish committees. All food originating in Poland would go to the Polish population and Polish constabulary except surplus potatoes. Imported food would be transported at half rates through the German territory, and free in Poland. The text of this agreement is to be found in 64th Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 494, p. 5.

²⁵ The Polish National Alliance, Polish Roman Catholic Union, Polish Women's Alliance, Polish Falcon's Alliance, Polish Alma Mater, Polish Union of America, Polish National Council, Polish Uniformed Societies, Polish Central Relief Committee, St. Joseph's Polish Union. The Polish National Defense Committee sent a separate cable on Feb. 2, supporting this appeal.

ities at Lublin. Secondly, the British felt that since there was no actual prohibition of export from Poland, the Germans were planning to declare a surplus whether one existed or not, under cover of which they could send food to Germany and Austria. Finally, the Foreign Office objected to the provision that the relief scheme would come to an end on the 1st of October with the Polish harvest, which it was assumed would be seized wholesale by the Germans. The Foreign Office declared, however, that it was ready to agree to immediate inauguration of relief, provided Germany and Austro-Hungary would give certain assurances. Among the more important were: that there be no distinction in relief between the spheres of Russian Poland occupied by Germany and by Austro-Hungary; that the export of all foodstuffs from Russian Poland be absolutely prohibited and that any surplus in one part of Poland should be applied to relieve distress in other parts; and finally, that the German and Austrian Governments should undertake as part of these arrangements to supply and care for the populations of Serbia, Albania and Montenegro, countries which were being reduced to a state of starvation through use of native food supply by occupying forces. These latter undertakings, the British demanded, should be under the supervision of neutral subjects or organizations, which must enjoy absolutely free and unfettered communications with their home offices besides every facility to satisfy themselves of the manner in which the Central Powers carried out their undertakings.

The British reply raised a new brood of diplomatic problems by making the proposed Polish relief contingent upon similar arrangements for other territories, especially those in the Balkans, which were then occupied by the Central Powers. It had already required five months to bring the negotiations to this point, and if they were now to be extended to other parts of the world, Hoover recognized that there was no hope of getting any relief to Poland until

after the majority of those who were chiefly in need had succumbed of hunger. This Hoover pointed out to Ambassador Page in a letter on May 12. He called attention to the fact that the proposed relief scheme was to come to an end in September and that there were only four and one half months left for carrying out the project. Even if the German government consented to the terms, which was unlikely, it would take at least three months to get the necessary German ships, send them out and return them loaded to Baltic ports. There was, therefore, no hope of sending any relief to the Poles before the harvest through the medium of negotiations under way. Hoover proposed, therefore, to the British government through Mr. Page that supplies be purchased in Sweden and sent across the Baltic to Poland. The British government, after some delay, replied that there were reasons of a general political nature which made them unwilling to ask any favors of the Swedish government.²⁶

Although there was no longer any real possibility of placing supplies in Poland before the harvest, the official obsequies for the relief plan were delayed another two months. The German Foreign Ministry required thirty-seven days to make known its decision not to accept Sir Edward Grey's conditions. Germany would contract only as to the Polish territory in her own control. Germany could not make questions of relief of Poland dependent on the establishment of relief in Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania, "since Germany is not in control of these countries." Germany, however, would use her "good offices" with Austria for the establishment of similar relief work in those countries. Two weeks later Grey declared the German reply unsatisfactory.

One more attempt was made to break the deadlock. On July 8 the American Government appealed to all the

²⁶ The Swedes objected strenuously to British blockade restrictions, and the British objected to what appeared to be a strong Swedish sympathy for Germany.

belligerent governments in the name and interests of humanity "to consider whether it is not possible for the powers on each side to make such mutual concessions in the terms proposed by them for the regulation of shipments of relief supplies into Poland as will make it possible for an agreement to be reached under which relief can be given to the suffering inhabitants of Poland."

This appeal of the American government had no greater success than the earlier efforts. Neither the British reply of July 26, nor the German of the 29th offered any concession, and each sought to place the moral responsibility for the suffering of the Poles upon the other. The German reply had the interesting additional information that there were prospects of an excellent harvest, and that after October 1, 1916, there would be little need for relief. The decision of the Central Powers to set up the Polish Kingdom rendered any international relief project entirely out of the question.

The German announcement that food conditions in Poland after the harvest of 1916 would make foreign relief unnecessary was received with some skepticism by all who knew the conditions there. Nevertheless the Hoover relief project was dead, and Poland was denied large scale relief from America until after the Armistice.²⁷ These negotiations, however, though they failed to accomplish their object, were not without benefit to the Polish cause. The propaganda of relief inevitably directed attention to Poland's political situation, and sympathy for the war sufferings of the Poles merged with sympathy for their demand for the unity and independence of their nation. In this way the restoration of Poland became a war issue for a large public long before it was accepted by the

²⁷ The Allied blockade not only stopped the overseas import of food to enemy and enemy-occupied territories, but also restricted the transfer of funds. In 1917 the C.R.B. attempted to work out a scheme for the transfer of funds to Poland by means of the Belgian relief machinery, but both the British and Germans were opposed.

foreign offices of Europe. For reasons that have already been noted, popular support of Polish aspirations gained headway more rapidly in America than elsewhere, and this championship was presently to be given new force in President Wilson's speech on January 22, 1917.

* * * * *

Before turning to the political changes of 1917, there is one other aspect of the German policy in Poland that must be mentioned. From the beginning of their occupation the Germans had requisitioned raw materials useful in military operations, but as time passed and the grip of the Allied blockade tightened, the requisitions became more drastic. Polish industries were denuded of such materials as oil, leather, sulphur, iron, wool and cotton; auxiliary machines were taken, and finally all kinds of machinery, and even iron girders from buildings.

The war used up not only raw materials, but human materials as well, and in 1916 the German government and General Staff struggled with the problem of manpower. The Reichstag and the press discussed more drastic laws to regulate the military and civilian war service of Germans, and the German Nationalists exhorted the government to utilize the man power of the conquered territories. In Belgium the efforts to induce unemployed workers to accept German employment were unsuccessful because the relief operations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium and the Comité National saved the workers from having to choose between starvation and German employment. In Poland there was no relief enterprise to intervene, and thousands of Polish workers were unemployed. For a time the employers issued subsidies, but these presently ceased. The workers then had to choose whether to allow their children to die of hunger or accept the employment offered in Silesia, Westphalia or the Rhineland. Many went to Germany, but not enough; therefore in Poland as in

Belgium, the demands of military leaders prevailed over the protests of German liberals, and there were labor requisitions, and forced migrations to the west.

From the economic point of view the destruction and requisition of industrial equipment and the dispersion of skilled labor caused a vast loss to Poland and added enormously to the difficulties of the first years of the restored state. Politically these policies strengthened the resistance and aggravated the hostility of the Poles to the pseudo-independent régime set up on the basis of the Manifesto of November 5. Ludendorff's comment on the failure of Germany's Polish policy is revealing: "The formation of a Polish army failed for political reasons, Poland apparently preferring to achieve her ends against Germany and Austria-Hungary with the aid of the Entente. Man-power she had in plenty, even after sending labor to Germany and Austria-Hungary. . . . Naturally, we continued to make every effort to recruit labor in Poland on the largest possible scale, and to make use of the country for the prosecution of the war." ²⁸

Ludendorff, *Ludendorff's Own Story*, I, p. 425.

CHAPTER IV

POLAND IN THE WAR: SECOND PHASE, 1917-1918

THE decision of the Central Powers to establish the truncated Kingdom of Poland was not due to love of the Poles nor to a devotion to the principle of nationality. It was, however, a recognition of the power of that principle and an attempt to utilize it to the advantage of Germany and Austria. All that the Central Powers succeeded in accomplishing was to draw against themselves the full force of this national movement, which during the first two years of the war had expended part of its energies against Russia. Furthermore, events outside of Poland occurring in 1917 increased the momentum of the national movement and identified it with the war aims of the Western Allies.

The first of these external events which profoundly influenced the evolution of the Polish question was Woodrow Wilson's declaration regarding the future of Poland made in the course of his "peace without victory" speech of January 22, 1917. A month earlier (December 18, 1916), the President had asked the belligerents to state their war aims in order to clear the way for a negotiated peace. The replies were not encouraging. The Central Powers side-stepped the President's suggestion by indicating that they preferred direct negotiations with their enemies. The Allies replied jointly and elaborately on January 10, improving the opportunity again to charge Germany with responsibility for the continuance of the war. As for Poland, the Central Powers stood on their declaration of November 5, while the Entente Allies merely accepted as their own the


Russian policy, reiterated by the Tsar in his address to his armies on December 25, 1916, promising the establishment of a united, autonomous Poland under his rule.¹

The President's next peace move—his speech of January 22—was in reality an appeal to the people of the belligerent states over the heads of their governments. It was a general statement of conditions on which a durable peace might be based, and it was the first public expression of the principles embodied a year later in the Fourteen Points. One of the most specific recommendations made by Mr. Wilson refers to Poland. In connection with the principle that governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed, he supported his argument by reference to Poland, "Statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland. . . ." There are several reasons why the President made this specific reference. Poland was a particularly flagrant violation of the right of self-determination, which recent relief negotiations had brought before the world. Finally, both Entente and the Central Powers had given lip-service to the rights of Polish nationalism, and so perhaps were as near agreement on this issue as any.²

This effort of the President's had no more success in bringing peace than its predecessors. The statement on Poland, however, was of the greatest importance to that nation. It aroused the hopes and strengthened the hearts

¹ The Russian government had issued an official statement in the same sense, on November 15, 1916, presumably to counteract the effects of the Manifesto of November 5 by the Central Powers. The Allies' reply of January 10 to Wilson's note implied the continuance of Russian possession of Poland, since it demanded that the Central Powers evacuate "the invaded territory in France, Russia, and Rumania. . . ." Most of the Russian territory invaded by the Germans was Polish.

² Colonel House explains the reference to Poland on this occasion by the fact that it was a point emphasized by both Russian and the Central Powers in proclamations and promises. Charles Seymour, *Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Vol. II, pp. 414-415.



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of Poles everywhere—in America, where they were encouraged to carry forward their work of relief and the propaganda for their cause; in Russia, where they expressed their gratitude in demonstrations and resolutions;³ and in the districts of the German occupation, where, when the news trickled through the German censorship, there was a new expression of the determination to win independence. The Provisional Council of State, recently set up under German auspices in Warsaw, thanked the President officially for his advocacy of an independent Poland. The overshadowing German authority was presumably responsible for their not thanking him for advocating a united Poland as well.⁴

The contemporary as well as the historical importance of Wilson's statement lies in the fact that this was the first occasion when the chief of a great power championed the cause of Polish nationalism without doing so in the interests of someone besides the Poles. It emphasized the inadequacy of the Russian and the Austrian solutions that had been proposed, of the German solution that Berlin was attempting to apply. For the first time a third party advocated the Polish solution of the Polish problem. This American proposal was so far in advance of what European diplomacy was prepared to recognize that a year elapsed before the western Allies were ready to follow Wilson's

³ "A million Polish exiles have heard the grave voice from over the seas—the message of the President of the greatest republic in the world. Our group of pilgrims, swept by the war and stranded in Moscow . . . seemed to hear at last the voice of the awakened conscience of humanity. . . . His sublime message will hasten the triumph of the right of nations to independence. . . ." The full text of this message is given by Robert Wilton in *Russia's Agony*, pp. 334-336.

⁴ The Berlin government actually interpreted this part of the President's speech as an attempt to rob Germany of her Polish conquests. *Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses der Deutschen Verfassungsgebenden Nationalversammlung und des Deutschen Reichstages, 1919-1926: Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 1918*, vol. 1, p. 515; vol. 2, pp. 636-637, testimony of Helfferich. Also, Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany*, pp. 266-67.

lead.⁵ In the meantime, the Polish territories were offered by one power to another in secret negotiations in the best manner of the Eighteenth Century.

The President's declaration would have had an enormous effect had not the American break with Germany followed a few days later. But the entrance of the United States in the war greatly increased the weight of American support of Polish independence. This influence had little effect on Allied diplomacy, and the United States was not involved in the secret negotiations with Austria. But world opinion reacted to the President's eloquent advocacy of the right of self-determination as a war aim of America and ultimately of the Allies.

* * * * *

Another external event in 1917, the Russian Revolution, profoundly affected the evolution of the Polish question as it affected every other political problem of Europe. The assumption of authority by the Provisional Government, and the abdication of the Tsar on March 15, cleared the way of reactionaries for a liberal and generous policy toward Poland. The Provisional Government signalized a new era in Polish affairs by issuing a declaration on March 30 that, "The Russian people, who have thrown off the yoke of despotism, recognize the full right of the kindred Polish people to determine equally their destiny according to their wishes. . . . The Provisional Government considers the creation of an independent Polish state in all territories where the Polish people constitute a majority of the population as a certain guar-

⁵ On December 7, 1915, a resolution was presented to the Italian Chamber expressing the hope that Poland would be restored as a united and independent state. Later the resolution was withdrawn by the authors who did not wish to make an "obstacle to the understanding between the Allies." This episode and Sir Edward Grey's declaration—in May, 1916—in the Russian Parliamentary Delegation that Great Britain would refuse to raise questions capable of creating discord between allies, illustrate further the effect of the Russian alliance on the policies of the Allies.

antee of durable peace in the remodeled Europe of the future.”⁶

Prince Lvov's government then established a Liquidation Commission of Polish Affairs, presided over by Alexander Lednicki, one of the leading Polish political figures in Russia, and plans were discussed for the formation of a Polish army from the Poles scattered through the ranks of the Russian service.

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The governments of the western Allies, which had refrained from support of Polish independence in deference to the Russian Imperial Government, continued to refrain in deference to its memory despite the generous leading of the Provisional Government. One of the last acts of the Tsar's régime was the negotiation with France of a secret understanding whereby Russia promised to aid her ally to recover Alsace and Lorraine, to acquire the Saar, and to detach the left bank of the Rhine from Germany, in return for which Russia should have a free hand on Germany's and Austria's eastern frontiers—in other words, in determining the future of Poland. This agreement was not repudiated, and the spirit which it typified dominated the policy of the Allies toward Poland through the rest of 1917. Neither France nor Great Britain would make a definite commitment on the Polish question during this year.⁷ There are several explanations for this attitude of the Allies. The foreign offices were not inclined to break away from a long-established course and hesitated to accept the new order in Russia as permanent. From the French point of view the erection of an independent state between Russia and Germany would seriously affect the value of the Franco-Russian Alliance, since in a future war Russia would be unable to attack Germany without violating the

⁶ Full text is given in Filasiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 151, Doc. 75.

⁷ Except to allow the Poles to organize an army to fight the Germans on the Western Front. This episode is described below.

neutrality of the new Polish state.⁸ Furthermore, Entente diplomats cherished the hope of detaching the Dual Monarchy from the German Alliance, and they were therefore unwilling to commit themselves in support of any national movement—Polish, Czech or South Slav—which involved the loss of Habsburg possessions. Secret negotiations then in progress included proposals for disposing of Polish territories without any particular regard for the wishes of their population.

The most promising of the secret negotiations were those conducted by Prince Sixte of Bourbon between the Emperor Charles and the President of France. The French and British statesmen to whom the Emperor's offer was presented, objected because no mention was made of the Trentino, promised to Italy in the secret treaties of the Allies, but they appear to have been quite unconcerned about the omission of all reference to Poland. As a matter of fact, Poland was to be the bribe offered by Charles to win Germany's consent to the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine.⁹ After Prince Sixte's negotiations broke down, other emissaries continued the discussion in Switzerland. On the 7th of August, 1917, the Entente proposed through Count Armand that if Austria would cede the Trentino to Italy and break away from Germany, England and France would endeavor to secure for Austria, Silesia, Bavaria, and Poland as it existed before the partition of 1772.¹⁰ Despite the unproductiveness of this quiet bargaining, the Allies continued to treat the Monarchy as more to be pitied than censured, and every move to bring Allied support to the subject peoples encountered determined opposition.

These negotiations illustrate two interesting aspects of

⁸ This is the explanation Mr. Balfour gave Colonel House in 1916. Mr. Balfour thought that the establishment of a Polish state would be sufficient to end the Alliance between Russia and France. *Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Vol. 12, p. 181.

⁹ G. DeManteyer, *Austria's Peace Offer*, p. 229. A letter from Charles to the Crown Prince of Germany, Aug. 20, 1917.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 222-3.

Entente diplomacy in respect to the Polish question. In the first place, there was the inherent assumption that when conditions in Russia stabilized, the old balance of power would be established along pre-war lines. In the second place, the foreign offices of the Allies regarded the question of nationalism, and particularly Polish nationalism, much less seriously than it was regarded in America.

* * * * *

Meanwhile in Poland, the German program in the new Kingdom was proving a failure, both in satisfying the expectations of the Poles and in providing the *menschmatteredial* in which the military authorities of the Central Powers were principally interested. This German program, as will be recalled, provided, first, for the establishment of a Polish government, and second, for the recruitment of a Polish army. Neither was realized. The new Kingdom of Poland included only the sphere under the German General Government at Warsaw, the eastern districts under Austrian rule, and the border regions to the north and east remaining under the administration which had been established immediately after the Russian retreat. As their first step in creating the government of the Kingdom, the Germans formed a temporary Council of State, with limited functions, which took office in January, 1917, and included in its membership representatives of right and left parties. Among the representatives of the latter was Pilsudski, who became chairman of the Military Commission. Pilsudski soon discovered that this appointment was merely a detail in the camouflage with which the German government covered the real objective of its Polish policy. Pilsudski's commission had nothing to do with the raising of an army, which was the function of an *Abteilung für Polnische Wehrmacht*. This department of the German General Government at Warsaw set out to build up the Polish armed force, using as a nucleus the Legions which had been

transferred to German control by the Dual Monarchy on April 10. But Pilsudski and the Legions had no intention of being used in this fashion by the occupying authorities, and on July 2 the Polish leader repeated with slight variations the tactics he had employed a year before in Galicia. He resigned from the Council of State, publicly proclaiming his distrust of the German policy. He then returned to the secret tactics of his revolutionary days, bringing into being an underground military organization known as the *Polska Organizacja Wojskowa* (P. O. W.). On July 9 the Legionnaires refused to take the oath prescribed by the occupying authorities of "Fidelity of arms with the armies of Germany and Austria-Hungary." The action of Pilsudski and the Legionnaires demonstrated the bankruptcy of the German policy. Instead of *menschmatterial*, the Germans had brought into existence a hostile force capable of blocking their lines of communication. The military authorities took prompt steps to prevent such an occurrence. They arrested Pilsudski on July 21, imprisoning him in Magdeburg, and the Legions they disbanded. Some of the Legionnaires were interned, and about eight thousand who had come originally from Galicia, were returned to the Austrian Army. The Austrian command revived the *Polnische Hilfskorps* which was sent under Generals Zielinski and Haller to the Bukovina. As for the *Polnische Wehrmacht*, in which the Germans had hoped to enlist 500,000 men, its enrollment never reached more than 2,000, and its loyalty to the occupying authorities was so doubtful that it was never sent to the front.

In the political sphere the shadowy institutions set up under the Manifesto of November 5, 1916, failed as conclusively as in military matters. The administrative measures of the occupying powers had increased the divisions of Polish territory from three to five, and the widely advertised independence of the new "Kingdom" signified nothing even in the restricted area in which it was supposed to

obtain. In the Prussian provinces a new and strong political movement for the reunification of Poland was launched by a Polish Party of National Action, led by Adalbert Korfanty. The Poles who had accepted the November 5 program at its face value had now lost faith. In May, 1917, Poles in the Kingdom demanded that more authority be given to the new institutions, while in the Austrian Reichsrat, meeting on May 30 for the first time during the war, the Polish Club declared for a united Poland as a neutralized state, with control of the lower Vistula and Danzig to ensure access to the sea. The occupying powers, of course, gave no encouragement to these projects. On August 25, 1917, the members of the Council of State resigned, and the Polish Supreme National Committee in Vienna, which had championed cooperation with Austria, gave up in despair and dissolved on October 15.

With the collapse of the Council of State, the Central Powers worked out a new device to preserve the fiction of Polish independence. On September 12 the two Emperors announced the appointment of a Regency Council "by the monarchs of the Powers which are masters of the country" with a reorganized Council of State and a "responsible" ministry. The Regency Council¹¹ took office on October 15, and in November, Jan Kucharzewski formed the first ministry under the new régime. This régime, having been imposed by foreign authority, had no popular sanction and represented no concession to the popular demand for unity and independence. It represented rather the severe "realism" of Ludendorff, whose authority overshadowed the civil governments of Berlin and Vienna¹² and whose hostility to Polish nationalism was as implacable as Bismarck's. Supported by this authority, the Regency endured until the fall of its sponsor a year later.

¹¹ The members were Mgr. Kokowski, Archbishop of Warsaw, Prince Z. Lubomirski and J. Ostrowski.

¹² By the Kreuznach Agreement, May 17-18, 1917, Austria-Hungary renounced her interest in the Kingdom of Poland.

Although the Regency evolved no general popular support, it had some bearing in the international position of the Polish cause. Despite the limitation of its powers it enabled the German government to pose as a greater friend of Polish nationalism than her enemies, none of whom except the United States had committed itself to anything except the program of the defunct Tsarist government. This circumstance, plus the more important influence of the growing popularity of the doctrine of the right of self-determination championed by Wilson, contributed to a change in the attitude of the Entente toward Poland. The new attitude is reflected in the relations of the Allies with Polish emigré organizations.

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It had already been noted that the Polish National Committee, which left Warsaw at the time of the Russian evacuation, later left Petrograd and reassembled in August, 1917, in Switzerland. On the 15th of this month the committee set up its headquarters in Paris, with Dmowski as president, and Paderewski as its delegate at Washington.¹³ Very shortly the Polish National Department in America, which has been formed by the Polish Association represented in the Central Relief Committee to support the war measures of the United States and promote the interests of Poland, and the Council of Polish Parties in Russia, recognized the National Committee as the spokesman for Poland. Then, one after another, the Allied Powers recognized the Committee as the "official Polish organization."¹⁴ This was a useful move, for it permitted the Allies to indicate

¹³ Other members of the Polish National Committee were: Count M. Zamoyski, Vice-President; J. Wielowieyski, Secretary General and Chief of Military Section; M. Seyda, Chief, Press Section; J. Rozwodowski, Chief, Publication Section; E. Piltz, delegate with French government; Count L. Sobanski, and S. Kozicki, delegates at London; C. Skirmunt, delegate at Rome, and F. Fronczak, representative of the Poles of America.

¹⁴ Dates of recognition were France, September 20; Great Britain, October 15; Italy, October 30; United States, November 10.

their benevolent interest in Poland and their disapproval of the German-made Polish government in Warsaw, without committing them to anything whatever respecting the future of the Polish state. A few months later, March 20, 1918, the French government recognized the Polish National Committee as the political head of the Polish army, then forming in France.

Critics of the National Committee and of the Allied Polish policy have charged that this "recognition" was a result of promises by members of the Polish National Democratic Party to raise an army to fight the Germans on the Western Front. In other words, the Allies, like the Germans, were making more or less empty promises to the Poles for the sake of *Menschenmaterial*. The chronology of events does not support this charge, for the project of a Polish army in France antedates the establishment of the National Committee there. At the beginning of the war many Poles volunteered for service in France. There was some talk of organizing a distinct Polish unit, but this was discouraged by the French government, doubtless out of regard for the sensibilities of the Russian ally. The Poles, like other volunteers, therefore, became members of the Foreign Legion. The Russian Revolution and the declaration of the Provisional Government on March 30, 1917, cleared the way for a revival of the projected Polish Army. There was at this time no Polish political organization in France, and the promoters of the scheme were more closely connected with the Russian Embassy than with Polish groups. On May 10 they asked the French government to permit the organization of *cadres* of a Polish army in France. The French government gave its consent on June 4, and further agreed that the new army should carry its own national flag. In Europe the only men available for this force were the Polish volunteers in the French army, and war prisoners of Polish nationality in France, Great Britain, and Italy. The total number of men from

these sources was small, and it was recognized that the new army must be recruited chiefly in America.

The Poles in America, like their kinsmen in Europe, had discussed early in the war the organization of Legions for European service, but the cloudy political situation and, particularly, the neutrality of the United States made this impossible. However, after the American declaration of war, and after the Polish policy of Imperial Germany became known, the Polish-Americans took up again the question of a national contingent for service in Europe. The Union of Polish Falcons (Sokols) Societies at a congress in Pittsburgh voted on April 4, 1917, to form an "army of Kosciuszko . . . to fight by the side of the United States for the liberty and independence of Poland". The compulsory service law, passed by the United States Congress on May 18, 1917, decisively affected the recruiting of Polish volunteers, since Poles of American citizenship not born in Austria or Germany were liable for service in the United States Army. About 100,000 men of Polish blood saw service in the armies of the United States.¹⁵ The recruits for the Polish army had to come from recent immigrants who had not yet acquired citizenship, or from Poles born in the German or Austrian provinces, and from those who lived in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South America. The Polish National Department set up on September 20, 1917, a military commission¹⁶ charged with affairs pertaining to this Polish force. Secretary of War Baker gave the official blessing of the American government to the Polish army a few weeks later (October 6). About 20,000 men volunteered and were trained at Niagara-on-the-Lake, Canada, and at Fort Niagara, New York. Early in June, 1918, the Polish troops were ready to take their place in the lines on the Western Front. After July

¹⁵ *New Poland*, Vol. IV, p. 225, July 1, 1918.

¹⁶ Members were T. M. Helinski, Dr. T. A. Starzynski, and A. Znamiecki.

13, they were commanded by General Haller, who had in the meantime made an adventurous escape from Austria.

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By the end of 1917, although the United States was the only one of the nations at war with the Central Powers to be publicly committed to the Polish solution of the Polish problem, the prestige of the Polish National Committee and those who based their hopes on an Entente victory had greatly increased. At the same time the Polish groups which had hoped that the Kingdom of Poland established by the Central Powers represented a step in the realization of their aspirations had been steadily losing hope. Among the causes of the progressive weakening of the case for the Austrian solution are, first, the growth of influence of the military command in Germany over the civil government, and second, the rapid development of internal weakness in Austria-Hungary. This weakness was reflected in the secret peace negotiations undertaken with the Entente by the Emperor Charles, and when these failed, in a greater subservience of the Dual Monarchy to her ally. The peace negotiations which began at Brest-Litovsk in December, 1917, fully exposed the desperate situation of the Habsburg government.

One of the principal items on the program of the Bolsheviks, who had captured the government of Russia on November 7, was peace. As a first step in the realization of this aim, Trotsky, then Commissar of Foreign Affairs, proposed to all belligerents on November 28 a general armistice. The Entente Allies did not reply to this proposal, but the Central Powers did, and on December 15, an armistice was declared on the Eastern Front. A week later, at Brest-Litovsk, began the solemn comedy of peace negotiations between the Imperial Government of Berlin, the Imperial

and Royal Government of Vienna, and the Government of the Soviets of Russian Workers and Soldiers. Both the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers (Germany openly, and Austria-Hungary by implication) accepted the principle of self-determination of peoples as applicable to the border nationalities—Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Letts, Estonians—, but both attempted to use this principle in the promotion of their own designs. The Bolsheviks, therefore, objected violently to the presence at Brest-Litovsk of the delegates of the non-Bolshevik Ukrainian Rada.¹⁷ The Central Powers refused peremptorily to allow the newly established Kingdom of Poland to take any part in the discussions which were to fix its frontiers. The Germans insisted that self-determination should be worked out while their troops were on hand to see that the peoples concerned determined their future as the Germans thought best.¹⁸ The Bolsheviks demanded that the Germans evacuate these

¹⁷ The Ukrainian delegates at Brest-Litovsk were the representatives of the Central Rada which had been nominated in April, 1917, by a National Ukrainian Congress at Kiev. The Rada at first proposed that the Ukraine should form a state in federation with Russia, but after the Bolshevik Revolution it proclaimed a Ukrainian Republic, and on January 9, 1918, announced its complete independence. At the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, the Ukraine was being overrun by deserters from the Russian front and menaced by Bolshevik forces from the north.

¹⁸ Influential Germans were by no means agreed as to what to do with Poland. At Kreuznach on May 18, 1917, the German Chancellor, Michaelis, Ludendorff, and Czernin had agreed on three points: (1) the reunion of Lithuania and Courland to Germany; (2) the attachment of the Polish Kingdom to Germany; and (3) the disinterestedness of the Dual Monarchy in Russian Poland. Ludendorff, however, was very little interested in the Polish Kingdom, but greatly interested in the strategic improvement of Germany's eastern frontier. In December, he was demanding rectification of that frontier, which would add a million and three-quarters of Poles to those already under the rule of Germany. General Hoffmann opposed this on political grounds, and the Emperor agreed with him. Ludendorff resented Hoffmann's intrusion, and the matter remained in suspense until after the Brest-Litovsk treaty was signed. This question is discussed from various angles by Ludendorff in *Ludendorff's Own Story*, Vol. II, p. 156; K. F. Nowak, *The Collapse of Central Europe*, pp. 14-17; Hoffmann, *The War of Lost Opportunities*, pp. 212-237; Burian, *Austria in Dissolution*, pp. 342-3; Czernin, *In the World War*, pp. 226-230; A. L. P. Dennis, *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia*, pp. 21-25, 29, 38.

territories and give a chance to social revolution, the peculiar expression of Bolshevik Imperialism. Because of these and other differences, the Bolshevik delegates withdrew from the conference, leaving the field temporarily to the Ukrainians, with whom the Central Powers continued to treat.

The Ukrainians demanded for their new state the Bukovina and Eastern Galicia, which were in the Dual Monarchy, and the district of Chelm, which had been a part of the Congress Kingdom since the Treaty of Vienna and was historically Polish. Count Czernin refused to consider the cession of any territory in the Dual Monarchy, and he hesitated to agree to give the Ukrainians Chelm, well knowing the effect that this would have on the Poles. But the Ukrainians were firm,¹⁹ and Austria needed peace. Her principal cities faced starvation, there were bread riots in Vienna, and frantic appeals came to Czernin to satisfy the Ukrainians and so make available the great stores of grain which were reputed to exist in the Russian Ukraine. After a few days of painful indecision, Czernin agreed to the Ukrainian demand for Chelm, and a treaty ceding this territory to them was signed on February 9. The Bolsheviks, threatened by a German advance on Moscow and Petrograd, came back sullenly to Brest-Litovsk, and on March 3 signed the German peace. Poland was not mentioned in this treaty, which provided that territories west of the conventional line should be separated from Russian sovereignty. These territories included Poland and the Baltic provinces. For their part, the Central Powers merely declared their intention to regulate the future

¹⁹ Czernin writes: "... the Ukrainian delegates refused to give way on this point and were evidently supported by General Hoffmann. Altogether the German military party seemed much inclined to support Ukrainian demands and extremely indisposed to accede to Polish claims." Hoffman, however, explains that he intervened to help Czernin, who was on the verge of a nervous collapse and unable to handle the Ukrainians.

of these regions according to the wishes of their populations.²⁰

It was the Ukrainian treaty, rather than the Russian, that reverberated in Poland. The Cabinet of Kucharzewski in Warsaw resigned (February 11), and the Council of Regency publicly protested to the occupying authorities. Poles in the German Reichstag proclaimed the injustice of the treaties, and the Polish Club in the Austrian Diet withdrew its support from the Government and brought on a first-class cabinet crisis. In many towns, notably in Cracow, there were public demonstrations, but the most sensational protest was made by the Polish troops, the remnants of the Legions, which had been brought back into the Austrian army.

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The Polish troops in the Bukovina received the news of the Ukrainian treaty with the greatest indignation. To them it was the final, conclusive proof of the futility of collaboration with the Central Powers. General Haller renounced his allegiance to Austria, and with a majority of the Polish troops broke away from the Austrian army and marched toward the Ukraine. Austrian troops sent against him captured his artillery, his trains, and his rear guard, but some 4,800 men crossed the Russian frontier February 15, 1918.²¹ Although they had escaped from the Austrians,

²⁰ Subsequent negotiations between the Central Powers revealed their method of discharging this obligation. On May 12, 1918, the Emperor William and Emperor Charles decided to go back to the Austrian solution of the Polish problem, but with a slice of the Congress Kingdom annexed to Germany, in order to satisfy Ludendorff's strategic requirements. In order to meet Hoffmann's objections to the placing of more Poles who could not be assimilated under German rule, Ludendorff proposed, in July, 1918, a colossal exchange of population—the expulsion of the Poles and the settlement of 300,000 German families on these Polish lands. Ludendorff, *Kriegsführung und Politik*, p. 179.

²¹ The Polish officers and men captured were interned in Hungary, and in June eighty-eight officers and twenty-four men were placed on trial for high treason at Marmoros-Sziget. In September the Emperor Charles, over the protest of the Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff, ordered the trial discontinued.

Haller's men were by no means out of danger in the Ukraine, for they were cut off from their base of supplies, compelled to live off an unfriendly country, and faced on three sides by the hostile forces of the Germans, Austrians, and Bolsheviki. But Haller's was not the only Polish force in Russia in this predicament.

Proposals during the summer of 1917 to organize a national force from Poles in the then disintegrating Russian army had been approved, after some hesitation, by the Provisional Government.²² About 20,000 men with considerable military equipment were assembled in the region of Minsk under the command of General Dowbor-Musnicki, constituting the First Polish Corps. A Second Corps, with headquarters at Kiev, was formed under the command of General Henning-Michaelis.²³ After the Revolution of November 7, the Bolsheviki attempted to "sovietize" the Polish troops and, when this failed, attacked them. Caught between the Bolsheviki and the Germans, General Dowbor-Musnicki signed on February 25, 1918, a "convention of neutrality" with the latter. A few weeks later the German command invited the First Corps to serve on the Western Front against the Allies, and when General Dowbor-Musnicki refused, his troops were demobilized and disarmed.

The Second Polish Corps in the Ukraine encountered greater misfortunes. Forced by the advance of the Bolshe-

²² In September, 1914, members of the Polish National Democratic Party asked the Tsarist government for permission to raise a Polish Legion in Russia, but the General Staff did not approve. The Staff did, however, permit the formation of a troop of Polish partisans, and a few months later the Russian command on the Southwest Front agreed to the transformation of the troops to a Legion, as a unit in the Russian army. This "Legion of Pulawy" (from the name of its depot) served in the campaign of 1915. At the end of 1916, the Petrograd Ministry authorized the formation of a brigade of Polish chasseurs.

²³ The political direction of these forces was in the hands of the Polish Supreme Military Committee and the Polish Council of Union of Parties, with the advice of the French Military Mission in Russia. Through these bodies General Michaelis was offered the command of the Polish Army in France, which he declined.

viks to evacuate Kiev, General Michaelis moved his troops westward to the Dniester, where they were joined by Haller's contingent. The combined force of about 20,000 men, without supplies or resources of any kind, was now menaced by the eastward advance of the Germans and the southward movement of the Bolsheviks. The Polish Council in Petrograd ordered the corps to move east and cross the Dnieper, and the Regency Council ordered it to stay where it was and take no hostile action against the troops of the Central Powers. Haller and his men had no intention of waiting passively for capture by the forces from which they had recently broken; but Michaelis and about 5,000 men decided to obey the orders of the Regency. Haller and the other 15,000 marched east to Kaniów on the Dnieper, and there on May 10 a German-Austrian force attacked them. The Poles fought tenaciously for four days until the exhaustion of their food and munitions compelled them to surrender. Haller and some of his officers escaped and eventually reached Archangel, where there were other Polish troops which served with the Allied North Russian Expeditionary Force until the Spring of 1919, when this Force was withdrawn. Haller meanwhile went on to France to take command in July 1918 of the Polish forces there.

There were two other Polish detachments besides those mentioned, which were engaged in futile military operations in remote parts of Russia. About 6,000 men under Colonel Czuma joined the Czechoslovaks and anti-Bolshevik Russians east of the Volga and took part in the operations along the Trans-Siberian railway in the winter of 1918-19. After the débacle of Admiral Koltchak's Omsk government, the Poles were interned, to be repatriated after the Polish-Russian Treaty of Riga in 1920. Far to the south, about 4,000 Poles under General L. Zeligowski assembled at Ekaterinodar in the Kuban. In December the Allied fleet in the Black Sea transferred this force along with General Denikine's anti-Bolshevik army to Odessa. The Poles

became part of a Franco-Polish force commanded by General d'Anselme, which remained in Odessa until April, 1919, when it was removed to Rumania. Thus by the end of 1919, the Polish detachments in Russia had been liquidated. The men who composed these forces had suffered the severest hardships in campaigns directed by Allied Military Missions, whose first objective was the reestablishment of the Eastern Front. Later the defeat of the Bolsheviki became the objective in these Russian wars. The interests of Poland were obviously involved, but they were less directly served by the fortitude of Polish soldiers in Russia than were the presumed interests of the Allies.

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In the west, meanwhile, the Polish cause made significant progress in the sphere of Entente diplomacy. During 1917, as described, although the Tsarist government had fallen and its successor had conceded Polish independence, the shadow of the old Franco-Russian alliance blocked specific recognition by the Entente of the Polish program. The Revolution of November 7, 1917, profoundly changed the Entente attitude toward Russia. The Bolshevik negotiations with the Germans, their publication of the secret treaties of the Allies, their repudiation of debts, and their program of world revolution killed the hope of further aid from Russia and added the menace of Bolshevism to that of Kaiserism. Entente diplomats turned to Poland as a substitute for old Russia in the east and a barrier against Bolshevism. In this fashion the Allied governments came to the open support of that independent and united Poland which Wilson had advocated a year before. Lloyd George announced the abandonment of the Tsarist solution of the Polish problem in his speech on war aims before the British Trades Unions on January 5, 1918. He said that while the Allies would not shed their blood for the Bolsheviki and could not save Russia from the catastrophe of their rule, he

believed "that an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form a part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe."

The effect of this declaration was overshadowed by President Wilson's speech three days later in which he stated his Fourteen Points as a program of world peace. One point—the thirteenth—dealt exclusively with Poland and was a more specific restatement of his declaration of twelve months before. *"An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenants."*

This declaration was of supreme importance to Poland because of Wilson's acknowledged leadership in the formulation of world opinion respecting peace,²⁴ because the Fourteen Points were later accepted by the liberals of the Central Empires, and because, eventually, they were the basis on which the armistice was made. It was not, however, a formal commitment of the Allied Powers which the Poles were anxious to secure. They expressed their aims at the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held at Rome in April, 1918, and they pressed the Allied Supreme War Council for a more specific declaration. This came finally on June 3, 1918, when it was announced that the British, French and Italian Premiers had agreed *inter alia* that ". . . the creation of a united and independent Poland, with free access to the seas, shall be one of the conditions of a solid and just peace and the rule of right in Europe."

The public opinion of Western Europe and America enthusiastically approved the Allied declaration of June 3,

²⁴ The French government committed itself to the same program when Pichon stated in the Chamber of Deputies that France would never exclude the cause of Poland from her own, and that she demanded a united, independent, and indivisible Poland with all the necessary guarantees of political, economic and military development.

for next to the "new world order," the "liberation of subject nationalities" was the most popular of constructive war aims. This seeming lack of disagreement among the Allies and the United States had its counterpart among the oppressed nationalities whose future rested on the outcome of Germany's final blow on the Western Front. The common danger contributed greatly to this unity, but when that danger passed, when the retreat of the German armies presaged the victory of the Allies, the currents of opinion began to change and differences began to appear.²⁵ The armistice negotiations and the establishment of temporary national governments on the territories of the Central Empires revealed the conflicting claims and ambitions of the liberated peoples and made the year of peace-making a year of wars on a dozen fronts.

²⁵ In order to present a united front at the forthcoming peace conference, representatives in America of nationalities "wholly or partly subject to alien dominion" formed in October, 1918, the Mid-European Union under the presidency of Professor Masaryk. The union at a convention in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, on October 26, adopted six general principles as a basis of common action. The principles were in line with those enunciated by President Wilson and were subscribed to by the Czechoslovaks, Poles, Jugoslavs, Ukrainians, Uhro-Russians, Lithuanians, Rumanians, Italian Irredentists, Unredeemed Greeks, Albanians and Zionists. General principles did not, of course, remove the specific differences which existed between many of these peoples, and the principal value of the Union was therefore in the sphere of propaganda. The Poles withdrew from the Union on November 9, and the Jugoslavs ten days later, because of conflicts which had arisen with other members.

CHAPTER V

INDEPENDENCE AND REUNION

IN the two months between the middle of September and the middle of November, 1918, the two Empires which, since 1915, had held all the Polish lands, toppled in defeat and revolution, and with them, crumpled the chief external barrier to unity and independence. Independence was quickly established and recognized, but the establishment of the unity and stability necessary to preserve that independence came more slowly. In the way of unity stood the experience of a hundred years under three different régimes and recent political schisms which the four years of war had shaped or accentuated. The pressure of the social and economic problems of the new state rendered internal political differences more menacing and stability more remote. In the last two months of 1918 and the first two of 1919, only beginnings were made in meeting both these problems. In both, America was deeply concerned.

The events in diplomacy which signalized the defeat of the Central Powers and their recognition of Polish independence may be briefly summarized. On September 15, 1918, the Government of the Dual Monarchy asked President Wilson for a statement of terms of peace. On October 4, the newly appointed German Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, proposed the conclusion of a general armistice. In the subsequent negotiations the Central Powers accepted the Wilsonian principles, as stated in the Fourteen Points and later pronouncements, as the basis of the armistice conventions which were accepted by Austro-Hungary on November 3, and by Germany on November 11. The Poles,

as well as the other "subject" races interpreted these requests for an armistice on Wilson's terms as recognition of their independence and proceeded to set up their own temporary governments in place of that of the Central Powers. Three days after Prince Max asked for an armistice, the Polish Club in the German Reichstag declared for an independent Poland, and about a week later the Polish Parties in the Austrian Reichsrat announced themselves citizens of a free and united Poland in accordance with the Thirteenth of the Fourteen Points. Hardly a week passed before the authority which the occupying powers had maintained since 1915 was superseded within the Congress Kingdom. On October 8 the Regency Council at Warsaw issued a manifesto dissolving the Council of State that had been elected under German auspices, and prepared to summon a popularly elected Diet as the Constitutional Assembly. Four days later the Regency took over the administration of the territory formerly controlled by the German government at Warsaw and placed under its orders and under oath to the new state the *Polnische Wehrmacht* which the Germans had organized but had never sent to the front. On the 22d the Regency summoned a new Cabinet under Swierzynski, largely National Democratic and hence anti-German in color.

In the Polish districts controlled by Austria, events took a parallel course. On the 15th of October the Austrian authorities at Lublin agreed to turn over the administration of the eastern districts to the Poles. On the 28th the Polish deputies in the Austrian Reichsrat formed a Liquidation Commission in Cracow to take over the authority in Galicia. This decision brought on no conflict with the Austrians, who relinquished the administrative machinery and state buildings in Western Galicia to the Poles on the 31st, but in Eastern Galicia Austrian withdrawal precipitated a bloody clash between Polish and Ukrainian claimants to the succession. Trouble began on October 30

when the Austrians surrendered authority in Lemberg, which passed to the control of the Ukrainians who had organized a force of men of their nationality recently in the service of the Dual Monarchy. But the Poles, who outnumbered their rivals in the city, assembled their own force of men and boys and gained control of part of the town. Street fighting continued for three weeks; public order was destroyed; while 2,000 criminals freed from the jails made the most of their opportunities. On November 21 Polish reinforcements came and expelled the remaining Ukrainians. Outside of Lemberg, most of Eastern Galicia remained in Ukrainian hands, and the struggle with the Poles for possession of this region soon caused international reverberations.

Further external and internal complications were the result of outrages committed against the Jews in the course of the struggle for Lemberg. Sixty-four Jews were said to have been killed and a considerable amount of property was destroyed before Polish officers' patrols were able to quell the disorders. Sensational accounts of this affair appeared in the European and American press and were used in support of charges that the Poles had organized Jewish pogroms.¹

In the first week of November confusion reigned in all parts of Poland, and unity seemed very remote. The Ukrainians held Eastern Galicia, and the Germans still ruled in Poznania. In Warsaw at the hour Poland was declared a republic on November 3, there were Cabinet troubles, with the Regency on the point of dissolution. In Lublin, the Socialist leader, Daszynski, Pilsudski's old lieutenant, had formed a socialist government on the 7th, declared for a republic, demanded the resignation of the Regency, and published a program of advanced social legis-

¹ See Chapter VII. Accounts of this affair are given in the *Morgenthau Report*, *The Jadwin-Johnson Report* in Sen. Doc. 177, 66th Cong. 2d Sess., and in the *Samuel Report* and the *Wright Report* in *Parl. Papers*, Min. No. 10 (1920), Cd. 674.

lation. In Western Galicia, Austria had surrendered to a temporary Polish authority. None of these improvised governments set up on Polish territory were recognized by the Allies, but in Paris, the National Committee, which controlled no Polish territory, enjoyed Allied recognition as the representative of the Polish nation.

Fortunately for Poland the German revolution released from the fortress of Magdeburg the man who through the vicissitudes of war had become the most popular leader of the soldiers and the masses of the Polish people. Joseph Pilsudski arrived in Warsaw on November 10, and his arrival marked the beginning of a centralization of authority. Political differences between him and the National Democrats were yet to be bridged, but in the meantime his personality and prestige, his popularity with the troops, were the greatest asset of the government which replaced the armies of occupation.

On the day of Pilsudski's arrival at Warsaw the Regency Council solemnly declared the German occupation at an end; Polish soldiers disarmed the Germans who remained; and von Beseler, the Governor-General, left in haste. On the next day, when the Armistice was signed on the Western Front, Polish officials took over executive functions in Warsaw, and the Regency placed the supreme military authority in the hands of Pilsudski.

The Regency Council did not long survive the German authority which had created it, and on November 14 it submitted to popular demand and resigned. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army became Chief of the Polish State. The Lublin Government immediately acknowledged the authority of Pilsudski, who then asked Daszynski to form a cabinet. Immediately afterward Pilsudski notified the belligerent and neutral governments that an independent Polish state had come into being.²

² Diplomatic relations with the German Republic were maintained until December 15,

Daszynski's attempt to form a cabinet largely of the left parties failed because of the opposition of the right parties in the Congress Kingdom and the even stronger opposition of the conservatives of Poznan and Galicia, who declined to cooperate with a government which seemed to be entirely made up of Galician Socialists and peasants. Moraczewski, another Socialist, had better success and on the 19th formed a government moderately socialist in character, without the cooperation of the Poznanians. The Moraczewski Cabinet, thanks to Pilsudski's prestige, remained in power for the next two months, but it did not advance Polish unity, for the Poznanians held aloof, maintained a customs frontier between Poznan and Congress Poland, and refused to acknowledge the authority of Warsaw.

These Poznanian Poles, meanwhile, had encountered a very different situation than their kinsmen in Galicia and Congress Poland, for the German authority was much more deeply rooted, and not easily dislodged. One of the manifestations of the German Revolution which dethroned the Princes and put the Socialists in power, was the formation of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils more or less on the Russian model. Such councils sprang up in Poznan among the German inhabitants along with Popular Councils among the Poles. The stage was set for a sanguinary conflict between the two groups, but the Poles, following the tradition of their long conflict with the Germans, did not attack the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, but joined them and in many places got control of them. This was a considerable achievement, but it did not bring Polish independence. On November 18, therefore, the Polish members of the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet, meeting at Poznan, decided to form a Supreme Popular Council, and straightway, while Germany and all Eastern Europe seethed in revolution, the Poznanians carried out an orderly election of delegates. This supreme Popular Council met on December

3, set up an Executive Committee of six members,³ notified the Allies of its existence, and, ignoring Pilsudski's Warsaw government, formally recognized the Polish National Committee in Paris as the representative of Prussian Poland.

The declaration of the Poznanians respecting the National Committee in Paris showed the wide breach that divided Poland between two groups of almost equal strength, neither of which was willing to submit to the other, nor strong enough to enforce its will on the nation. The National Committee, headed by Dmowski and dominated by the National Democrats, had the support of the conservative bourgeois and peasant groups in Congress Poland and Galicia, in addition to the newly constituted Council in Poznan. It controlled the Polish Army in France (commanded by Haller), and it enjoyed the confidence of the Great Powers whose representatives were gathering in Paris to redraw the frontiers of Europe.

On the other side, Pilsudski, the hero of the masses, was installed in Warsaw. Though his organized political backers—socialists and peasant radicals—were less numerous and less influential than the bourgeois parties opposed to him, his personal prestige with the masses was greater than that of any leader on the other side, and at his back was an army rapidly growing in numbers and organization and intensely loyal to him. But Pilsudski's position was weak where that of his rivals was strong—in relations with the Great Powers of the Allied Supreme War Council, whose victory had made them the masters of Europe. Pilsudski's service in the forces of the Dual Monarchy and his brief collaboration with the Germans in the Council of State had not been

³ Among the members were: Adamski, Patron of the Cooperative Credit Societies; Korfanty, a deputy from Silesia who later became prominent in the conflict in Upper Silesia; and M. Seyda, President of the Parliamentary Club and later (1923) Foreign Minister of the Republic. The Germans did not, of course, accept Polish control and severe fighting occurred late in December, continuing sporadically until the Allied Mission arrived on the scene.

forgotten by the Allies, despite the General's later conflict with the Germans and his imprisonment at Magdeburg. More damaging at this particular moment to Pilsudski's standing in the west were his socialist opinions and his long revolutionary career. Bolshevism had succeeded Teutonism as the great bogey of Western opinion, and Bolshevism was an inclusive term making socialists of all complexions suspect.⁴

As the year 1918 closed, the situation of Poland was far from hopeful. Foreign rule had been broken, but Poland was still divided. Division meant not merely weakness in the face of enemies on the frontiers, but weakness before the all-powerful Allies and an ever-present danger that internal political differences might burst into the flame of factional strife. Even more menacing to internal stability were the social and economic conditions in Congress Poland and Galicia,—the residue of war and hunger. The political soil of Poland, naturally unfavorable to Bolshevism, had been prepared by the storms of the last four years for the seed of social conflict, which was beginning to germinate. To escape disaster and profit by the independence won at such cost, it was imperative for the Poles to patch up a political unity which would make it possible to utilize the prestige and ability of Pilsudski in Poland and of Dmowski and Paderewski in Paris, and secure from abroad economic aid—particularly finance and food—to check famine and social disorganization.

The first steps toward political compromise were fruitless. The emissary (Stanislas Grabski) sent by the National Committee to Warsaw in November, and the delegation (headed by Casimir Dluski) sent by Pilsudski to Paris in

⁴ Sisley Huddleston, an able journalist, well-informed respecting the Quai d'Orsay, writes, "Socialism, of course, was taken to mean Bolshevism, and for a long time Dmowski, in spite of, or rather because of, his associations with the late Tsar, his dislike of agrarian reform, and his antipathy to Jews, was supported by the Quai d'Orsay as against Pilsudski, who was regarded as dangerously advanced." *Peace Making at Paris*, pp. 43-4.

December, failed to bridge the gap. Fortunately Poland had a son who held the esteem of his own people and had won the confidence of leaders and public opinion of the western nations, and possessed qualities of statesmanship of the highest order. Ignace Paderewski reached Paris from America on December 15, and after conferring with representatives of the Allies and the United States and with the Polish National Committee, left for Poland on the difficult mission of conciliating and unifying the diverse political groups of his nation. A few days later—December 22—the first step was taken to meet Poland's urgent need in another sphere. On that day Hoover sent the first American Food Mission to Warsaw.

On Christmas Day, 1918, Paderewski landed at Danzig from the British cruiser *Condor*. From Danzig he went not to Warsaw but to Poznan, where he received a tremendous ovation from all classes of people. Paderewski's arrival in Poznan coincided with an uprising during which a hastily raised Polish force under General Dowbor-Musnicki gained control over most of the territory in this region claimed by Poland. Legally, the territory was still part of Prussia, and desultory fighting continued until at the conference of Trènes in February, 1919, the Allies laid down a temporary line of demarcation.

From Poznan Paderewski journeyed to Warsaw where he was received with great popular enthusiasm on New Year's Day. These demonstrations of Paderewski's popularity undoubtedly had an important bearing on the political situation in Poland, but they did not immediately produce the compromise between the rival groups which the situation demanded. The discussions were still deadlocked when Paderewski visited Austrian Poland and at Cracow received his third great ovation. The culminating effect of Paderewski's triumphal journey was to demonstrate that despite the differences born of years of dismemberment and political strife, the Prussian, Russian and Austrian portions

of Poland were united in their faith in the man who had been their foremost champion in the west.

While the Paderewski-Pilsudski negotiations were still in the balance, an event occurred which decisively revealed the lurking dangers of the existing political situation. On the night of January 4, (the day the American Food Mission reached Warsaw), a group led by Prince Sapieha attempted to overthrow the Socialist Government. The conspirators arrested the Premier and some of the other ministers, but they failed to reach Pilsudski and his Chief of Staff, and the plot completely collapsed. The following day Pilsudski released the ministers and locked up several of the conspirators, and there were no further disturbances. Fortunately this affair did not break up the negotiations and on Paderewski's return to Warsaw on January 7, conferences were resumed.

More effective than conspiracies like the Sapieha affair in bringing pressure on the Socialists to agree to a coalition government was the refusal of important groups to cooperate with the Moraczewski cabinet and the hostility of the Allies to a government by a single party. The propertied classes, lacking faith in the Socialists, were unwilling to support the loans which the government offered, or to pay the taxes which it attempted to levy. There were unmistakable intimations that the Allies would do nothing for Poland in the way of military supplies or financial support unless a more representative government was established, which included the Conservative as well as the Socialist party. Paderewski, moreover, represented more than the Polish National Democrats; he represented a majority of the Poles in America, and behind him was a friendly world opinion and the confidence of the American government. Under these circumstances, a compromise was made by which the Moraczewski cabinet resigned and Paderewski became Premier and Foreign Minister on January 16, 1919, with a cabinet representing the different

parties and also the three different divisions, Galicia, Poznania, and Congress Poland.

Paderewski's assumption of the Premiership is a landmark in the history of the restoration of Poland. The new state was able to present a united front at the Peace Conference, which had its first session in Paris two days after the new cabinet assumed office, and was represented in her Prime Minister by one of the most notable and influential personalities at that historic gathering.⁵ Immediately after the news of Paderewski's appointment reached Paris, President Wilson, through the Secretary of State, sent his wishes for success in the new office and gave official assurance that it would "be a source of gratification to enter into official relations with you at the earliest opportunity; and to render to your country such aid as it is possible at this time. . . ." Further indication of the significance of Paderewski's appointment was the Allied decision on January 22 to send a political and military mission to Poland.

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The establishment of a coalition government with Paderewski at its head was a great step toward unity and stabilization, but it was only a step. It did not provide the means of supplying food to thousands of half-starved people, nor did it start the factories to give employment to a great industrial population. In short, it was not in itself a guarantee that the social structure of the new state could withstand the forces which had broken and shattered empires of long standing. America was privileged to aid Poland in defeating these forces, which marched with famine and economic demoralization. The dispatch of the Food Mission to Warsaw was the first move in the American campaign. Before noting the conditions which this Mission found and the steps which it took to meet them,

⁵ Poland's other delegate was Dmowski. Dluski, Pilsudski's appointee, was alternate.

it is desirable to tell briefly how an American Food Mission came to be established in Europe, and why it was able to deliver American food to Poland six weeks after its first contact with the situation.

In the summer of 1918, Hoover, then United States Food Administrator, was engaged with plans for maintaining the food supply of the Allies and the United States through another winter of war. But by October, it was apparent that the Central Powers would be defeated, that the war would be likely to end before winter, and that the problem of supplying the Allies with food would be on an entirely different basis. The cessation of hostilities did not solve, it merely changed the food problem. The Allies became less dependent on America, but in Central and Eastern Europe there was the most acute food shortage, which was one of the important causes of the collapse of the Central Powers. The declaration of an armistice would not provide any food, and if famine were to be averted and the social structure of Europe preserved, the relief of these regions would have to be organized. In October, Mr. Hoover placed the situation before President Wilson and with the President's approval laid plans to rush supplies to Europe on the cessation of hostilities. On the 7th of November the President asked Hoover to undertake the extension of Belgian and other reconstruction and relief work as soon as the Armistice was concluded, and on November 12 he directed the Food Administrator to go "at once to Europe to determine what action, if any, is required from the United States and what extensions of the food administration organization, or otherwise, are necessary in order to carry out the work of the participation of the United States Government in this matter and to take such steps as are necessary to temporary relief."

Hoover arrived in Europe on November 23 and immediately established the nucleus of an organization which in the next five years was to carry out a series of relief

operations which covered Europe from the Rhine to the Urals and from the Baltic to the Caspian. Within a week of his arrival abroad the SS. *West Lashaway* sailed from the United States with a cargo of supplies for relief.

Hoover found that the Allied governments had plans for the management of relief not easily reconciled with American tradition and experience. Briefly, the Allied plan placed the administration of relief, for which America must necessarily furnish the bulk of supplies and finance, in the hands of a committee of representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on which the United States, as a minority of one, would have been unable to control the use of American supplies. Hoover's plan left to each state the control of the relief supplies it contributed, with an inter-Allied body to coordinate the measures undertaken.

Agreement was difficult. The discussions were long, and time slipped by while the situation in Central Europe became steadily worse. Knowing that famine would not wait for these discussions to end, Hoover went ahead with the investigation of conditions and preparations for the allocation of the first cargoes to reach Europe. On December 11 one of his representatives went to Germany; on December 20 another left for Serbia; and on the 22nd others left for Berne and Vienna to get in touch with the situation in Austria and Hungary. On the 22nd, as we have seen, Dr. Kellogg and Colonel William R. Grove, accompanied by Jan Harodyski, left for Warsaw to make arrangements for Polish relief. The swiftness and directness of Hoover's action are significant. Had he delayed until an inter-Allied agreement for relief had been reached or until the new states had organized their governments, the supplies, which reached their destinations at the moment when they were most needed to preserve life and public order, would have arrived too late.

Kellogg and Grove reached Warsaw on January 4, 1919, while the conferences between Pilsudski and Paderewski

were going on. Without waiting for the outcome of these conversations and without attempting to bring to bear any of the tremendous pressure which their position placed in their hands, they began discussions of the food situation with the Chief of State, the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Approvisation, Agriculture, Railways and Finance, the President of the City of Warsaw and various delegations of citizens. At the end of two laborious days they had completed their preliminary estimates, based on local data, of Poland's food needs, and had under way arrangements for unloading, transport and distribution of the expected cargoes.

Preliminary investigations indicated that of a population of 27,000,000 in territories claimed by the Polish Government more than one-third, or about ten million, were unable to provide themselves with enough food to maintain health. Some could provide a little; many were totally destitute. On the basis of these estimates the tentative American program involved importation of supplies sufficient wholly to care for two and one-half million people, or as many more on part rations as demanded. This involved the importation of 348,250 metric tons, consisting of flour, 216,000 tons; beans, peas, and rice, 72,000 tons; fats, 54,000 tons; condensed milk, 2,400 tons; and miscellaneous articles, 3,850 tons.

Destruction and confiscation of crops, and mobilizations and deportation of manpower were the chief factors in the problem of food production and supply. Of scarcely less importance was the depletion of farm stocks. From over 1,020,000 horses available before the war in eastern and northern districts, 800,000 were left. The Bolsheviki in their advance after the German withdrawal in November, 1918, seized 240,000 head, leaving about half the normal requirement. This left from 600,000 to 750,000 acres of producing land entirely untilled because of the lack of

horses. In other parts of Poland, the Germans and Austrians had requisitioned horses for the army and for agricultural purposes, leaving the country in a condition which, if not remedied, would indefinitely prolong the food shortage.

Cattle stocks were as depleted as horses, not by slaughtering for local use, but by the requisitions of the occupying forces,—the Germans with systematic efficiency, the Russians by taking the animals they wanted when and where ever they could get them. The total cattle in the country before the war amount to some 3,100,000 head, including calves. After the Germans withdrew there were but 2,200,000. In many sections cows were used in land cultivation, further reducing beef, fat and milk supplies.

After making a preliminary report, the Americans made a rapid inspection of the regions in greatest need. They found that at Lodz there were from 250,000 to 300,000 persons belonging to families whose breadwinners were unemployed. The textile mills were closed and not likely to open, for there were no raw materials, no markets, and much machinery had been carried off to Germany or destroyed. Local relief measures furnished some of these people with a quart of cabbage soup daily, and a piece of unpalatable war bread, but this ration was insufficient, and relatively few received it. Families were crowded in dilapidated dwellings, one family or more to a room, without beds, bedding or blankets. In the Dabrowa mining districts conditions were no better.

As they travelled through the district of Pinsk in north-eastern Poland, where agriculture rather than industry is the means of livelihood, the Americans were met at each station along the way by delegations who begged for bread and nothing more. The situation in Pinsk has been described by H. N. Brailsford, the English journalist, who visited that city a few weeks later:

"Nearly every shop in the broad streets of wooden houses is closed. There is literally nothing to sell. The four Jewish Co-operative Stores are all closed. I found the Catholic Co-operative Store open, however, in a Franciscan Monastery on whose walls a late seventeenth-century fresco showed the saint preaching in a powdered wig and peach colored coat to the birds. I examined its whole stock with care. Its stock consisted of salt, and of literally nothing else. Up till the departure of the Germans there was food in Pinsk. The ration was small, and the quality was bad, but it was very cheap and it was fairly distributed. . . . The people are now almost too weak to help themselves, and though there are woods not far away, it is hard to find a man, and harder still to find a horse, fit to fetch fuel. The birth-rate had fallen last year (1918) from a normal thirty-one per thousand to seven. The death-rate had risen from fifteen to twenty-nine. The figures today must be very much worse. Old women came crying round me like gibbering Homeric ghosts, so light they seemed, murmuring that they were cold, and children with white lips, pinched faces, and transparent hands. This day was, I hope, the worst for Pinsk. Five trucks of American flour were expected in the evening."^a

The area around Brest-Litovsk and Pinsk contained about 500,000 people. Of this number, 200,000 had managed to stay in the country or to get back to their homes during the German occupation, while 300,000 had returned after the Armistice and after the occupation of that region by Polish troops. All of these 300,000 had to be fed. Perhaps one-half could pay for their food; the other half, or 150,000, had to be furnished food free or given the means of earning money to purchase it.

The territory east of the Bug River, from Vilna to Lemberg, presented the most desperate problem of Poland. Practically no crops were harvested in 1918, only meagre stocks existed here and there, and the means of communication were few and primitive. Daily the situation grew worse, for the advance of the Polish army eastward added to this territory constantly, and more and more people

^a *Across the Blockade*, pp. 77-78.

were coming across the Bolshevik lines, expecting to find relief. In the desolate country along the marshes of the Pripet River, winter would fatally intensify the hardship. Thousands would die unless aid could immediately be given.

For causes which have been mentioned in an earlier chapter, Galicia was not normally self-supporting. Crops here in 1918 were greatly below normal, owing to lack of seed, implements, and farm animals. Importations were now urgently necessary to allow the creation of stores at railway points as near as possible to serve the remote mountain districts throughout the winter in the period of worst need. Particularly in the neighborhood of Lemberg, the scene of military operations during the war and of the later Polish-Ukrainian fighting, conditions were as bad as in any district in Poland. Of the situation in a region along the slopes of the Carpathians, one of the relief investigators, Captain Merion Cooper, wrote: "Of the 100,000 people in this district, 70,000 are producers and 30,000 non-producers. Of these 70,000 producers even in normal times, 20,000 produce a very small part of the food necessary for themselves, as they own less than an acre of ground per family. At this writing the people are unable to develop their crops on account of the great migration of young people to America and because they are cut off from going into Hungary to work and take pay in grain." The only sections of Poland which were self-supporting were the central agricultural regions, the district about Cracow, and Poznan. The stocks, however, in these self-supporting regions provided no surplus to carry the burden of feeding the rest of the country.

These first American investigations fully confirmed the earlier estimates of Poland's desperate economic situation. They also confirmed the fact that the new state could not possibly meet this situation by its own efforts, no matter how ably made. To secure the food necessary to prevent famine, large funds were required with which to buy, trans-

port and distribute the supplies. It was necessary to have connections abroad, particularly in America, through which to secure the desired materials in competition with other nations long established. It was necessary to have influence in the political and economic organization of the Allied and Associated Powers to secure permission to penetrate the blockade still in force, and to find the shipping for which there was the most intense competition. The new Polish government could accomplish unaided practically none of these things. The aid which America gave in Poland's fight against famine and economic disintegration was delivered while the new government was prevented from giving its full energy to internal affairs by the conflict of diplomacy or arms, which it faced on all its frontiers. These conflicts were most intense in 1919 and 1920, and during those years America gave her greatest economic and diplomatic support to Poland. Because the character of this support was so various, separate chapters are devoted to the different phases of American activity. The reader should, therefore, bear in mind that all of the six chapters which follow relate to those critical years, 1919-20, in the history of Poland's restoration.

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE OF THE FRONTIERS, 1919-1920

The formation of the Paderewski ministry and the arrival in Warsaw of the American Food Mission were the beginning of the unification of political administration and the defense against famine and economic demoralization. The same month (January, 1919) that saw this hopeful progress in these spheres saw also the election of the Diet, which served as a constituent assembly and provisional parliament until the adoption of the new Constitution in March, 1921, and the election in November, 1922, of a Senate and *Sejm*, under the new laws.¹ In this month, also, Poland was recognized by the Great Powers, when on January 18 her plenipotentiaries were admitted to the Peace Conference in Paris. This recognition of the Polish State did not, however, determine the very important matter of what territories the new state was to include. Even after the German and Austrian treaties were signed and the Peace Conference had dispersed, the frontiers of Poland were still undetermined. Not until four years after its recognition as a state were the last of the Republic's boundaries confirmed by the Great Powers. Neither the Great Powers nor Poland was responsible for this delay, but rather those historical


¹ The elections of January 26, 1919, on the basis of universal suffrage and proportional representation, were held only in Congress Poland and Western Galicia. In Eastern Galicia the Polish-Ukrainian conflict was raging, and since elections were impossible, the former members of the Austrian Reichsrat from this region were appointed members of the Diet. Poznan was still legally a part of Germany, but after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles (June 28, 1919), the Polish Supreme Popular Council of Poznan sent deputies to Warsaw.

processes already referred to which made the frontiers of this state the most complex and obstinate of the territorial problems before the Paris Conference. The high pitch of nationalist emotion, the ambitious aims of national leaders, and the presumed interests of Western European Powers added enormously to existing complications. Six or seven special commissions of the Peace Conference, in addition to the Supreme Council, had a hand in drawing up the clauses of the Versailles Treaty which related to Poland and yet, as has been said, that treaty left the major part of Polish frontiers in suspense.

The basis of the Polish territorial settlement was the Thirteenth of the Fourteen Points, which had been accepted by the Allies, by the Central Powers, and by the Poles. It provided for "an independent Polish State . . . which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea. . . ." ² The Thirteenth Point, in turn, was based on the principles of nationality and economic necessity, though Wilson and his advisers realized that it would be impossible to apply both principles without conflict.³ In practice it proved to be impossible to apply the nationality principle without serious modification, or to restrict the economic principle to outlets to the sea. No frontier could be drawn which did not either consign other

² The Allied Supreme War Council's declaration of June 3, 1918, made the establishment of a "united and independent Polish state with free access to the sea . . ." a war aim. It appears that in discussion with Wilson, Dmowski and Paderewski had urged that the historical principle be adopted as a basis for the Polish settlement. They finally accepted Wilson's statement of the nationality principle, but in the controversies at Paris the Polish representatives (and others) frequently appealed to history. See Mermeix, *Le Combat des Trois*, Ch. XVI.

³ The report on "War Aims and Peace Terms," by S. E. Mezes, D. H. Miller and Walter Lippmann which Wilson used in formulating the Thirteenth and others of the Fourteen Points, recognizes this conflict. "Its (Poland's) boundaries shall be based on a fair balance of national and economic considerations, giving due weight to the necessity for adequate access to the sea." R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Vol. III, p. 37,



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nationalities to Polish rule or leave Poles under foreign rule, and the economic principle came to include not merely ports, but rivers, railways, mines and oil lands. In this situation, the Poles' claims inevitably clashed with those of their neighbors, and since there were many neighbors, there were many clashes. Objections, complaints, charges of imperialism, were made against the Poles by so many that the impression gained great headway in Great Britain and America that of all the clamoring nationalities, the Poles were the most troublesome, with the least justification. Polish representatives, it is true, were not notably modest in their claims, but in that they did not differ greatly from the representatives of other powers, great or little. Certain military activities of the Polish government in 1919-1920 gave color to the "imperialist" charge, but here, also, other powers furnished abundant precedents. In short, while the Poles were by no means immune from territorial ambitions, not justified by the nationality or the economic principles, their case was not an isolated one, for most of Europe suffered from the same disease.

The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference⁴ formally took up the matter of Poland's frontiers on January 29, when it listened to a five-hour presentation of the Polish case by Dmowski and authorized the appointment of an inter-allied Mission to Poland to investigate on the ground and report. On February 12 a Commission on Polish Affairs (known also for a time as the Polish Liaison Committee) was set up to receive for the Supreme Council the reports of the Mission to Poland. Two weeks later (February 26) the Supreme Council instructed the Commission on Polish Affairs to examine and report on "the question of the

⁴ At this time the Supreme Council was the Council of Ten, composed of the heads of states of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States, and two representatives of Japan. Later the Supreme Council was divided into the Council of Four (Clemenceau, Wilson, Lloyd George, and Orlando) and the Council of Five, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the four powers and a Japanese representative,

boundaries of the Polish State.”⁵ The Commission sat from February to December, 1919, dealing first with the Polish-German frontier, concerning which it made its first report the 12th of March, 1919, and later, after the signing of the German Treaty, with the eastern frontiers of Poland.

In attempting to draw the Polish-German frontier, the Commission encountered all those difficulties relating to the application of the nationality and economic principles that had been foreseen and some new ones, that had not. For example, the opponents of the Poles declared that the linguistic test was not a fair or reliable proof of nationality. They insisted that though the Slavic people of the Allenstein area in East Prussia spoke a Polish dialect, they were not Poles at all, but Masurians; that the Poles of West Prussia were not Poles, but Kashubians; and that those of Upper Silesia were Wasser-Polnisch. Plebiscites held later in two of these regions showed that in one case the linguistic test did not prove nationality, and in one it did.

The labors of the Commission also revealed that Poland's frontiers could not be divorced from the broader questions of European politics, and, therefore, that the attitude of representatives of the Great Powers on this matter was determined not so much by the application of the Wilsonian principles, as by the measure of their own national interest. The French, for example, vigorously supported the Polish claims to territory previously German, but backed the Czechs against the Poles in Teschen. As for the eastern frontier, the Quai d'Orsay did not push the Polish claims far enough to antagonize irrevocably the old Russian ally.

⁵ The Interallied Mission to Poland consisted of M. Noulens (President) and Gen. Niessel, France; Gen. Kernan and Prof. R. H. Lord, U. S. A.; Sir Esme Howard and Gen. Carton de Wiart, Great Britain; and Signor Montagna and Gen. Longhena, Italy. M. Jules Cambon was the President of the Commission on Polish Affairs, the other members being Dr. Isaiah Bowman, U. S. A.; Sir W. Tyrrell, Great Britain; Marquis della Torretta, Italy; and Mr. Otchiai, Japan. A little later a Committee on the Eastern Frontiers of Germany was set up, composed of Prof. Lord, U. S. A.; Mr. Headlam-Morley, Great Britain; Gen. Le Rond, France; and Marquis della Torretta, Italy.

One reason for French support was the historic friendship for Poland, but a greater one was the conviction that anything which weakened Germany was good for France. In regard to the Polish-Czech controversy, the Quai d'Orsay favored a strong Czechoslovakia and in view of its support of the Poles against Germany, could afford to back the Czechs in Teschen. As for the Polish-Russian frontier, there was still the possibility that the Bolsheviki might be expelled and the Franco-Russian alliance reconstructed. French support of Poland against Germany was in certain obvious respects an asset to the Poles, but in other respects it was a liability. It stiffened British opposition and made the Americans suspicious of the validity of Polish claims. It led President Wilson, who had repeatedly demonstrated his friendship for Poland, to remark that "the only real interest of France in Poland is in weakening Germany by giving Poland territory to which she has no right."^a

The British, though in favor of the restoration of Polish unity and independence, were not eager to make the new state either very large or very strong. In fact, they believed that a large Poland with numerous racial minorities would be weak and a menace to peace. This led to the point of view, not expressed in so many words, but implied, that it was better for Europe that Germany should have a Polish minority problem than that Poland should have German minority. British hostility to certain Polish claims vigorously supported by the French was a part of the Anglo-French diplomatic conflict which began at the Peace Conference and continued for five years. This conflict did not, of course, originate in the Polish Question, but in the general problem of the balance of power in Europe.

The Americans stood between the French and the British. They were less conscious of and little interested in questions of balance of power, and hence stood resolutely for the application of the Wilsonian principles as far as they could be

^a R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Vol. II, p. 60.

reconciled with the existing conditions. They opposed placing large numbers of Germans under Polish rule for the sake of weakening Germany, and they objected to leaving large Polish communities within the German state on the British theory above mentioned. The historian Kozicki, Secretary-General of the Polish Delegation, wrote that, "The Americans desired that Poland should obtain neither too much nor too little, but only what belonged to her." This attitude caused the American representatives to agree to the first British demands for revision of the original frontier proposals and to oppose the later, more radical revision which the British delegation proposed.

Of the other two powers represented on the Supreme Council, the Italians, though not very active in these questions, were in general pro-Polish. The Japanese intervened scarcely at all in the Polish dispute.

On March 12, 1919, the Polish Commission reported to the Supreme Council on the Polish-German frontier. The following were the principle recommendations:

1. In Poznan and West Prussia the western limit of Polish ethnographical majorities to be made the frontier between Poland and Germany.
2. Danzig and the whole length of the Danzig-Mlawa-Warsaw Railway to be given to Poland.
3. All regions in Upper Silesia with a Polish majority to be assigned to Poland except a small area in the extreme south to be given to Czechoslovakia.
4. The city of Memel and the surrounding districts to be ceded by Germany to the Principal and Associated Powers.
5. The disposition of the Allenstein region of East Prussia to be determined by a plebiscite.

Items 4 and 5, though the subject of some controversy, were not at all serious as compared with the others. Memel was a German city in a Lithuanian district. Here as in many other cases, the nationality and the economic principles clashed, for Lithuania needed Memel as an outlet,

and Memel's prosperity depended on the Lithuanian hinterland. The cession of the district to the Allies and Associated Powers was a temporary expedient, as at that time there was no Lithuanian government recognized by the Great Powers, and the future of that state was undetermined. The city and surrounding district remained under Allied control until January, 1923, when the Lithuanians carried out a bloodless coup d'état, and the town came into their hands. The draft convention for Memel, drawn up by the Council of Ambassadors in 1923, was unacceptable to the Lithuanians, and in September the question was referred to the League of Nations. The League asked Mr. Norman Davis, former Under-Secretary of State of the United States, to serve as chairman of a special investigating commission. Davis succeeded in unraveling the tangle, and a revised convention was signed by the Allied Powers and Lithuania in May, 1924.

The Allenstein area had a population of over 550,000, of whom slightly over half were Polish in race and language, but Protestant in religion. The plebiscite held here on July 11, 1920, resulted in 363,209 votes for union with East Prussia, and 7,980 for union with Poland. The whole area was, therefore, assigned to Germany.

The proposals respecting Poznan and West Prussia aroused considerably more controversy. Poznan, as we have seen, was the cradle of the Polish race, and West Prussia has been the scene of centuries of Teutonic and Polish competition. The Poles in this conflict had succeeded in maintaining a belt of territory along the left bank of the Vistula through to the Baltic, thus cutting off the Germans of East Prussia from the Germans of the western district of West Prussia. A "racial" corridor, therefore, already existed and the Commission proposed to recognize it by political boundaries which would, unfortunately, cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany. An equally important reason for

this proposal was that this corridor was necessary if Poland was to have that "free and secure access to the sea" which she had been promised and which was necessary for her economic life. The corridor proposal was consistent with the nationality principle, and though it violated in certain respects the economic principle, it did it to a less degree than the alternative, which was to leave Germany in possession and cut Poland off from the sea. Any settlement would have been unfavorable to some of the population in this region, but as the Allies pointed out in their reply to German objections in the corridor, ". . . the interests which Germans in East Prussia, who number less than two millions, have in establishing a land connection with Germany, is less vital than the interests of the whole Polish nation in securing direct access in the sea."

Closely related to the corridor proposal was another which assigned the city and district of Danzig, with a population of 300,000 overwhelmingly German, to Poland. The reason for this recommendation was that without the port of Danzig the corridor would be useless as an access to the sea since it contained no other harbor.⁷ Here was a clear violation of the nationality principle in order to satisfy economic necessity, but the only alternative was to jeopardize the economic life of Poles and Danzigers.

More explosive even than the Danzig proposal was that which recommended the division of Upper Silesia, making the Polish-German frontier the western boundary of the ethnographic Polish area. This meant cutting off from Germany an area of about 11,000 square kilometers with a population of nearly 2,000,000 in which the Poles consider-

⁷ The Commission also proposed that a small region around Marienwerder, with a population of 138,000 predominantly German, should be given to Poland to assure control of the lower Vistula and the one direct railway line between Danzig and Warsaw. Recognizing that this was a very broad violation of the nationality principle and that Marienwerder was historically a part of East Prussia, the Supreme Council decided that the fate of this district should be decided by a plebiscite. The vote on July 11, 1920, gave a large majority for union with East Prussia

ably outnumbered the Germans. Here the Commission was following the nationality principle ⁸ as in West Prussia, but here other objections were raised. Whereas Poznan and West Prussia had been Polish during the greater part of their history, Upper Silesia had been separated from Poland since the Twelfth Century and hence was not, it was argued, historically Polish. The Poles replied that although their kindred in Silesia had been under alien rule for hundreds of years, they were still Poles, and their desire for union with their race was greater than ever before.

Supplementing this historical argument, the Germans appealed to an adaptation of the economic principle. Upper Silesia possessed great economic wealth. Before the war it had produced twenty-three per cent of the annual coal output of the Empire, eighty-one per cent of the zinc, thirty-four per cent of the lead and large quantities of steel and iron products. The Germans were responsible for the economic development of the region; Germany required its production; division would destroy its economic value; and, therefore, no part should be given to Poland. The Poles answered that the industrial resources of Upper Silesia were as necessary to Poland as to Germany and that Polish labor had contributed its share with German capital and administrative skill in the economic progress of the territory.

Although the proposals of the Polish Commission were with one or two exceptions based on the nationality principle, Lloyd George attacked the report in the Supreme Council on the ground that the principle of nationality was being violated. He pointed to the fact that over 2,000,000 Germans would be placed under the control of a people "which is of a different religion and which has never proved its capacity for stable self-government." His argument was applicable only to Danzig and one or two small sections, but by inference it was applied to the whole plan

⁸ An exception was the district of Leobschütz, which was German in race and was cut off by the Polish regions from the German part of Silesia. This was assigned to Czechoslovakia.

of settlement. It ignored the fact that though the areas like West Prussia and Upper Silesia assigned to Poland contained Germans, a majority of the population was Polish. He adopted the doctrine of "superior races," assiduously preached by German and Magyar nationalists, that it was both dangerous and wrong to place "vigorous and powerful" races under less talented people such as the Poles, Czechs and South Slavs. There were warm debates in the Supreme Council. Clemenceau backed the Polish Commission's proposal, and Wilson was converted to compromise only in the cases where the nationality principle was clearly violated.⁹ The British Premier's insistence produced several changes in the Polish Commission's proposed frontier. The most important change concerned Danzig. The Supreme Council, knowing that a plebiscite (as was ordered for Marienwerder), would merely show the well-known German majority in Danzig and contribute nothing towards giving Poland the promised outlet, sought a compromise. Recalling the fact that as a Hansa town, Danzig had been for many centuries outside the political frontiers of Germany, and recollecting the precedent of Napoleon, the Supreme Council decided that the city and the German area adjacent to it should be a Free City with its own government under the guardianship of the League of Nations. A High Commissioner of the League should act as arbitrator between the Danzigers and the Poles. The city was placed within the Polish customs union, its foreign relations were in the hands of the Republic, which was also to exercise a kind of economic control over the means of communication. Two conventions between the Free City and Poland, signed at Paris on November 9, 1920, and at Warsaw October 24, 1921, regulated their relationship. Meanwhile, on November 17,

⁹ The clashes in the Supreme Council are described by C. T. Thompson, *The Peace Conference Day by Day*, pp. 251-3; H. W. Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, Vol. II, pp. 296-7; S. Huddleston, *Peace-Making at Paris*, pp. 133-4; Mermeix, *Combat des Trois*, p. ch. XVI. Lloyd George's arguments are given in *Parl. Papers*, Cd. 1614 (1922).

1920, the Council of the League of Nations approved the Constitution of the "Free and Hanseatic City of Danzig."

Although the Danzig controversy generated a great deal of heat, it was a temperate affair when compared with the Upper Silesian dispute. Despite British objections the conditions of peace handed to the Germans on May 7, provided that the part of Upper Silesia with a Polish majority should go to Poland. On the 29th of May, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau presented the voluminous German reply which objected strenuously to the loss of Upper Silesia. In the meantime there was great excitement in Germany, where the decision was interpreted as merely a part of the Allied determination to dismember Germany and prevent her recovery as a great power. All this strengthened Lloyd George's opposition, and he was now convinced that unless concessions were made, the Germans would refuse to sign the Treaty. Many others, notably General Smuts, held the same view and urged that the Upper Silesian decision be reconsidered. There were further lively discussions by the Big Three, and finally the British Prime Minister won Wilson to his point of view, and the Allies on June 16 notified the Germans that a plebiscite would be held to determine the fate of the territory.

The plebiscite, provided for in Article 88 of the Treaty, was not held until March 30, 1921, and during the two years' interval Upper Silesia was in a turmoil of industrial and civil strife. The Germans worked feverishly to strengthen their hold on the area, while the Poles, led by Adalbert Korfanty, staged unsuccessful revolts in August, 1919, and again in August, 1920. The International Commission sent to maintain order and prepare for the plebiscite was far from harmonious, for the British favored the Germans, the French the Poles, while the Italians sustained an harassed neutrality.¹⁰

¹⁰ The United States did not appoint a representative to the International Commission. There were Americans in various other Upper Silesian Commissions in 1919. See Chapter VIII.

In contrast to the disturbances that preceded and followed it, the plebiscite was a solemn and orderly affair, and its results were not far from the expectation of experts. In the whole of the Upper Silesia plebiscite area, the German vote amounted to 707,605 and the Polish to 479,359. According to zones, there were German majorities in the northwestern and western-central of about four to one and five to four respectively, while in the southeastern and eastern-central there were Polish majorities of over two to one and five to four. Thus it appeared that the western portions should go to Germany and the eastern to Poland. But the region through which the frontier had to be traced was densely populated, crowded with mines and factories intricately bound together by a net of economic organization. So mixed was the population that it was impossible to draw a line strictly on the basis of the plebiscite returns, but so concentrated were the industrial establishments of the basin that to push the line east in this case meant the assignment of a greater part of the economic resources to Germany, while to push the line west meant giving them to Poland. In view of the conflicting points of view of the British and French members, it is not surprising that the Plebiscite Commission could not agree on how much consideration should be given to economic and geographical factors, and on whether Poland or Germany should be the principal beneficiary, if there were departures from strict application of the nationality principle. The Supreme Council, equally divided, finally on August 12, 1921, referred the matter to the Council of the League of Nations. The League Council rendered its decision on October 12, 1921, and it was accepted by the Allies on the 20th of that month. The League then appointed a Commission, consisting of a former president of Switzerland as chairman, with a German and a Pole, to conclude a convention to carry out the terms of the award. The convention was finally signed on May 15, 1922, and the ratifications were exchanged on June 3.

On the 9th of July, 1922, the last Allied troops, which had been sent to the region before the plebiscite, were withdrawn.

The League award, a compromise between the British pro-German and French pro-Polish lines, did not divide equally the industrial assets of the basin. The greater portion went to Poland, constituting an accession of economic resources of great value to the new state. Poland's share included, among the important items: fifty-three of the sixty-seven coal mines; 91.5 per cent of the accumulated pithead stocks; eleven of the sixteen lead and zinc mines; twenty-one of the thirty-seven blast furnaces; nine of the fourteen steel and rolling mills; and all of the zinc and lead foundries of the basin.

The award aroused a violent storm of protest in Germany and considerable criticism in England and America among those who had accepted the German thesis that Upper Silesia was "economically indivisible," and since there was a German majority in the whole area, no part should go to Poland. A calmer view leads to the conclusion that like the Danzig compromise, it made the best of a very bad matter. It necessitated a surgery on the economic life of the region, which produced results sometimes absurd and sometimes monstrous, but in view of the temper of national feeling not only in Poland and Germany, but in France and Britain, drastic surgery was the only treatment. Readjustment of economic life in Upper Silesia has been slow but considerable, accelerating with the stabilization of economic conditions in Europe. The Polish-German convention remains in force until 1937, with the Upper Silesian Mixed Commission and the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to supervise its execution and settle private disputes between nationals. By that time both economic and political difficulties should be settled.

The Germans of Upper Silesia and of Prussia have not given up hope of recovering the Silesian territory lost to

Poland. With ability and thoroughness they have worked so to improve conditions on their side of the frontier that the Poles on the other side will ask for the restoration of German sovereignty. Private and official bodies like the *Vereinigte Verbaende Heimattreuer Oberschlesier* and the *Ostausschus* labor in different spheres to bring this about. On the Polish side one finds the not unusual spectacle of a violent factional quarrel between the followers of Korfanty and Grazynski, an adherent of Pilsudski. As a result of German unity and Polish factionalism, the Germans polled 43 per cent of the vote in the communal elections of November, 1925. The task of the Poles is to prove their capacity in self-government and to place the national interest above the advantage of faction.

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Just south of Upper Silesia lies the Duchy of Teschen, which though much smaller, produced an angry controversy and a miniature war between the Poles and the Czechs. In many respects the Teschen problem was similar to the Upper Silesian. The Duchy was of great economic importance because of its coal mines, of strategic importance because of its railways, and difficult to divide because it constituted an economic unit. Linguistically, a little over 54 per cent of its population spoke Polish, 27 per cent Czech, and 18 per cent German. The Czechs, however, argued that this linguistic test was not a proof of nationality, since among those who spoke Polish were the native Silesians and Slonzaks, who were not really Poles, and recent immigrants from Galicia, who were not really permanent residents. The Czechs further supported their claim to the whole of the Duchy by pointing out that historically Teschen had had a longer connection with Bohemia than with Poland. As in Upper Silesia, a Polish majority did not exist in all parts of the Duchy. In the northeastern part the Czechs and Germans together were more numerous

than the Poles; in the western part the Poles were also in the minority; but in the central and eastern regions the Polish-speaking majority was pronounced. The Germans in general were settled in towns where they formed the middle class, and German capital, as in Upper Silesia, was largely invested in the mines, factories and large landed estates.

Some months before the end of the war, the Czech and Polish leaders recognized that the Teschen question had controversial possibilities, and in May and June, 1918, Masaryk, the head of the Czech National Committee, and Paderewski discussed the matter in Washington and agreed that it should be settled by friendly negotiations between the Czech and Polish governments in the event of the defeat of the Central Powers. When Austrian authority collapsed in October, 1918, the Polish *Rada Narodowa* and the Czech *Narodni Vybor* took over provisional authority in the midst of great confusion. On November 5 the two bodies established a provisional frontier on an ethnographical basis, and a central committee, made up of seven Czechs, seven Poles and five Germans, was to be formed for the distribution of food supplies for the whole Duchy.¹¹ In the important mining area six pits went to the Czechs and ten to the Poles.

In January, 1919, the truce broke down, and there was some skirmishing between the Czechs and Poles which lasted until the 5th of February. This incident caused the Supreme Council to attempt a settlement between the opposing parties.¹² On January 31, it appointed a commission with the usual mandate to investigate and report. The

¹¹ American food supplies began to enter the Duchy of Teschen a few months later, when the A.R.A. Mission to Czechoslovakia was established.

¹² This was the occasion of Mr. Lloyd George's famous remark in the House of Commons on the 16th of April, 1919: "How many members have heard of Teschen? I do not mind saying that I had never heard of it, but Teschen very nearly produced an angry conflict between two allied states, and we had to interrupt proceedings to try and settle the affairs in Teschen."

Commission at the end of March suggested three possible solutions: the maintenance of the Duchy as a neutral state; division along ethnographical lines; or division along unsettled hydrographical lines. The Supreme Council, having little faith in any of these solutions, urged the two republics to settle the question between themselves. The Poles and Czechs debated until the last week of July, 1919, when the question was referred back again to the Supreme Council after the Czechs had refused to agree to a plebiscite which the Poles demanded. The Council then decided, on September 27, to hold plebiscites for the whole Duchy, as well as for the disputed region of Spisz and Orawa. In the meantime peace and coal production in the mining area were maintained largely by Americans on the Coal Commission.¹³

The Interallied Plebiscite Commission reached Teschen on January 30, 1920, and prepared for the plebiscite. In the coal regions, however, where the agitation of the nationalists of the two republics was most aggressive, there was much friction and some disorder. These events, greatly exaggerated in the press of both countries, raised the temperature of the controversy. On May 18, 1920, a bloody riot broke out in Teschen, and the miners in the Karwin district went on strike. Convinced that a plebiscite could not be carried out, the Interallied Commission referred the matter to the Ambassadors' Council at Paris, which in turn called on the Czechs and Poles to resume direct negotiations. Shortly afterward the two governments agreed to a suspension of the plebiscite and to accept the decision of the Allies, and at Spa in July, 1920, the Supreme Council laid down the principle on which the Duchy should be partitioned.

The Supreme Council based its line of division on the river Olza, assigning to Czechoslovakia the whole of the

¹³ See Chapter VIII.

Karwin mining area and the important Oderburg-Jablunka railway, with a suburb of Teschen through which it passes. To Poland went the venerable city itself, which was a Polish castellany in the Twelfth Century and since 1848 has been a center of Polish literary and political activity. With the city the Poles received a rich agricultural area with undeveloped coal deposits west of the Olza, and the textile industries of Bielitz. At the same time the nearby districts of Spisz and Orawa, formerly parts of Hungary, were divided, the northern portions going to Poland and the southern to Czechoslovakia.

Like the Upper Silesian settlement there are many features of the Teschen award which from the economic point of view are extremely bad. Time will heal the economic wounds, and in the meantime public opinion in both countries has calmed down and a serious conflict has been averted.

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There are many reasons why the determination of Poland's frontiers in the east caused greater political confusion and more savage conflict than in the west. Although the regions in dispute in the west contained a mixed population, they were made up almost entirely of the peoples of the two claimants—as for example, Germans and Poles in the Corridor and Silesia, and Poles and Czechs in Teschen. In the east, on the other hand, many of the inhabitants of the disputed districts were not of the race of the chief claimants—Poland and Russia—but of other races, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, White Russians, Jews, who were aggressively demanding their national rights in one form or another. Still another difference was the status of the government of the chief rival of Poland in the east. The Soviet government had neither representatives nor champions at Paris, and such support as was given to the Russian

claims was in deference to the Russian Political Conference,¹⁴ representing anti-Soviet groups, rather than to the Bolsheviks. The Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Jews all had their representatives at Paris, but they were not admitted to the Conference, nor officially recognized as the plenipotentiaries of independent states.

The fighting between Polish and Ukrainian partizans in Eastern Galicia, which had continued since November, 1918, and the charges and counter charges of both parties' representatives in Paris forced the Supreme Council, a few weeks after its first meeting, to interest itself in the affairs of that region. On February 24, 1919, it asked the Poles and Ukrainians to cease fighting and directed the Allied Military Mission in Poland to secure an armistice. The opposing commanders agreed to a truce, but four days later it was broken. On March 19, the Supreme Council sent further telegrams to Generals Rozwadowski and Pavlenko, requesting an immediate truce and offering to permit both sides to present their case at Paris, subject to the suspension of arms. General Kernan, an American member of the Allied Mission to Poland, delivered the telegrams at a conference with the two commanders on March 27. The Poles agreed to the suspension of arms on condition that the Ukrainians would accept the terms of the armistice drawn up the previous month. This the Ukrainians refused to do, and in spite of General Kernan's efforts, the war was resumed.¹⁵

Having failed to secure a truce between the commanders in the field, the Supreme Council next attempted to bring about a settlement of the dispute through representatives

¹⁴ Among the members of this group were S. D. Sazonov, Tsarist Minister of Foreign Affairs, B. Maklakov and Prince Lvov, first head of the Russian Provisional Government. They represented such anti-Bolshevik military movements as those of Koltchak in Siberia, Denikine in the Ukraine, and Judenitch in the Baltic.

¹⁵ See Gen. Kernan's confidential report to President Wilson, April 11, 1917, in R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, III, Doc. 24.

of the Poles and Ukrainians¹⁶ in Paris. For this purpose on April 2, it set up, under the presidency of Gen. Louis Botha, a Commission for the Negotiation of an Armistice between the Poles and Ukrainians, which immediately began the preparation of a draft armistice convention. This convention was placed before the Poles and Ukrainians in Paris on May 12. The Ukrainians accepted it, but the Poles declined on the ground that the security of Poland against the Bolsheviks could not be assured without the military occupation of Eastern Galicia. Botha referred the matter back to the Supreme Council, which on May 27 telegraphed Pilsudski that if Poland refused to accept the decisions of the Council, the Allied and Associated Powers would no longer be justified in furnishing Poland with supplies or assistance. Pilsudski replied that the reason for Poland's position in this matter was fear of a combined attack by the Bolsheviks and Germans, in case the Treaty were not accepted. In the face of this possibility, he argued that it was necessary to effect a juncture between the forces of Poland and Rumania.

¹⁶ The Ukrainian delegation at Paris represented not only Eastern Galicia, but the Ukrainian Directory in South Russia, the legatee of the Central Rada which had signed a treaty with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk on Feb. 9, 1918. Shortly after Brest-Litovsk, the Germans had dispersed the Rada, which was Socialist but not Bolshevik, and set up a government under Gen. Skoropadsky, a conservative landowner. On the defeat of Germany in the west, Skoropadsky's government collapsed, the Rada returned, and appointed a Directory of five which included W. K. Vinnitchenko and Gen. Petlura. In the meantime the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia on the collapse of Austria had formed a National Council which established a Secretariat of State and a provisional constitution for the Republic of the Western Ukraine, which was to include Eastern Galicia and parts of the Bukovina and Hungary. On Jan. 4, 1918, the Ukrainian Republic of the West formed a union with Russian Ukraine, each preserving its own government, but under the supreme authority of the Directory of which Petlura was now the head. On Feb. 10, 1919, the representative of the Directory asked the Supreme Council for recognition of their republic, which embraced all Ukrainian lands in the former empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary. Recognition was not given, and the Supreme Council was rather at sea as to what it was being asked to recognize.

Before the Supreme Council, which was racked by dissensions over the German Treaty at the time, was prepared to enforce its threat against the Poles, the situation in Eastern Galicia had very significantly changed. The Ukrainian attack on Lemberg failed, and the Poles, reinforced by Haller's army recently arrived from France, drove the Ukrainian forces from the country and forced the government of the Western Ukraine to flee to Vienna. The Supreme Council when it next took up the question, took an entirely different attitude and on June 25 authorized Polish military occupation as far as the River Zbrucz, the old boundary between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

Events outside of Eastern Galicia likewise had a bearing on the policy of the Supreme Council. After defeating successively the Ukrainians and Denikine's¹⁷ anti-Bolshevik forces, Trotsky's youthful Red Armies swept across the Ukraine. In Hungary, meanwhile, the power slipped from the hands of Karolyi into those of Lenin's protégé, Bela Kun, and there was much talk of Red Armies from Russia breaking through the Carpathian passes to join the Hungarian Communists in a thrust at the heart of Europe. Paris, near the point of hysteria on the subject of Bolshevism, was looking for materials to build a *cordon sanitaire*, and for this purpose the broken Ukrainian forces were not promising. In Paris itself there was dissension among Petlura's representatives, a pro-Russian group favoring the union of Eastern Galicia with the Russian Ukraine in a Russian federation, while the anti-Russians planned an independent Eastern Galicia, as the Piedmont of a great,

¹⁷ The Bolsheviks drove the Ukrainians from Kiev in February, 1919, and were shortly expelled by Denikine in his victorious northward thrust from Odessa. Denikine refused to collaborate with the Ukrainian "traitors" and roused the country through which he passed into bitter antagonism. Shortly his forces began to disintegrate and were soon in flight to Odessa, which was evacuated by the Russians and the Allied forces sent there under French command. The conservative Russians with Denikine appear to have been as hostile to the Ukrainian Directory as to the Soviet, an attitude shared by the French command.

independent Ukrainia. Under the circumstances of Ukrainian weakness and dissension, it appeared to the Supreme Council that Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia and a juncture with the Rumanians was the best way to close the gap in the anti-Bolshevik *cordon*.

The undoubted existence of the Ukrainian national sentiment and the opposition of this people to union with Poland led the Supreme Council to consider a number of schemes which might make the Polish occupation less of a violation of the right of self-determination. There was some talk of giving temporary occupation of the country to Czechoslovakia or Rumania. Another scheme was to divide Eastern Galicia by running a line east of Lemberg and Drohobycz, but this was satisfactory to neither Poles nor Ukrainians and would have left a fragment of a state without resources or ability to defend itself. Finally all the delegates except the British came to favor turning over all of Eastern Galicia as a natural unit to Poland, with certain safeguards and stipulations to protect the interests of the Ukrainians. A plebiscite, it was felt, was impossible under existing conditions and without the supervision of a strong Allied force which was not available. Therefore, in spite of strong British protests, the Supreme Council authorized the continuation of the Polish occupation, and the experts began to work out a scheme of local autonomy for this region within the Polish state.

In the meantime the legal status of Galicia had been clarified and the political status complicated by Article 91 of the Treaty of St. Germain (September 10, 1919), by which Austria ceded all of Galicia to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The legal possessors then (on November 20) proceeded to give Poland a mandate for Eastern Galicia for twenty-five years, at which time a plebiscite should be held. The Poles strongly objected to this arrangement, and in December (1919) the Supreme Council, on French initiative, abandoned it. For nearly a

year, while the Russian-Polish war raged, Galicia remained legally the possession of the Allied and Associated Powers. On August 10, 1920, in the "Certain Frontiers Treaty" signed at Sèvres, these powers ceded Western Galicia to Poland, but not until March 15, 1923, was the status of Eastern Galicia cleared up by its cession to Poland.¹⁸

Scarcely less complicated than the Eastern Galician controversy was the clash of Polish and Lithuanian nationalisms in the Vilna area. The Supreme Council did not at once undertake to settle this sector of the Polish frontier because of the political confusion in Russia and Lithuania and the persistent hope that the Soviets would soon be dispersed and a restored Russian government have a hand in this affair. But the Soviets were neither dispersed nor chastened into recognition of the Supreme Council's authority, and hence both the Vilna question and the Polish-Russian frontier were the issues of an intermittent warfare which lasted until the autumn of 1920.

The Lithuanian national movement had become a considerable factor in Baltic politics before the armistice of 1918. From the time of the occupation of the Lithuanian and Polish lands in 1915, German authorities had encouraged the Lithuanian nationalist movement as a check on Polish nationalism and as a basis on which to establish German hegemony in the Baltic. A by-product of this policy was the *Taryba*—the Lithuanian National Council—which came into being in September, 1917, with a German blessing, as the foundation of a future Lithuanian government. In December, 1917, and again in February, 1918, the Germans recognized the independence of the Lithuanian state with its capital at Vilna, but this recognition, like that of Poland in 1916, was a pallid imitation of reality. Lithuania, by

¹⁸ Of the other former Austro-Hungarian territories claimed by the Ukrainians, Ruthenia (also called Sub-Carpathian Russia) went to Czechoslovakia under the Treaty of St. Germain, September 10, 1919, and the Bukovina to Rumania, under the "Certain Frontiers Treaty," signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920.

one tie or another, was to be joined in "eternal union" with Germany. One scheme was to effect this union with Prussia through the election of the King of Prussia (Kaiser William II) as king of Lithuania; another scheme was a personal union with Saxony. The Lithuanian nationalists, while not unwilling to accept German assistance in their conflict with the Poles, were suspicious of this extravagant German interest. The *Taryba*, therefore, on July 11, 1918, decided to invite Duke William of Urach, a minor German Prince whose family had some historical connection with Lithuania, as the ruler of the country. The German government objected, but in October when Prince Max asked Wilson for an armistice, the Lithuanians were invited to enjoy the right of self-determination in accordance with the Wilsonian doctrine.

The Armistice of November 11 did not mean the withdrawal of German troops from Lithuania. By its terms ¹⁹ the Allies permitted the Germans to retain troops in Lithuania, Courland, and elsewhere in the Baltic to preserve order and to keep out the Bolsheviks until the Allies should be able to take other measures. These German troops caused a good deal of trouble while they remained in the Baltic regions. Those in Lithuania, without previously notifying the Lithuania authorities, suddenly withdrew from Vilna which the Bolsheviks, pressing westward, promptly occupied on January 5, 1919. The Lithuanian government at this time was unable to expel the Bolsheviks, and it remained for the neighbors to the south to rescue the city from the Russians.

The movement of the Red Armies which had resulted in the capture of Vilna was along one of the main routes from Russia to Poland between the Dvina and the Dnieper Rivers. One of Pilsudski's first acts when he took command of the Polish troops was to block this route by taking over the positions abandoned by the Germans and by opposing

¹⁹ Article 12.

the Bolshevik advance where it had penetrated the old front lines. In this campaign Pilsudski was successful, and by the 19th of April, 1919, he had driven the Bolsheviks from Vilna and occupied that city to the accompaniment of protests by the Lithuanians. By the middle of 1919 the Polish forces had pushed still farther east to the line of the Dvina and Dnieper, which they held for the rest of the year. The drive against the Bolsheviks was not pressed, and although some occasional conflicts occurred between Polish and Red troops, there were no serious military operations until the spring of 1920.²⁰

By the time the Poles had established this temporary frontier with their troops, the representatives of the Great Powers at Paris had begun to have a somewhat clearer idea of the situation in the Baltic. In order to put an end to the fighting, which was going on between the Poles and the Lithuanians, the Supreme Council, on July 27, 1919, fixed a provisional line of demarcation, known as the Foch Line, northwest of Vilna. The Poles and Lithuanians in the meanwhile were attempting by direct negotiations to settle the controversy over the Vilna area and the future relations between the two peoples. Their discussions did not make much progress, for the Polish suggestion of a federal union between the two countries with the understanding that Vilna should be recognized as Lithuanian, found no favor in Kovno, while the Lithuanian insistence on the return of Vilna as a preliminary to further discussions was equally unpopular in Warsaw.

At Paris, meanwhile, the experts had been at work on a

²⁰ There are several explanations why the Poles did not press the attack against the Bolsheviks at this time, when Trotsky's troops were being attacked on three fronts by counter-revolutionary forces. One is that the Poles were not eager to help reestablish a reactionary government in Russia, which would be even more hostile to Polish independence than the Bolsheviks. See Skryzinski, *Poland and Peace*, p. 39. Karl Radek says that Pilsudski had a secret agreement with the Bolsheviks not to attack them at this time. *Die Auswärtige Politik Soviet Russlands*, p. 55. Another explanation is that the energies of Poland were fully engaged in the Silesian and Galician conflicts.

tentative frontier between Poland and her eastern neighbors. This line, which the Supreme Council accepted on the 8th of December, 1919, and which was subsequently known as the Curzon Line, extended from the East Prussian frontier to the Rumanian border. The line was considerably less than was then held by Polish troops, much less than the frontiers of 1772, and considerably less than the present boundary, as drawn in the Riga Treaty of March 21, 1921.²¹ The Supreme Council did not intend this line as a definite limit to the Polish claims to the east, but rather as a minimum, representing what the experts regarded as territory indisputably Polish. The Curzon Line left the disputed Vilna area outside the Polish borders, and because of this and its exclusions farther south, no Polish Government would accept it in any sense as the future Polish frontier. It was, however, the only line officially approved by the Allies until the Council of Ambassadors on March 15, 1923, and the United States on April 5, recognized the frontiers established by the Riga Treaty after the Russian-Polish War of 1920.

* * * * *

Much of the fighting on Poland's eastern frontiers in the early month of 1919 was partizan warfare. The participants were sometimes mobs, sometimes contingents of armed men, without uniforms and undisciplined. Civil authority did not exist, and hoodlums and criminals let loose from the jails carried on their depredations without restraint. The regions from Vilna to Lemberg, where the worst disorders occurred, contain the greatest concentration of Jews in Poland outside of Warsaw, and it was the Jewish com-

²¹ This first direct attempt of the Supreme Council to trace the Polish-Russian frontier was based on Art. 87 of the Treaty of Versailles which stated that the frontiers of Poland not specified in that treaty would later be fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The Poles called attention to the fact that the Curzon Line corresponded very closely with demands put before the Supreme Council by the Russian Political Conference composed of ex-officials of Tsarist Russia.

munities which suffered most. Such was the case at Lemberg in November, 1918, during the struggle for the town between mobs of Polish and Ukrainian sympathizers; in Vilna and Pinsk in April, during fighting of like character between Poles and Bolsheviks; and in Minsk under similar circumstances a few months later. Accounts of these affairs quickly spread abroad, greatly exaggerated,²² until it was widely believed that the new Polish government had organized pogroms against the Jews. The Jewish communities of other lands, notably of England and the United States, becoming greatly alarmed, held meetings of protest, drew up resolutions condemning the Polish authorities, and brought great pressure to bear, directly and through public opinion, on the officials of the Allies and the United States.²³ The protestations of the Polish government that it was not anti-Semitic, that the reports were distorted and exaggerated, failed to stem the rising current of hostile opinion. The atrocity charges did great damage to Polish prestige in world opinion and at the Peace Conference, and rival claimants to disputed territories did not fail to make use of the implication that the Poles were a barbarous and undisciplined race, unfitted to administer the border lands which contained other races as well as Jews.

Sensing the disastrous effect of these reports on the international standing of the young republic, and desiring to prevent further trouble for both Poles and Jews, Hoover asked Premier Paderewski to appoint an investigating commis-

²² The Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, Nov. 30, 1918, reported the number of Jewish victims at Lemberg as between 2,500 and 3,000. Local Jews placed the maximum at 76.

²³ On May 21, 1919, a number of American newspapers carried advertisements in which it was stated that Jews were being slaughtered in Poland, that pogroms were being organized from Lemberg to Vilna, from Warsaw to Pinsk, and that the Jewish people had never been set upon by an enemy more merciless, more brutal, more determined, or more powerful. That evening Jewish leaders addressed a great mass meeting of protest in Madison Square Garden. The same day Mr. Goldfogle introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives, asking the President to cause steps to be taken to prevent a recurrence of massacres of men, women and children "in Poland, Rumania and Galicia."

sion. This the Premier did, but the feeling had gathered such headway that a Polish commission had little effect. A few weeks later Hoover suggested that Paderewski ask President Wilson to appoint an independent committee to investigate on the ground, to report its finding, on the basis of which the Polish government should take proper action, and to advise the Jewish community in Poland in regard to its relations with and interest in the new democracy. On June 2, 1919, Hoover wrote President Wilson, urging the appointment of such a commission.

The President appointed Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Brig. Gen. Edgar Jadwin, and Mr. Homer Johnson on this commission, which visited the localities in which the serious disturbances had occurred and endeavored to learn exactly what had taken place and fix responsibility. The British Government also appointed a commission headed by Sir Stuart Samuel for the same purpose. Mr. Morgenthau made his report in December, 1919. His conclusions are given in the following paragraph:

"Just as the Jews would resent being condemned as a race for the action of a few of their undesirable co-religionists, so it would be correspondingly unfair to condemn the Polish nation as a whole for the violence committed by uncontrolled troops or local mobs. These excesses were apparently not premeditated, for if they had been part of a preconceived plan, the number of victims would have run into the thousands instead of amounting to about 280. It is believed that these excesses were the result of a widespread anti-Semitic prejudice, aggravated by the belief that the Jewish inhabitants were politically hostile to the Polish State. When the boundaries of Poland are once fixed, and the internal organization of the country is perfected, the Polish Government will be increasingly able to protect all classes of Polish citizenry. Since the Polish Republic has subscribed to the treaty which provided for the protection of racial, religious and linguistic minorities, it is confidently anticipated that the Government will whole-heartedly accept the responsibility, not only of guarding certain classes of its citizens from aggression, but also of educating the masses beyond the state of mind that makes such aggression possible."

General Jadwin and Mr. Johnson submitted a separate report. Their conclusions were similar to Mr. Morgenthau's:

"By way of summary, we find that beginning with the armistice, about November 11, 1918, and for six months and more during the establishment of orderly government in Poland, many regrettable incidents took place throughout both Congress Poland and the regions, the future of which is still in doubt. The occurrences in Congress Poland were not so serious in number of deaths, but there have been violent collisions accompanied by riots, beatings, and other assaults, which are apparently traceable in large part to anti-Jewish prejudice. In every case they have been repressed by either the military or the civil authorities, but only after grievous results. In the territory occupied or invaded by Polish troops, civilian mobs have followed the soldiery, and the two elements have engaged in robbery of shops and dwellings, and, in cases where resistance was offered, in assaulting and killing the owners or occupants. The circumstances of some of these incidents have been aggravated by intoxication, due to the looting of liquor stores, with the usual adjuncts of criminal irresponsibility and mob rage. We believe that none of these excesses were instigated or approved by a responsible governmental authority, civil or military. We find, on the other hand, that the history and the attitude of the Jews, complicated by abnormal economic and political conditions produced by the war, have fed the flame of anti-Semitism at a critical moment. It is believed, however, that the gradual amelioration of conditions during the last eleven months gives great promise for the future of the Polish Republic as a stable democracy."²⁴

The causes of the disturbances, it was generally agreed, were first, the disturbed and disorganized condition in the eastern regions where the number of Jews is greatest; second, the anti-Jewish feeling, which was partly the result of anti-Semitic propaganda of certain Polish groups, and

²⁴ These reports are published as *Senate Document 177, 66th Congress, 2d Session*. Sir Stuart Samuel's report was somewhat more severe on the Poles. This severity, however, was not concurred in by Sir H. Rumbold, the British Minister at Warsaw, or by Captain Wright, another member of the British Mission. These reports are published as *Parl. Papers, 1920* (Cd. 674).

partly due to the belief that the Jews had sympathized with the ruling powers during the occupation and were now sympathetic to the Bolsheviks in their struggle with the Poles; and third, the attitude of Jewish political groups which were hostile to the Polish state and not satisfied with equality of rights with Polish citizens, but demanded a national autonomy within the state.²⁵

The publication of these reports, the stabilization of political conditions, quieted the agitation over the Jewish question; they did not solve it. The problems of the Jews and other racial or religious minorities retained an unfortunate prominence in the affairs of Poland and the other new states. The well-intentioned Minorities Treaties,²⁶ which the Supreme Council required the new states to sign were an answer to the criticisms of territorial awards which seemed to violate the nationality principle and to Jewish demands for "emancipation," as well as an attempt to mitigate the friction which minorities engendered. Poland, like several other states, objected to the treaty because it was unilateral in its obligations. Poland had to assume obligations respecting Germans in her territories, but Germany was required to make no similar undertaking respecting Poles, and none of the Principal Allied Powers made any treaties whatever covering the treatment of their minorities. Later on, however, Poland and other states accepted the

²⁵ This Jewish nationalist formula was supported by the Zionists, and the right and left Jewish Socialists. The orthodox Jews advocated merely emancipation and equality of rights. The conflict, therefore, was not with "Poles of the Jewish faith," but with "Polish citizens of the Jewish nation."

²⁶ Polish representatives signed the Minorities Treaty on June 28, 1919, at Versailles. It provided that all inhabitants, whether citizens or not, are entitled to protection of life and liberty and to the free exercise of religion, and that all racial, religious or linguistic minorities are guaranteed equality in civil and political rights and the right to use their own language. They are given the right to organize their own religious, educational and charitable institutions and in districts where the minority is a "considerable proportion" of the population, instruction in its language is to be given in primary public schools. Besides Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, Armenia, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey signed similar treaties.

principle of minorities protection in binational agreements, such as those between Germany and Poland affecting Upper Silesia, in May, 1922; Poland and Danzig in 1920, and Czechoslovakia and Austria in the same year. Treaties of this character did not, of course, remove at once the causes of irredentism or the dangers to the political rights and cultural life of the minorities, but they relaxed somewhat the tension of racial conflict. Much more could have been accomplished in this nationalistic relaxation had the Great Powers been courageous or generous enough to apply to themselves the medicine they administered to their smaller neighbors.

The year 1919 closed with Poland's "battle of the frontiers" by no means over. In the west by the Treaty of Versailles, signed in June by a protesting but helpless Germany, the Boundaries were definite except for the plebiscite areas. Poland had received considerably less than she had claimed at the Peace Conference, but more than the Germans and some of the Allies believed she was entitled to. In this connection it is worth recalling that though the Germans vehemently objected to many of the preliminary peace terms, the Supreme Council brushed aside most of these objections; the only concessions made before the Treaty was signed were at the expense of Polish claims. Despite the critical uproar which it caused, the settlement was a fair and reasonable application of the principles of nationality and economic necessity on which the Treaty was based.

In the east no comparable progress had been made. The fronts of the opposing armies were more clearly marked, but Russia, the other state most concerned, was in the eyes of the west an outlaw. Beyond the lines held by Polish troops the voice of the Supreme Council was an empty echo from a hostile world. The eastern frontier was therefore an affair for Poland and Russia to settle, and the method of settlement was war.

PART II
RECONSTRUCTION

CHAPTER VII

THE REVICTUALMENT OF POLAND—1919

THE battles of the frontiers, fought in the hectic atmosphere of Paris with the weapons of diplomacy and on the disputed borderlands with machine guns and bombs, constituted only one phase of the evolution of a New Europe in 1919. Struggles of equal proportions were waged to maintain social order. In these conflicts with an enemy of the elusive resourcefulness of the Old Man of the Sea, the familiar resources of diplomacy and war were useless, and defeat followed wherever they were used. The enemy was called "Bolshevism," and the Communist revolutionists of Moscow eagerly accepted the accusation of paternity. Political and military leaders, taking the father of Bolshevism at his own valuation, schemed to end the depredations of the offspring by the destruction of the parent. But Bolshevism was nourished not on the doctrines scattered by Moscow, but on the despair of hungry, hopeless people in wasted fields and idle shops. The drawing of frontiers in Eastern Europe and the political and military aspects of Bolshevism engaged the energies of the Supreme Council on which American influence was great, but not predominant. The conflict with Bolshevism at the source of its strength, in the economic fabric of the Continent, was the affair of another body which came into being in the early months of 1919—the Supreme Economic Council. The American members of the S. E. C. in a large measure formulated and executed its policies, and since these policies affected Poland, as well as other parts of Central Europe, it is advisable to describe the origin of this body.

It has been told in Chapter V how, without waiting for the Supreme War Council to conclude its discussions of the form of organization of interallied relief, Hoover sent American Food Missions to Poland and elsewhere to investigate and arrange for the delivery of relief. The Food Missions, with the headquarters set up by Hoover in Paris, were the beginnings of what was presently known as the American Relief Administration. Besides getting relief under way, Hoover's independent action forced a decision by the Supreme War Council¹ on the much discussed matter of relief organization. On January 3, 1919, the press carried the announcement that a Supreme Council of Supply and Relief was to be created "to investigate and consider the requirements for relief in Europe and to determine the general policy and measures which should be taken for its execution and its relation to the general supply to allied and neutral countries." At the same time the Supreme War Council accepted the appointment of Hoover as Director-General of Relief for the Allied and Associated Powers.

The Supreme Council of Supply and Relief did effective work in one field—food relief—where Hoover pushed forward the projects he had previously initiated. A Permanent Committee, set up to assist him in coordinating the efforts of the Allies, secured the appointment of British, French and Italian representatives to collaborate with the American Food Missions already on the ground. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this action was that it defeated the attempt then being made to place the administration of

¹ The United States as an "associated" not an "allied" power had been represented on the Supreme War Council since August, 1917, by Col. E. M. House and on the subsidiary Council of Military Advisers by Gen. Tasker H. Bliss. Col. House had authority only to observe and report, and hence his position was not the same as that of the allied representatives who were Premiers or responsible ministers. After the meeting of the Peace Conference, the Supreme War Council became the Supreme Council on which the United States, like the other Great Powers, was represented by the head of its government.



WHEAT AND RYE

POLAND'S FOOD SHORTAGE IN THE RECONSTRUCTION YEARS

Although this diagram shows clearly the striking grain shortage in 1919 and 1921, its showing for later years is somewhat deceptive as an indication of the food needs of children. Poland in the later years had enough grain and from these stocks the Polish Government furnished all the flour for the American feeding kitchens. What the children needed most, in addition to bread, were foods like milk, cocoa, sugar, etc., in grave shortage in Poland. These were furnished from American sources.

relief in military rather than civilian control. In other matters upon which the success of relief depended—shipping, the blockade, raw materials, finance—the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief was less successful, for these matters remained in the hands of national or interallied bodies over which the S.C.S.R. had no authority. Recognizing the fundamental weakness of the S.C.S.R., Hoover proposed to President Wilson early in February the creation of a new council composed of members of ministerial rank and with executive authority in economic matters relating to relief and reconstruction. The President carried the proposal through the Supreme Council, which on February 8, 1919, adopted the following resolution:

(1) Under present conditions many questions not primarily of military character which are arising daily and which are bound to become of increasing importance as time passes, should be dealt with on behalf of the United States and the Allies by civilian representatives of these Governments experienced in such questions as finance, food, blockade control, shipping, and raw materials.

(2) To accomplish this there shall be constituted at Paris a Supreme Economic Council to deal with such matters for the period of the Armistice. The Council shall absorb or replace such other existing interallied bodies and their powers as it may determine from time to time. The Economic Council shall consist of not more than five representatives of each interested Government.

(3) There shall be added to the present International Permanent Armistice Commission two civilian representatives of each Government, who shall consult with the Allied High Command, but who may report direct to the Supreme Economic Council.²

² *Minutes of the Supreme Council*, February 8, 1919. The Supreme Economic Council as finally established consisted of: The United States, represented by Herbert Hoover, Vance McCormick, Norman Davis, H. M. Robinson (vice E. M. Hurley and Bernard M. Baruch); the United Kingdom, by Lord Robert Cecil, J. M. Keynes, Sir Wm. Mitchell Thompson, Sir H. Llewellyn Smith; France, by Wm. Clementel, Klotz, Loucheur, Boret; Italy, by Signors Crespi, Chiesa, Pirelli, Attolico. Many members of the various peace missions attended and took part in meetings of the S.E.C. and its sections.

Under the terms of its mandate the S.E.C. went promptly to work, taking over the functions of various interallied bodies such as the Allied Maritime Transport Council, which became the Transport Section of the S.E.C., and the Permanent Committee, Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, which became the Food Section of the S.E.C.

* * * * *

While this work of organization was going on, the American Food Mission to Poland was not idle. The Kellogg-Grove investigations and conferences with Polish officials revealed not only that vast stocks of food were needed, but that no time at all could be lost in delivering them. In such a critical situation it was impossible to wait even for a settlement of finances before starting food on the way, and it was essential to rush all the preliminary arrangements for transport and delivery. The Americans, therefore, went ahead with food delivery, while Paris, Washington and Warsaw still discussed ways and means. Fortunately food ships were soon in European ports for just such emergencies, thanks to the fact that Hoover had started supplies from America before the investigations began. The first three ships, carrying cargoes of wheat flour transshipped from Rotterdam, reached Danzig on February 17, and by midnight of the eighteenth the first train of forty cars with six hundred tons of flour had crossed the German-Polish border at Illowa to reach Warsaw the next day. By February 22 all three ships had unloaded, and during February fourteen thousand tons of food reached Poland.

The size of these and subsequent shipments and the speed with which they were made give a false impression of the conditions under which food deliveries were handled. The revictualment of any country after four years of war is difficult, but Poland was a special case with individual problems which complicated the task a hundredfold. Its frontiers were still undetermined; wars were still fought on its

borders; and its government was inexperienced. In spite of its strong national impulse to independence, the country was divided in habits of thought, in background and experience by its long years of separation in three parts under three alien governments and by the fact that, especially on its borders, it contained people of various races and religions. In towns and cities labor was idle, depressed and hungry. Agricultural production was at low ebb after the war, and the continued battles on the frontiers prevented recuperation there and increased the number of homeless people. Money and credit were almost non-existent in the new state, and with railroads disorganized, communications and trade with adjoining countries disrupted, and the main port of entry, Danzig, in the hands of a hostile people, supplies could not be delivered and reconstruction begun without the intervention of outside agencies as mediators between Poland and her neighbors. Theoretically the Food Mission of 1919 was to deliver food to the Polish government which distributed it to the people, but in reality it was necessary for those who were delivering food to take responsibilities in relations with other governments, in finance, and even in local distribution which normally would not have been theirs. Consequently the story of revictualment and relief is a tale of the constant, active contacts of the Food Missions, the A.R.A., and the various Allied and American technical missions with even the minor details of Poland's life in 1919 and the succeeding years.

* * * * *

Danzig was clearly the best inlet to Poland for food supplies, but because it was a German city desired by Poland as an outlet to the sea, the relations between the Poles and the Germans were so strained that the port could not be used without the intervention of Allied authorities. Permission was secured in January, 1919, through the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Council of Supply and

Relief. The next step was to investigate the port for its technical facilities, the possibility of mines in the vicinity, and the draft and number of ships that could be accommodated, and to arrange with German and Danzig officials for the guarantees and assistance to be given in unloading the food and guarding and transporting it to the Polish border. This was done in January by American officers of the Food Mission,³ who soon realized that while the port was ideal in many respects, the political situation was such that they must use the greatest tact in availing themselves of its facilities and must act as mediators between the Germans and the Poles in every detail of the operation. The point of view of the Germans is suggested in the following order by the President of the Police of Danzig, published in the *Danziger Neuste Nachrichten*, February 8:

It is the national duty of all inhabitants of Danzig to protect these goods, for in case of robbery most serious consequences threaten us on the part of the Entente, in whose power it is to deliver Danzig to the Poles.

We must avoid at any price giving the Poles the occasion of stating that only by way of cession to them of West Prussia, with Danzig included, can they get an unhindered communication with the sea.

As to the details of transporting the food, the local officials in conference with the Americans made the following statements:

1. That they were short of locomotives to transport the food to the Polish border, and were forced to negotiate with the Entente for a supply of locomotives.
2. That while they would allow the use of German cars to carry the food, they required a written guarantee for the return of empties by the Poles within 48 hours of delivery.

³ The American Staff at Danzig included Major James Webb, Captain Frank Baackes and Lieutenant Chauncey McCormick. The last named made preliminary arrangements with thirty German and Danzig officials on January 21, and the others came from Warsaw, February 10, with Polish representatives, to complete the arrangements and receive the food. The U. S. Navy, also, assigned Captain David Hanrahan to Danzig to assist the Food Mission.

3. That since they had only a temporary supply of coal for the railway, they demanded that (a) the blockade be lifted for the transport of Westphalian coal, or (b) the difficulties of bringing Silesian coal via Poznan be removed, or (c) a supply of English coal be delivered against payment.

There was also the question of guards for the food both in Danzig and en route to the Polish border, since the Germans doubted if they could supply enough soldiers, and even such minor details as telegraph or telephone communication between Danzig and Warsaw, and Danzig and Berlin and Paris were subjects for debate. There were objections to the presence in Danzig of Polish representatives to check and receipt the food consigned to their government. This was settled only when the Polish representatives signed an agreement, countersigned by the Americans, to abstain from propaganda while in German territory. Whenever possible, the Americans handled such matters on the spot, but many of the questions raised could be settled only after Hoover had taken them up with the Armistice Commission or the Supreme Council, and throughout the food delivery it was necessary at times to have recourse to this higher authority in order to keep supplies moving.

Quite as important, however, as the machinery of transport was the question of the attitude of the inhabitants of Danzig towards this delivery of large quantities of food across German territory to Poland. Germany was as yet receiving no food from abroad, and while conditions in Danzig were far better than in Poland, the Danzigers were not sufficiently well fed to view with equanimity the transshipment of large quantities of food to their enemies across the border. It is significant of the feeling at the moment that the Americans, in choosing the base for their operations, selected the Freihafen Basin because, among other reasons, a high wire stockade surrounded it, with its docks, tracks, warehouses and offices, and "rendered the American docks and ships easily defensible in case of riots." The publication in the

Danziger Zeitung on February 10 of the agreement of the Allied Governments to deliver food to Germany relieved the tension somewhat, although the Germans received the announcement with mixed feelings. Some of the Berlin papers, for instance, at once criticized the financial arrangements, saying that the German gold paid for the food would go to the Allies, and Germany would later have to pay the United States for it. In the course of meeting the food problem at Danzig, the Food Mission negotiated the sale to Germany of a small amount of fats consigned to Poland and the exchange of Polish potatoes for German coal. They also gave workmen at the docks a special food ration, and both of these acts cleared the air temporarily.

Once, in the latter part of March, it appeared that a serious break in the food schedule might occur, just as Danzig had been fully organized to handle the flow of supplies to Poland. Many ships were on the way from America; the port was busy; and outgoing carriers were loaded to capacity. But on March 28 General Nudant, acting for Marshal Foch, submitted a note to the German Government, demanding passage through Danzig for General Haller's Polish divisions in France, and permission for their march into Poland to maintain order. Germany, without refusing, replied with her own interpretation of the Armistice terms, submitted that she had no reason for recognizing the Polish Army, asked for information on its composition and strength, and proposed that it be sent in via Stettin, Königsberg, Memel, or Libau. Germany not unnaturally feared that this transport of troops meant a *fait accompli*, the seizure of Danzig by Haller's troops. But quite aside from that, the American Food Mission knew that the railway from Danzig could not handle both soldiers and food and feared that the presence of Haller's army would cause local disorders in Danzig and close the one channel of food supply to Poland. Therefore on April 2, Hoover wrote to President Wilson as follows:

I have been for many days filled with the greatest anxiety over the feeding of Poland, due to the proposed transportation of troops through Danzig, the absorption of railway facilities, and the conviction on the part of all of our staff that bloodshed and disturbances will break out, probably requiring considerable military occupation. It is not alone the attitude of the German Government, but the local feeling is so high that I do not conceive that these troops can be taken through without trouble from the local people.

I have not hitherto said anything about it, as I assumed that it was the only course to be pursued. I had, of course, made up my mind that there must be a longer or shorter break in the food supply and that the Allies were taking the account of the balance of starving populations versus more soldiers in their calculations. I learn, however, today, from General Bliss, that the Germans show a disposition to transport these troops overland direct from France. I cannot urge upon you too strongly the importance of taking this action and leaving the port of Danzig alone to the food people until its fate has been decided by peace negotiations. These proposed military plans for Danzig, together with the military actions taken at Budapest and other instances through Europe, make the whole problem of trying to maintain stability by food completely discouraging.

Foch and Erzberger met at Spa the next day and on April 4 signed a protocol to the effect that while the Allied right to land troops at Danzig had been maintained, in order to hasten their arrival the German proposal to transport them via Coblentz, Stettin and Königsberg was accepted.

Still later another situation arose which necessitated an appeal to the Supreme Economic Council. The British, early in May, secured permission through the A.R.A. to ship 10,000 tons of nitrates to the Poles for reconstruction purposes. The shipment was held up by the German authorities on May 6 along with several cars of American and British Red Cross supplies. Both the Americans and the British took the matter up with the Armistice Commission. The Germans, apparently wishing to test the powers of Article 16 of the Armistice, by which relief supplies were shipped, demanded guarantees that only food and Red

Cross stores were in the shipments. The British claimed the right to ship whatever was necessary for the maintaining of order. The A.R.A., because it was in close touch with both the Germans and the Poles and was the transport agency for practically all relief societies working in Poland, carried on much of the informal negotiation.

On May 9 the *Danziger Zeitung* published a note from Erzberger to the Allies at Spa which stated that the "American Food Commission for Poland wishes to forward in addition to foodstuffs, sanitary materials, auto tires, automobiles, sewing machines, clothes, tools and other war materials for the Polish army in considerable quantities." Major Webb, chief of the A.R.A. at Danzig, immediately wrote the German General in command protesting against this note and stating emphatically that the A.R.A. was shipping no supplies whatever to the Polish army. He said:

These sanitary materials, rubber tires, automobiles, sewing machines, clothes, tools are for the actual alleviation of suffering and wants in Poland caused by the war. All material sent to Poland through Danzig is either for direct distribution to the needy and suffering or for use in the equipment of various agencies engaged in such relief work whether these agencies are the American Relief Administration, British Mission for the Supply and Relief of Poland, Jewish Distribution Committee, the American or British Red Cross.

He reminded the General that all supplies had been shipped with his full knowledge and requested him to publish the facts as to A.R.A. shipments, and to transmit his letter to the German government. Shortly after this the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council despatched the following decision to the Armistice Commission:

Article 16 of the Armistice places no restrictions on the character of the supplies which can be conveyed to the populations of the territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern front, or for supplies necessary for the purpose of maintaining order, and in the view of the Supreme Economic Council it

would therefore be impossible and highly inadvisable to give a guarantee to the German Government that only food supplies and Red Cross stores are to be transported to Poland via Danzig. It is almost certain to be necessary to import for relief purposes raw materials, clothing and railway repair material. In our view the Germans should merely be informed that they must conform with the letter and spirit of Article 16.

This view of the case was transmitted to the Germans, and the shipments thereupon proceeded.

The incident caused only a minor delay, and meantime relief materials had been reaching Poland in greater quantities each month. The first ships from Rotterdam to Danzig had been of shallow draft, not because Danzig could not accommodate heavier vessels, but because the Kiel Canal was closed and a detour around the north of Denmark necessary, a route limited to ships of 22 feet draft. Consequently the first ships from America direct to Danzig were also of shallow draft, and a fleet of ten Great Lake steamers were used. These Lake steamers were started as soon as reports from Danzig showed, in January, that the port could be used, and when these first direct shipments began to arrive, the expense and delay of reshipping from Rotterdam were ended. In the meantime, the question of what quantities could be transported by rail to Poland from war stocks in Western Europe was investigated, and an emergency shipment, including milk for children, was purchased in Switzerland for the relief of Lemberg and the Dabrowa mining regions. By the end of March the Vistula had been opened to relief shipments, by barge to Warsaw, and the month of April saw fifty-two thousand tons of food pass through Danzig for Poland.

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The arrival of these first shipments in Poland produced no miracle of recovery, but its effect was notable. It was, in the first place, the first delivery of any kind of supplies to Poland after the war and tangible evidence of America's

intention to stand by the new state in its struggle for existence. Consequently the delivery of food greatly strengthened the hand of the Government in preserving order at a time when disorder was born in the desperation of hunger. And because food was delivered first in towns and cities where the greatest emergency existed and workers were almost at the end of their hope and patience, it gave an impetus to the renewal of industry, besides saving the lives of many of a productive population who were facing actual starvation at the beginning of 1919. In general the presence of imported foodstuffs and the evidence that the supply would continue tended to stabilize prices, bring out hoarded stocks, and discourage profiteering. This effect was cumulative, of course, and not immediate, but it was noticed throughout the country, wherever imported stocks arrived. A secondary result of the food delivery, but one of great importance to the hungry, ill and poor, was that by opening the way into Poland and proving that transportation difficulties were not insurmountable, the A.R.A. assisted other societies and agencies to bring relief in various forms. In February and the spring months, the American Red Cross, the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the British and American Friends, and others, sent units to Poland. The A.R.A. acted as transport agency for most of them during 1919, and they established a variety of relief programs, large and small, which were of the greatest value to Poland in the succeeding years.

The maintenance of the revictualment program did not, of course, depend merely on keeping the port of Danzig open and finding ships, cars and barges to move supplies. Large questions of finance had to be settled in order to guarantee a continuous, adequate supply. The first deliveries were made before credits were found, and in January and early February it appeared doubtful that any resources existed to provide the food that Poland needed. Her government discussed finance with Kellogg in January, and

Grove continued the discussion, but no feasible method of meeting the situation was found. As a temporary measure the Government converted 60,000,000 Polish marks into Swiss francs and deposited them in the Polish State Loan Bank to the credit of the United States Food Administration, not as payment, but as security, pending final arrangements. With only this security, which was of little value in relation to the total needed and not negotiable, the Americans continued shipments and delivery in Poland. The first supplies to reach Poland had been financed by temporary measures instituted in America by Hoover before he left for Europe. The Grain Corporation, with the approval of the President, financed half the relief shipments temporarily, the War Department providing temporary finance for the other half. In initiating these measures, Hoover assumed a heavy responsibility which, however, was fully justified by the situation in Europe and which had the President's full support. Had Hoover waited for formal arrangements to be completed, American relief would have been greatly delayed and its value to Poland and other lands faced with famine, vastly reduced.

All this, however, was merely an emergency arrangement and did not provide for a continued, vast revictualment. The Polish government was ready to do anything and everything it could, for food was essential to the nation's very life, yet it was in the position of having practically no resources, of being uncertain even of its own tenure of office, and at the same time unable to start the normal industrial life of the country and attain stability without food. Actually, there was no country in Europe, not even Austria, in which the Americans found conditions more confused or the need greater than in Poland. It should be remembered that when the Food Mission reached Warsaw, January 4, Paderewski had been there only three days and his conferences with Pilsudski, from which the new government emerged, were still going on. Very naturally this govern-

ment, struggling to reunite a long-divided people, immediately found itself in a financial tangle which was even more complicated than that of the defeated powers. For all of Poland's finances had been tied up with those powers, and with Russia.

For instance, among the assets offered to the U. S. Food Mission in payment for food were values due Poland, accrued by Germany during the occupation period of the war to the sum of 800,000,000 marks. These had been kept on deposit in German banks as a basis for the same quantity of Polish marks, issued by the Polish State Loan Bank, a German war creation. Up to the Armistice the Poles had drawn checks against this German deposit, but since that date no transactions had taken place owing to lack of answer from Germany. The credits were fully acknowledged, and it was not believed that the German banks would repudiate them, yet it was hardly possible for the United States Food Administration to accept what might turn out to be, in the confusion of post-war finances, the collection of a bad debt for Poland. It was also suggested that foreign securities and currencies in the Polish Treasury might be used, but there were not enough of them, and they were urgently needed to cover other enormous expenses of national defense and reconstruction. It was also proposed that guaranties of corporate towns be taken in the form of bills of exchange or engagements for future payments, but all city budgets in Poland showed great deficits, and all municipally owned property was so heavily bonded that redemption of further obligations was doubtful.

In short, Poland and the other "liberated" states of Eastern Europe and the Baltic could not mobilize the resources to purchase and deliver the food necessary to check famine and maintain internal stability. Moreover it soon appeared that though the three Entente Powers had undertaken responsibility for 60 per cent of the provisional relief program (Great Britain 25 per cent; France 25 per cent; Italy

10 per cent; the United States, providing the remaining 40 per cent), they were actually not in a position to carry out these obligations they had assumed.⁴ If the necessary relief was to be given the United States must provide the greater part of both supplies and finance.

Fortunately for Eastern Europe steps had already been taken to enable America to meet such an emergency. On November 9, Hoover had written to President Wilson suggesting that Congress be asked to appropriate a sum of money to be used as a revolving fund for European relief. Hoover renewed the suggestion on November 15, and early in December Mr. Sherley introduced in the House of Representatives a bill embodying these suggestions. The bill met opposition in the Committee on Appropriations where it remained until, at Hoover's instance, President Wilson brought pressure for action. Despite opposition, the bill appropriating \$100,000,000, entitled "an Act providing for the relief of such populations in Europe and countries con-

⁴ In fact shortly after the provisional program was agreed upon in the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, Allied representatives suggested a revision of the original estimates of food needs, with a total reduction of some 110,000 metric tons on a program of 416,000 tons. Hoover protested that the original figures had been arrived at "after consultation with the chief officials of the liberated governments concerned and were very much moderated from the estimates provided by them of their present necessities," and added, "I do not feel that I am justified in placing before the liberated governments these arbitrary reductions. It is to me a serious matter that the Council should fail to provide the supplies necessary to give adequate relief against suffering to these liberated countries and to promote their political stability, even though it be accomplished at considerable sacrifice. It must always be borne in mind that the very creation of the Supreme Council at the hands of the four great governments implies immediate remedy to these situations. The gross quantities are not large compared to the world movement. The Allied Governments have, of course, repeatedly expressed their intention since the first of December of participating in these supplies, and as these governments do not find themselves in a position to carry their portions of the whole programmes for February and probably for March, the American representatives are willing to take upon themselves the utmost effort in finance and shipping to meet the different programmes without regard to proportions between the different Associated Governments. The ability of the United States, however, naturally has a limit, and it is a matter of regret that we shall not be able to complete the whole programme."

tiguous thereto, outside of Germany, German-Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey as may be determined upon by the President," passed the House and the Senate and was signed by the President in Paris on February 24, 1919. On the same day Wilson issued an Executive Order, designating the American Relief Administration, under the Directorship of Hoover, to administer the relief and authorizing the A.R.A. to employ the United States Grain Corporation as the agency for the purchase and transport of supplies.

The Appropriation Act solved the major problem of financing relief in those states in which it was applicable. It was especially important to Poland, for it made available vital food credits which she otherwise would have been unable to obtain. The A.R.A. could now accept the obligations of the Polish Treasury,⁶ and the full American revictualment program was assured. Realizing that the assurance of continued American assistance on a large scale would greatly strengthen the new government, Hoover immediately telegraphed to Paderewski that the stream of food from America would continue to flow in increasing volume. To this announcement Hoover added this personal message:

It is now four years since I first attempted in cooperation with yourself to secure the international organization of systematic relief to Poland, and, late as the day is and as great as the suffering of the Polish people has been, yet I witness this day with no little personal satisfaction. It marks a good omen in the road of realization of Polish aspirations to which you have devoted your life.

Paderewski replied on March 15:

Your beautiful message touches me profoundly. I certainly remember all your noble efforts four years ago to assist my country and shall never forget your generous endeavoring, alas! frustrated by the merciless attitude of our common foe. It is a

⁶ In the funding of the Polish debt, which included this and other advances mentioned below, there was a substantial reduction in the amount to be paid in the liquidation of these loans. The terms of the debt settlement are given in Chapter XIII.

privilege for any man to cooperate in your great work, and I highly appreciate the honor of having my name in a modest way associated with yours in the present relief of Poland. The activity of Colonel Grove and his staff is beyond praise, goods of higher quality arriving daily, and thousands of people, after four and a half years of terrible suffering, realizing at last what wholesome nutritious bread is. In behalf of the government I beg to offer you most sincere thanks and with the deepest personal gratitude, I remain, devotedly yours,

I. J. PADEREWSKI.

By February 28, Hoover was able to write Grove definitely as to A.R.A. plans. He said:

Mr. Taft has sent you to-day a letter with the proposed Polish contract showing the credit which the United States has definitely agreed to extend to Poland in the shape of foodstuffs. For these foodstuffs we are prepared to accept the obligations of the Polish Government and we do not desire to make any requirements regarding the further deposit of marks received for this foodstuff. We would prefer that the government make use of these marks for such purpose as it may see fit in the general administration of its affairs. The marks are of little value to us and they may form a very substantial support to the continuance of the present Polish Government. We wish by this operation first to indicate to the Polish Government the confidence of the American people in that government, and further to assist them by allowing the government to use the receipts which they obtain for the sale of these supplies.

The contract between the A.R.A. and the Polish government was signed on April 30 at Warsaw, and called for the delivery on credit of \$8,500,000 worth of foodstuffs monthly from February 1 to the next harvest.⁶ The Polish Diet had been elected by this time and promptly gave authority to the Minister of Finance to execute obligations for this loan. The Polish government agreed to assume minor expenses of the A.R.A. in Poland, such as direct costs of transporta-

⁶ Actually some \$51,000,000 worth of food was delivered, as Poland increased its requests for credit later. Appropriations under the Congressional Act closed June 30, but deliveries of food thus purchased continued until August. See below for total deliveries.

tion, unloading, etc., and further agreed that if Poland could purchase food through the export of commodities or by provision of international exchange in any form, such exchange would be offered in reduction of the American credits. The ultimate payments to the United States were to be in the same ratio as payments of other similar credits. The A.R.A., on its part, was to make every effort to deliver the agreed quantities of food and more if it proved necessary. The A.R.A. was to furnish the Polish government with statements of accounting, and further agreed to furnish ships to carry any exports to the United States by which Poland might carry some of her financial burden and credit the sales of such exports to the food account.

The A.R.A.'s place in the revictualment has been indicated: it was to be a cooperative effort with the Poles in charge of the actual distribution of food, and the Americans assisting with technical advice. For it was the stated policy of the Director-General of Relief that the revictualment program should encourage the initiative of the people concerned in the use and development of all local resources. The aim of the revictualment was not simply to save as many individual lives as possible, but to hasten Poland's return to a normal economic life.

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Investigations and conferences with the Government had shown that the peasant and village populations could probably carry themselves to the next harvest, and that the imported food should be concentrated in cities and industrial centers where it would preserve order, take care of the unemployed, and help to revive industry. Grove from his base at Warsaw set up subsidiary missions at Lemberg, Lodz, Brest-Litvosk, Vilna, Sosnowiec, Cracow, Lublin and Lida, to superintend the feeding, but there was no intention of creating a separate feeding machine, for Poland had her own relief organization during the war, and the

Ministry of Approvisation was theoretically in control of the food supply with inspectors in all provinces. Food was sold by the Ministry to district committees, which in turn sold it to local magistrates' committees, and in the larger cities, such as Warsaw, there was an elaborate municipal Food Administration which sold direct to the staple-food shops, many of which had been set up by the Germans during their occupation and were continued under Polish auspices.

The instructions to the Americans in February, when feeding was begun, emphasized these facts, and directed them to keep in touch with government inspectors and regional committees, to encourage the workers in soup kitchens, bakeries and warehouses, many of whom had been working at relief at great sacrifice for four years, but not to intervene in the actual distribution except in case of abuses, which were to be reported to Warsaw. The Americans were to report on food and clothing conditions in their districts, see that the food was distributed without distinction as to race, creed or politics, keep check on the movements of foodstuffs, and report cases of export, speculation or overcharging on imported food. The instructions closed with these paragraphs:

Keep entirely out of politics. There are political missions assigned to political work, and we should forward to them any matters of interest in their work, or to the advantage of Poland in the general Allied cause, but your work is entirely that of relief.

Remember that you are representing the American nation in a great enterprise, and that the task is one requiring day and night work when necessary. You are now playing personally a large part in the broad reconstruction work of the Peace Conference, and the Allies look to you to do your part to give Poland a start she so well deserves.

It soon became evident that the task did require day and night work and was extraordinarily complex. Grove's report of June 30, 1919, said:

Due, on the one hand, to the relative insecurity, and consequent weakness, of the temporary Polish Government, and, on the other hand, to the long standing habit of mistrust and evasion in their dealings with government officials which had been bred in the Poles during the dominance of alien governments, the Ministry of Approvisation was powerless to put the entire country on an economical ration basis or in any other way to exercise positive and effective control over the entire stock of foodstuffs in Poland. This unavoidable state of affairs had to be recognized by the American Mission in all of its dealings with the food problem in Poland.

The Ministry of Approvisation, in fact the whole Government, was working against tremendous odds. The first Minister of Approvisation, Anthony Minkiewicz, was the subject of severe attacks in the Diet and sometimes in the press, but impressed the Americans with his ability, for he was handicapped in his work by the fact that the Government had few trained officials in any department. In taking over authority they had inherited many incompetents and some antiquated systems. Many of the old officials and clerical employees were used to service under régimes neither energetic nor efficient. Their administrative minds functioned according to different systems; their financial minds thought in different currencies; they were without a common political experience; and only the remarkable national spirit which inspired them carried them through these critical months.

The continued fighting on various borders called for hurried levies of troops, created new refugee problems, and diverted the attention of government leaders whose energies were greatly needed for reconstruction. The fact that the boundaries of the country remained unsettled made control of the food supply more difficult and postponed normal trade relations between Poland and her neighbors. And it was natural that under these conditions racial and religious prejudice should run high; that people used to illicit trade under alien rule should indulge in it now; and that the

government frequently had to look to the Americans for assistance in the actual control and distribution of food and other supplies. The A.R.A. men could by the exercise of restraint keep out of politics, but they could not prevent politics, wars, and international relations from entering their own problems, forcing them to take cognizance of matters that were in reality out of their sphere, but were fundamental to the success or failure of the revictualment.

In the matter of price-control, prevention of profiteering and hoarding, the Government set up various organizations which were at least partially effective. An office, fashioned on the German army food control system during the occupation, was organized to prosecute usury and profiteering. In Warsaw alone there were at least twenty inspectors engaged in uncovering secret stores of food, and other commodities, for merchants had acquired great skill in concealing their stocks during the German régime. There were provincial offices also, since many profiteers had moved their stocks from Warsaw to far corners of the country and were directing fresh imports to their new bases. In an effort to effect cooperation among traders themselves, the Government arranged meetings with merchants to draw up regulations to reduce excessive prices, and a National League of Consumers was organized with a network of provincial branches. The A.R.A. assisted this government campaign in every possible way, especially by the reports of its investigators who noted all cases of overcharging or speculation in their districts. It was found, however, that the importation of large stocks of food was in itself the most effective discouragement to profiteers. As already stated, it reduced prices of commodities sold in the competitive market and brought out from hiding the secret stores that had been held for a higher price. Moreover, it gave the Government an effective means of price-fixing on the importations, and it is significant that food prices remained practically con-

stant during the seven months of the 1919 revictualment, after which they instantly soared. The artificial leveling of prices by Government-A.R.A. control of course had its aftermath of difficult readjustment, but temporarily it was the only salvation for a hungry people.

The control of illicit exports of food across Polish borders and the stimulation of legitimate trade was far more important, for the whole reconstruction program rested on the controlled use of all the stocks within the country. When the American Food Mission first reached Poland, the Germans were still in possession of some districts which they were to evacuate on February 15, according to the Armistice terms, and it was natural that the first complaints of illicit export came from these regions. Early in February Grove was appealed to in regard to the reported requisitioning of food in the vicinity of Bialystok and Grodno by the Germans, who were still in possession of Bialystok. He went there on February 6 to investigate, only to be refused admission to the city by the German military commander. Since Poles and people of other nationalities were allowed to come and go, Grove felt certain that the refusal to admit him was because food was being taken to Germany contrary to the Armistice terms, but there was little that he could do until the region was evacuated. Towards the end of February he was able to visit both Bialystok and Grodno, and found the food situation fair, but unearthed no definite proof of requisitioning. There was an evident need of seeds, agricultural machinery and live stock, and part of a gift-shipment of relief supplies from America was distributed in that district as a result of his visit.

It was known that illicit trading in food was going on at various points during early 1919, and it was several times reported on other borders, as well as the German. As late as March 15 a shipment of grain from Poznan to Germany came to light, which forced the A.R.A. to take vigorous steps to stop the practice. It was entirely natural that the

Germans of Poznania should remember their brothers across the border, but by this time food was being delivered to Germany also, and the revictualment of Europe could not succeed without real control of local supplies. Even within Poland such control was necessary, for some regions were far richer in supplies than others and the government was not yet strong enough to prevent illicit sales between provinces. As late as 1920 an American observer reported conditions which hardly could have existed in a fully united country.⁷ In such a situation the A.R.A. was forced to assist the central government wherever it could, not only by reporting abuses, but by using its prestige to stop unlicensed trade and to promote legitimate trade within Poland and with her neighbors.

The fighting on the Eastern borders added still other problems. It was the policy of the Americans to keep out of military entanglements, but it was still more their policy to feed the hungry, and as the boundaries of Poland shifted with the fighting, there was an increasing need for food and

⁷ Kenneth L. Roberts, "Poland for Patriotism," *Saturday Evening Post*, April 17, 1920.

"Since things are cheaper in Posnania than in Congress Poland," he wrote, "the Posnanian officials must guard against the people who wish to buy there and take goods into other parts of Poland to resell at a profit. This gives rise to the peculiar situation of one part of a nation maintaining customs officials to prevent smuggling into other parts of the same nation. After one has passed the customs officials at the German-Polish frontier one runs up against another set of officials at the Posnanian-Congress Poland border and the latter are even more thorough in their search than the former. They herd passengers out of the through train at two o'clock in the morning, line them up with their hands over their heads, and frisk them with the utmost vigor. They take loaves of bread from the travelers, break them open and wriggle their fingers round in the interiors of the loaves. They open bottles of wine belonging to the voyagers and take generous swigs from the bottles. They whack the travelers on the head in order to see whether anything is concealed in their hats. They even make them remove their boots. They don't do these things to Americans or British or French; but the ordinary traveler is treated with about as much consideration as though he were trying to escape with all the treasures of the Polish church.

"Posnania has a government all its own, and presents all the appearance of a separate state, working in many instances at variance with the central government at Warsaw."

a growing flood of refugees to be cared for. Grove's report of June 30 says:

The advance of the Polish troops against the Bolsheviks in the east during the months of March and April opened up a large territory where immediate relief was required. This newly taken area embraced a population of five million people, who were in the greatest distress, due to starvation and typhus. American foodstuffs in quantity were diverted from the relief of the industrial districts to the relief of these refugee districts. As the Bolsheviks were being driven back, the problem of feeding this constantly enlarging territory was becoming a more and more difficult one. The offensive against the Ukrainians in May resulted in the addition of still more territory to Polish rule and of still further expansion of the refugee districts.

It would be impossible to exaggerate the difficulties of these months. In March when Lemberg was cut off from the outside by the Ukrainians,⁸ Lieutenant James H. Becker was there to distribute American food, and his report is worth quoting as evidence of the conditions in which the revictualment was carried on.

On March 5 [he said], the heaviest shelling of the town which I have witnessed took place. This shelling started about four o'clock in the afternoon and lasted until eight o'clock at night. During this time there was a bombardment with heavy shells and the Polish ammunition magazine in Lemberg was blown up. This caused a terrific explosion and a great deal of damage was done around the railroad yards. In addition to heavy shelling around the vicinity of the railway station there was also considerable bombardment in the residential district of the city. I had been invited to attend the theatre that evening along with the British and Italian representatives in Lemberg and we arrived at the theatre during the bombardment, only to find that none of the actors, musicians or spectators had dared to venture forth. Again during the earlier hours of the morning, between two and three o'clock the heavy bombardment was resumed, and from my bed in the hotel I could hear the roar of the shells as they passed over the hotel and exploded in the near vicinity.

⁸ See Chapter X.

On March 7 another car of American foodstuffs arrived in Lemberg and it was necessary to unload this at once because I was afraid the car might be blown to pieces in case there was any delay in unloading same. At this time there was difficulty in getting men enough to work on this job, because it is very dangerous work around the railway station, and the men objected to being employed in that work at this time.

On March 19 Becker left Lemberg, and Captain Merion C. Cooper took charge, remaining at his post under almost continual siege. Lemberg had a greater shortage of food during March than any other city in Poland, and when the siege was partially raised, Cooper called loudly for transportation to distribute foodstuffs in the city, for, he said, "the Poles had eaten their transportation during the siege." Later, during the Ukrainian offensive, Cooper went to open feeding in districts newly won by the Poles and vividly described the impossibility of ordered relief in regions that were recently battlegrounds. The troops, he said, had accomplished the offensive with very slight losses, and "the country (in the district of Styrj) is hardly torn up at all except the railroad lines." Yet he found that "the Ukrainians had stripped the place clean of food with the exception of ten cars of sugar. Five of these cars the military took, and some one stole the other five during the night before the city authorities knew that the Ukrainians had evacuated the railroad station where the sugar was still lying in the cars. Styrj will need temporary shipments of flour, fat, coffee, tea, beans, etc., but I believe after a short time it will be able to supply its own meat and milk, as I saw quite a few cattle and cows in the country while I was driving and walking through it. I might mention at this point that in making this inspection I had to pack my suitcase on foot or ride on farm wagons or trucks during part of the trip. For this reason and on account of the bad railway connection it took me forty-eight hours to cover a distance of 100 kilometers."

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Despite the obstacles encountered at every step the revictualment program was completed. The total American deliveries of supplies to Poland for the seven months from February, 1919, to the close of the revictualment contract, amounted to 260,202 tons, mainly flour, of a value of \$51,671,749.^o The last of the American food ships for the revictualment program reached Danzig about the middle of August. From that time on the crops then being harvested were expected to furnish bread supplies, at least, for a majority of the population, and it had been assumed that the recuperation of industries would enable Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe to purchase necessary food imports through normal channels the following year.

Hand in hand with the food deliveries under the Congressional Appropriation were various large shipments of clothing and miscellaneous relief supplies, as well as other deliveries on separate credits from the United States of surplus stocks from the American Expeditionary Force. The British and French also gave material aid to Poland in this year. All of this aid, though either distinct from or supplementary to the revictualment program, should be mentioned here because it was given during the first months of 1919 and, like the revictualment, was the beginning of a long period of foreign relief.

The A.E.F. had amassed enormous quantities of supplies in France which included not only munitions and food, but a great variety of material such as railway equipment, engineering supplies, chemicals, clothing, bedding, hospital equipment, medicines, and all the miscellaneous stocks of a modern army. The end of the war would have made them a white elephant on the hands of the Army, if Europe—

^o American food deliveries by months in 1919 were as follows: February, 14,000; March, 52,000; April, 39,000; May, 63,000; June, 78,000; July, 17,000; and August, 21,000. They included 138,847 tons of wheat and cereal flour, 74,819 tons of wheat and rye grain, 17,403 tons of beans, peas and rice, 21,315 tons of pork, beef and fats, 1,994 tons of condensed and evaporated milk, and other miscellaneous commodities.

the Allies and the shattered countries of the east and south-east—had not been in dire need of exactly such material. The U. S. Liquidation Board was appointed to dispose of these stocks and after some negotiations sold a portion of them to Poland. In March, 1919, Hoover suggested to President Wilson that the surplus Army stocks might be used for the liberated regions of Europe. The President approved, and in April Hoover took up with Judge Edwin B. Parker, chairman of the U. S. Liquidation Board, the sale of Army food stocks to the A.R.A. and to the liberated States. Hoover stated the A.R.A.'s position in the following letter:

The Treasury appropriations for relief were made on the basis of approximately 60 per cent of the amounts that were necessary to furnish a minimum ration of breadstuffs, fats and condensed milk to the populations under Relief; it being the expectation that further amounts for Relief would be furnished by the Allied Governments. This latter has been to some extent true, but their total is not sufficient to maintain a ration of the above commodities on a scale it is desirable should be maintained, even on a scale of most rudimentary form of nutrition. It is only possible in these conditions to organize a country on a basis of relief consisting of two or three staple commodities in large volume, and to secure that every member of the community participates in the ration. We are therefore confining relief supplies to *cereals, fats, and condensed milk*. Therefore, if, in these circumstances, it were proposed to introduce miscellaneous lots of less essential or more expensive foods, having pound for pound less caloric value, at the cost of a reduction of the ration in the primary foodstuffs, it would not only result in the lowering of the ration, but the whole rationing system would break down. Such commodities as canned corned beef and other canned goods cannot be rationed out in small parcels which this situation now demands.

For the above reasons we cannot undertake to purchase anything except these simple staples from the Army list, nor can we agree to allowing the appropriations made for Relief purposes from the Treasury to be encroached upon by the sale of the other commodities to those relieved Governments. If the Army can secure from the Treasury an additional extension of

credits, or if the Board itself is disposed to give direct credits to liberated Governments, we, of course, would be glad enough to have the other items of food sold. They are, from our point of view, "luxuries," and while we are anxious enough for the more "luxurious" part of the population to consume them, we do not feel that we can entrench on the necessities of the poor in order to permit such operations. . . .

In the matter of prices, I think it is only right for us to take these commodities over at a price at which we can replace in equal position, and we naturally find that the prices upon the Army books are higher than we should pay. . . .

There is another aspect to this food problem. The appropriations that we have from the Treasury to some of the liberated countries, and the money that we are spending from the one hundred million dollar appropriation, are from the very nature of things to be devoted solely to civilian relief. In consequence, we do not feel that we can under any circumstances furnish foodstuffs to Armies further than on quantities to which they might be entitled as members of the civilian community. As armies require a vastly larger amount of food per capita than we are able to distribute to these communities, it becomes a matter of some consideration as to whether or not a proportion of your foodstuffs cannot well be sold for purely military purposes, but in such case this sale should be with a special subvention from the Treasury or on special credit given directly by your Board for such purposes. For Army purposes the list of goods which you possess is not necessarily one of "luxuries."

The Liquidation Board then sold the A.R.A. certain staple foods at Hoover's stated prices, and carried on separate negotiations with the liberated governments for the sale of other commodities either for cash or on long term credits. The Liquidation Board's report shows that stocks sent to Poland reached a value of \$59,365,112, of which about two-fifths were in clothing and food, and the rest railway equipment, engineering and miscellaneous supplies. Poland bought about one-third of this for cash, and two-thirds on long term credits. The miscellaneous purchases included 5,900 army horses for use in Polish agriculture which were transported from Coblenz across Germany in army box cars, hauled by American engines, both cars and

engines remaining in Poland as part of the army deliveries. This whole transaction between the U. S. Liquidation Board and the Polish government, which was distinct from the revictualment program, made it possible for Poland to secure these varied and valuable supplies in addition to the food provided under the Congressional Appropriation.

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Among the first gifts to Poland in 1919 from American organizations was a shipment of used clothing and shoes which had been consigned for relief in Belgium. This was given by the Commission for Relief in Belgium, through the A.R.A., to the Polish Ministry of Public Welfare, which allotted the goods to the needy, according to a plan approved by the Polish *Seim*. The first shipment was of 460 tons, and three smaller consignments followed, which were distributed in the Dabrowa and Kattowitz mining districts under direction of Colonel Goodyear of the Allied Coal Mission.

The Jewish Joint Distribution Committee ¹⁰ in January, 1919, supplied funds for the purchase by the Grain Corporation of half the million dollar cargo of a gift-ship to Poland, the *Westward-Ho*. The Polish National Department, a Polish-American organization of which John F. Smulski was president,¹¹ donated the other half, and the A.R.A. delivered the supplies and arranged for their distribution in cooperation with Dr. Boris D. Bogen of the J.D.C., who opened an office in Warsaw in February as a member of the A.R.A. staff, and Dr. Symkowski of the Polish Relief Committee. This shipment was distributed without distinction

¹⁰ The Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (J.D.C.) was organized in 1914 to unite all classes of American Jews in relief work for their race in Eastern Europe, Palestine, Morocco and Spain. Since then it has given relief in 42 countries, by no means only to Jews, but frequently to all needy regardless of race or creed. It was interested in Polish relief throughout the war, and expended some five million dollars prior to 1919 for relief in the Occupied Territories of the Central Powers. Its work in Poland is further discussed in Chapters IX and XII of this book.

¹¹ See Chapter IV.

as to the creed of the beneficiaries. The J.D.C. had no American representative in Poland until this time, but in November, 1919, it sent a unit of workers and was engaged in active relief in Poland from that time on. During 1919, the A.R.A. delivered a number of shipments for the J.D.C. and received special grants from them, particularly for motor transport and for children's relief. The J.D.C.'s reports show that they devoted almost seven million dollars to relief in Poland, Lithuania and Courland in the year 1919-20.

The American Red Cross also sent supplies and workers in February, 1919. The first shipment of supplies reached Cracow about the middle of the month, and was distributed by Captain Nowak of the A.R.A., as Red Cross representatives had not then arrived. Their first unit reached Warsaw March 3, on a sanitary train, and by April first they had a base at Kowel with 58 cars of supplies and 140 personnel. It was agreed that while the A.R.A. cared for the importation of all supplies and carried on the government revictualment campaign, the Red Cross would devote itself to medical and children's relief. However, food was the first essential in Poland at this time, and so the Red Cross opened soup kitchens, as well as dispensaries and health centers. Later the A.R.A. took over children's relief, and the Red Cross concentrated on health work, refugee relief, and the anti-typhus campaign of 1919-20. They distributed considerable used clothing during this year and at one time had three active units in the Eastern Districts engaged in feeding, clothing relief, and medical work.¹²

The Friends (British and American Quakers) also sent relief workers to Poland soon after the country was opened to such missions. The first investigating party arrived in May and the first unit of 25 in August. They came primarily for health and typhus relief, but, as was

¹² For work of the A.R.C. after 1919, see Chapters IX, X and XII.

characteristic of their work, settled in a few localities and turned their hands to whatever was needed in any particular community. Their first station was opened in Zawiescie, in Southwest Poland, August 20, 1919, and here they engaged in feeding as well as other forms of relief, distributing A.R.A. food in the children's relief campaign.¹³

Great Britain, in spite of four years of financial strain and her war loans to allies, had also assumed the obligation of materially contributing to the revictualment of Eastern Europe, and delivered supplies to the value of nearly \$55,000,000 to a dozen countries. The British allocated about \$8,000,000 to Poland, a large part of which was devoted to the payment of ocean freights on American cargoes and to railway material, the remainder to deliveries of food, clothing and hospital supplies. The United Kingdom also supplied ships for transport of supplies from the U. S. Liquidation Commission. Sir William A. M. Goode, K.B.E., was British Director of Relief, and delivery in Poland was superintended by the British representative on the Allied Food Mission at Warsaw.

France contributed no food, having none to spare. Her aid to Poland was military,—the sending of a strong military mission to help Poland maintain her position on several fronts, notably the Russian, and the granting of credits for military supplies in a country in which war persisted long after Western Europe had settled down to its troubled peace.

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In spite of all these efforts in her behalf, Poland was still in a serious situation as regards food supply when the harvest of 1919 came and the revictualment contract between the Government and the A.R.A. was fulfilled. In the troubled Eastern provinces there was little or no crop, and the refugee problem was acute owing to the wars on

¹³ See Chapters IX and XII.

that border and because the people who had been driven into Russia in 1915 were beginning slowly to return to their devastated acres. For political and economic reasons, as well as humanitarian, special efforts in relief and reconstruction were imperative there, but the whole of Poland was in such a precarious state that the Government had few resources for such special measures. The harvest as a whole was late, and this caused delay and difficulty in supplying the towns and cities. Some regions, like Poznania, were practically self-supporting, but Poznania suffered from a lack of fuel for threshing; all Poland felt the shortage of coal and rolling stock for transport; the area planted and production per acre had not returned to their pre-war level;¹⁴ and administrative and political difficulties still hampered the control of distribution and, probably, even discouraged agriculturalists from increasing production.

In a country where the majority of the population is agricultural, it is always difficult to restrict consumption and provide an adequate balance for the non-producing classes in short crop years, and the new Polish government found it an almost impossible task. There had been unlimited requisitioning during the German and Austrian occupation and also under the Polish government with the crop of 1918. In July, 1919, the Diet passed a law giving the government a grain monopoly, but limiting quantities subject to requisition, except in Poznania where requisitioning was still unlimited. But the provision for enforcing requisition-

¹⁴ Statistics on acreage cultivated in 1919 are as follows:

<i>Rye</i>	<i>Wheat</i>
75% of pre-war area in the Kingdom	55% of pre-war area in the Kingdom
56% of pre-war area in Galicia	69% of pre-war area in Galicia
90% of pre-war area in Teschen	80% of pre-war area in Teschen

Production per acre was also below the pre-war level.

From a report by Dr. E. Dana Durand, Food Adviser to Poland, November, 1919

The P.A.K.P.D. report on children's relief (1919-22) states that the total arable land under cultivation in 1919-20 represented 61% of the 1913-14 area,

ing was inadequate, and peasants and landowners, partly because of unhappy experiences during the German and Austrian occupation, objected to a government monopoly. The Government in order to encourage agricultural production had to make concessions, although in order to feed the town populations it was obliged to keep prices low and to control distribution and prevent illicit trade. Consequently in November, 1919, the Diet revised the law, doing away with monopoly, but strengthening the power of requisition. At the same time the government was forced to import food, to the extent of 310,000 tons in the remainder of 1919 and the year 1920.¹⁵ Thus the difficulties in food supply once more took credits which were badly needed for reconstruction and made the continuation of foreign aid necessary.

The real situation is suggested in Hoover's words to Polish officials when he came to Warsaw in August to see the results of eight months' work and to consider future plans:

. . . I have had an unusual opportunity to observe the progress of economic restoration and the economic currents that now dominate the world, and I am daily impressed with the fact that while political government can be established in a period of days, and armies created and order restored in a period of months, yet economic recuperation cannot take place, much less economic government built up, short of years.

Poland has accomplished the first essentials of government: she has secured her liberty and armed herself against external enemies, and has built up political solidarity and restored order.

Now she has before her the greatest task of all, that is, the upbuilding of her economic life. . . . In the economic situation of the world to-day, with shortages of supplies due to five years of destruction, with shortages of capital, with economic depression throughout the world, Poland must look even more to her own resources than would be the case if the rest of the world were not itself engaged on these same problems and suffering from the same economic disorganization.

¹⁵ A large proportion of these imports were secured from the United States on credits furnished by the Grain Corporation under Congressional authorization. See footnote I, Chapter XII.

The revictualment campaign had carried Poland over the immediate post-war food crisis and was the first step in the long process of economic readjustment. It saved thousands of lives; it undoubtedly saved the Government, which could not have carried on and created any semblance of order with famine in its cities. The revictualment program had already led to activity in child-feeding, clothing distribution, sanitary and anti-typhus relief, and finally into various cooperative efforts in economic reconstruction, so that in the fall of 1919, though revictualment was over, Poland was not left to struggle on alone, but continued to receive friendly, disinterested aid from abroad for several years.

CHAPTER VIII

ECONOMIC FIRST AID, 1919

OF all the measures initiated by the Director-General of Relief to avert famine and preserve social order in Central and Eastern Europe, revictualment was widest in scope and most important in its immediate effects. But revictualment did not stand alone. It depended in some degree on other activities which were supplementary to it. These concerned economic functions of the new states of vital importance to their industrial life and essential to the distribution of relief: inland transport; the exchange of commodities; the production and distribution of fuel. The measures which Hoover and his associates put into effect were not conceived as cures that would restore the injured economic system to normal health, but as first aid treatment which would save the system from bleeding to death from its wounds.

Some mention has already been made of the chaotic condition of inland transport in Poland, of the effects of this condition on the economic life of the country and its bearing on the work of revictualment and reconstruction. A.R.A. representatives in other states of Central and Eastern Europe encountered similar conditions. Not only did the blocking of rails and rivers hold back the distribution of supplies from America, but it prevented the shipment of surpluses of food and materials from the few regions where they existed to the regions of shortage, and in the political sphere made the restoration and maintenance of order difficult or impossible. There were many causes for these transport troubles. Political conditions, ranging all the way from

suspicious hostility of one people for another to open warfare, blocked the frontiers. Underproduction and inability to distribute coal reduced the available power.¹ Lack of equipment and war damage to roadbeds, canals, etc., and finally administrative disorganization resulting from political changes, added their quotas of trouble. Locomotives and cars, badly needed, remained idle in remote junctions without fuel or crews; trains crossed frontiers never to return; hungry and unpaid trainmen held up their trains for bribes from passengers; and everywhere military forces of a dozen nationalities were making such use as they could of whatever rolling stock they could lay their hands on.

As a first step towards bringing the transportation lines into the service of relief, Hoover, on February 19, 1919, set up an A.R.A. Transportation Section under Colonel W. G. Atwood. On February 25, the S.E.C. organized a Communications Section on which Colonel Atwood became the American representative, the other members being General H. O. Mance (Great Britain) as President, General Gassouin (France), and General Levi (Italy). On March 25, Major T. R. Ryan left Paris for Danzig and Warsaw to become transportation expert for the A.R.A. Polish Mission and to serve as U. S. representative on the Allied Railway Mission to Poland, which the Communications Section had decided to establish under the chairmanship of General Hammond (Great Britain).² General Hammond did not

¹ The complicated factors in the coal situation are discussed below.

² The Communications Section decided to allocate responsibility for the various states and territories among the Four Powers. This precipitated a lively controversy. Gen. Mance proposed that the United States be responsible for Czechoslovakia, the line of communication from the Adriatic to Prague and Jugoslavia; Great Britain for Rumania, the Don Region, the Caucasus and the Baltic Provinces; France, for Greece, Turkey in Europe, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, the Donetz and Poland; Italy for Austria and Hungary. The French declined to take Poland, which the British took over. Then France demanded Rumania and Czechoslovakia, while Italy claimed Bulgaria. The S.E.C. decided that the Americans should remain in charge of Czechoslovakia, but no decision was made regarding Rumania, where British and French maintained competing missions, or in Bulgaria, where the Italians finally succeeded in partici-

reach Poland to organize the Allied Mission until May 10. but in the meantime Ryan performed important services for the Polish Railway Administration and the A.R.A. He inspected and reported on the harbors of Danzig, Memel and Königsberg and on the Vistula transport facilities. He made a general survey of rail facilities and needs, of coal requirements and output, and reorganized the terminal facilities at the Dabrowa mines. He recommended to the S.E.C. the immediate assignment to Poland of 2,000 Armistice cars and 100 locomotives³ and later provision of 5,000 cars and 3,000 engines. As transportation expert of the A.R.A., Ryan, with the collaboration of Col. Ross, of Grove's Mission, negotiated the exchange of 10,000 tons of potatoes from Poznan for 20,000 tons of Upper Silesian coal. Another "potato exchange" between Poles, Germans and Czechs put through by Ross and Ryan was partially blocked when the Polish command in Poznan closed the frontier at Benschen and kept it closed, despite great pressure, until the middle of July. As a result of this alleged military necessity, in which the French Mission for a time supported the Polish command, only 50 per cent of the contract could be carried out, and some 200,000 tons of potatoes, worth their weight in coal if not in gold, were left to rot unused. This incident illustrates two significant aspects of the situation in Europe at this time: the fact that there was no medium of international exchange, and peoples were reduced to the primitive system of barter; and the further fact that political tension was so great that even barter under neutral auspices was impossible.

pating with the French. Hoover, however, was appointed mandatory for the disposition of rolling stocks in the succession states. British and American representatives worked harmoniously on the Railway Mission to Poland, the British being concerned primarily with the provision of equipment and the Americans with the movement of supplies.

³ The "Armistice" cars and locomotives were from those turned over by Germany to the Allied and Associated Powers by the terms of the Armistice of November 11, 1918 (see below). Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Rumania also received Armistice rolling stock.

It has already been noted that the shipment of A.R.A. supplies for revictualment from Danzig—then German—to Poland by barge and rail required the intervention of the Americans, and the transport as well as food mission were forced to take part in the negotiations. The Poles refused to allow their barges to enter German territory for fear of confiscation, and the Germans refused to send their barges into Poland for fear of injury to the barge personnel. Ryan finally had the barges moving, after securing guarantees from the Polish War Ministry and from the Germans in Berlin through the A.R.A. Mission there. The rail shipments from Danzig were made under the agreement negotiated by Major Webb, of the A.R.A. Food Mission, whereby the Poles were to deliver 250 empty cars per day at the frontier to replace the German cars loaded with relief supplies. Because of the shortage of rolling stock the Poles could not deliver the specified number of empties, and the Germans threatened daily to refuse to release cars for evacuating the stocks discharged at Danzig by the relief ships. Without American intervention, which was both tactful and forceful, the movement of supplies on which thousands were dependent, would have been blocked by suspicion or open hostility.

Wire communication in Poland and across the frontiers was as badly disorganized as rail transport, but before their departure in midsummer, Ryan and his associates had brought about the restoration of telegraph communication between interior points and between Warsaw and Vienna. Political or military conditions nullified their efforts to reopen lines between Warsaw and Danzig, and Warsaw and Kovno.

As soon as the Allied Railway Mission was fully organized, it continued Ryan's efforts to secure Poland's share of the Armistice locomotives and cars turned over by Germany to the Allies. These were in repayment of the equivalent railway rolling stock taken by the Germans, during their

occupation and upon their withdrawal. The Allied Mission carried through all the arrangements for the selection and movement of this rolling stock from the transmission points in Allied Occupied Territory to Poland. Though the 100 locomotives and 2,000 freight cars assigned to Poland came through less promptly than harrassed officials desired, they were of incalculable value to the Polish railways. Not only was there a serious shortage of rolling stock, but the existing stock was not all available for service. Forty-five per cent of locomotives and 13 per cent of freight cars were waiting for or under repair. This percentage was nearly three times as high as under normal conditions in Poland. In order to remedy this condition, the Mission secured, with credits largely provided by the British government, quantities of repair materials unprocurable in Poland. The Mission assisted in the procurement of considerable rolling stock through the U. S. Liquidation Board, began negotiations to secure 150 locomotives on credit from the Baldwin Locomotive Works, and interested itself with good effect in technical and operating matters.

In addition to their part in these specialized activities, the American members of the Polish and other Central European Railway Missions continued the negotiation of exchange contracts between Poland and her neighbors. Acting for the Allied Railway Mission, Ryan was instrumental in completing such a contract between Poland and Austria in May, 1919. The contract was important because the materials involved were desperately needed by the two parties to the arrangement. Austria needed Polish coal, horses, raw leather, petroleum, potatoes and other raw materials; and Poland needed locomotives (new and repaired), clothing for the army, manufactured leather goods and other finished products. This exchange, moreover, was one which could not have been negotiated and certainly not have been carried out except for the friendly aid of Ryan in Warsaw, Colonel W. B. Causey, the Ameri-

can railway representative in Vienna, and Dr. Lincoln Hutchinson, the A.R.A. representative in Czechoslovakia, across whose territory the goods had to be transported. Other bartering operations of benefit to Poland were initiated and put through by the members of Col. Causey's and Captain T. T. C. Gregory's A.R.A. Missions in Trieste and in Vienna. Captain H. L. Kyle convoyed a trainload of Austrian manufactured goods to Poland, which he bartered for thirty-seven cars of eggs, two cars of hams, seventy-one cars of petroleum products and five cars of other supplies. Another American brought 200 cars of tannin from Lubiana in Yugoslavia to Poland and returned with 200 cars of gasoline. The bartering operations, encouraged and supervised by the A.R.A. throughout Central Europe and the Balkans, accomplished two important results. They provided needed supplies without resort to credit operations, and they encouraged the resumption of international trade by overcoming suspicious hostility and preventing "incidents," which were forever occurring in the absence of the American representatives.

The mandate of the Allied Railway Mission to Poland expired in the early autumn of 1919, but this did not mean the end of American activity in the affairs of Polish inland transportation. The A.R.A. maintained its contact through its continued relief work in the aid of children and intelligentsia, and the American Technical Advisers carried on the work in transportation and other matters on which the Poles needed expert, neutral advice.⁴

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The shortage of coal, it has been noted, was one of the principal causes of Poland's transport troubles. It was also an important factor in the critical economic and social condition of the whole country. A Polish Minister thus

⁴ See Chapter XI.

summarized the situation in a letter to Col. A. C. Goodyear, of the A.R.A.:

Poland is confronted by a coal crisis which is threatening disaster to the whole economic existence of the country. The civil population gets only starvation rations of coal, while the industries cannot be reanimated since even that part of our industry which is now working stands in danger of having to close down for want of coal. The consequences are easily foreseen; namely the increase of unemployment, hunger, labor disturbances and revolution. . . .

Briefly, the cause of the coal crisis was this: Before the war, Russian Poland derived its coal supply first from the Dabrowa mines within its own boundaries, supplemented by necessary imports from Upper Silesia (Germany), the Donetz (Russia) and Teschen (Austria). Galicia's pre-war requirements were supplied by the Galician mines near Cracow, plus foreign imports from Upper Silesia. Poznan produced no coal and was supplied entirely from Upper Silesia. Altogether the three divisions of Poland secured approximately two-fifths of their coal requirements from mines beyond their borders. In 1919, political conditions had cut off this foreign supply, while the effects of war on labor and plant had greatly reduced local production. Thus in the spring of 1919, Poland had only *forty per cent* of normal coal requirements. This is enough to explain the apprehension of the Polish officials and their American collaborators.

All Central Europe felt the same coal crisis and suffered in greater or less degree. The new Austria produced within her shrunken frontiers less than fifteen per cent of her requirements. Hungary and Jugoslavia both suffered, though less than Austria, for their own mines, normally not very productive, were being fought over by rival claimants. Germany, with Upper Silesia, the fate of which had not been settled, had eighty per cent of her coal requirements. Czechoslovakia with Teschen, which she held temporarily

until the Supreme Council decided its permanent status, had about enough coal for domestic requirements, if production were kept up and if she were not required to make shipments to Austria and Poland.⁵ In short, there was not enough coal being produced in Central Europe to supply more than sixty-five per cent of requirements; production, because of labor, food, political and technical difficulties, was diminishing; and the coal actually produced was not being efficiently utilized because political conflict and administrative confusion made effective distribution out of the question.

Grove, Causey, Hutchinson and Gregory reported these conditions to Hoover, who decided that the situation demanded a unified administration in the Central European coal basin. As a result of his representations, the S.E.C. on April 28 passed the following resolution:

The Director-General of Relief is charged for the present with all matters in connection with the endeavor to increase coal production and with the supervision of the distribution of the coal so produced in the former Empire of Austria-Hungary and in Poland, working through the Missions of the Communications Section charged with the operation of the through railroad services for the distribution of food supplies in this territory.

Instead of employing the Railway Missions, which had their hands more than full with transport affairs, Hoover organized a new commission under the presidency of Col. Goodyear. This body received the formidable name of "The Coal Commission of the Supreme Economic Council for the Territory Included in the Former Empire of Austria-Hungary and Poland," but it was usually referred to as the "Allied Coal Commission," though twenty-one of

⁵ After the Czech occupation of the part of Teschen containing the coal mines in January, 1919, the Supreme Council appointed an Inter-Allied Teschen Commission (Jan. 31) which arrived in Teschen on February 12. This Commission arranged that the Czechs should deliver a specified amount of coal and coke to Poland. The amount was not large, and the program was never fully carried out because of lack of cars.

its twenty-two members, including its President, were Americans. Pursuant to Hoover's instructions, Goodyear established the headquarters of his Commission at Mährisch-Ostrau near the center of the great coal basin which includes the Ostrau-Karwin fields of Teschen, the Kattowitz fields of Upper Silesia, the Dabrowa fields of Russian Poland, the Cracow fields of Galicia, and the Bohemian fields of Czechoslovakia. The aim of the Commission was not, of course, to serve exclusively the interests of Poland or any other single state, but by improving the production and distribution of the coal in this basin, to benefit all the states dependent on it. Poland, therefore, profited not alone from the Commission's work in the fields which were then or later to become Polish, but from all that was done in the whole basin to improve production and distribution.

The two factors of chief importance affecting production were the condition of technical equipment and the attitude of workers and conditions of labor. The investigations of the Commission revealed that technical conditions in the Polish fields of Dabrowa and Cracow were far worse than elsewhere in the coal basin. This was due to the destruction of equipment during the German invasion and, in mines which escaped this disaster, to the lack of replacements for wornout machinery. The replacement equipment could be secured only in the United States, Great Britain, or Germany. In the case of the first two, time was required for the arrangement of purchase and transport, and in the case of Germany, political conditions stood in the way. The Coal Commission with its restricted mandate could, therefore, only advise as to the most efficient utilization of the existing equipment.⁶

With respect to the other factor in production—labor, many causes combined to produce strikes, riots, sabotage and malingering,—and very little coal. Undoubtedly the

⁶ A few months later the American Technical Mission was engaged in assisting the Poles to secure equipment for the mines. See Chapter XI.

three most important of these causes were: first, nationalist agitation and conflict over the possession of disputed mining areas in which the workers were divided between rival nationalities. This condition obtained in the two most valuable and best equipped fields, Kattowitz, where the workers were Germans and Poles, and Ostrau-Karwin, where they were Czechs and Poles. The second cause of trouble was the conflict between workers and operators, the result of the breakdown of the autocratic authority exercised before the war, of the workers' resentment of forced labor under the military authorities during the war, and of revolutionary ideas ranging from a mild, conservative socialism to a lurid communism of the Russian variety. The third cause was the physical condition of the workers and their families, undernourished during the last years of the war and now in 1919, unable to obtain food or clothing. With respect to the conflict of nationalities, the Coal Commission, aside from using its influence for peace, could do little but support the Teschen (Political) Commission which represented the Supreme Council in whose hands rested the final political decisions.⁷ In the realm of industrial relations and food and clothing relief, Goodyear's Commission could and did accomplish a great deal.

In dealing with the conflict between miners and operators, Major W. S. Brand, of the Commission, concentrated on the Ostrau-Karwin field where half the miners were Poles and half Czechs, and the employers mostly Germans. The methods he employed were based on twenty-five years experience in industrial relations in America. His first step was to impress both workers and employers with the significance of the changes in their status, resulting from the war

⁷ Until after the Treaty of Versailles was signed and the Allied Plebiscite Commission was established in Upper Silesia, the Germans maintained their authority in the Kattowitz district with troops. The two Polish insurrections in 1919 were against this German authority. There were no comparable insurrections in Austrian Silesia while the Coal Commission and the Allied Teschen Commission were there.

and the revolutions that had followed it. To the workers he pointed out that while they had new privileges, they also had new responsibilities; that the mines could not be operated without discipline and work. He asked the Miners' Association to appoint a committee to report on their grievances and to state the workers' opinion as to the chief causes for the decreased production. As a condition precedent to any action by the Coal Commission, Major Brand asked the miners to reinstate ten or twelve engineers and other officials whom they had recently ousted. In his conference with the mine owners, Major Brand urged a frank recognition of the political changes that had occurred since the war and impressed upon them the necessity of forgetting the old autocratic methods by meeting the workers half way and in general "catching step" with the new order. Brand's American methods, his tact and good sense, won the confidence of both miners and operators. The former restored the ousted officials, made a valuable, good-tempered report on their difficulties and agreed to come to an understanding with the owners. The operators in turn accepted the American's advice, and in a few weeks order had been restored, a wage scale adopted, and methods of settling grievances agreed upon, with the result that within a little over two months production in the Ostrau-Karwin fields had increased over twenty per cent.

The Coal Commission urged the adoption of this method of industrial conciliation in the Kattowitz and Dabrowa fields, but the expiration of the Commission's mandate prevented the recommendation's being followed under American guidance. How much permanent value Brand's success had, it is impossible to say, but of its immediate value in this critical time there can be no doubt. The Poles and Czechs employed in the Ostrau-Karwin district were at once benefited by the improvement of conditions, and the increased production of coal helped greatly to stave off the coal famine that was threatening the transport on which

food relief depended, killing industry, and adding to misery and unrest in the towns.

In the miners' report mentioned above, the representatives of the workers stated that the shortage of food was an important cause of decreased production. Independent investigations by the Americans confirmed the fact that undernourishment had weakened the miners physically, while the hunger of their families had added to their discontent. The Coal Commission, finding that there was no way to improve the food situation by local measures, appealed to the nearby A.R.A. Mission. Grove has already investigated the food situation at Dabrowa and found it so serious that he allocated to this region about forty per cent of the first A.R.A. shipment to Poland. Subsequent allocations improved conditions at Dabrowa, as did those sent by Grove to the Cracow fields and the eastern sections of Teschen. Through Hutchinson, head of the A.R.A. Mission at Prague, an increase was secured in the rations of the population of Teschen under Czech control. The Kattowitz area, likewise, benefited by the A.R.A. imports to Germany.

Of particular value was a special fund of \$100,000 set aside by Hoover as a gift of the American people to the undernourished children of miners in the whole basin, when the A.R.A. began child feeding. The special foods bought with this money were distributed by the A.R.A. children's relief organization and produced almost as remarkable effects on the miners as on their children.

Second to food was the shortage of clothing—not work clothes, but shoes and garments for the families of the miners and here, again, it was possible to make use of A.R.A. supplies. On May 31, Grove wired Goodyear that he had a large quantity of used clothing donated in America and ready for shipment to the mining regions. In the course of the following weeks, the Coal Commission distributed thirty cars in Ostrau-Karwin, twenty in Dabrowa and thirty-two

in Kattowitz.⁸ The value of this gift, wrote Goodyear, "... could be placed at many hundreds of thousands of marks, and its distribution not only produced a favorable result in improving the living conditions of the miners and their families, but also established good relations from the first between the miners and the members of the Coal Commission."

Increasing production was only part of the Coal Commission's job. Of equal importance was the distribution of coal to the states whose transport, industries, and internal stability depended on it. When Goodyear reached Mährisch-Ostrau in May 1919, there was only one contract covering the delivery of coal from one country to another and this, providing for deliveries from Ostrau-Karwin to Poland, was the one negotiated by the Allied Teschen Commission in connection with the suspension of the Polish-Czech hostilities in Teschen. A few private contracts had been attempted, but they had not been fulfilled, and there was no encouragement to negotiate new ones. As with other commodities, there was no medium of international exchange; communications and transport were hazardous; and government departments and military officers made regulations and seizures with bewildering irresponsibility. Intergovernment contracts were not made because each government of the Central European states was openly hostile or highly suspicious of the others, and each was too desperately concentrated on self-preservation and too sensitive to inflamed nationalist opinion to attempt cooperation with present or potential enemies. The Coal Commission had no authority to force the execution of contracts nor to compel their fulfillment, but it was Hoover's belief that as a disinterested, non-political body with the prestige of America

⁸ Supplementing this clothing donation, the A.R.A. purchased 75,000 yards of cloth, 40,000 sets of underwear, 100,000 pairs of socks, 10,000 pairs of shoes and 10,000 pounds of soap which were shipped to the mining districts and distributed by the A.R.A. in its clothing relief campaign after the departure of the Coal Commission. See Chapter XII.

and the influence of the A.R.A. organization behind it, the Commission would be able to break through the national blockades and revive the movement of international trade.

In its efforts to increase and regulate distribution the Coal Commission did not by any means realize all its hopes, but to have supervised the exchange of over a million tons of coal in the course of three or four months was a notable achievement. The exchanges were accomplished chiefly through rather informal arrangements, made with the aid of the A.R.A. and Railway Missions, and they usually involved other commodities besides coal. The rôle of the Commission was to bring together the representatives of the interested states, to act as referee or conciliator as occasion demanded, and, once agreement was reached, to supervise the exchange, and in a measure guarantee the execution of the contracts. Not only Poland, but Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany benefited.

Through no fault of its own, the Coal Commission was less successful in bringing about the fulfilment of more formal contracts between governments. Several were laboriously negotiated under the Commission's auspices, but in many cases sudden political disturbances prevented their being carried out. The Polish government was a party to two of these contracts. The more ambitious of these was embodied in a coal protocol, drawn up under the auspices of the Commission and signed in Mährisch-Ostrau on June 16 by representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. It set up a committee of three with a neutral chairman to control the distribution of coal from the Dabrowa, Kattowitz, and Ostrau-Karwin fields. It was based, however, on the assumption that the Kattowitz district would go to Poland in accordance with the peace terms originally presented to Germany. As has been noted elsewhere, the peace terms were revised, and Upper Silesia, including Kattowitz, was made subject

to a plebiscite, so that the terms of the protocol were no longer applicable. The other contract, negotiated in July, was based on an exchange of Poznanian potatoes for Upper Silesian coal. The Warsaw government supported the plan but the Poznanian authorities opposed it, fearing it would strengthen German influence in the Silesian plebiscite area. Finally, in August, Goodyear was on the point of getting the signature of both governments to a new contract, when the Polish insurrection broke out, and there were no more coal negotiations between Poland and Germany.

The August insurrection, on which the potato-coal contract foundered, was a sanguinary affair, savagely fought and costly. That it was not more costly was due to prompt American intervention. As soon as Hoover heard of the outbreak, he wired Goodyear^o to go to Kattowitz to stop, if possible, a conflict which would do great damage not only in Upper Silesia, but throughout Central Europe by throwing the coal regions into unproductive confusion. Goodyear found on his arrival at Kattowitz on August 19, that though the fighting was still going on, the veteran German troops had broken and scattered the untrained Polish insurrectionist detachments, and German order was being established, accomplished by the execution of captured Poles suspected of having a part in the revolt. Goodyear's first move was to get the promise of the German commander, General von Pessow, to stop executions in that sector and not to invade Polish territory. He then went to Sosnowice for a conference with Polish leaders. On his return to Kattowitz Goodyear learned that the last Polish detachments driven out of Upper Silesia had carried off two hundred Germans as hostages and turned them over to the Polish army at Cracow. The Germans asked Goodyear to secure the return of these hostages, and the Colonel agreed to attempt it, on

^o The Coal Commission's mandate had expired by this time, and its functions were being taken over by a new body.

condition that executions of Poles in all Upper Silesia were immediately stopped and not resumed. The German command agreed to suspend executions for a few hours until Berlin could be consulted. When word came from the capital that there would be no more executions, Goodyear crossed over to Galicia to discuss with General Haller the return of the hostages.

The progress of the interview with Haller was abruptly ended when two German officers appeared with an ultimatum to the effect that if the Poles did not agree by 12 noon (it was then 1:30 P.M.) to return the hostages, the Germans would seize two Poles for every German and take other retaliatory measures. Goodyear asked the Germans to withhold the ultimatum, as it was contrary to the engagements made with him by the German command. The officers refused to do so. General Haller, however, was persuaded not to send the ultimatum to Warsaw until Goodyear could have words with the German command. On his return to Kattowitz the Colonel attended a meeting of civil and military officers, including General von Gröner, the Commander-in-Chief. He related the circumstances of the ultimatum and declared that he considered its delivery an act of bad faith on the part of the Germans which made it impossible for him to act further. The high officials were chagrined and angered, for this was their first knowledge of any such ultimatum. General von Gröner immediately took steps to have it withdrawn, and when this was done Goodyear proceeded with his mediation. With the aid of Hugh Gibson, American Minister in Warsaw, he secured authority to return the German hostages to Upper Silesia. American officers conveyed the hostages across the frontier, and the fragile peace was again restored.

In view of the danger of new troubles, Goodyear asked the Supreme Council to send an Interallied Commission to Upper Silesia to help keep the peace. This Commission,

of which Goodyear became a member, arrived in Kattowitz on September 2.¹⁰ Its presence had a stabilizing effect although many months of tension and intermittent conflict were to pass before the Upper Silesian settlement was finally made.

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Unrelated to coal and transport problems, but pertaining to economic first aid to Poland was the long fight waged by Hoover against the Allied blockade of enemy and liberated states. He began to attack the blockade on economic and moral grounds as soon as he reached Europe in December, 1918, encountering the powerful opposition of the highest military authorities, led by Marshal Foch and supported by French and Italian political leaders. American members in the Blockade and Raw Materials Sections of the S.E.C. urged relaxation, and Hoover and Vance McCormick through President Wilson carried the fight to the Supreme Council. But the blockade on Germany remained until the Treaty was signed, and on Poland—a friendly state admitted to the Peace Conference—until April 1, nearly five months after the end of the war. The raising of the blockade did not give Poland full access to the sea, and until the Versailles Treaty was signed Danzig received practically no supplies for Poland beyond those handled by the Director-General of Relief.

Food and other materials for relief went through the blockade, but it was practically impossible for Polish individuals or institutions to initiate their own purchases or sales because the war time regulations were maintained "for military reasons" in times of peace. When the blockade was finally raised, Polish industries were under great disadvantages because of lack of credit, lack of business con-

¹⁰ The members were Generals du Pont, Malcolm and Bencivengo. Another commission consisting of one British, one American, three French, two Italian, and one Japanese officers had previously arrived in Breslau, but having no authority, it was unable to accomplish anything.

nections, the shortage of shipping, and other factors. American influence was useful to Poland in overcoming these disabilities. Hoover was able to arrange for a credit to the Polish government for 25,000 bales of raw cotton to give employment to 250,000 textile workers and to supply the Polish people with clothing manufactured in their own mills. Part of this cotton was purchased in Europe and part in the United States. It is interesting that the first consignments of raw cotton from the United States were loaded on vessels in American ports before the financial arrangement had been consummated, the credits being arranged only after they were under way. The Polish government guaranteed Polish cotton manufacturers temporary credits of \$40,000,000 for this cotton, which not only served to reopen Polish textile factories, and furnish the clothing so needed in Poland's fight against typhus, but also stimulated trade between rural districts and cities in Poland, and alleviated a dangerous condition of unemployment in the Lodz district.

* * * * *

The signing of the Versailles and St. Germain Treaties marked the expiration of the mandates of many of the commissions set up by the Supreme Council, among them the Coal Commission. The coal situation of Central Europe was by no means comfortable, but it had improved, thanks to the work of the Commission. Their work was, moreover, the more notable when one considers that Goodyear and his associates had no authority to compel governments, mines or operators to do anything. The authority of the Director-General of Relief was undoubtedly their strongest support, but in day-to-day matters they had to rely on their own tact and ingenuity. Even the tobacco supplied by the U. S. Army Commissary had uses beyond the satisfaction of a personal habit. "It was found," wrote Goodyear in his report, "that because of the great

shortage of tobacco, cigarettes properly distributed had a most excellent effect."

The work of the Coal Commission on its dissolution fell into various hands. Its more general activities were assumed by the new European Coal Commission, which was formed on the recommendation of Hoover to the S.E.C. on August 1, 1919, for the stated purpose of stimulating production, controlling distribution in Central and Eastern Europe and advising other international bodies on coal matters. The headquarters of this commission remained at Mahrisch-Ostrau until March, 1920, when it was reorganized under the Reparation Commission as the Central European Coal Bureau with headquarters at Mahrisch-Ostrau and Kattowitz. Some time before this change Col. H. C. Nutt had succeeded Goodyear as the American representative.

The changes in the status of the international commissions and the gradual withdrawal of Americans from their membership did not end the participation of Americans in coal, transport, and other technical matters in Poland and the other Succession States. American technical advisers carried on and expanded the functions relating to production, operation, and rehabilitation of the basic industries to which the Coal and Railway Commissions had given first aid.

CHAPTER IX

RELIEF FOR POLISH CHILDREN, 1919-1920

CHILD welfare work had been in existence in Poland for several years before the Great War,—before 1905 clandestinely and after that openly. The relaxation of Russian rule after the Revolution of that year permitted the establishment of "The Society of Guardianship for Children," without the danger of swift suppression. Other societies were formed in the succeeding years, and gradually an interest in child welfare spread over the country. Indeed, it was so widespread that when the American Red Cross undertook intensive child health work in Poland in 1921, it found that in school health work, at least, a complete pre-war organization existed with pre-war posters and child health literature in Polish, available for the beginning of the campaign. The war itself, although it interrupted peace-time efforts in child-care, greatly stimulated children's relief work. As the war slowly wiped out food supplies and brought disaster to thousands of families, the Poles, in connection with their general war-relief and with such financial help as their friends in America and elsewhere could give them, organized emergency soup kitchens, milk stations and children's homes for the care of orphans and the sick. At the Armistice there were 1,430 registered institutions in Poland, caring for about 100,000 children. But the food shortage and the resulting high prices in 1918-19 forced many of these institutions to cut down their work at the very time when the number of children in need of relief was steadily increasing. For instance, the *Soupes Scolaires*, which had served one substantial meal a day to 44,000 children in the spring of 1919,



AMERICAN FEEDING CENTERS FOR UNDERNOURISHED POLISH CHILDREN

Each black dot represents a town or center where American kitchens were established for feeding Polish children, poverty stricken in war and post-war disruption.

could provide only a very light daily meal to 28,000 children in the tragic spring of 1919.

Poland was suffering, perhaps to an unusual degree, from the same shortage of milk, fats and other growth-foods, which the whole war-area felt. The numbers of dairy cattle and of all live-stock had been greatly reduced, and there was a shortage of fodder which further cut down the milk supply. Moreover, in the mining and industrial centers, where men had been out of work for years, there was no money to buy food. Disease was spreading and finding its first victims among half-starved children, and the country seemed to be flooded with orphans or lost, refugee children. The number of orphans or half-orphans in Poland after the war has never been fully estimated. In 1922 the Polish-American Children's Relief Committee (P.A.K.P.D.) estimated that in 13 districts in what was formerly Austrian and Russian Poland, there were 160,640 children who had lost one or both parents in the period 1914-1920. In proportion to total population this represents a percentage of 2.14 in the Pinsk area, 1.64 in Stanislawow, and so on, down to 0.17 in Kielce. The estimate was based on data collected from districts and communes in the summer of 1921, and was known to be incomplete. The J.D.C. registered over 30,000 Jewish orphans in Poland in the course of their work there. The A.R.C. in 1919 estimated that there were 750,000 orphans in Poland, but this was probably an exaggeration, due to the great confusion of that year, when, especially in the east, thousands of families were wandering about the devastated provinces, or living, homeless, in caves and dug-outs. However, it is a fact that when the A.R.A. was feeding over one million children in the spring of 1920, there were still others who needed help, and it is probably true that in 1919 at least two million Polish children needed food, clothing or medical care.

The Polish government, and those especially interested in child welfare, knew all too well that special relief for

children was necessary, although it is doubtful if even they realized the full truth at this time. But they had no funds for special relief; in fact, as described, without the American appropriation they could not have financed even the general revictualment, which provided chiefly bread grains and not the growth-foods needed for children. One of their first requests, therefore, when the American Food Mission reached Warsaw, January 4, was for emergency shipments of milk and fats for starving children in the worst districts. Vernon Kellogg wrote in his first informal report to Paris, January 6, that "because of the horrible conditions among children and the sick," especially in Lemberg, condensed milk must be sent instantly. In fact the need was so urgent that he appealed by wire to the Red Cross at Berne for one carload of condensed milk and 7,000 bottles of malted milk, especially for Lemberg. By January 27, he was asking for fourteen carloads, to contain condensed milk, cocoa, rice, white flour, and fats. Such things were not easy to find in Europe, but early in February, five cars of general foodstuffs and four cars of milk were shipped from Switzerland and delivered before the end of the month at Lemberg, Dabrowa and Cracow, the first supplies to reach Poland by land.

Meantime, the cry for special children's relief had been growing louder. On February 3, Paderewski cabled to Poles in America, begging for \$30,000 "for condensed milk for dying children." The *Westward Ho*, the gift-ship, whose cargo, purchased by the A.R.A., was financed by the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the Polish National Department of America, carried 1500 tons of condensed milk besides flour, fats and vegetable oils, and at the same time the food ships, loading cargoes for Danzig, were ordered to take on some milk and fats in addition to flour. The American Red Cross sent food for children and the sick, and, on the arrival of their mission at Warsaw, agreed to carry on children's relief as well as health work, while the A.R.A. conducted the revictualment campaign.

Yet every inspection, every contact which the Americans had with Poland, showed that the real problem of child-saving had scarcely been touched. Wherever the Americans went they found appalling signs of malnutrition among the children. Rickets and tuberculosis were everywhere;¹ in eastern Poland there was actual starvation; in towns and industrial centers child mortality had increased alarmingly; and with the return of refugees, cholera and typhus were spreading. The revictualment campaign might be expected to help by increasing the general food-supply, bringing out hidden stocks, and lowering prices, but the foods needed for child care did not exist in Poland, and the Government could not provide them. The only solution was a separate relief campaign, almost as large as the revictualment program, and based on the scientific principles of child-feeding.

Of course this was true, in a greater or less degree, not only in Poland, but over the whole of Central and Eastern Europe where the A.R.A. was working. Col. A. J. Carlson, an eminent physiologist in civilian life, wrote in the *A.R.A. Bulletin*, April 29, 1919, on the gravity of the general situation as follows:

War means decreased birth-rate and increased child-mortality in proportion to the disorganization, want, and distress forced on the civilian population. Modern warfare is directed against nations rather than against armies, and the child is the innocent victim of war. The pangs of hunger in the child are more intense than in the adult, and the miseries of starvation are more persistent. It is a common experience as well as a reasonable deduction that in proportion to the size of his body, the child needs more food than the adult, as the child is more active and, besides, is adding to his stature day by day. It has recently been shown that quite apart from growth and muscular activity, the food requirements of the child at rest is 15 to 25 per cent greater than that of the adult.

The known facts are: The growing child needs: (a) greater

¹ As late as the fall of 1920 a Red Cross Survey in Polish manufacturing towns showed that 50 per cent of working-men's children were infected with either pulmonary or bone tuberculosis.

pro-rata amounts of food than the adult; (b) special growth-producing substances present only in certain foods, such as milk; and lastly (c) nature has provided a "factor of safety" in the persistence of the capacity for growth beyond the period peculiar to the species, in case of growth arrested by under-nutrition.

As for the effects of undernourishment, he pointed out that "the increase of tuberculosis by starvation not only affects the tubercular person, but each new tubercular individual produced by starvation acts as a focus for the further spread of the disease," while "rickets in the young is more than likely to affect the individual permanently in rendering him a cripple, or at best a physical and mental weakling. We may sum up the whole matter by saying that starvation kills the weak and maims the strong, and the number of dead and wounded as well as the permanency and duration of the wounds, depends on the severity and duration of the starvation. It should also be added that the physical and mental weaklings produced by starvation are likely to beget their kind (physical and mental weaklings) to the detriment of the next generation."

The American Red Cross a little later said that "the best informed, who have reflected carefully on conditions, have invariably come back to one fundamental conclusion which they confidently announce. It is, that after all momentary and superficial factors have been identified and swept aside, the absolutely vital and indisputable fact remaining is that child life over vast areas of Europe stands in the gravest peril."

There were, and could be, no accurate figures as to the extent of temporary or permanent starvation among European children, but the A.R.A. estimated in 1919 that "in some regions 90 per cent of the children under ten years of age are seriously starved, and 10 to 25 per cent stunted and sick from prolonged undernourishment."

* * * * *

The C.R.B., forerunner of the A.R.A., had done child welfare work on a large scale in Belgium and Northern France, and when these tragic realities of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe became apparent, Hoover prepared to organize the same kind of work there, but on an even larger scale. There were other organizations interested in child-feeding, but it was doubtful if they had the resources for such a vast campaign. The American Red Cross seemed the most likely to do so, but had its primary interest in health work, and could probably not assume the added burden of general child-feeding. Hoover wrote to Henry P. Davison on the subject, February 22, 1919, as follows:

Reports which we now have from the many skilled investigators whom we have sent through Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Roumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Jugo-Slavia, Montenegro, and also in the North of France, show that there is a great deal of malnutrition amongst the children, more particularly of the poorer classes. It is necessary to at once provide a special ration for these children and to systematically organize such agencies as we conducted in Belgium for some years by way of creation of systematic handling of the debilitated children and the provision of supplementary rations through the schools, which shall be independent of the general rationing of populations.

This work requires large systematic organization as an adjunct to the general provisioning of the country and will run into several millions of dollars per month, as well as requiring people not only of skill but of actual experience in the handling of these problems. It requires a considerable amount of shipping, the recruiting of appropriate supplies both abroad and of domestic order, the handling of railway transportation, etc., which of course would go hand in hand with the general relief of these populations.

I do not wish to transgress on the field of the Red Cross and I was in hopes of having a meeting with you to discuss whether or not the Red Cross would have any feeling if we inaugurate this service, which will be so largely purely charity, under the general European food relief, which, in turn, is under the auspices of the Supreme Economic Council. I would, of course, be glad enough if the American Red Cross would undertake the work

systematically throughout the whole of these countries. I am uncertain whether your financial resources allow you to take this additional burden. Alternatively, I would be glad to have financial assistance from the Red Cross if we inaugurate the service, or, alternatively again, if the Red Cross feels that its funds are required for its other most beneficent services, I will endeavor to set up the finance and carry on this work.

I would be glad, indeed, to have your views in the matter. We have had already to inaugurate some emergency service of this kind at various places, and time is the essence of the problem.

Col. Robert E. Olds, the Red Cross Commissioner for Europe, replied on February 25:

Your letter of February 22, addressed to Mr. Davison, did not arrive until after he had left Paris. I am quite sure that I reflect his opinion when I say that the problem of providing a special ration for children throughout Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Roumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Jugoslavia, and Montenegro, as well as in the North of France, is so vast as to be beyond the immediate resources of the American Red Cross. It would seem to be properly a governmental operation in the same sense as the *ravitaillement* programme for the territories mentioned. We have, I think, all agreed that it is quite out of the question for the American Red Cross to undertake the feeding of these peoples. Under the circumstances, therefore, we not only can have no objections to the inauguration by you of a special ration service, but we should be very glad, indeed, to see the great need met in that way at the earliest possible moment. It goes without saying that to the limit of our ability and to the extent of our resources, we shall at all times cooperate whole-heartedly with you in this work, and earnestly hope and expect that the Commissions sent by us to some of the countries named, may be of real assistance.

If you desire, and will name an hour convenient to you, I should be pleased to lay before you our plans more fully than seems possible by correspondence.

The Red Cross not only did cooperate whole-heartedly, but in the later stages of children's relief took over supplementary child health work in connection with the A.R.A. feeding organization. Immediately after this exchange of

letters, Col. Olds and Hoover met in conference, and Olds sent a memorandum to all field units of the Red Cross, announcing the A.R.A.'s plans and requesting them to assist the new organization.

The A.R.A. immediately (March 1, 1919) set up in Paris a central Children's Relief Bureau to plan and control the campaign. E. A. Peden, formerly Food Administrator for Texas, and Col. A. J. Carlson were in charge. Dr. Alonzo E. Taylor, with others expert in this form of relief, assisted in drafting plans and in making investigations in the various parts of Europe to be served. The purchasing and shipping machinery of the A.R.A. and the Grain Corporation were, of course, used for this new work, but it was entirely separate from the revictualment program and differed from it in purpose and character.

The latter was a matter of general rehabilitation, an economic progress, which involved government loans and mass distribution of food in bulk. Children's relief, though on a large scale, covering fifteen countries in Eastern Europe, was more individualized and personal, since its aim was not merely to end starvation, but to build up child-health. Daily rations were worked out to meet the requirements of children at various ages, and the food was selected and allocated on this basis. It was distributed not in bulk, but at kitchens in the form of cooked meals which gave each child the necessary balance in food-elements and prevented the use of supplies by anyone except the children for whom they were intended.² The daily meal of about 624 calories, at first, was considered only supplementary, that is, it was not to take the place of any food which the child's

² As a matter of fact at the start of children's relief, conditions were such that in some isolated places kitchens could not be opened without great delay, and food was given to the hungry children in any possible form. Sometimes hard-tack and condensed milk were simply handed from the trucks that brought them. But this was only in the greatest emergencies, as during the border wars in Poland, and the A.R.A. never varied from its reasoned policy of distributing the child-feeding supplies in individual, cooked rations in kitchens.

family could provide, but was to supply the special food-elements which the child could get in no other way. In some places it was really all that the children had, and at times the A.R.A. was forced to increase the ration to meet this situation. In other places, and especially as the general food supply increased, children obtained about half their normal needs at home, and the A.R.A. meal represented the other half.

The funds for children's relief were outright gifts, not loans, although the various governments concerned made grants for child-feeding, and so the food remained the property of the A.R.A. until it reached the consumer, whereas the food for revictualment was consigned to the various governments, and the A.R.A. had no actual responsibility for its distribution beyond the cooperative responsibility which it assumed. The food for revictualment was distributed largely by local government sales. The children's food, distributed by special local committees, was also sold in some cases, but in a different manner. Parents paid at the kitchens for their children's meals, if they were able, but the money derived from sales was used for the local expenses of distributing, preparing and serving the food, and the price of a meal was regulated by ability to pay, not by cost. In Poland, for instance, it was estimated, in June, 1919, that a single daily meal at the prevailing rate of exchange cost 85 pfennigs (about five and a half cents), but 60 pfennigs was the maximum charge and in some regions, like the Eastern Districts, parents paid 5, 10 or 15 pfennigs, while many children, of course, received their meals free.

It was estimated later that about 85 per cent of the children could pay something for their meals, but the percentage varied with localities and time, and the question of ability to pay was always settled locally. This sale of children's meals was the only way of covering local expenses where local governments were poor, and it not only allowed all A.R.A. funds, gifts, and government grants to be used for

the actual supply of food, but was in line with the A.R.A. policy of encouraging self-help at all points, from the Government down to the consumer.

The revictualment and child-feeding campaigns were, in fact, only alike in being based on certain general principles which marked A.R.A. work everywhere, namely: first, that need was the one criterion, and food must be distributed without regard to race, religion or politics; and second, that self-help, local responsibility and the use of all local resources were to be stimulated by every possible means, to the end that the countries where the feeding was done might be self-reliant in the shortest possible time. The children's relief program, therefore, called for support of the work by the several governments and for local responsibility in distribution through national organizations with district, town and village subsidiaries, which carried on the actual feeding. It was believed that such organizations were essential, both to stimulate local responsibility and to carry on the work when the emergency was over and the A.R.A. withdrew. The development of effective national agencies for child-care was secondary to the effort to get food to the children as quickly as possible, but it was highly important and, in the long run, became one of the most valuable of the A.R.A.'s contributions to the recovery of Eastern Europe.

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In Poland the A.R.A. appointed Lieutenant Maurice Pate, an experienced C.R.B. worker who had been in Poland since February, as its director of child-feeding. On March 23, he met the Polish President of Ministers to map out the initial program. The A.R.A. had assigned \$800,000 of its funds to child-feeding in Poland and increased this to \$2,400,000 by the end of May. The Polish government was asked to make grants of funds to pay the local expenses of railway transport and warehousing. The latter was not formally agreed to until May 22, but on April 10 the Gov-

ernment made an initial grant of about one million dollars for child-feeding from the general approvisionnement fund and increased its grants from time to time. As the work of organization went on and the extent of the need developed, funds, both from the A.R.A. and the Government, increased, so that the program was constantly expanding, with difficulties in organization and transport as its chief hindrance in these first months.

The child-feeding operation was placed under the protection of the Ministry of Health, and on March 30, a central committee was formed with Madame Paderewska at its head and eight men and women actively interested in child welfare as its members. This was later named the *Panstwowy Komitet Pomocy Dzieciom* (State Children's Relief Committee) and was known as the P.K.P.D. It was not fully organized until June, so that the preliminary work of making surveys and forming the local sub-committees which were to conduct the feeding, was done largely by the Americans, assisted by a temporary committee of Polish organizers. It was a complex and, at times, delicate job, and the organizers worked at top-speed to get food to the hungry towns while the system of distribution was still in embryo, and at the very time when transport and communications were most difficult. The distributing system was not perfected for many months, but in the meantime food did reach the neediest districts, and kitchens were opened, usually in existing institutions such as the *Soupes Scolaires*, milk stations, hospitals, children's homes, and schools. As with the revictualment supplies, it was believed that since the industrial towns and cities were in the worst condition, the first kitchens should be placed there, but as the border was opened more territory, food was delivered as fast as possible among the starving children along the recent battle-front, sometimes in evacuated cities and often in what had been villages, but were now only collections of hovels.

The first consignment of food under this program reached Warsaw April 18, and was shipped to Brest-Litovsk where the first kitchen for 2,000 children opened on the 30th. During May, about 2,000 tons of food were sent in small shipments to the neediest sections and about 125,000 children fed. By June the organization had really taken shape, and in that month 400,000 Polish children received a daily meal of American food.

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The work of these first months can be described only by a detailed account of the machinery of distribution. The A.R.A., with its small American staff, was merely to supervise the work, and a network of Polish committees—the central office in Warsaw, provincial branches, and town and village feeding units—had to be formed. The usual procedure in any given town was for the American organizer, first, to interview the mayor, a priest, or other influential citizen and ask him to call a small meeting of the town's leading men and women—the head of any local welfare organization, a doctor, a rabbi, a member of the school board, and so on. The American then explained the projected work to this gathering, outlining the system and the regulations for feeding, and secured information on local conditions in order to make a tentative allocation of supplies.

The A.R.A. required that all local committees must represent the prevailing races, religions, and classes. Where Jews and Catholics, for instance, predominated, as they usually did in all parts of Poland, each must have a representative on the committee, and where a town or district contained several nationalities, as they often did, especially on the borders, each group, again, must be represented. This ruling immediately marked the A.R.A. feeding as a community affair and emphasized that there was to be no favoritism to races or to creeds, but it was an almost revolu-

tionary idea in places where there had always been a dominating nation or religion and where people had regarded each other for years with prejudice, suspicion, or worse. There was trouble, of course, for this was a time when racial antagonisms were strong, and yet it was found that diverse elements in the population could and did work together for the purpose of child-feeding. In Upper Silesia, in July, 1919, Poles and Germans submerged their differences to work on a committee that fed 20,000 children in that district, and in the East, Poles, Russians, White-Russians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Germans, Catholics, Uniates, Orthodox, Jews and Mohammedans, all worked together, to feed children in the reclaimed villages from which the Russian army was then withdrawing.

In this connection an incident may be described which occurred considerably later in the relief campaign and was relatively unimportant, but is typical of the way in which racial and political complications affected relief work. A complaint was sent to the central office in Warsaw and to the United States, which was signed by the mayors of several Ukrainian communities in the region of Cracow. It stated, (1) that A.R.A. feeding had been unfairly stopped in these Ukrainian communities by Polish authorities, contrary to A.R.A. rule against racial favoritism, and (2) that the Polish district supervisor had said in an open meeting, "We do not like the Ukrainian nation, but we have to give aid, because they have a right to it." The feeding had, in fact, stopped in those communities—and in many others, regardless of race—for the simple reason that this was a time when the relief program was being cut down all over the country. But an American representative went at once to clear up any misapprehensions on this score in the minds of the Ukrainians. He arranged a meeting of the local relief committee with the district supervisor and three of the complaining mayors. These complainants immediately said that they knew that their kitchens were closed because

the program had been reduced, and explained that since they could not read, they did not know what the complaint said, but had been told that it was merely a request that the kitchens be reopened. They usually signed papers, they said, which, as in this case, were brought to them by the priest or the school teacher, because the priest and teacher, being able to read, ought to know more than they did. It was agreed that the district supervisor had not said what she was accused of and that these mayors had no complaint whatever to make of their treatment by the Poles. The school teacher was out of the district, but the priest was sent for, and in the meantime others at the meeting enlightened the American as to the supposed relation of this priest to the Russians, who were suspected of creating disaffection in Galicia through the Uniate Church. The priest, on arrival, disclaimed all knowledge of the protest, but added further ramifications to the tale by suggesting that a Ukrainian-American "agitator" was responsible. When the peasants remarked that this agitator had not been in the country for eight months and that the priest's own daughter had circulated the protest, he left, saying that he could not stay where the honor of his word was doubted. Thereupon, with the air somewhat cleared of political argument, and in general good feeling, it was possible to get down to the real question at issue, namely the actual needs of the Ukrainian children. But this meeting cannot be left without quoting a peasant who expressed the bewilderment which the acts of the Americans often created in the peasant mind. Pointing at the A.R.A. man and addressing the Polish supervisor, he said, "Really, Madame, is it true that the Americans are such fools as to give food away free, and then have all this trouble about it?"

All distribution was in the hands of such local committees, and there were strict rules of procedure. Not an ounce of the food was to be used for anyone who did not need it, and so, wherever possible, one member of the com-

mittee was a doctor who could select the neediest by physical examinations of the applicants. In practice, it was evident that popular judgment was as reliable a basis for selection as examination, for neighbors knew who were the hungriest, and once it was understood that race, creed and politics made no difference, any errors in selection were quickly remedied. In cities and the larger towns physical examinations were necessary, and in the course of time special examination centers were established there in addition to the kitchens.

The strictest rule was that requiring the cooked daily meal to be served and eaten in the kitchens, and it was at first the most difficult to enforce. In places where everyone was hungry, the parents simply demanded that supplies be given out in bulk for the use of the whole family,³ and if the local committee was not strong, it was impossible to prevent the diversion of children's relief supplies. There were not enough Americans to cover the ground except for hurried inspections, and the P.K.P.D. was slow in getting started. By June 1st it had organized 32 local branches, not feeding committees but relief councils, but it was hard to find intelligent volunteers as directors because almost everyone was too busy with the countless other problems of mere existence to devote much time to the details of kitchen organization and control. The result was that without a strong district leadership for local control, local committees followed their own inclinations, food went sometimes to the most active, rather than the neediest, community, and the few Americans could not organize new kitchens, supervise the operation of the existing stations, and allocate and deliver supplies fast enough to meet the need.

³ It must be remembered that child-feeding began in April, when the revictualment was barely under way, and so government allotments of food had not reached many of the towns where child-feeding was begun. Sometimes when children's kitchens opened, the workers found a line of people of all ages waiting to be fed. Mothers with babies were fed, but others over 15 years of age were sent to the Red Cross or other relief agencies.

As a matter of fact, the greatest difficulty at this time, for everyone concerned, was in transport, and Poles and Americans alike were forced to spend most of their energy on merely getting the food from Danzig into the districts where it was needed. The shortage of cars, engines, and fuel; the fact that revictualment supplies must be kept moving; and the continued wars, which disrupted rail communications and diverted rolling stock to the use of the army, combined to make the delivery of child-feeding supplies an almost superhuman task. The Ministry of Approvisionnement assisted by transporting child-feeding stocks with its own and storing them in its warehouses, subject to the call of the children's relief committee, and both Poles and Americans worked frantically at their tasks, but it required constant driving effort to find cars, engines, or even rails to get food into the districts, and from district warehouses to the kitchens.

In Eastern Poland, where conditions were worst, there was no transportation, not even horses. The Americans who went to open kitchens there often had to walk from village to village, unless they were lucky enough to find a single peasant cart with a tired horse attached. The A.R.A. finally bought seven automobiles, which helped to speed up the work, and in June the J.D.C. contributed fifteen Ford trucks and twenty heavier trucks. The first of these were sent to Vilna, and there began the emergency distribution of American army hard-tack and condensed milk to children in the small villages along the Bolshevik front, where it was impossible to deliver a variety of supplies or to organize kitchens. When the other trucks arrived they went on similar errands to Slonim, on the front east of Bialystok, Pinsk and Kowel, so that by the end of June about 8,000 children were being fed daily in these inaccessible places.

Meanwhile, food was arriving in larger quantities, more kitchens opened, and the P.K.P.D. strengthened its organization. It divided the country into 22 sections with a

delegate in each. There were only 15 Americans on the child-feeding staff, but they were also assigned to districts, some of them handling more than one in order to cover the country.

Because of the variety of selected foods (milk, flour, rice, fats, peas, beans, cocoa and sugar) to be distributed to the feeding-points in balanced allocations, the control of stocks and an accounting system were especially important, and a separate business organization was created to handle this. The national, district, and local committees for distribution were made up almost entirely of volunteers, but this accounting division consisted of paid workers, former business men, who gave full time to the work. The central office was in Warsaw and there were branches in the districts parallel to the feeding organization.

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In such fashion the obstacles to relief were slowly overcome, and, while the machinery for distribution was far from functioning smoothly and could not do so in the generally disorganized condition of the country, it was possible to reach more and more children week by week. In July, 525,000 children were fed; in August, 600,000; and in September, 700,000.

The funds for this increasing program came in the first instance from a portion of the Congressional Appropriation, set aside for this purpose. This was supplemented from a variety of sources. Special efforts were made by the Polish organizations in the United States for the purpose of raising funds, and various American charitable or relief agencies made contributions through the A.R.A. The J.D.C., for instance, besides its gift of trucks in June, sent 30 carloads of soap, clothing, condensed milk and vegetable oils for use in children's institutions. The Polish government, after its initial grant of about one million dollars from the appropriation fund, added \$1,000,000 in May and \$1,560,000 in

June. The latter was not from the approvisionnement fund, but was credited to Poland by the A.R.A. and represented the margin against loss charged in the money remittance operation which the A.R.A. conducted to enable Poles and others in America to send money to Poland.⁴ The result of all these contributions was that whereas the original A.R.A. allocation for children's relief in Poland had been \$800,000, by August, 1919, about \$6,000,000 worth of supplies had reached the country.

Yet it was evident that even this was insufficient. When the Children's Relief Bureau was formed in March it was hoped that after the harvest of 1919, with the end of the revictualment program, the A.R.A. could withdraw, and the Government and the P.K.P.D. could continue children's relief with the increased local resources. But as the real conditions at the end of the summer were seen, it was realized that no local resources could possibly bring the Polish children back to health. Moreover, the P.K.P.D. was barely organized, and even with funds from abroad could not expand and control a larger effort without A.R.A. help. Hoover came to Poland in August, travelled to the Eastern Districts to see conditions there, and met officers of the Government and the P.K.P.D. in Warsaw to discuss their needs. There were no accurate estimates of how many children needed relief; the maximum estimate was 2,000,000; but there was no way of measuring the need since it depended so much on economic recovery, peace along the borders, and other changing factors. The one certain fact was that over 800,000 children needed relief, and it was formally announced that the A.R.A. would continue child-feeding for the next year.

The same general conditions held in the other countries where the A.R.A. was working, and so when the revictualment program was completed and the A.R.A. ceased to be

⁴ The important function performed by the A.R.A. remittances is described in Chapter XI.

the appointed agent of the various governments, it was reorganized to conduct children's relief alone, and the A.R.A. European Children's Fund was named as the repository for government grants to child-feeding. This was largely a formal gesture and represented no break in the work, for the new organization inherited the personnel of the old and operated through similar channels. It was a voluntary association, with Hoover as chairman and an executive committee of men who had been active in food distribution and relief since the beginning of the war. Its main office was now in New York instead of Paris, and Edgar Rickard was Director-General. Among the other officers at this time were: Julius H. Barnes, Vice-Chairman; Edward M. Flesh, Comptroller; Gates W. McGarrah, Treasurer; George Barr Baker, Director States Organization; Perrin C. Galpin, Secretary; R. H. Sawtelle, Assistant Treasurer. The head European office was in London, with Walter Lyman Brown as Director for Europe.

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The fall, winter and spring of 1919-20 in Poland were marked by three great efforts in child-care: (1) the expansion of the feeding program; (2) a reorganization and strengthening of the P.K.P.D.; and (3) the importation and distribution of \$4,000,000 worth of clothing for children.

This last was supplementary to the feeding program, but was of the greatest importance, for, as usually happens, a clothing shortage had followed the food shortage, and the relatively small amount of clothing distributed by the A.R.A., A.R.C., and others in the spring of 1919 had reached only a few of those in need.⁵ For years the Polish people

⁵ About \$192,000 worth of clothing was imported up to August, 1919, part of it in used clothing and part in bulk goods which were made up in Poland. The Red Cross held a special drive for used clothing in 1919, and its Mission to Poland distributed clothes as a part of their general relief; the C.R.B. and J.D.C. gifts of clothing were "rationed" according to a plan agreed upon by the P.K.P.D., A.R.A. and the government.

had been forced to spend everything they had on mere subsistence; the cost of food was still the main item in the family budget; and, in any case, clothing was scarce and dear because of the shortage in raw materials, the paralysis of the textile industries, and the absorption of stocks by the armies of occupation during the war. When Hoover was in Warsaw in August, the P.K.P.D. described "25,000 children in bare feet, winding their way over Warsaw's pavements to Motowski Park for a demonstration of appreciation to the American people," but the barefoot children of Warsaw were well off compared to thousands of others in the outlying districts. The refugees and practically all children in the Eastern provinces were literally dressed in rags. Children had come to the kitchens during the first half of the year in tattered overcoats, dresses made of curtain hangings, burlap, or anything a garment could be made of, and sometimes had even borrowed clothes for an hour for the sole purpose of getting food. In fact, some children were unable to come to the kitchens at all because they had no clothes, and it was necessary to send food to their homes and run the risk that others would share the child's portion.

Therefore, it was evident that in order to carry the children through the winter of 1919 a large importation of clothes must be added to the food program. In agreement with the P.K.P.D., when plans for the year were made, the A.R.A. supplied material for 700,000 sets of overcoats, shoes and stockings, and about 500,000 children received these outfits during the fall and winter. The quantities were so large that all of the material could not be made up before spring, and some of it was held over for the next year. The supplies were brought in bulk from America for the double purpose of providing work for Polish clothing factories and producing clothes for the children at a cost below that of American manufacture.

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
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The child-feeding program was pushed during the winter until in February a million children were being fed, but at the same time it was necessary to give further attention to means of distribution and control, both to make the increased program effective and to prepare the organization to carry on without American assistance. The P.K.P.D. was after all only a makeshift, hurriedly formed in a great emergency, and although it had already assembled a large corps of devoted workers all over the land it was, by this time, being rapidly outgrown. To carry on so large a relief program efficiently it was necessary to decentralize the organization, to increase its membership to take in all interested bodies, to improve and reform the warehousing, accounting and inspection systems, and to clarify rules and orders and regulate allocations so that there would be uniformity and no waste in the kitchens. All these things were done during 1919-20 with the collaboration of the A.R.A. The country was divided into 14 regions with 207 districts and later it was found that a paid district manager was the best solution for efficient control of local distribution. W. Parmer Fuller, who had become chief of the A.R.A. in Poland when the revictualment was over and Col. Grove left, undertook a study of the Polish warehousing, accounting and inspection organizations. Fuller possessed splendid ability as an organizer and executive and the reforms he instituted greatly increased the speed of distribution and efficiency in kitchens.

He discovered that while the warehouses were in general in excellent condition, no real inventory of stocks had ever been taken; but the accounting rested on a book inventory which was theoretically correct, but practically of slight value. That is, if 1,000 pounds of rice were sent to Lodz and then 600 pounds ordered to another place, the inventory showed 400 pounds in Lodz, but no one knew what was actually there. Moreover, the child-feeding stocks were stored with those of the Ministry of Approvisionnement without

Thousands of Children Fed

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240



M

NUMBER FED IN POLAND
(By Districts, at Height of Operation)

segregation. This had been done at the start to save creating a separate warehouse system, and the Ministry was pledged to deliver child-feeding supplies at the call of the P.K.P.D. to the amount received, but as the supplies were sometimes used by the Ministry at one warehouse with the idea that they would be returned from another, there was great danger of a sudden shortage in some needed commodity at any time. Supplies were not always allocated as the kitchens needed them, and because the central office had not enough inspectors the kitchens were likely to work as they saw fit, and meals were not always uniform in either quantity or kind.

A real inventory of stocks was immediately started and the segregation of supplies begun. A rigid system of inspection and control was worked out which rested on the sending of clear uniform orders from the center to the districts, and included exact allocations of supplies and an increased staff of inspectors to visit all kitchens regularly. It was found that there was a great difference in prestige, locally, between Polish and American inspectors when decisions were made, and so the American staff was enlarged, and the "Polish Grey Samaritans" used as A.R.A. inspectors. They were American girls of Polish ancestry who had been sent to the country by the Y.W.C.A. for relief work. They were trained in child-care and home-visiting and at first were engaged in hospital and family welfare work in Warsaw. Later they helped in the A.R.A.-P.K.P.D. clothing distribution and were now assigned to feeding districts as kitchen inspectors. They were indefatigable workers, unafraid of hardship and exposure to disease, and because of their knowledge of the language and of Polish character were ideal inspectors in the communities where they worked.

This whole effort in reorganization had shown the need for closer relations between the A.R.A. and the P.K.P.D., and so, in January, 1920, when the P.K.P.D.'s director, Mr. Galikowski, resigned, Maurice Pate of the A.R.A. was

appointed to the office. The relation of the A.R.A. to the P.K.P.D. had, after all, been unsatisfactory to both parties. Theoretically the A.R.A. brought supplies from abroad, which the P.K.P.D. distributed, and had only a supervisory or advisory interest in local distribution, but in practice the A.R.A. had been appealed to for active help in distribution as well as advice on policies. Also, if the A.R.A. was to withdraw, as it hoped, during 1920, the P.K.P.D. must grow into a permanent, not emergency, organization, and to effect this permanency must give more time to problems of consolidation than the feeding of over a million children allowed.

For all these reasons both the Poles and the Americans were anxious for the closest possible connection between the two agencies, and the appointment of Pate as director was the beginning of a movement which culminated in the summer of 1920 in the creation by government statute of the P.A.K.P.D. (Polish-American Children's Relief Committee), to be the permanent national child welfare agency and, at the request of the Polish members, named American as well as Polish.

The emphasis on organization and the machinery of relief in this year did not mean either that the primary needs of the children were forgotten or that the P.K.P.D. and A.R.A. were in constant difficulties. The only way in which a larger number of children could be fed was by improving and enlarging the machinery, and each month of this winter and spring more and more children were reached and relief became more effective. As for the relation between the Americans and Poles, it is true that at times their ideas and temperaments clashed, but a remarkable spirit of determination to feed the children existed on both sides and held them close together even in moments of misunderstanding. Indeed, enough cannot be said of "the Polish spirit." The success of the work rested ultimately with the Poles, for the actual feeding was necessarily in their hands.

In June, 1920, there were 27,890 Poles working on children's relief, including personnel in central, regional and district offices, on local committees and in kitchens and institutions. At the same time the A.R.A. Mission to Poland consisted of 24 men, or one American to every 54,000 children fed. About 70 per cent of the Poles were volunteer workers without pay; many others received only their expenses; and the maximum paid to any worker was about \$12 a month. Thousands of them worked full time, living under difficult conditions, exposing themselves to typhus, cholera, and other diseases in order to get food to the children in remote and dangerous places. Their enthusiasm and energy brought extraordinary results. So far as the Americans were concerned, there was no doubt how they were regarded in Poland. The words *Missia Amerikansky* (American Mission) were a password anywhere,—at the front, through any line of guards, or even past the sentinels at the Palace of the Polish Chief of State.


In June, 1920, the feeding reached its maximum, when 1,315,000 children were fed. Relief was now working smoothly and plans were under way for reducing the program with the coming harvest. But the Russian armies were already invading Poland, and soon all the energies of Americans and Poles were concentrated on the frantic effort to save food supplies, feed the growing flood of refugees and homeless children, and keep just one jump ahead of the battle front as it moved across Poland toward Warsaw. The Russian-Polish war of 1920 changed the whole complexion of relief and marked the beginning of a new era in child-feeding.

CHAPTER X

CORDON SANITAIRE, 1919-1920

WHENEVER the specter of Bolshevism intruded, as it frequently did, on the deliberations of Paris, plenipotentiaries, experts and pressmen talked of a *cordon sanitaire* which would confine if not lay that ghost. The *cordon* so conceived was a matter of men and war materials, the latter to be supplied by the Allies, the men by the states on whose soil the barrier was to be built. The troubled months of 1919 revealed that food, not men and munitions, would keep Bolshevism out of Western Europe; they revealed that the immediate danger from Russia was not a westward drive of the Red Armies but a westward spread of typhus. It was, therefore, a *cordon sanitaire* in its literal as well as its political sense which Poland was compelled to erect and defend in 1919-1920.

The spread of typhus in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, came before the Peace Conference at Paris late in March, 1919. Word came that the disease had appeared in Vienna, where it had been brought by prisoners of war returned from Russia. The Supreme Council referred the matter to Hoover and the Food Section of the S.E.C., which in turn asked for the cooperation of the national Red Cross societies, then engaged in health work in the liberated states. The Red Cross societies were, of course, aware of the typhus menace from the reports of their representatives in the field, and the subject



SPREAD AND CONQUEST OF TYPHUS IN POLAND

was discussed at a meeting at Cannes in April. The League of Red Cross Societies, formed at Cannes, notified the Supreme Council, and later the S.E.C., of its readiness to take the responsibility for the typhus campaign, provided the governments of the Great Powers would furnish the necessary resources in funds, army medical personnel and materials.¹ The governments did not furnish the funds, the Red Cross did not assume responsibility, and for a month nothing was accomplished beyond the drafting of well-intentioned resolutions.

In order to stimulate action Hoover asked Dr. Janiszewski, the Polish Minister of Public Health, to come to Paris for conferences with him, the Red Cross, and others interested in health matters. These conferences, held early in June, produced slight results, for the Red Cross societies had not received the funds which they regarded as necessary for the work, while the Polish government lacked the necessary technical equipment and the money to procure it. In desperation Dr. Janiszewski appealed to Hoover to use his influence to secure for Poland the needed materials from the surplus army stocks in France, for, wrote the Minister, ". . . people are dying of typhus in Poland, our epidemiologists are falling victims to the disease in protecting the whole of Western Europe from further spread of the epidemic, while here (at Paris) all the time there are experienced people as well as all means to fight the terrible scourge." Hoover, with the full support of President Wilson, asked Judge Edwin Parker of the United States Liquidation Board to arrange to furnish the Polish Ministry of Health on credit the equipment it required.

¹ "If, upon consideration, the Allied Governments should deem it necessary to call upon the League of Red Cross Societies to undertake this program of relief, and should place at its disposal supplies and transportation necessary, the League will immediately give the matter its consideration with the hope and expectation that a way can be found for the League to undertake the work on such a comprehensive plan as must be involved." From a *Memorandum* addressed to the S.E.C. by the League of Red Cross Societies, May 8, 1919.

Judge Parker at once gave his full cooperation, details of transport and delivery were handled by Edwin Sherman of the A.R.A., and under this arrangement ² the Polish government received sanitary supplies valued at \$6,500,000 and requiring thirty-two trains of over fifty cars to transport to Poland. Included among its important items were: all the steam sterilizers formerly used by the A.E.F., 27 mobile steam laundries, 500 mules with harnesses, carts, drags, etc., 10,000 beds, 40,000 sheets, blankets and pillow slips, 40,000 towels, 100 tons of soap, 17 motorized bath plants, 300 portable bathing plants, 1,000,000 suits of underclothing, 160 five-ton motor trucks, 324 light ambulances, 160 light motor cars, 3 mobile machine shops, and hundreds of other smaller items.

In order to assist the Poles to get help from other sources, Hoover introduced in the S.E.C. a resolution that the Polish government should be supported in the typhus campaign and that the various boards disposing of supplies of the Allied Armies should furnish equipment to the Poles on credit. The British particularly made important contributions to the health campaign. The British Red Cross gave £100,000 in hospital supplies, and British relief credits to the Polish government procured £144,800 for cotton cloth, £100,000 for boots and leather materials, 568 tons of soap, £100,000 for drugs and medical accessories, and £10,000 from the British Red Cross and £10,000 from the Government under the "pound for pound" scheme for aid in the typhus campaign.³

To meet the Polish Minister's request for the assistance of personnel trained in sanitary work, Hoover asked President Wilson and General Pershing to detail Colonel Harry L. Gilchrist, Medical Corps, U. S. Army, with a detachment

² This was wholly separate from the earlier transaction with the Liquidation Board described in Chapter VII.

³ *Parl. Papers, Misc.*, No. 6, 1920 (Cmd. 641), p. 29.

of officers and men for service with the Polish Ministry of Health. In his letter to the President, Mr. Hoover said:

One of the grave questions before the Supreme Economic Council relates to the sanitation of Central Europe. A typhus epidemic is raging throughout eastern Poland. The disease is most easily controlled during the summer and displays its worst ravages during the winter. If the infected area is not cleaned of vermin during this summer, we must anticipate a dreadful epidemic during the coming winter with the great danger of spreading westward. Two things are required to combat a typhus fever epidemic: disinfection equipment and trained medical officers. The disinfection equipment the Polish Government is purchasing from the liquidation boards of the allied armies. The mere furnishing of equipment, however, will have little result unless it is handled by experienced men. The allied armies in Europe have been freed of body lice, and in the American Army in particular this infestation has been completely eliminated. Our army possesses a special service for this work, for which there is no use at home. At the present time this organization is being broken up and its members returned to the United States. The officer who has been in charge of this work, Colonel H. L. Gilchrist, has now completed his duties in Europe. His services can be spared for this important duty in Poland. I know of no way in which our sympathy for the distressed peoples of Central Europe can be better expressed than in the transfer of American officers to this service. I therefore venture urgently to request that this officer and such additional members of his trained organization as he may select be detailed with the Polish Government in connection with this work.

On July 16 Gilchrist received orders to "report to Mr. Herbert Hoover, Director-General of Relief, Supreme Economic Council . . . for duty in connection with relief work in Poland." The expenses of Col. Gilchrist's detachment of some 500 men were borne by the United States.

* * * * *

The situation which confronted the anti-typhus cam-

paigners ⁴ was appalling. Cholera, smallpox, dysentery, and typhus had raged in the wake of the armies that surged across Poland in 1914-1915. Cholera, smallpox, dysentery, and typhoid were checked, but typhus became epidemic in 1916 and steadily increased with each succeeding year. The striking increase which coincided with the movement of refugees and war prisoners after the end of the war in 1918 is shown in the following table: ⁵

In the year 1919 economic and political conditions created a situation in every way favorable to the spread of typhus. This year the epidemic in Russia reached its peak, and this year war prisoners and refugees began to move westward from Russia, bringing some 2,400,000 men, women and children into Poland. Less than half of them were Poles; the others were the nationals of sixteen other states, including the United States. As they approached Poland, the refugees passed through a desolate no man's land in which civil government had disappeared, where contending troops disputed the frontier and marauding bands pursued each other; where transport was destroyed, food scarce; and where equipment for disinfection, segregation and treatment did not exist. The chaotic political conditions in the Eastern Districts severely handicapped the efforts of the

⁴ In addition to the Gilchrist detachment and the Polish Ministry of Public Health, the American Red Cross had established a Mission to Poland in March, 1919, and had three anti-typhus units in operation in the eastern districts in April. The American and British Friends organized a unit in August. The American Joint Distribution Committee was carrying on anti-typhus work in connection with its other relief activities in 1919. The League of Red Cross Societies sent an investigating commission to Poland in the summer of 1919.

⁵ *Report of the Epidemic Commission of the League of Nations* (1921), p. 10. These are not accurate figures, representing only "reported" cases. They are interesting as showing the curve of incidence of the disease.

Year	Cases	Deaths
1916	34,538	3,478
1917	43,840	3,776
1918	97,082	6,484
1919	231,306	19,891
1920	157,612	22,565
1921 (six months)	36,962	

A.R.A. with food, and of the Gilchrist detachment and the Red Cross with sanitary equipment and supplies, to establish a cordon against disease. There was no security and the routes of travel were under the arbitrary authority of the military, whose chief interest was in the movements of the Bolsheviks rather than of the refugees.

The sanitary campaign made progress, but the task was so difficult that the approach of winter found the health cordon only partially built. In these circumstances the Polish Ministry of Health was reluctant to lose the aid of Col. Gilchrist's detachment, which was under orders to leave Poland after four months' service. Dr. Janiszewski wrote to the Secretary of War, asking that the Gilchrist unit be permitted to remain in Poland for another year. At the same time the Minister of Health requested Hoover to use his influence to have this American aid continued. The following quotations from Dr. Janiszewski's letter to Hoover indicate how highly the Polish government valued the help which it had already received:

The work initiated by you has borne rich fruit. We are in the possession of practically all the material which we have obtained through your friendly intermediary from the American Army Liquidation stocks, and Colonel Gilchrist with his unit is at work with us, rendering us invaluable services. . . . The services of the Gilchrist Unit have been timed by the American Government to continue for four months . . . which would mean that they would have to commence withdrawing before long. This I feel would be a calamity for us and I have addressed the enclosed letter to the Secretary of War, requesting the permission for the Gilchrist Unit to stay with us throughout the next year. . . . I am sure that your powerful support will not be refused by you on this occasion, as indeed it never has been before whenever the needs of relief work demanded from us that we should ask your help.

The selection which you have made by suggesting Colonel Gilchrist as Commanding Officer of the Unit could not have been a happier one. We found in him a friend of whom we are verily proud and on whose complete loyalty I can count absolutely.

I should be indeed very grieved if my Ministry were to be deprived of his further cooperation during the very critical winter months that are ahead of us. . . .

Hoover immediately urged the Secretary of War to accede to Dr. Janiszewski's request, and on November 5, Mr. Baker notified Hoover that the request had been approved. On the same day the War Department sent the following order to the Commander of the American forces in Europe:

Request of Herbert Hoover that Colonel Gilchrist, Medical Corps, and Army personnel continue on duty in Poland in anti-typhus campaign approved by Secretary of War.

Colonel Gilchrist remained in Poland for another year at the head of a somewhat smaller detachment. The work on which they were employed included the installation and operation of bathing and delousing plants, of disinfecting railway cars and at quarantine stations along the frontier. The work was arduous and dangerous, and one member of the expedition, Lieut.-Colonel Register, was a victim of the disease.⁹ Conditions which the Typhus Expedition encountered are indicated by excerpts from Gilchrist's report in March, 1920:

From the present indications Poland is threatened with one of the worst typhus fever epidemics in the history of the world, which, unless checked, will prove a danger that will threaten the whole of Europe. The Government of Poland is fully alive to the duties incumbent upon her in view of the seriousness of this present epidemic, but cannot conceal the fact of her inability to cope with this grave situation which is developing for the reasons of her lack of financial resources and sufficient sanitary supplies in the present overwhelming emergency.

⁹ In December, 1919, there were twelve doctors at this station [Tarnopol], and one of them—Lt. Col. Edward Register—was an American. Early in January, 1920, two doctors out of the twelve were left. The others, including Colonel Register, had died of typhus. . . . When the news of Register's illness reached Warsaw an American Red Cross nurse—Miss Susan Rosensteil, of Freeport, Illinois—took the night train for Tarnopol to nurse the case, knowing that she had about one chance in a thousand of coming back alive." K. L. Roberts, "Poland for Patriotism" in the *Saturday Evening Post*, April 17, 1920.

The typhus epidemic, which for the fourth year in succession, has been raging in Poland, has increased in intensity each year due principally to large influx of refugees and prisoners of war from Russia and to the thousands of cases being imported from the interior of Ukraina and other eastern territories. The situation at present is getting beyond control.

This western spread has become more and more extensive in a measure as the military and political conditions of the Ukraine have become more unsettled. In fact the breaking up of the Armies of General Petlura resulted in tens of thousands of the Ukrainians percolating through the frontiers, passing principally through the areas between Tarnopol in the north and Borszczow in the south. Sometimes they presented themselves at the quarantine stations in such crowds that they could not be handled and a break through would result, thereby permitting thousands of cases to be scattered throughout Eastern Galicia.

In Galicia whole towns are crippled. Schools are closed and business practically suspended from the effects of the disease. In the northeast of Poland, American inspectors report the disease raging as affecting nearly every home with a high mortality. Starvation and lack of clothing and medicines are also in evidence. There are few doctors and no nurses. As a result of the ravages of the past war and the fact that Poland has been occupied by several armies who, when retreating, either destroyed or took with them all the materials of any value, the Eastern country has been left with only absolutely meager essentials. . . .

At present nearly every house has from one to five cases of typhus fever, all lying on the usual beds of straw or hay. Houses have been visited by me in which the entire families were stricken, some delirious and without medical attention of any kind. . . . Doctors and nurses are unknown to these people, the peasants acting as doctors, nurses and undertakers. If the dead have no near relatives to claim their effects, the bodies are stripped before burial and their clothing taken away in ignorance by the peasants to distant parts to be sold, thus implanting the disease in new areas.

There is a great dearth of doctors in some districts, there being but one doctor to each one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants—the latter in many cases badly scattered. These doctors are doing a magnificent work, but are greatly overworked and labor under terrible handicap of the lack of medicines and

nourishment for the sick. The death rate among doctors has been very heavy; in Galicia alone over forty-six doctors have thus far succumbed. . . .

The proportion of typhus fever cases appearing among the refugees during the past three months has been greatly increased. The following is an extract from the report of one of the Medical Officers with this Expedition station at Dorahusk Quarantine Station: "Yesterday a train of refugees came in from the east. There were 118 refugees unloaded here, all were filthy and covered with vermin. Of this number I removed 15 well advanced cases of typhus fever to the hospital." Reports have been received from other stations giving about the same proportion of cases.

During the winter of 1919-1920 the American Red Cross, with a personnel of 187 under Lt. Col. Chesley, worked beside the Gilchrist detachment and Polish government agencies. Between October and March it imported 378 carloads of medical supplies, hospital equipment, food, clothing and other materials. It distributed clothing to refugees, operated delousing plants, clinics and dispensaries, equipped hospitals and orphanages, and established and maintained a surgical hospital at Vilna.

The typhus campaign of 1919 had revealed serious defects in the Polish health organization, and in the winter the Council of Ministers appointed regional Epidemic Commissioners with extraordinary powers in areas under military as well as civil rule.⁷ Professor E. Godlewski, Jr., became Chief Commissioner and cooperating with him were Col. Gilchrist and Colonels Shaw and Chesley of the American Red Cross. On July 14, 1920, the Polish Diet passed a special law giving the Epidemic Commissioner full powers and extending his authority to all parts of Poland. In the

⁷ In March, 1920, Col. Gilchrist reported: "After seven months of active work in Poland as the Commanding Officer of the American Typhus Fever Expedition . . . I am convinced that before typhus fever can be eliminated from Poland the entire matter will have to be placed under the control of a commission, preferably international . . . which will have to have absolute control over all matters pertaining to the elimination of typhus fever in the country."

meantime the League of Nations had been attempting to organize a typhus campaign under its auspices and to collect funds from members of the League for its support. The contributions to this fund were disappointing, being only one-eighth of the amount (two million pounds) thought necessary. The League, however, sent an Epidemic Commission to Warsaw, where it contributed to the campaign within the limits of its resources.

Just at the moment when the various Polish, American, and other agencies were in a position to perform the most efficient service, disaster overwhelmed the whole enterprise. The Russian invasion of Poland—the climax of the Russian-Polish War—destroyed seventy-five per cent of the work accomplished. When peace came the typhus campaign was renewed. The refugee flow from Russia had diminished, but stations of sanitary control still had to be maintained on the eastern frontier. In the resumed campaign the A.R.A., the J.D.C., and the American Red Cross continued their cooperation with Polish health agencies, furnishing provisions, supplies and technical aid. When the Russian famine in 1921-22 sent in a new wave of refugees, Polish and American agencies were better prepared.

* * * * *

The unsettled state of the eastern frontier, so conducive to the spread of typhus, was equally an invitation to war. In April, 1920, this invitation was accepted and for five and a half months the western Ukraine, White Russia and the eastern and northern districts of Poland were once more inundated by armies on the march. By comparison with the battles of the World War, the Russian-Polish conflict was not a sanguinary affair. There were no great battles except, perhaps, the decisive action on the Vistula, but despite the small military losses the war was a costly one. The cost, borne by the civilians, was the result of incidental damage from military operations. of the interruption of the typhus

campaign already noted, of the interference with the care of children and invalids undertaken by the A.R.A., the J.D.C., the A.R.C., the Friends and others, and of the check to economic rehabilitation undertaken by the Polish government with the cooperation of the American Technical Mission. The war, it is true, did lead to the settlement of the eastern frontiers, but this might have been achieved by peace as well as by war.

The issue on which the Russian-Polish War began was the status of the regions of mixed nationality between the ethnographical frontier of Poland and her historical frontier of 1772. The inhabitants of the northern portion of these regions are White Russians, Poles, Lithuanians, Great Russians, and Jews; in the south, Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews. Both the Lithuanian and Ukrainian problems were therefore involved, but it was the latter which was the more important in bringing on hostilities.

The pressure of the Bolsheviks from the north and of the Poles and Rumanians from the west, combined with the lack of support by the Great Powers at Paris, had by the latter part of 1919 reduced the Ukrainian nationalist organization to a fugitive force under Petlura, precariously installed at Kamieniec-Podolski. In desperation Petlura abandoned the Ukrainian claim to Eastern Galicia and turned to the Poles for aid against the Bolsheviks. In Warsaw Petlura and Pilsudski came to an agreement, and on April 23, 1920, a treaty was signed which declared Ukrainian disinterestedness in Eastern Galicia and Polish recognition of Petlura's group as the government of the Ukraine in which two Polish ministers were to participate. The treaty thus implied the recovery of the Ukraine from the Bolsheviks.

In the meantime Moscow and Warsaw had been exchanging notes, but making little progress with respect to peace between Poland and Soviet Russia.⁸ To the first Russian

⁸ Diplomatic relations had been broken on December 9, 1918.

proposal of peace negotiations (December 22, 1919) the Polish government made no reply whatever. To the second (January 29, 1920) the Warsaw Government replied after a delay of two months (March 27, 1920), during which both sides prepared for war. Before replying, Poland sounded Paris and London. The Quai d'Orsay advised against negotiating with the Bolsheviks, and Lloyd George warned against hazardous adventures in the east. How much French advice against conciliation influenced Polish policy it is impossible to say, but doubtless not as decisively as has been popularly believed, for Polish opinion by this time was intoxicated with the doctrine of "federalism," which could not be realized except by war.

Federalism (its most eminent exponent was Pilsudski) was an audacious, romantic scheme for the solution of the eastern borderlands question by the creation, at the expense of Russia, of a series of independent states—Lithuania, White Russia, Ukraina—federated with and under the hegemony of Poland. This doctrine was popular, but for quite different reasons, with the left parties, which were impressed with its recognition of the national rights of border peoples, and with the landlords, who hoped to recover their estates in the western Ukraine, expropriated by the Bolsheviks. With its appeal to national pride and its evocation of memories of the great days of the Polish Commonwealth, it caught the imagination of the masses and aroused great popular enthusiasm. Against it the realistic doctrine of "incorporation"—which favored smaller territorial acquisition, to be rapidly incorporated in a national state, and the maintenance of good relations with Russia, regardless of her government—made little headway. The federalists offered many arguments against incorporation and the intensive nationalism proposed by Dmowski and the National Democrats, but the principal reason for the adoption of the rival policy was its tremendous popular appeal.

The Polish note of March 27 was based on the federal-

ist theory.^o Aside from various reparations demands, it required Soviet Russia to recognize the frontier of 1772, Poland agreeing that the status of the territory west of this frontier should be determined by a plebiscite. The Council of Ambassadors at Paris, having been forewarned of the terms, called Warsaw's attention to the fact that Polish claims went far beyond the Curzon Line; but the Bolsheviki merely demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities and the commencement of peace negotiations in an Esthonian town. The Poles insisted that the conference take place at Borysow, and the negotiations broke down on the absurd pretext of inability to agree on a place to hold the peace discussions.

Polish diplomacy was decidedly inept in these Russian negotiations. There seemed to be no serious desire to make peace with the Soviets, nor were the liberal attributes of the federalist program properly placed before world opinion. Poland appeared, therefore, to many as determined to wage a war of conquest to satisfy a greed for territory as reprehensible as that of the partitioning powers a century and a quarter before. Doubtless federalism was impossible of realization, but however that may be, no policy so badly executed could possibly succeed. It cost Poland dearly, laid her open to the charge of reckless imperialism, and gave her the reputation of a dangerous international trouble-maker. Such a reputation is a useful weapon in the hands of rivals and enemies, as Poland has since had cause to know.

* * * * *

On April 26, 1920, the campaign of Ukrainian liberation began. The Bolsheviki at first offered little resistance, and on May 7, the city of Kiev was in Polish hands. Petlura summoned the Ukrainians to defend their liberties, and Pilsudski promised to withdraw his troops as soon as the

^o It is alleged that military reasons also influenced this decision, that is, that Russia was preparing to attack Poland in 1920. The evidence in support of this is not conclusive.

Ukrainian government was established and ready to assume its functions. The Bolsheviks in their turn called upon the Ukrainian peasantry to rise and resist the violation of Russian soil by Polish lords and to prevent the exploitation of Russian workers and peasants by Polish capitalism.¹⁰ The Polish-Ukrainian triumph was short-lived. At the end of May, Russian troops assumed the offensive, and on June 13, Kiev was abandoned and the Polish retreat begun. Through the month of June the retreat continued, demonstrating with costly emphasis Poland's unpreparedness. On July 10, the Polish Premier, Grabski, appeared before the Supreme Council in session at Spa and asked for arms, munitions, military instructors and credits.

The Council received Grabski's request very coldly, and Lloyd George intimated that since the Poles had undertaken this adventure against his advice, they must now suffer the consequences. He said, however, that he would intervene if Poland agreed to these conditions: (1) To renounce all ideas of conquest; (2) to withdraw to the Curzon Line (which meant surrendering Vilna and most of Eastern Galicia, including Lemberg); (3) and to accept Allied decision on the pending questions relating to Teschen and Danzig. At the same time, the Russians would be required to halt fifty kilometers east of the Polish army, and a peace conference would be assembled in London to which representatives of Soviet Russia, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Eastern Galicia would be invited. The British government then sent the Lloyd George proposal to Moscow, but the Bolsheviks declined to enter such a conference and would deal with the Poles alone, whereupon the British and French Premiers threatened to support Poland with all the means at their disposal. There was great excitement in the west, and dire consequences were foretold of a Bolshevik-German alliance. The Allies sent munitions which the

¹⁰ The Bolshevik championship of Russian nationalism evoked a favorable response from a number of Tsarist generals, who offered their services.

Danzig workers refused to forward to Poland and which consequently were held up until discharged from the ships by Allied troops.¹¹ British and French civilian missions went to Warsaw to advise the Poles and shortly departed in haste to Poznan when Warsaw seemed doomed. Of greater value was the French Military Mission under General Weygand, which came to help organize the defense of the capital. Lloyd George declared England obligated to protect the integrity of Poland and was warned by British labor not to involve England in a Russian war. In Poland there was a rush of volunteers to swell the ranks of the army, but the military situation grew more desperate as the Red Armies pushed along the East Prussian frontier to cut Warsaw's communications with Danzig. On August 11 the diplomatic situation cleared somewhat as the Bolsheviks agreed to discuss an armistice.

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Meantime, the A.R.A.'s child-feeding work had been disrupted over large areas. The military activities of June and July occurred in those eastern districts where relief operations were in full swing. As the front lines surged westward the relief workers moved the bulk of their reserve stocks out of danger of bombardment and pillage, leaving the feeding stations with two months' supplies in the expectation that by the end of that period the situation would be cleared up sufficiently to resume operations. Amid scenes of greatest confusion, with every railway line overcrowded by troops, refugees and war material, the A.R.A. inspectors worked day and night to get the supplies out of warehouses near the fighting front. Thus they withdrew successively, and usually just at the last moment, from the regional warehouses at Minsk, Vilna, Bialystok, Brest, Chelm, Kowel and Lemberg. To handle

¹¹ Czech workers also blocked overland shipments of munitions from France to Poland.

the enormous accumulation of stocks from these warehouses a special depot was set up at Modlin. Supplies were no sooner stored there than they had to be reshipped to Thorn and Danzig. Thorn itself was then threatened, and all supplies had to be shifted to Danzig. Stocks from Warsaw and Lemberg were sent to Dziedzice and Cracow, near the Silesian border.

In spite of the disorder and lawlessness which reigned between the departure of one force and the arrival of the other, with refugees so thick on the road that all traffic was jammed, with workmen refusing to load supplies, somehow the Americans and their Polish aides moved their stocks to safety. At Vilna Dr. H. C. Walker worked at his post with twelve men four days and nights before fighting reached the city, trying to combine relief service with the immediate withdrawal. He labored to get cars from the Polish military authorities, meanwhile issuing two months' rations to local kitchens. At last he got all the supplies out and left the city with Major Mockett, British representative, just as Russian troops entered from the other side. At Slonim Donald E. Hardy put his last shipment on the rails and left town three hours before the enemy arrived. Joining up with Dr. Walker somewhere on the road, he helped him clean stocks out of Bialystok on the midnight before the arrival of Red troops at dawn. At Kowel, Patrick Verdon encountered great difficulties, not only in getting railway cars, but in keeping the food out of the hands of the soldiers who had lost contact with their commissariat. Tadeusz Dyakowski, Polish manager of relief in Eastern Poland, was of great assistance to Verdon, and himself saved fifty carloads of food while Russians attacked the outskirts of the town. A few months later Dyakowski died of typhus contracted in the service. In Lemberg there was a large stock of over 1,200 tons, half of which Fuller had removed to Cracow some time before the city was in danger, the remainder being evacuated by William M. Gwynn when the

city was menaced. In the meantime all shipments inland from Danzig had been discontinued.

Other American organizations reported similar experiences in these days of mad confusion. Shohan, of the J.D.C. station at Rowno, wrote:

I worked like a beaver to obtain cars to move the packages; I was determined not to leave them behind. We obtained freight cars, but we could not load them; every horse, during the night, had been carried off by the retreating armies. Some horses the Jews had succeeded in hiding, but all my assurances of military protection would not bring horse or man from hiding. I did succeed in buying a pair of horses, stolen ones, to be sure, for twelve thousand marks (one-third their normal value). Later the Jews of the city saw soldiers working around my horses and soon the packages were on the way to the station.

Another incident reported by the J.D.C. illustrates the hazardous conditions under which civilian relief was maintained:

At midnight Samuel Schmidt, a member of Overseas Unit No. 1 of the Joint Distribution Committee, rode into New Borisow directly under shell fire, organized a non-sectarian relief committee consisting of two Jews, two Poles and two Russians, and returned to Minsk to secure supplies. Three hundred and fifty cans of condensed milk, 1,500 kilos of flour, and 15 kilos of beans were put in a truck and sent to a warehouse in Smolewichi, a city about 35 versts from New Borisow, where the supplies would be safe and at the same time easily transported to New Borisow; the food supplies for one day were sent on to New Borisow; in the streets of the town the truck was shelled from a Russian aeroplane, but the food was delivered safely and the truck returned. Every night, when the shell fire had settled down to a steady volley, a truck of food, sufficient for one day's rations, was sent from Smolewichi to New Borisow.

In the June and July campaign, the Polish Army averaged a rate of retreat of about ten miles per day. No one knew how long the retreat would last or how far the Russians would go. Among Polish officials there was reassuring confidence in Pilsudski's plan of counter-attack, but the

British Military Mission firmly believed the Poles could not turn back the Bolsheviks, whom they expected to overrun most of Poland. This uncertainty naturally made decisions regarding relief policy exceedingly difficult. As indicated below, Hoover had left the matter largely to the men on the ground, and their aim was to continue the work, even in territory occupied by the Russians, if possible, but above all to guard their precious food stocks against confiscation during the fighting. As soon as the movements of the Russian troops indicated that the capture of Warsaw was their objective, Fuller began to move stores from the capital to Cracow, although the American personnel did not leave. The Polish headquarters of the Central Committee was moved back, with many of the Government offices. Warsaw warehouses were almost entirely emptied when the Bolsheviks arrived within twelve miles of the city. Commenting on whether the Americans, also, should leave, Fuller reported thus to Brown at London:

The matter is being seriously and almost continuously considered by your staff here consisting of Baldwin,¹² Gregg, Howard, Pate and myself. We have not yet reached a definite decision on the main issue whether or not personnel will remain in Warsaw should the Bolsheviks occupy the city, and I cannot prognosticate what our final decision will be. I can only assure you that, if they are free to decide on personal grounds, my colleagues will not hesitate for a moment in taking full advantage of the opportunity to stay.

For the purpose of discussion in hand, these various considerations, however, become of more or less minor importance in comparison with the possible significance of the entire Bolshevik offensive. The theory here has been strong that the ultimate bid for the big Bolshevik objective is world revolution, or at least general revolution in Europe. We ourselves have taken this theory with a grain of salt. But if the Soviets have actually rejected the armistice proposal and really do come on to Warsaw, those very facts must be looked upon as real evidence of a wide and ambitious project. Practically everyone who comes out of

¹² Philip S. Baldwin, John P. Gregg, Thomas D. Howard, Maurice Pate.

Russia says that the world revolution idea is the real mission in life of the Soviets. If this is true and if the march on Warsaw is an attempt to carry this general design into effect, these considerations must be weighed in the balance. Furthermore, as we understand it, Lloyd George has stated (so definitely that even he may have difficulty in wriggling out of it) that invasion by the Soviets of Poland proper would cause England to render all possible assistance to Poland. The French here give the same idea of the purposes of their nation. Also, in overrunning Poland, the Soviets join up directly on a wide front with Germany. In short, while we have never been accused of being alarmists, it seems to us that a real crisis is well within the realm of possibility. This eventuality we feel we must also consider in coming to a final judgment. . . . For poor old Poland, we fear, there are only two alternatives, an armistice or the Bolsheviks.

All through this crisis, although seriously ill and overworked under most trying conditions, Fuller carried on until ordered by his physician to leave Poland. At the time of his departure, however, all A.R.A. stocks in the east had been evacuated to safety, and despite the confusion and the tremendous pressure of war, the A.R.A. kitchens in the territory of Polish occupation continued to function as regularly as usual and even extended their service to thousands of new refugee children.

But the likelihood that the Red Armies would capture Warsaw and overrun all of Congress Poland raised the question of relief policy under Bolshevik occupation. Hoover had outlined the A.R.A. policy in a telegram on July 23:

My view is that if our men think it at all safe they should continue former feeding stations within Bolshevik lines if they take Warsaw Lemberg, and rehabilitate old stations as rapidly as possible. After the preliminary mess of invasion they may be able to set up again in Bolshevik occupied Poland under some kind of arrangement. It would be desirable some strong man or men remain in Warsaw Lemberg with view carrying on and negotiating with the Bolsheviks generally. It is impossible to define policies from United States, but we want to show every

practical zeal in feeding Polish children even in territory occupied by Bolsheviks.

In order to insure the security of A.R.A. personnel and supplies Walter Lyman Brown, A.R.A. European Director, on July 24 sought assurances from the Soviet Trade Delegation in London and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. After eleven days a reply came from Moscow stating that Brown's proposal would be favorably considered, but adding that the activities of the A.R.A. "must be placed under control of our [*i.e.*, Soviet] state relief organization." This condition of state control, experience had shown, was dangerous to the administration of relief, and especially so where government was frankly in the interests of one class. Brown, however, went forward with the negotiations, suggesting that two members of the A.R.A. Polish Mission accompany the Polish Armistice delegation to Minsk in order to discuss details with the Soviet authorities. Maurice Pate and Herschel Walker, therefore, went to Minsk with the Polish delegation when the Armistice discussion began. By this time, however, the Russian armies were almost in the suburbs of Warsaw and its capture seemed inevitable. The plans of the A.R.A. in that event were disclosed in this message from Baldwin:

If there was ever a good reason for remaining in Warsaw during the Bolshevik occupation, this reason is no less good now that said occupation seems imminent. Besides, we are convinced that our presence here will really do much towards protecting the stocks from looting and exert on the Polish organization a good moral influence and keep them on the job in the feeding operation in Warsaw and surrounding districts. Pate, Gregg and myself have elected to remain.

Though there will probably be a certain amount of looting and disorder when the Bolsheviks first take the city, we feel that if we lie low during this period we will not run much risk and will receive every consideration when once the Soviet Government is established. In the meantime, the evacuation is proceeding with the utmost alacrity both at Modlin just outside of Warsaw, where the stocks evacuated from the eastern

districts are stored, and from the Warsaw warehouses. We have received a written order from the Ministry of Railroads for all the cars we require daily for the work of evacuation, but the confusion here is so complete that if we had to rely on this order for obtaining said cars, we would hardly receive one car a week. We accordingly have to fight and beg in competition with every other organization in Warsaw, both Polish and otherwise, for every car we secure. As a result we have evacuated to date approximately 1,300 tons from Modlin and 1,000 tons from Warsaw. There still remain about 500 tons in Warsaw and 200 tons in Modlin, and not very much time to complete the evacuation as the Poles have now retreated to within twenty kilometers of the city. . . .

Our work goes merrily on a wild scramble to keep one jump ahead of the Bolshevik advance. We have sent the Polish personnel that could be spared from the office to Cracow, together with all luggage, and records. The situation here is of course full of interest, and, needless to say, there is a certain amount of excitement in the air.

You have no cause to worry over the situation here as we are all doing our damndest to make good and believe that everything is going as smoothly as possible.

These plans of Baldwin and his co-workers had immediately to be abandoned when the American Government declared that it wished no member of the A.R.A. to remain in territory under Bolshevik control. Brown sent these official instructions to Warsaw in a telegram directing withdrawal:

We have not yet been able to secure response from Moscow giving necessary guarantees asked for. We do not know if Pate succeeded going to Minsk or success of his discussions, if any. Failing of advice to contrary from us or direct word from Pate that he has secured necessary safety guarantees, you are hereby instructed to evacuate all personnel from Warsaw in case of occupation by Soviet troops. We greatly regret necessity having issue these definite orders after previously leaving question in your hands but had hoped to be able to arrange satisfactory agreement with Moscow in sufficient time to protect you. All American government opinion is against your remaining and we must accept their viewpoint.

The Polish victory and the armistice made it unnecessary for the A.R.A. to withdraw from Warsaw or to secure Russian consent to the resumption or continuation of relief in Congress Poland and Galicia.¹³ The energies of the Americans were fully employed in restoring the dislocated machinery of relief and in adapting their work to meet the conditions produced by the war and the changing economic status of the country.

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The state of mind of Warsaw during these ominous days of early August was extraordinary. A few of the wealthier citizens had departed for safer regions, but among other classes there was a remarkable confidence that the city would be saved either by divine intervention or by the execution of Pilsudski's "plan." To the urging of Lord d'Abernon and M. Jusserand, the heads of the British and French Missions, that the Government remove to safer quarters or at least prepare to move, Prince Sapieha replied that Warsaw was as safe as London, and his government could see no good reason for leaving it. Political groups competed merrily for cabinet portfolios while the common citizen went about his own affairs, but pausing to join a great procession which, behind banners and religious emblems, went from church to church chanting prayers for the safety of the city. A volunteer army was raised, conscription drastically applied, and, to consolidate peasant support, an agrarian reform was put through the Diet.

On August 15 the execution of "the plan" began with

¹³ There was, however, the question of reopening A.R.A. stations in regions east of the Riga Treaty boundary and hence under Soviet rule. Pate and Walker went on from Minsk to Moscow and discussed the extension of A.R.A. feeding to Russian towns. They were unable to secure a satisfactory agreement, and the A.R.A. did not enter Russia until the following year when Soviet policy respecting foreign relief was relaxed. An account of these negotiations is given in Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, chs. 1-3.

a Polish counter-attack near the town of Deblin, southeast of Warsaw. The attack broke the Bolshevik lines and, pressing northwest, flanked the Russian forces investing Warsaw from the north. The whole current of the war was immediately reversed. The Russians were now desperately trying to escape complete disaster by swift retreat. The miracle of the Vistula had been performed. Warsaw and Poland were saved. Subsequently disputes arose as to whom the chief honor should go for the victory. No one who observed the desperate gallantry of Polish troops, volunteer and regular, before Warsaw had any doubts as to the honor due them. But as to leadership there were differences of opinion. Pilsudski's political enemies and many foreigners proclaimed General Weygand the "savior of Warsaw," but that able and modest officer promptly announced that the victory was a Polish victory, executed by Polish generals in accordance with a Polish plan. There is no reason to question this statement, which should not, however, obscure the fact that General Weygand and the members of his mission made a great contribution to that victory through the aid they gave to the Polish General Staff.

The United States sent no political or military mission to Poland during this war, and the A.R.A. and other relief societies adhered to their long-established principle of non-intervention in political affairs, but Poland did receive military and diplomatic support from American sources. Many of the Polish-Americans who had enlisted in the Polish army for service in France and later in eastern Poland, were again engaged in the war of 1920. The Kosciuszko Squadron, made up of former members of the American Air Force, rendered distinguished service to the Polish forces throughout the campaign, particularly along the southern front against the cavalry of General Budenny. Col. Cedric Fauntleroy, the commander, became Chief of

Aviation of the 2nd Polish Army, and Capt. Merion Cooper succeeded to the command of the Squadron.¹⁴

Victims of the war, wounded and refugees, received medical aid and care from the American Red Cross, which sent out from Warsaw five railway trains with canteen, dispensary, and store cars. These trains did the elementary medical and surgical work of casualty clearing stations, treating more than 1,000 surgical cases weekly and feeding a maximum of 750,000 persons in one month.

In the diplomatic sphere Secretary Colby's note of August 10, 1920, on the Russian-Polish situation reaffirmed the interest of the United States in the maintenance of Polish independence and territorial integrity and opposed the expansion of the Polish-Russian armistice negotiations into a general European conference, which would certainly not have been in the interest of Poland. This note, with its castigation of the Bolsheviks, was well received by the Polish Government. Less well received was Mr. Colby's later note of August 21, in which he criticized the Polish advance in Russia and warned against the resumption of an aggressive campaign beyond the Curzon Line.

The Vistula victory cleared the way for peace negotiations. The Bolsheviks, sobered by defeat, abandoned

¹⁴ In a speech delivered on July 5, 1920, Prince Lubomirski, Polish Minister at Washington, said of the American aid to his country: ". . . . Hundreds of American men are to-day fighting in our army. Thousands of Americans who emigrated from Poland have returned to take up the gage of battle. Over our swaying lines fly the volunteers of the Kosciuszko Escadrille, full-blooded Americans, translating into action the ideals of their ancestry. These noble young crusaders have more than repaid the debt of Kosciuszko and Pulaski. . . . Like the Polish heroes who came to the aid of Washington, these Americans came in greater numbers to the aid of Poland. We do not ask for more. We are proud and grateful for these spirits, but we do plead for America's understanding, for America's material support and for America's voice to help us make the peace that will prevent further sacrifice of the cleanest, finest young blood in Poland." The final demobilization and repatriation of the Polish-American troops was completed in 1921.

the extreme conditions of peace which they had put forward on August 11 and which included disarmament of the Polish forces and the establishment of workers' and soldiers' councils. As for the Poles, the victory had saved Warsaw and made possible the recovery of much of the territory lost in July, but the Red Armies were still formidable, and the memories of disaster were fresh in their minds. Thus the plenipotentiaries who went to Riga on September 21, met to formulate what Joffe, the Soviet commissioner, described as "a democratic peace, accessible to each nation, without victors or vanquished." An armistice was concluded on October 12; on November 14 the peace conference met; and the treaty was signed on March 18, 1921.

The terms of the Riga Treaty of particular interest here are those which trace the Russian-Polish frontier. The new line gave Poland less territory than the frontier of 1772, less than her representatives had asked for at the Paris Peace Conference, and less than was held by her troops on April 26, 1920, at the beginning of the Russian-Polish War. On the other hand, it was considerably to the east of the Curzon Line, giving Poland a part of the twilight nationality zone in which the White Russians, the Ukrainians and other peoples have a plurality over the Poles.¹⁵ It joined to Poland a region beyond the confines of the Congress Kingdom of about 110,000 square kilometres with a population of approximately 4,000,000. The line is a fair compromise between Russian and Polish nationalist claims, but it does violence to the claims of Ukrainian and White Russian nationalism, leaving segments of these people on both sides of the frontier. For Poland it creates minorities problems, and for the Soviet Republics of White Russia

¹⁵ The Polish census of 1921 shows the following percentages by nationalities in the five departments ceded to Poland. Poles, 45.8%; White Russians, 22.7%; Ukrainians, 17.3%; Jews, 9.7%. A nationality census in this region does not, however, prove much except that the population is mixed.

and the Ukraine, grounds for irredentist agitation—familiar ingredients of international friction.¹⁶

For some time the Great Powers represented on the Supreme Council and the Council of Ambassadors declined to recognize the validity of the Riga Treaty, which had been negotiated without their participation. But in March, 1923, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, and, a few days later, the United States recognized the Riga boundary.

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Involved in the Russian-Polish War was the Vilna region, claimed by both Poland and Lithuania. It will be recalled that in April, 1919, the Poles took Vilna from the Bolsheviks, who had held the city since the German withdrawal in January. In July, 1920, the Bolsheviks reoccupied the town, which with its environs was recognized as belonging to Lithuania by the Russian-Lithuanian Treaty of Moscow, signed on the 12th of that month. This treaty, however, left the matter of the Polish-Lithuanian frontier to be settled by the two states. After the Russian withdrawal from the attack on Warsaw, Vilna remained in the hands of the Lithuanians and a source of controversy with the Poles. Polish-Lithuanian negotiations made no progress, and the League of Nations took up the matter, drafting the Suwalki Truce to go into effect on October 10, 1920. Lithuania accepted the League's intervention, but before the truce came into effect General Zeligowski, acting independently, but with popular and unofficial Polish support, seized (on October 8) the disputed town.

The League again undertook to settle the dispute, sending a commission of control to Vilna and arranging an

¹⁶ At the Riga Conference the Soviet commissioners, at the request of the Ukrainian Soviets, demanded a plebiscite in Eastern Galicia. The Poles objected and the demand was not pressed. White Russian nationalists under General Balachowicz, who had fought against the Bolsheviks during the Russian-Polish war, were forced to abandon their struggle when the Riga armistice went into effect. Poland in the treaty recognized the independence of the White Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics.

armistice and a neutral zone between the two armies. The Council of the League then proposed to send an international police force to the area to supervise a plebiscite. On a pretext this plan was abandoned, and Poland and Lithuania were invited to settle the dispute in a conference which met at Brussels in April, 1921, under the presidency of the Belgian statesman, Paul Hymans. The proposal for the federation with Poland of an autonomous Lithuania with Vilna as its capital was accepted in principle by the Poles and rejected by the Lithuanians, and the conference ended on June 3 without progress. A later proposal to assign Vilna to Lithuania without raising the question of federalization was rejected by the Poles. On January 8, 1922, elections were held in the Vilna district under the auspices of the Polish General, Zeligowski. The assembly thus elected promptly voted for incorporation with Poland. The Polish Diet accepted this vote as the expression of the will of the people of the area, and in March the government of Vilna was merged with that of Poland.

This action of Poland evoked mild protests from France, Great Britain and Italy, but in February, 1923, the Council of the League, in order to end the state of insecurity, recognized the *fait accompli*. This decision of the Council did not end the state of insecurity, for the Lithuanians, for reasons easily understood, have never accepted the loss of the historic capital of their country. Normal friendly relations between the two states have been impossible; a condition has existed which is a constant invitation to nationalist extravagance on both sides of the closed frontier and a convenient excuse for the intervention of neighboring states with interests in Baltic politics.

The conditions which have prevented an amicable solution of the Vilna question from 1919 to 1928 are of such long standing that no settlement is possible which does not do injustice to the claims of one or the other of the contesting states. Economics is not particularly involved, but both

Poland and Lithuania can appeal to the historical and nationality principles in support of their claims. Lithuania demands her ancient capital; and Poland, the city which after Warsaw and Cracow, has been a center of Polish culture. The city and its environs contain people of both nationalities, as well as White Russians and Jews, and since there are already Poles in Lithuania and Lithuanians in Poland and White Russians and Jews in both countries, the acquisition of Vilna means new accessions to the minorities problems of the state whose possession is confirmed.¹⁷

¹⁷ The Poles claim that the elections to the Vilna Diet on January, 1922, and the elections of November, 1922, are proof that the people of the area desire union with Poland. The Lithuanians, on the other hand, maintain that these elections were so conducted that there could be no free expression of the pro-Lithuanian sentiment.

CHAPTER XI

ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS, 1919-1922

UNDER the political and economic conditions prevailing during the months that followed the Armistice with Germany, Poland and the other new states, as we have seen, depended heavily for emergency economic aid on the American and international commissions established for the purpose. This situation obviously could not last, and it was clearly to the interest of Poland to place as rapidly as possible the full management of her economic affairs in the hands of her own citizens and to establish normal commercial relations with other states as soon as conditions permitted. The period of transition was bound to be difficult, and it was the privilege of America by advice and cooperation to help Poland overcome these difficulties.

As a means of facilitating and organizing Polish imports and exports during this period of transition, Hoover, in March, 1919, suggested to Paderewski that the Polish Government set up a commission of Polish business men and provide it with local and foreign credits as a revolving fund, for the purpose of buying abroad the commodities Poland needed and selling in foreign markets the products of Polish agriculture and industry. The commission was not conceived as a government monopoly of foreign trade, for one of its functions was to encourage and assist private concerns to engage in foreign commerce so that in the course of a few months the commission would withdraw, leaving the field to private enterprise.

For some time after this suggestion was made, the Polish



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government was not in a position to undertake the establishment of an organization of the kind suggested. The importation and distribution of food supplies continued to be handled directly by the Ministry of Approvisionnement, while the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in part handled similarly other essential commodities, notably coal, and in part furnished government aid in the importation of necessities by private concerns. The A.R.A. and Allied Missions in Poland continued their assistance to both governmental and private agencies in handling their import and export business, in arranging credits, providing transportation and establishing distribution systems within the country. By the summer of 1919, however, with the peace treaties signed, and the withdrawal of American and Allied commissions from Central and Eastern Europe in progress or in prospect, it became evident that Poland and other newly established countries, as indeed even the principle Allied powers, had not progressed sufficiently in restoration of normal economic relations and their adaptation to new conditions brought about by the war. At Prime Minister Paderewski's request Hoover, therefore, outlined an economic organization which he believed would serve Poland's interests in the period of adjustment, taking into account the predominant part which, under the existing conditions, the Government and its various agencies would have to play in both foreign and domestic economic problems. Also at the Prime Minister's request he arranged for an American technical staff to serve several of the branches of the Polish government in an advisory capacity during their period of economic adjustment. The plan outlined by Hoover is given in the following letter to Paderewski, dated August 17, 1919:

In response to your request, I take pleasure in preparing the following short summary of the suggestions I made as to economic organization in the Polish Government, in order that Poland, during the coming year, can in the best manner

cooperate with the other Allied and Associated Governments in meeting the fearful economic problems that Poland and all the world must face.

Poland is now a nation and with large necessities. She must at once prepare the organization necessary to participate in these world economic problems. The vast destruction of war has crippled the world's credit ability and has shortened the supply of food, raw materials, and shipping. Every country in the world must organize to secure its supply and control its distribution. International organization to these ends is now in progress in Paris, London and Washington.

It might appear at first sight that the external economic relations of Poland—credits, imports of food, raw materials, coal, and other supplies—can be separated from the domestic economic problems of the same order, and that the organization of the two phases could be treated separately. They are, however, so much involved together that it is practically impossible to set up any form of organization that would meet the exterior problems that must not at the same time deal with those of the interior. Internal coordination in the economic department of each government is the foundation not only for the solution of the internal problems, but the very basis on which the external relations must rest. Therefore, not only must these economic necessities be coordinated between the different governments, but they must be coordinated within each government if we are to get through this next year.

For these purposes I would suggest the creation of an Economic Council in Poland, comprising representatives appointed by the Ministers of Finance, Approvisation, Railways, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Interior and Labor, under the chairmanship of a new Minister (without portfolio) to be called something like the Minister of Economics.

It is of extreme importance that the foreign economic advisors sitting in the departments of transportation, food, finance, etc., especially appointed and retained by the Government of Poland, should also be members of this Council.

The Ministers at the head of the Economic Departments of the Polish Government are themselves necessarily overwhelmed with actual administrative problems, and in order that the issues of internal coordination between these departments and external relationships may have constant solution and attention I suggest this separate Council, which, being comprised of representatives

of the different Ministers, will necessarily represent their views, and thus not usurp the prerogatives of the Ministers. It is also important that the gentlemen nominated by the different Ministers should be men of wide experience and standing in the community, for instance, a leading banker would make a useful nominee for the Minister of Finance; a leading Trades Union leader the nominee of the Minister of Labor, etc. This Council should be in regular session, with necessary staff, but the members would have no administrative duties.

This Council would have the primary purposes set out below:

(a) The technical study of all important economic problems, and the preparation of definite projects and methods. These projects, when prepared by the Council, would necessarily come before the Cabinet for adoption and modification. The Council must, therefore, have complete right of access to all of the departments of the Government, and must have their assistance in securing necessary data.

(b) The study of the departmental organization of the Government, as to their relationship between the different departments, both generally and also with regard to the assignment of the parts of approved economic projects which the government must undertake.

(c) It should keep itself informed as to the progress and efficiency of the different departments in the administration of the projects approved by the Cabinet, and make recommendations to the departments with reference thereto.

(d) In order that there shall be a united front on foreign problems, by all departments of the Government, the Council should consider and coordinate foreign purchases and negotiations on economic matters, and should be consulted in the nomination of all economic representatives abroad. For instance, in the world Economic Council that is in course of construction, Poland will probably have one representative, and he must represent the functions of finance, railway materials, foods, etc., and not only must represent all of these departments, but there must be some agency in Poland that will coordinate the needs and policies for him. The necessity of such councils has been recognized by all of the Allied Governments, and they are actually in being in many directions.

As an instance of the necessity of such councils, I may cite

the fuel problem. At the present moment, this is of transcendent importance. It would be the function of this Council to determine the coal necessities of Poland, the proportion of these necessities that can be met from domestic production, the substitution of oil and wood, the amount of coal that must be imported, the arrangements which should be set up for the exchange of oils for coal, the rights of Poland for a portion of the coal production of the surrounding countries, and to determine which industries should have precedence in distribution. This very complex problem engages at once the functions of the Departments of Commerce and Industry, of Railways, of Finance, and of Labor. None of these Ministers working independently can solve the problem, and a definite study, plan and policy, with regard to such a problem could be prepared by the Economic Council and presented to the Cabinet in its completed form, and thus the administrative part to be performed by each of the departments of the Government determined. The Council, through the Minister of Economics, should direct and be the channel of communication with the Polish representative on the European Coal Commission at Paris. The Council, through its departmental members, should see that every department is carrying out its part in the programme decided upon. I could enumerate twenty such problems on finance, coal, oil, food, agricultural products, wool, shipping, and railways.

Inasmuch as the men who comprise the Economic Council are the representatives of the Ministers, they would in the natural course evolve plans and recommendations in consultation with their Ministers, so that the project ultimately evolved by the Council would in normal course represent practically the views of the different department Ministers. It will be impossible for Poland to solve all these problems over night, and as this Council must determine the priority of necessity, it should study and recommend which and what part can or must be attempted. In case of disagreement in the Council as to these matters they would necessarily be referred to the Cabinet.

There are a hundred directions in which this organization must penetrate, but what I am endeavoring to make clear is that its functions are not administrative, but are purely for study, advice and coordination of the administrative functions; that its scope should cover the entire domestic, economic and foreign problems of Poland.

You will see that the newly devised Minister I propose would

need to be a gentleman of great parts and experience, and in order that the Council may function properly, he should be entirely apart from the administrative Ministers, and should not be involved in administrative details. He should be responsible to the Prime Minister, and it may be desirable that he should have the privileges of a Minister, in that it would be his function to explain to the Diet the coordinated action among the different Ministers in the Diet but, on the other hand, he would not in the ordinary course be greatly involved in political action.

I believe if such an organization were set up, it would be at once accepted abroad as evidence of sound political and economic organization, and would be helpful in establishing that atmosphere of credit which we all so much desire for the new-born Polish Republic."

In August, 1919, on the occasion of his visit to Poland, Hoover held extensive conferences with the Prime Minister and other officials with regard to the economic needs of the country and measures for accomplishing the purposes outlined in this letter. While the organization actually set up departed in details from that proposed, many of the recommendations were used during the following years when Poland's internal and international economic life was being stabilized. An Economic Council of Ministers was formed under the Chairmanship of the Minister of Finance to deal with national economic questions such as those outlined in Hoover's letter. Under the general control of this Council detailed projects were worked out by the staff of the several ministries. In much of this work the American technical and food advisers participated, as will appear later in this chapter.

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Of the many economic problems of the new state none was more vital than finance. The resumption of national life began amid mad financial confusion, with nothing in the treasury and seven different kinds of paper currency circu-

lating,¹ vying with each other in the speed of their depreciation. As the country was practically without revenues, essential requirements of the Government were met by printing paper currency in ever increasing quantities as its unit value fell—a vicious circle which went so far in the course of the next three years that at one time a widespread strike of government employees threatened on account of non-payment of salaries resulting from delays in shipment from Vienna of several carloads of special paper required for the printing of currency. The first Polish budget introduced by Minister Grabski provided for ordinary expenditures of some 12,000,000,000 marks, not to mention large war and other extraordinary requirements, whereas income in sight only reached 1,650,000,000 marks.

The Polish State Loan Bank, founded late in 1917 by the German occupation authorities, had never been on a gold basis, being merely a branch bank of issue of the German government. When the new Polish government took over this bank, it had even less resources than before, except its claim upon Germany for the gold transported into Germany during the occupation. Demand for Polish marks abroad was nil, leaving no possibility of doing foreign business except by credits, and Poland had no credit abroad. If we look at the balance sheet of the Polish State Loan Bank in the middle of 1919 we are greeted by total assets of over 2,000,000,000 marks, but an analysis shows that gold and silver at hand amounted to 8,000,000 odd marks, or but four-tenths of one per cent of all assets. The assets which had some probable value (far less than quoted book value) formed about ten per cent; the remaining assets, like paper money, bonds of the bank itself, loans to the Government and insolvent creditors provided ninety per cent of the alleged assets of the Polish State Bank. Polish esti-

¹ German occupation marks, Polish paper marks, Austrian paper crowns, Russian Imperial rubles, rubles of the Ober-Ost, rubles of the defunct Kerensky government, and Bolshevik rubles.

mates looked more like astronomical calendars than like a state budget.

It must be borne in mind that the new nation from its rebirth in November, 1919, had heavy military responsibilities. For the preservation of her independence Poland had to organize and maintain forces against the Germans, along the unsettled northern and western boundaries and parts of the southern frontier, and, most important of all, on the long eastern front against the Russians. Military expense called for about one-half of the entire budget. Expenditures for imported foodstuffs, immediate reconstruction, railway equipment and railway operating deficits took most of the remainder of the extraordinary budget.

In the effort to cover its deficit the Government attempted to levy high taxes on imports and exports, on incomes, alleged war profits, besides excise and luxury taxes on practically everything. Even these measures when projected covered only the ordinary budget, and when collected the taxes fell far short of covering even that, because of the rapid depreciation of the valuta in the interval between levying and collection. The extraordinary budget was supposed to be covered by short and long term internal and external loans. As the internal loans carried a rate of interest far below the market rate, they were virtually a capital tax, subscribed to chiefly through patriotic impulse. External conditions in 1919 and 1920 added to Poland's difficulties. With half the world producing less than it consumed, prices and living costs went up enormously, far outpacing relative increase in incomes. Credits alone could bridge the gulf between buyers and sellers. In Poland, as in other countries similarly situated, these credits were rendered almost impossible by the very causes which made them so necessary.

On the other hand, there were reassuring signs. Despite the oppression which Poland had endured, despite inexperience, despite the influence of revolutionary ideas which

stirred Europe in 1919, the Polish nation remained fundamentally conservative. Radicalism and communism made less progress in Poland during the first months after the war than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. With this political moderation Poland possessed another asset in the industrial ability of her citizens. Before the war Polish engineers had contributed largely to the development and management of factories in all parts of Russia. The American experts found the Polish mines of the Dabrowa to include some of the best operated mines in the world. The same skill is found in the Polish textile industry, producing cottons and woolens of the quality of which Manchester and Yorkshire might well be proud. In agriculture many of the Polish properties are unsurpassed in the world in their methods, including the use of the most modern agricultural machinery.

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One of the greatest obstacles in the resumption of necessary commercial and financial activities was Poland's economic isolation. How could essential trade and contact be resumed if the parties at either end had no means of communicating with each other? How could a firm, say in New York, transact any business with the group in Poland if there existed no means of transmitting cash for payments? How could a Polish-American aid needy members of his family in the old country when his letters took two months and there was no surety of delivery? How could a bank in New York transact any affairs with banks in Poland when no arrangements could be made for transmission of funds or credits essential between banks; when the New York bank, through broken communications, could not even ascertain the condition of its correspondent?

Those who considered these vital questions soon saw it would take several months for any sort of free communication to be restored. The old machinery, thrown out of gear

by the war, had been built for quite a different political and territorial alignment. In addition, therefore, to the emergency supply of food, and the establishment of a temporary economic and transport direction in the late winter and spring of 1919, Hoover, as Director-General of Relief, devised a temporary means of transmitting values between America and the new countries of Europe and of forming connections between private, non-governmental agencies.

In collaboration with the U. S. Federal Reserve Board the American Relief Administration worked out a practical plan by which money could be safely transferred from America to a number of the new countries, including Poland. By this plan, a banker in America doing an exchange business received the money which individuals wished to transfer to some correspondent in Poland. Outlying American banks forwarded their applications to a central bank in New York, where they were consolidated and turned over, accompanied by drafts, to the A.R.A. The A.R.A. office in New York then cabled totals of remittances to the Paris A.R.A. office, which in turn telegraphed the A.R.A. Mission in Poland, which, in its turn, notified the Polish State Loan Bank that it was called upon to pay the specified equivalent in Polish currency to the Polish banks named in the orders. The next and more difficult step in the transaction was the transfer of the values named. There was no compensating exchange movement from Poland to America, which would ordinarily offset such debits. Shipment of actual gold was out of the question. The formulators of the plan solved the difficulty by leaving the funds in New York and crediting the account of the Polish government with the amounts. Actual details of these remittances were handled as between the interested banks themselves, with the excellent result that almost at once there began that resumption of banking relations which it was the object of the remittance plan to promote. In two

months, after nearly \$2,600,000 had been thus transferred, these contacts had been closely enough established to permit the liquidation of the A.R.A. exchange bureau, leaving the matter in the hands of individual bankers, where it properly belonged.

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In the summer of 1919 many of the American members of commissions set up by American Peace Commissioners or by the Supreme Economic Council began to withdraw from Europe as a part of the general exodus of American wartime and Peace Conference bodies. The A.R.A. which was not an official body, though it acted as the agent of the United States and other Governments, remained to devote its principal energies to the rescue of Europe's children. Children's relief, important and necessary as it was, affected only indirectly Poland's general problems of economic administration. In order to assist in the solution of these technical problems, Hoover suggested the appointment of American experts as Technical Advisers to the new government. Paderewski gladly accepted the suggestion and invited the nomination of a technical adviser and a food adviser for a period of one year. Though not official appointees of the American government, these experts, like similar American advisers to Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia, were not only to aid in the solution of knotty internal economic problems, but to do much to facilitate commercial relations and transactions in the United States and in many European countries. Colonel A. B. Barber was appointed Technical Adviser to Poland, and Dr. E. D. Durand, Food Adviser. Colonel Barber had wide experience with the American Corps of Engineers, had served in Europe on a railway commission after our entry into the war, had been a member of General Pershing's staff in duties of organization and transportation, and after the Armistice had been in charge of shipping and transportation of the

A.R.A. food supplies to the various countries of Europe.² Dr. Durand, a statistician and economist, former Director of the U. S. Census, was expertly informed on world food conditions, as a result of his service in the Food Administration. In addition, Mr. Irving Shuman was employed by Mr. Paderewski to advise the Polish government in certain commercial matters.

The chief services performed by these men were in connection with the rehabilitation, organization and operation of the railway and water transportation systems, the obtaining of food and coal supplies, railway material, and other necessities, the solution of questions of mining and oil production, and the reestablishment of trade and commerce. In their early activities they carried on many projects of the A.R.A. and the Railway Mission already described. They participated in numerous formal and informal economic negotiations with neighboring countries. One of their most useful services was in frequently taking up with other governments such matters as, procurement of equipment and supplies, car exchange, and other involved technical questions of international difficulty. In these matters they were not arbiters, but negotiators for Poland. In New York Messrs. Edgar Rickard and William B. Poland formed the connection of the Technical Advisers with America, giving constant assistance not only in negotiation for and shipments of large quantities of relief supplies, railroad material, etc., but to many Polish agents who came from time to time to America on economic missions of the greatest importance to their country.

Through Colonel James A. Logan, stationed in Paris as American Unofficial Representative on the Reparations Commission, the Technical Advisers possessed a direct con-

² Assisting Colonel Barber were Colonel C. S. Gaskill (railway-mechanical), Major T. R. Ryan (railway operation), Major H. R. Gabriel (railway construction), Captain A. J. Fisk (coal production), Lieutenant H. B. Smith (commercial), Mr. R. N. Ferguson (oil and gas), and Lieutenant W. E. Joyce (Secretary).

nection with Allied authorities. Logan took up various matters with the Council of Ambassadors and the Reparations Commission for the betterment or adjustment of international questions such as the distribution of coal and the repartition of railway equipment. By actively putting forward the facts on these important issues, he was thus able, also, materially to contribute to Poland's economic recovery.

* * * * *

The locomotives and cars allotted to Poland from the stocks delivered to the Allies by the Germans under the Armistice terms did not meet Poland's railway equipment shortage. At the request of the Polish Prime Minister Barber went to England in the autumn of 1919 to advise as to the purchase on credit of a large number of locomotives and cars from the British government. He promptly reported favorably on the equipment and price, recommending purchase, but although the various ministries approved the project, a cabinet crisis delayed it. By the time the purchase was finally authorized the British government had sold most of the equipment to British railways. Important assistance had, nevertheless, been rendered to the Polish railways by the British, through supply on credit of a considerable quantity of machinery and supplies for the Polish railway shops at the instance of the Allied Railway Mission in the Spring of 1919, and meantime the Poles had turned to the United States for new rolling stock. Early in 1920 the Baldwin Locomotive Works began delivering to Poland 150 freight engines purchased by the Warsaw government as described in Chapter VIII. This transaction was on liberal credit arrangements which demonstrated the confidence which even at that time a great American corporation had in the future of Poland. Some months later at the instance of the Technical Adviser,

after investigation as to their suitability for service in Poland, and with the assistance of the advisers' New York office in negotiations for purchase and ocean shipment, Poland also obtained 4,600 American thirty-ton freight cars left over from army stocks in the United States. These were received at a time of desperate need of rolling stock on the Polish Railways.

Besides these more or less emergency activities Barber and his staff made important investigations of a number of the broader phases of railway transportation; on new lines required, on maintenance of way requirements, on train delays and remedies, on distribution of motive power and rating of locomotives, on handling damage claims and protection of commercial shipments, on demurrage policies, on passenger and freight tariffs, on railway budgets, and on general questions of railway organization. Gaskill also made an extensive survey of the railway shops.

The food movement during the spring and summer of each of the three years 1919, 1920, and 1921, constituted one of Poland's most important transportation problems. During 1919 in the transport of these imported foods the Polish railways were actively assisted, especially in their relations with Germany, by members of the A.R.A. In 1920 the movement of food from Danzig and Poznan again constituted a difficult problem. Here the problem was the shortage of cars and locomotives with frequent congestion due to unusually heavy traffic in unaccustomed directions, and the limited facilities for discharging goods from ships to railway cars. By providing for use of the Vistula barge fleet to supplement the railways at the peaks of unloading from steamers, the daily grain and flour discharge capacity of Danzig was increased under a plan worked out by Barber from 3,000 tons in 1919 to from 4,000 to 7,000 tons per day during rush periods.

In 1921, in addition to the problem of evacuation from

Danzig, there were difficulties in moving grain from Rumania to Poland. These difficulties, quoting Barber,³ were caused by "the limited ability of the Rumanian railways to deliver the traffic to the frontier, due to difficult conditions in that country, including a shortage of motive power. The remedies found were to supply Polish cars and locomotives for use in Rumania, and to establish Polish agencies to follow up the shipments to Polish territory. In this way nearly 100,000 tons of grain were finally worked through from Rumania." Side by side with food shipments were equally important shipments of seed and fertilizers carried out with unusual success under difficult conditions.

In respect to the purchase, distribution and control of food the Polish government had the benefit of the advice of Dr. Durand who accompanied representatives of the Ministry of Approvisionnement on a mission to buy food in the Balkans, made recommendations on restrictions on the character and quantity of food served in restaurants and prepared a number of valuable reports on the food resources and needs of the country.⁴

When the new Polish government took over transportation in the country it was faced by the problem of bringing together and unifying fragments of several separate railway systems and administrations—German, Russian and Austrian—the management and operation of each having always been conducted by different methods. By August, 1919, only the railways of Congress Poland and Galicia had been brought into the main system, administered from Warsaw. In Eastern Poland the army operated the railways, while the lines in Poznanian had a largely autonomous administration. Lack of cooperation between those lines and the main system naturally caused many difficulties. After investigating these troubles Barber strongly recommended consolidation of administration under the general

³ A. B. Barber, *Report of American Technical Advisers Mission to Poland*.

⁴ Dr. Durand, as well as Col. Barber, was frequently consulted by the Ministry of Finance on taxation, loans and currency matters.

supervision of the Railway Ministry in Warsaw, and this was effected early in 1920.

The consolidation worked so well and so conclusively showed the advantages of unity of administration, that it was shortly followed by a similar consolidation of the coal office of Poznań with that at Warsaw, and later by the consolidation of other executive functions. It was not, however, until 1922 that the Warsaw government finally achieved complete administrative unity with the governmental machinery of former German Poland,⁵ including that of the portion of Upper Silesia assigned to Poland as the result of the plebiscite. Both before and after the actual transfer of former Prussian lines Barber and his associates had frequent occasion to assist in dealing with the problems involved.

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Of the Polish relations with neighboring countries, we read in Barber's report: "On account of the unsettled political conditions, Poland's exchange and transit traffic with the various neighboring countries was often interrupted or uncertain, and I was frequently asked to investigate and intervene. It was generally found that all that was needed was to make the facts known to each side and to bring together the technical representatives of the countries concerned, being careful to keep all political considerations out of the discussion. Although these traffic difficulties continued for many months, railway agreements were one after the other finally established between Poland and other Central European countries, and these agreements, generally in conjunction with commercial conventions, went far towards restoring a normal international railway situation. Unfortunately it was for more than two years impossible to secure such a convention with

⁵ The difficulty of bringing Prussian Poland into economic unity with the other portions of the new state was one of the fruits of the separate political and economic experience during the partition. See Chapter I.

Germany. Railway as well as commercial relations with that important neighbor remained in a most unsatisfactory condition."

For instance, more than two years were required to straighten out complicated difficulties connected with car accounting in interchanges on the forty separate railroad lines crossing the Polish-German frontier. Polish and Prussian claims and counter-claims, never agreeing, caused continuous friction. The Prussians used their claims for cars owed them by the Poles as reasons for cutting down the supply of coal from Upper Silesia to Poland, seriously affecting industry and railway operation. Barber took an active part in ironing out these differences, and was frequently able to secure temporary working agreements pending the final settlements.

A similar difficulty existed in the supply of coal from the Czechoslovakian Teschen mines. Here, also, the intervention of Barber and of Dr. Lincoln Hutchinson, the American Technical Adviser to Czechoslovakia, facilitated the settlement of differences over car accounting and the coal deliveries.

Because of Poland's great shortage of coal and the frequent necessity to rush coal through as an emergency movement, congestion frequently occurred. Delivery of coal shipments from Upper Silesia^{*} at times entirely stopped, and at other times suddenly came forward in large volume, producing serious traffic difficulties requiring special measures to restore normal movement. Just at the moment when unusually large deliveries of coal from Upper Silesia to Poland were being made, the Bolshevik invasion of Poland knocked all normal railway arrangements askew. In addition to great confusion due to the movement of military stores and troops, withdrawal of food supplies, the evacuation of many governmental bureaus and of large numbers

^{*} At this time the Polish-German frontier in Upper Silesia had not been settled and the bitter political controversy greatly interfered with all economic activities.



EFFECTS OF WAR AND OCCUPATION ON INDUSTRY
CONGRESS POLAND
(Numbers of Workmen)

of refugees, there was a great concentration of rolling stock on all lines in unoccupied Poland. This congested every yard and station, making it a herculean job to get the heavy movements of Silesian coal through. During this period Gabriel of the Barber mission assisted the Polish railway officials, and by using motor instead of rail transportation was able to move rapidly from one critical point to another to ascertain conditions and recommend immediate steps for clearing blockades. In the worst time the yards about Warsaw contained 10,000 cars, which practically stopped movement to and from the capital. At this critical time great service was rendered by the 150 Baldwin Locomotives, which proved themselves able to handle much more than their rated loads. They traveled without difficulty over many lines, which had previously been considered too light to carry them, and hauled from twice to three times the normal trainloads.

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One of the first ways in which Barber was able to give assistance in coal production was in obtaining explosives for mine work, for which Poland had formerly been almost entirely dependent upon Germany. After the war Germany followed a consistent policy of refusing to allow the export of explosives to Poland on the ground that they might be put to military use. When, early in 1920, the Polish mines were left without explosives, Barber intervened with the German government and received consent for delivery of several hundred tons of explosives under his personal guarantee that they would be used under his supervision and not for military purposes. By similar efforts in Czechoslovakia and Austria several hundred more tons were secured, thus bridging over the period before their production in Poland could be begun.

Most of the mine machinery, spare parts, and various mine supplies had been produced in Germany, Czecho-

slovakia or Austria. Both Czechoslovakia and Germany often declined to issue export permits for these articles. When, however, such matters were taken up by Barber with the proper Czechoslovak authorities, and with the assistance of Hutchinson, export permits were usually granted. In Germany, export permits were generally refused.

Keeping in constant touch with the coal situation in Central Europe, the Technical Adviser was frequently called into consultation regarding Polish imports of coal from Upper Silesia, negotiating with Germany, with the Central European Coal Commission, the Reparations Commission, the Interallied Plebiscite Commission in Upper Silesia and with the Czechs in Teschen. Deliveries never met needs of Polish industry. The most frequent causes of delivery failures were the inadequate car supply and difficulty and delays in transmitting funds or making other financial arrangements. As these matters were gradually being straightened out, Poland, through various measures, was also increasing her coal production, until in the latter part of 1921 it reached 95 per cent, and in the spring of 1922, 100 per cent of previous production, a record equalled nowhere in Europe, except perhaps in Belgium. In connection with this work, which was largely furthered by the efforts of Captain Fisk, one of Barber's early suggestions to the Polish Mine Department was on the advisability of introducing modern American coal cutting machines, which were later introduced in Polish coal mines and also in the government salt mines.

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In oil production, instead of producing 2,000,000 tons of oil per annum as before the war, Poland produced less than 750,000 tons, far less than the capacity of oil refineries in the country, not to mention those of Czechoslovakia and Austria, which previously had refined quantities of Polish

crude oil. Among the chief causes that restricted operations and held up drilling was the uncertainty of the commercial aspect of the industry, primarily due to excessive government control. Barber constantly recommended both improvements in methods of operation and the necessity of giving greater opportunity to private initiative. To obtain pipes, drilling materials, and other equipment which Poland needed, Barber, by request, took up these questions with authorities in Czechoslovakia, where these articles were produced. Some exchanges were arranged by a trade agreement between the Poles and the Czechs, whereby oil and other products were exchanged for machinery and equipment.

* * * * *

On the very important question of the general economic and financial policy of the new Polish government, we quote again from Barber's report: "During 1919 and part of 1920 there were certain influences in government circles in Poland which tended to exaggerate the importance of the rôle which the Government should play in relation to business, and to place too much control of business in the hands of government agencies. After becoming sufficiently acquainted with the local conditions and in response to an inquiry from the Prime Minister as to the attitude of foreign capital, I took occasion, in the early part of 1920, to draw attention to the undesirable effects of excessive government control, and to outline the conditions which seemed necessary to attract desirable capital to Poland. This brought out a number of profitable conferences regarding the conditions affecting business and the economic situation of the country. Among the suggestions made were: Abandonment of the system of import and export licenses; elimination of attempts at an artificial control of exchange; elimination of price control and subsidies and the abandonment of control of distribution as soon as conditions would

permit; the improvement of mail and cable communications; and the elimination of censorship. . . .

"The attitude of Polish authorities toward foreign capital, particularly foreign banks, was for a long time undefined and especially difficult because of the differing legislation existing in the Russian, Prussian and Austrian parts of Poland. Now, however, while the recodification of the laws is not complete, the attitude of the Government and the laws applicable to the operation of foreign capital have been defined by an executive memorandum, which, although not yet entirely satisfactory, considerably simplifies and improves the conditions under which business may be conducted. It should be understood that the old laws themselves, such as those relating to titles to real estate, et cetera, particularly in Russian Poland, are very well defined and exact, and are reported as very satisfactory by foreign interests which have long been operating in Poland."

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In the complex relations existing between the Free City of Danzig and Poland, Barber assisted the Poles in many negotiations, including the Allied Conferences at Paris at which the convention governing the relations between Poland and Danzig was worked out, as well as subsequent negotiations at Danzig and Warsaw.

As Danzig was of great economic importance to Poland as the only practicable route of access to the sea for commerce on a large scale, so Upper Silesia represented for Poland the only available source of coal, zinc and other mining and metal manufacturing on a sufficiently large scale to offer relief from the under-supply of these resources which had existed for several generations. Thus apart from ethnographic and political aspects, the Upper Silesian settlement was bound to hold the greatest importance for Poland.

The controversy over Upper Silesia⁷ was heated from

⁷ See Chapter VI for a discussion of the political aspects of this dispute.

the start. During the summer of 1919 both Goodyear of the Coal Mission, and Barber were called on to participate as intermediaries in the attempt to restore peace between the two parties. Subsequently, in the discussions which raged over the proposed division of the territory after the plebiscite, there was much conflicting economic and technical information in the investigation of which Barber and his associates rendered important service, developing the facts and assisting in presenting them to the authorities, which finally settled the controversy. We quote from Barber's reports once more: "As a result of the curious plebiscite, German majorities in the cities in the part of Upper Silesia nearest to Poland, while great areas in the interior gave Polish majorities, the selection of a frontier on purely ethnographic considerations was impossible. Economic and technical factors thus became of increasing importance and my participation in these phases of the work carried on by the Polish authorities continued until after the final transfer of the territories. It includes visits to Paris, London and Geneva with the Polish delegations; discussing the settlement with Allied authorities and the Council of the League of Nations; participation in the conference with the Germans at Kattowicz, where the convention to govern divided Upper Silesia during a transition period of fifteen years, was negotiated; in the Polish preparations for taking over the railways in the portion of the plebiscite territory transferred to Poland in June, 1922; and discussion with the Warsaw authorities of various economic phases of Poland's policy in relation to her Upper Silesian territories." Barber accompanied the Polish delegation to the Genoa Conference in 1922, at which some practical conclusions were reached in regard to railways, finance and trade, and, about the same time, he represented the Polish railways at the International Railway Congress at Rome.

Barber's appointment as Technical Adviser had originally

been for the year 1919-1920, but at the request of the successive Polish Cabinets he remained to advise the Government during 1921 and 1922. On his departure in August, 1922, Barber made a number of recommendations for the consideration of the Government. The principal recommendations in summary were as follows:

Railways: Necessity to balance the budget and to take in hand the development of new lines to afford service in many parts of the country now without railways. Because Polish railways were underdeveloped, Poland had the chance to introduce a modern and efficient system by improvement of equipment and method, specific and detailed recommendations being for heavier trainloads, larger rolling stock, stronger tracks and bridges, automatic block signals, and automatic brakes on freight trains.

Coal: Although there existed no surplus of coal in Poland at the then rate of production, Barber foresaw that improvement of methods then under way, and changes in the coal situation in other countries, would give Poland a surplus. He advised that export restrictions then in force be withdrawn as fundamentally unsound, that free trade in coal be put into effect, and that every effort be made to develop export markets, particularly to the south and east.

Oil: Because Poland had great undeveloped wealth in her oil fields, Barber recommended that all efforts be made to increase oil production from the 700,000 tons then being produced to the 2,000,000 tons reached before the war. To Poland this constituted a valuable export asset. He recommended that repressive governmental restrictions be taken off so as to permit private initiative in the drilling of new wells and the prospecting of a wide area of undeveloped oil lands.

Other Economic Policies: Barber also called attention to the changes to be wrought in Poland's life by the acquisition of the Upper Silesian coal region, making the country not as predominantly agricultural as formerly. He recom-

mended improvement of agricultural methods, educational measures, greater use of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, and farm loans. He spoke for the "liberation of the building industry from the stifling influence of requisitions and legally controlled rents . . . one of the worst aspects of Poland's social and economic life." He suggested the possibility and desirability of finding new markets for Upper Silesian products, and suggested the steps to be taken. He urged the removal of export restrictions, the abolition of attempts to control prices, the institution of a policy of encouragement of exports of every kind, the liberating of economic activities from the cumbersome inefficiency and unfairness of any monopolistic tendency. He warned of the harm Poland would inflict on herself if she did not resist the temptation to interfere with the trade of competitors to or from Russian markets by restrictive control of transit trade. He advised her to open freely the transit routes to all countries for sake of the ultimate double prosperity Poland would, herself, reap in general European trade stimulation.

Finance: In the matter of Polish government finance Barber expressed the conviction that Poland could balance her budget without much difficulty, mainly through increasing taxation, which hitherto had been far too low a burden upon the individual. He pointed out the unproductiveness of theorizing and attempting to manipulate the budget by any of those complicated and fallacious methods not based upon tried and true fundamentals; that to have a financially solid government the people of Poland must be allowed to produce freely, and must pay in taxes that fair proportion of their production, necessary for any country to stand solidly on its own feet. He mentioned only a few of the fallacies obtaining credence in Poland, such as the idea that the budget could not be balanced because of the small extent of the currency issue when calculated in gold; that the increasing cost of living was as an excuse for budget

deficits; that stabilization of the currency could only be accomplished by a large foreign loan; too much reliance on foreign credits, expected on more or less sentimental grounds; and excessive control of private financial operations, such as prohibition of free foreign exchange operations, seizure of funds belonging to innocent travelers, and searching of private mail, as part of this attempted financial control. In short, Barber recommended that instead of wasting time and effort on such ideas and restrictions, the Polish people "should at once set about the unpleasant and politically difficult task of balancing the budget by taxation."

In conclusion, said Barber: "Some of the policies I have outlined may seem to be based on a rather optimistic confidence in the future of Poland, and her ability to face foreign competition in her own and nearby markets. Such a confidence I feel to be entirely justified both by the resources of the country and the capacity of the people for a high order of productive effort."

CHAPTER XII

GROUP RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION—1920-1922


THE armistice with Russia in October, 1920, and the gradual cessation of disturbances in Teschen and Galicia during 1920-1921, marked the beginning of a new, constructive period in Polish relief work. This does not mean that previous to this time no constructive work had been done or that now, suddenly, all was well in Poland, but that for the first time since the founding of the Government there was no war and no boundary fighting to divert energies and thought from the main problems of rehabilitation. The Polish government and people were at last able to concentrate on domestic affairs, and it was now possible to widen the scope of relief to cover more than the emergency child-feeding program.

The idea that the A.R.A. would withdraw in the fall of 1920 was abandoned in May when the effects of the Russian war were foreseen, and at that time the A.R.A. announced that it would furnish a daily meal to 500,000 children from June, 1920, to the summer of 1921. But during the summer the Russian invasion disrupted feeding in the four great regions of Bialystok, Brest-Pinsk, Kowel, and Vilna and at the same time greatly increased the number of children in those invaded districts who could not live through another winter without relief. Moreover, the 1920 harvest was seriously affected by the war. There was a low crop-yield all over the country, with a slightly reduced area under cultivation, and this, added to the destruction and seizures incident to war and the diversion of parts of the scant food-

stocks of 1919 to the army, caused an even greater shortage of bread-grains in 1920 than in the years before.

The Government was still faced by the problem of adjusting food prices to perform the impossible, that is, (1) to encourage agricultural production and increase the grain supply by higher prices, and (2) to feed towns, and city workers without government subsidy by encouraging low food prices to meet wages. The population, from the standpoint of food-supply, divided itself into two great classes: First, those who could supply themselves either by their own production or by purchase in the markets, and second, those who must be supplied, in part at least, by the Government. But this second class, consisting in 1919 chiefly of refugees and unemployed residents of industrial cities, was greatly increased in 1920 by additions to the army, a new influx of refugees, and the many people in the invaded regions who had been self-supporting, but were now left by the war with destroyed crops or disrupted industries. Thus the government was again forced to import food,¹ to increase its subsidies for food supply, and to continue its endless battle with the rising cost of living and the persistently falling value of the mark. Transport and trade between districts and with neighboring countries were now somewhat improved except in the invaded regions, and some industries were slowly recovering, but the importation of food used government credits that were badly needed for industrial reconstruction. For the Polish people, therefore, this period was marked by the effort of agriculturalists to return to their pre-war crop yield, the struggles of trade

¹ Poland imported 340,000 tons of food in 1919; 230,000 in 1920, and 265,000 in 1921, largely in flour from the United States, purchased, after the U. S. Congressional Appropriation was exhausted, by credits from U. S. Grain Corporation, authorized in part by President Harding and in part by Act of Congress, March 20, 1920 . . . "for the relief of populations in Europe and countries contiguous thereto suffering for want of food." In 1921 some of the grain came from Rumania, with small amounts from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Grain Corporation credit to Poland for flour amounted to \$24,353,590.97. See F. M. Surface, *The Grain Trade During the War*, pp. 417 ff.



M

NUMBER OF CHILDREN FED

This chart shows the number of Polish children cared for each month by the American Relief Administration in its post-war aid to Polish orphans and destitute. The children needing aid were naturally much more numerous in winter when farm products of the preceding summer had become exhausted. This explains the wide fluctuation of the number aided.

unions to raise wages to meet prices, the inability of the intelligentsia or professional classes to stretch their income to cover bare necessities, and the continued increase of helpless refugees and destitute along the Eastern border.²

Clearly, in such an economic impasse there was almost as great a need for children's relief as in 1919. If Poland could barely supply enough food for her adult population, she could not import the special foods needed for children, and the refugee children in the East, alone, were a greater problem than the A.R.A. had expected to face in this winter. Consequently a feeding program for at least 900,000 children was announced in the fall of 1920, and the A.R.A., knowing that probably over a million children must be fed, set to work to find additional resources. For although the Polish government was glad to assist in children's relief, it could hardly increase its grants in this difficult year, and the funds must come from American sources which had been tapped regularly for European relief since 1914.

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In the other countries of Central Europe where relief was going on there was a similar need. It was estimated that in all about 3,500,000 undernourished, ill or orphaned children and sick or destitute adults must be cared for by various American agencies during this year. In order to coordinate this great effort, Hoover organized the European Relief Council to conduct a joint campaign for funds in the United States, which would amount to a "national collection" for European relief. The Council included the American Friends Service Committee, American Red Cross, A.R.A., Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Knights of Columbus, National Catholic Welfare Council, Y.M.C.A., and Y.W.C.A. Hoover was elected chairman and Franklin K.

² Refugees began returning from Russia in 1919, but a new wave of returning peasants came after the Bolshevik war and during the Russian famine of 1921-23.

Lane, treasurer, and the directorate and committees were made up of the executives or directors of the member organizations. It was estimated that \$33,000,000 must be raised, \$10,000,000 for medical service and supplies, and \$23,000,000 for food and clothing, the total to be apportioned among the constituent organizations and the countries to be served according to an agreed plan. It was not easy to raise this huge sum, for not only had there been continued drives for relief in the United States, but the country was just beginning to suffer from the economic ailments which had attacked Europe after the Armistice. There were persons who reiterated that charity begins at home, and others who tried to use the campaign for political or other private purposes, but it was in fact a national drive, beginning in the fall of 1920 and ending in the spring of 1921, with leading men and women all over the country and American citizens of foreign birth especially organized to reach all sections of the population.

In order to consolidate relief for Poland, great efforts were made to reach the four million Polish-Americans, through the existing Polish relief societies, the Polish press, and at special meetings in sections where there are large Polish communities. The Polish Ambassador to the United States, Prince Lubomirski, issued appeals for relief, and Hugh Gibson, American Minister to Poland, sent a statement to the Secretary of State (January 7, 1921), which is so clear an analysis of the situation as to merit quoting. He said:

I have carefully followed the relief work in Poland for the past two years and wish to assure the Department of State that the continuation of the relief work for children on the present scale is absolutely necessary to avoid widespread starvation. I am the first to believe that not one dollar of American money should be expended for relief in countries that are able to take care of their own, and that every appeal should be closely scrutinized from this point of view. Proof should not only be given of the necessity for relief work, but there also should be

conclusive evidence that the government and the people are doing their utmost.

So far as Poland is concerned, the government and the people are straining every resource to meet this responsibility in spite of the difficulties of exchange which is now at the rate of more than 700 marks to the dollar, thus making purchases abroad almost impossible. They are unable to provide even the minimum for the children. American aid has been generous, but it is noted that we do not maintain the Polish children, but merely seek to supply the necessary supplement between what the Polish people themselves can provide and the minimum necessities for the preservation of life and health. Aside from the humanitarian question which is involved, it is plain that the work contributes greatly to the maintenance of public order and toward the reestablishment of normal life among people who have withstood the insidious appeal of subversive doctrines through more than six years of suffering and privation. It must also be seen that the maintenance of peace and orderly government is mostly dependent upon mental and physical soundness of the coming generation.

The original estimate of \$33,000,000 required for European relief had been based on the prices of commodities, services and transportation in September, 1920, but by the end of February, 1921, American prices for food, clothing, and transport had fallen, so that the \$29,350,000 then in sight would cover the joint program, and the drive was closed in order not to place an unnecessary burden on American charity.

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In the meantime the member organizations of the European Relief Council had been carrying on their winter programs, based on the success of this drive, and in Poland the A.R.A. had been reexpanding its child-feeding operations to cover the territories evacuated during the Russian war and reach the refugee children in the East. In September, 1920, only 327,058 children were fed, a smaller number, owing to the war, than at any time since July, 1919, but through the fall the number increased by 100,000 or more a month,

until in February it reached the million mark again and continued to rise to the new maximum of 1,246,921, May 1, 1921.

The P.K.P.D. had been superseded by the P.A.K.P.D. (Polish-American Children's Relief Committee) during the summer when the Diet passed a law creating this new agency. Pate, of the A.R.A., was director with a Polish vice-director, at first, Jan Odechowsky, and later, Roman Kutylowski, who had filled the post of general secretary until then. An advisory body was formed, the Foundation Council, under the presidency of Stanislas Staniszewski, with members both from the A.R.A. and among the leading men and women in Poland. The Polish government was represented as well as the Diet, and various welfare societies and institutions.³ The Council's object was to place the whole children's relief effort on a lasting basis and, as will be seen, they accomplished it most effectively.

The machinery of distribution was still being improved, and when the P.A.K.P.D. took over all warehouses from the Ministry of Approvisation in December, 1920, it was able to perfect a system which worked smoothly and well from the time the food was shipped from Danzig to its delivery in cooked form at the thousands of kitchens all over the land.⁴ There were three Central warehouses

³ Among the members were the Reverend W. Blizinski, Member of Diet, Dr. Emil Bobrowski, Member of Diet; Stanislas Dzierzanowski, Minister of Finance; Stanislas Drzewiecki, Ministry of Interior; Dr. Emil Godlewski, Typhus Combat Commission; Dr. Henry Goldschmidt, Israel Children's Relief Institution; Stefan Jantzen, Ministry of Interior; Stanislas Jarkowski, Publisher; Sigismund Kmita, Ministry of Approvisation; Dr. Stanislas Kopczyński, Ministry of Education; Jan Kuncewicz, Ministry of Labor; Leon Rembieszewski, Ministry of Justice; Dr. Stefan Rotermund, Member of Diet; Dr. S. Starkiewicz, Ministry of Health; Dr. Ladislas Szenajch, Children's Medical Society; Ladislas Szumanski, Lawyer's Council; and Julius Trzcinski, Member of Diet.

⁴ At the peak of operations there were 7,630 child-feeding centers in Poland, 6,289 in kitchens and 1,361 in institutions. Of the total 1,492 were exclusively for Jewish children, and vegetable oils were served there in place of the pork products used in other stations. About 30% of all the children fed in Poland were Jews.

(Brest, Warsaw and Lemberg) and eleven regional ones, and the food was shipped here from Danzig for distribution to the 207 districts on the basis of allocations from the Central Office in Warsaw. Each local committee sent a monthly requisition to its district office, and a monthly budget and cash account. The district officer then approved and consolidated these and forwarded them to Warsaw, where they were checked and a general allocation schedule made for the regional warehouses. In this way the Central office was able to reduce excessive requests, adjust allowances between districts in accordance with priority of need or availability of supplies, and at the same time have a complete record of the past use of supplies and funds in every district. As an additional assurance of equitable distribution, inspectors traveled constantly from kitchen to kitchen, reporting conditions and adjusting any irregularities. All this meant that the Central office contained two main departments, Distribution and Inspection, with many sub-divisions, such as Accounting, Statistics, Legal, Press, Medical, Clothing, etc., to cover all the activities of the P.A.K.P.D. It was a complex organism but well justified in its work with the individual children. Meals were served six days a week in the kitchens or hospitals and orphanages, and here the children came each noon to sit at long tables and attend to the vital business of eating. At first the age limit had been 15, but this year it was raised to 17, and the calorie content of the meal was now 670 instead of the 624 that had originally been planned.⁵

In the larger cities at this time (1921), the Pelidisi sys-

⁵ A sample weekly menu was as follows:

Monday	—Rice with milk, sugar and bread.
Tuesday	—Rice and pea soup with cocoa and bread.
Wednesday	—Dumplings with bacon.
Thursday	—Soup with beans and noodles.
Friday	—Cocoa and a double ration of bread.
Saturday	—Dumplings and beans.

As already stated, there were separate kitchens for Jewish children where the menu differed to suit their religious laws.

tem of physical examination of applicants at the kitchens was introduced in the special examination centers. The Pelidisi system had been originated by Dr. Clemens Pirquet in Austria and used with great success by the A.R.A. there. It afforded a simple method by which the examining physician, using the relation of the child's height to weight at a given age as a measure, could determine the degree of undernourishment and select all applicants whose Pelidisi was below a certain figure. This system was not used in smaller places, but was of great value in the cities, and periodic examinations were instituted so as to discover when a child had attained normal growth, and an applicant with a lower Pelidisi quotient could be sent to the kitchens in his place.

The total number of children fed in 1921-1922 ran from the year's maximum of 1,246,921 in April, 1921, to 363,795 in May, 1922, just before the A.R.A.'s withdrawal.⁶ The harvest of 1921 was considerably better than in 1919 or 1920 and although Poland again imported some food, communications and general economic conditions were so much improved that it was possible to reduce the program gradually from August, 1921, when the new harvest came.

* * * * *

During 1921, with the machinery of relief running smoothly, it was possible to devote attention to many supplementary problems in the fields of social and child welfare work. As a beginning, the P.A.K.P.D. Council established a milk farm near Warsaw which furnished 600 litres of milk a day for babies of the poor in that city; took over a large building near Warsaw as a shelter for refugee orphans from the East; instituted lectures on child hygiene and welfare;

⁶ Expectant mothers were also given a daily meal, either in hospitals or in special dining rooms, and in cases where they could not go to the kitchens, food was sent to their houses, on approval by the local committee.

and established a child welfare library for the collection of local and foreign material on the subject.

At the same time work among the refugee children of the East was pushed, and it was understood that because of their great need, they must be the first to receive food. Besides the 2,000 kitchens already functioning in the East, special kitchens were organized in refugee camps, camps for children were established, and in the region of Kowel, rolling kitchens were arranged in freight cars to be attached to refugee trains, so as to feed the children en route. To thousands who came from Russia during 1921-1922 this food was the first really nourishing meal they had had for months. At the larger refugee concentration camps, baby milk stations were established, and special clothing relief was carried on throughout the Eastern provinces. One great difficulty in these devastated regions was that no buildings existed for child-feeding or shelter, and many kitchens found their first foot-hold in former German or Russian dug-outs and trenches. During 1921-1922, the P.A.K.P.D. built wooden shelters wherever possible, with assistance from the government Reconstruction Bureau.

Special aid was also given during this period to children's homes and orphanages, caring for the great number of war orphans. These institutions, operating usually on a fixed income, found that with the falling value of the mark, it was impossible to care for the increased number of children within their walls. Consequently the A.R.A. authorized the P.A.K.P.D. to send larger allocations of food to such homes, on the recommendation of inspectors, and in some cases one and one-half or two daily rations were distributed to them per child, since they were unable to supplement the usual A.R.A. meal, and this was practically their only source of supply.

The great work of the spring of 1921 and thereafter, however, was the formation of the Sanitary Medical Division of the P.A.K.P.D. which, in cooperation with the American

Red Cross, undertook an intensive child-health campaign. The Red Cross in the course of its health work in Poland had been especially impressed with the need of medical relief and special milk stations and ambulatories for children, in addition to the A.R.A. kitchens, and now that the P.A.K.P.D. was well-organized, agreed to direct such work and furnish certain supplies, with the P.A.K.P.D. as distributing agent. It was decided that the program should cover:

1. The distribution of medical supplies to institutions for children and of clothing and medicines through local stations;
2. The establishment of baby milk stations and of ambulatories or clinics for children of all ages;
3. A demonstration of visiting nursing; and
4. The training of Polish personnel in child-health work.

In the first few months of the work the total hospital capacity for children was increased twenty per cent, and educational propaganda was begun under the supervision of two Polish doctors in Warsaw. The Red Cross established a school for Public Health Workers in Cracow and Schools of Nursing in Warsaw and Poznan, so that Polish workers were trained to conduct the ambulatories, milk stations, visiting nursing services, and so on. The existing medical and nursing associations were also pressed into service, with the result that when the child-health campaign was at its peak, the American personnel included only eight doctors, thirteen nurses and ten social workers, although 159 ambulatories and 69 infant health stations, with 6 dental clinics and 3 day nurseries, were in operation. That is, here, as in child-feeding, the Poles themselves did the greater part of the individual work, with the Americans acting in an advisory capacity. When the Red Cross withdrew every local committee was operating on its own and finding revenue partly from the sale of milk and partly from local contributions. To increase the supply of milk the Red Cross had bought some cows and used, also, A.R.A. contributions of condensed

and evaporated milk and its own gifts of fresh and dried milk. Besides medical supplies, 72,884 layettes and 84,200 baby dresses were distributed. In all 20,000 children and 2,000 mothers were registered; a large amount of child-health propaganda was distributed in the form of lectures, films, and pamphlets and through the press; and the Polish child-health personnel was so well trained and organized that to-day there is hardly a city of any size in Poland without its well-equipped, modern milk station, where clothing as well as food is distributed to poor children, mothers receive instruction in child-care, and babies are given regular physical examination. In March, 1922, when the Red Cross prepared to withdraw it secured a subsidy for the P.A.K.P.D. of \$275,000 to continue the work for five and a half years and left supplies to the value of \$150,000. The Government's acknowledgment in this same month of responsibility for the future of the P.A.K.P.D. further ensured the continuation of child-health work in Poland.⁷

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During this time the P.A.K.P.D. engaged in two more distributions of children's clothing, supplementary to those of 1919 to 1920. In the first, the remaining materials imported by the A.R.A. in the fall of 1919 were used, with a new importation of stuff for undergarments, shoes and stockings. Some 300,000 children received outfits in this winter and spring, and in the following year, 1921-1922, the A.R.A. brought in about 340,000 pairs of shoes and stockings for P.A.K.P.D. distribution, in addition to 180,000 suits and 65,000 sets of underwear, donated by the American Red Cross. The clothing distributed from 1919 to 1922 reached a total value of almost five million dollars, and it is safe to say that over a million children benefited from it. Yet it met only the absolute minimum requirements, and

⁷ See below for Government action on the P.A.K.P.D., March, 1922, preparatory to the A.R.A., withdrawal.

the clothing program could have been extended had there been funds which were not even more urgently required for other forms of relief.

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Early in 1919, as described in Chapter XI, the A.R.A. had begun a money remittance system to enable individuals and business organizations in America to send funds to individuals or firms in Poland, or the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and, in 1920-1921, when normal methods of money-exchange were resumed, but as there was still a food shortage in these countries, the individual remittance system was developed into a food draft transfer. Many persons in America had attempted to send packages of food to Europe, but transport charges were high, and the packages were often lost in transit or suffered from breakage or pilferage. Money could be sent, of course, but it was subject to the extreme fluctuations of exchange and, once received, would buy little food at the prices then current. Indeed, in some places, such as the eastern borders of Poland during the Bolshevik war, there was no food to buy, although it was sometimes possible for the A.R.A. to deliver relief supplies there.

For these reasons, and because any system which permitted the millions of foreign-born in America to send personal relief to friends in Europe was of psychological as well as material value, at a time when communication was difficult and most relief was necessarily on a vast, impersonal scale, the A.R.A. set up the food draft machinery, with the consent and assistance of the various European governments. Special warehouses were established, where food was shipped in bulk to be made up in standard packages of different values, containing a specified variety of foods. The donor in America then purchased a draft for one of these packages and the recipient abroad, on presenting the draft at a warehouse, received a package of the

specified content. There were two sizes of parcels, one at \$10, and one at \$50, and two selections of foods available at the price, one for Christians and one for Jews. The system had many advantages, for the purchase of food in bulk secured producer's prices for the donor; delivery was safe, since the A.R.A. could use its own relief distributing machinery; the draft itself, designating the recipient, could travel by fast, letter mail to save time; and the delivery of large numbers of the parcels brought food stocks into the country at no expense to the Government.

In one year, from March, 1920 to April, 1921, the A.R.A. warehouses in Poland delivered 49,000 individual parcels, valued at \$671,380. The Polish government fully recognized the value of such personal relief and not only allowed the food to circulate outside of and supplementary to its rationing system, but waived all customs duties and taxes on the parcels, provided free transportation, raised the parcels post limit to permit mail deliveries of the larger consignments, and even provided free warehouse space for the bulk supplies.

To the individual recipient the parcel represented the thing he needed most, a variety of food-stuffs, plus concrete evidence of the personal interest of his friends in America. In some places the delivery of food packages seemed like a miracle to the hungry recipients. On the eastern border drafts were actually delivered during the Russian war to people who were huddled in cellars and dug-outs with no apparent hope of getting food until the fighting was over. One man who received a draft there wrote with delight of how he managed to go to a warehouse for his package and then "in the cellar . . . made up a stove and, having flour, oil, rice, milk, cocoa and sugar, managed to keep the hungry wolf out of our newly adopted quarters. Here I am bound to remark," he wrote, "and ask everyone, what good it would have done me if I had millions of marks in my pocket and was confined in a cellar for over a week without food?"

An interesting aftermath of the delivery of food packages was the later sale of drafts in Poland for parcel-delivery in Russia, during the famine, when the A.R.A. inaugurated a similar system there. This was in 1922 when money was still scarce in Europe, yet the Polish people knew so well the value of food parcels that, at great personal sacrifice, they purchased as much as \$10,000 worth of food drafts in a single week for the relief of their starving friends across the Russian border.

The food draft system had a further development when it was used for group, as well as individual relief within Poland. Individuals, societies or communities in America were encouraged to make large, block purchases of drafts, which were designated either for "general relief," in which case the A.R.A. selected the neediest families or individuals as recipients, or for the relief of special groups or classes of society.

* * * * *

The middle classes and salaried men, the group known in Europe as the *intelligentsia*, had suffered, perhaps, more than others in the post-war depression, for the cost of living had far outstripped the buying-power of their stationary incomes, and they were not a class that looked naturally to charity or mass relief to furnish the necessities of life. They included teachers, architects, writers, doctors, scientists, engineers, lawyers, students, musicians, artists and others whose work was of the highest value to Poland, and they were in such straits that the A.R.A. made special efforts in their behalf in the form of group relief.

The Rochester Community and Patriotic Fund; the Detroit Community Fund; William P. Wharton, of Beverly, Mass.; E. S. Harkness, of New York; William C. Bingham, 2nd, of Maine; and many other societies and individuals in America, made large gifts for relief to these people and for refugee and general relief, but the largest donor was the Commonwealth Fund, which contributed

\$401,532, especially for the *intelligentsia* of Poland. About \$60,000 of this grant was for clothing, and provided over 6,000 outfits of shoes, stockings, and underwear with material for either a man's suit or a woman's dress. The rest was used for food, about one-half of which was distributed in package form to families, and the rest at special kitchens which were established in the larger cities.

Committees made up of members of the Government or of leading citizens were formed to arrange for distribution and to select those most deserving of aid, but this was a task of considerable delicacy, calling for tact and discretion, since so many of the neediest of these classes preferred to suffer quietly rather than solicit or receive open relief. Consequently, investigations were made as unobtrusively as possible, and the food was distributed by local committees of persons who best knew the neediest people. The Polish Grey Samaritans did invaluable work in discovering needy cases, since, because they were Polish and because they were women, they were far better able to establish contact with the needy than were the male members of the A.R.A. The J.D.C., the Russian Red Cross, teachers' organizations, and universities also assisted in distribution, and food was sent to hospitals, clinics, asylums, convents, old peoples' homes and other institutions serving the *intelligentsia* in about fifty towns.

Soon after this work began it was discovered that many of the recipients of food parcels, especially in cities, had no adequate lodgings and no place to cook meals, so that distribution through special kitchens was the only way to reach them. Such kitchens were operated at one time or another after November, 1920, in nineteen cities or towns. They were managed by the *intelligentsia* themselves, and the American food was supplemented wherever possible by fresh vegetables of local supply.* The daily meal was furnished

* The Polish Farmers Union furnished such vegetables for the kitchens in Warsaw.

at a cost of one-half to one cent for cooking and serving, and most of the recipients were able to pay this small charge, while about ten per cent of them received the meal free. The largest kitchen in Warsaw, which gives a fair example of the classes of people served, except in the special university kitchens, catered in 1922 to 810 women and 222 men. The women included wives, widows and daughters of 210 former estate owners, 66 officers, 31 physicians, 29 lawyers, 54 engineers and 33 artists, besides 165 women who were either teachers themselves or related to teachers, and 222 business women or relatives of business men. The men, fathers and sons, were classified as 58 estate owners, 29 officers, 5 doctors, 9 lawyers, 16 engineers, 18 artists, 10 teachers, and 77 former business men. The largest number of persons fed in intelligentsia kitchens in any one month was 191,000, but the total number of meals served from November, 1920, to June, 1922, was 2,298,400.

The last gift from the Commonwealth Fund was exhausted in June, 1922, and it became a question whether "intelligentsia relief" should stop or efforts be made to provide further support for it. Economic conditions in Poland were considerably improved, but farmers and industrial workers had benefited by the change more than the professional classes, whose incomes, if they had any, had not increased to meet the still rising prices. They faced another winter with despair, and it was felt that to end this form of relief abruptly would undo a great deal of the constructive work of the past two years and place the lives of many intellectuals in actual jeopardy. The feeding schedule could be reduced, but it could not be ended, and so the Commonwealth Fund, J.D.C., and A.R.A. jointly raised \$65,000 to continue this relief until June, 1923.

* * * * *

The students in Polish universities and technical schools had suffered, like others of the *intelligentsia*, from war and

post-war economic conditions, and another form of group relief was organized for them. One of Poland's first efforts after the war had been to rehabilitate and enlarge her educational system. The Universities of Lemberg, Vilna and Cracow had remained as thoroughly Polish educational centers even during Poland's years of subjugation, but Vilna was closed during the later years of the Russian régime, Lemberg was badly damaged during the war, and Cracow's equipment was much depleted. As for the University of Warsaw, it had been conducted in the Russian language and was largely boycotted by Poles until, after the war, it was reopened with a new curriculum under Polish auspices. At the same time Vilna reopened, Lemberg and Cracow were improved, and new universities founded at Poznan and Lublin. Mining, technical and agricultural schools were also established, so that in 1922 Poland had 17 higher schools of learning, with a total registration of 33,000 students. But many of these students had entered the Universities directly from the demobilized army and were homeless, almost penniless, and lived, especially at the larger Universities, the most miserable of lives while trying to pursue their education. They had, very sensibly, organized their own mutual aid societies, founded student-hostels in some places and organized cooperative kitchens, but they were still unable to provide themselves with really nourishing meals or clothing, the Government could not subsidize them, and their poverty was such that in December, 1920, the European Student Relief (World's Christian Student's Federation of the International Y.M.C.A.) reported that hundreds of Polish students were living in railroad stations and streets, the student hostels were often "worse than prison camps in the war," and special relief must be organized for them at once. This Students' Relief branch of the Y.M.C.A. had organized a general European program of relief in the fall of 1920, and in January, 1921, as a result of the above quoted report, began its work in

Polish universities and technical schools. With funds from the European Relief Council collection, and other contributions from America, the American section of the Y.M.C.A. was able to take over the student-feeding and clothing relief in Poland, and in April, 1921, the A.R.A. agreed^o to conduct this feeding program for the Student Friendship Fund.

The students' kitchens were, like those for the *intelligentsia*, managed by the beneficiaries themselves, who paid the small cost of overhead, if they had the means, or received their daily meal free, if they were without funds. The existing student dining-rooms were used in Warsaw, Cracow, Lemberg, Vilna, Poznan, and Lublin, and served a daily meal of about 1,100 calories to each student. Sometimes as many as 11,000 were fed a day, and in the course of the whole operation, from April, 1921, to June, 1922, a total of 2,337,165 meals were served at student-kitchens.

The Student Friendship Fund interested itself in clothing relief, also, and in helping both students and the Universities by special donations of the technical supplies and scientific literature which they greatly needed. The A.R.A. ended its student-feeding work in June, 1922, but the Student Friendship Fund continued its relief in Central Europe on a smaller scale until the following year.

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The refugees who swarmed into Poland from Russia in 1921 were another class for whom special relief was instituted. As described, the A.R.A. and P.A.K.P.D. had founded camps and kitchens for refugee children long before this, and the American Red Cross, J.D.C., and others, had been interested in adult refugee relief, both in typhus prevention and in feeding and clothing. In fact, as early as the spring of 1920, the Red Cross had assisted the Polish gov-

^o The A.R.A. also provided some of the funds and took charge of student-feeding for the Y.M.C.A. Student Friendship Fund in the Baltic States, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as well as in Poland.

ernment by conveying transports of refugees from various points in Russia to Warsaw, and in various forms of relief in the Government refugee shelters and concentration camps. But in 1921, the end of the Russian war and the sudden Russian famine sent hungry people across the border into Poland in such numbers that it was necessary to secure special funds in America for additional relief on a large scale for refugees, not only in camps and centers, but in the devastated areas where they tried to settle. Their pitiable condition is suggested by a cable from the Warsaw office of the A.R.A.:

November 25, 1921.

To the London Office:

It is estimated that 70,000 refugees will have come through Baranowice in month November and that death-rate from time they arrive at frontier until their departure will amount to 1000. Stream of refugees continues to arrive in entirely unexpected volume and they are succumbing to cold, privation and hunger. Worst part of whole situation is that after leaving Baranowice they go to villages in devastated region where there are no crops and no habitation, and conditions are as bad as those they believe they have escaped from in Russia. They expect heaven and get hell.

This was only a single instance, but typical of the general conditions among refugees in this year. Many of them found their way, or were transported by the Government or the various relief agencies to cities or concentration centers; some of them brought what provisions they had with them into Poland; but hundreds became ill or died in the course of long, weary journeys from the interior of Russia during which, if they came by train, they were herded like cattle, and, if they came on foot, they suffered all the privations of living on an impoverished land and of travel in all weathers.

The Polish government had organized a Refugee Repatriation system, but found it next to impossible to stem the sudden flood, and was genuinely alarmed by the

situation, as well it might be. In the first place there was a doubt whether all these people were Poles. Newspapers stated that only a small proportion registered as Poles, the rest being Ukrainians, "Galicians," or various kinds of Russians, and asked if the Government had no right to stop such emigration. In the second place, the concentration of homeless, jobless people in cities and camps put a tremendous burden on the Government and all relief and reconstruction agencies. And, finally, when the refugees returned to their old homes in the regions where two wars had thrown armies back and forth, they found, as described above, "no crops and no habitations." In the Pinsk district in the winter of 1921-1922, the P.A.K.P.D. estimated that 21 per cent of the population was living in dug-outs and 12 per cent in former barracks, while 41 per cent had no provisions, 30 per cent had supplies for three months, 20 per cent for six months, and only 9 per cent for a whole year.

For this special form of relief the A.R.A. secured about \$302,000 in the United States and cooperating with the government Refugee Commission, the J.D.C., League of Red Cross Societies, and other smaller associations or institutions, distributed food and clothes through rolling kitchens, railway station canteens, refugee camps and shelters, and at makeshift feeding stations in the Eastern provinces. In the cities, such as Warsaw, as many as 10,000 meals a day were served to refugees who poured in there, and in Pinsk other special relief was necessary for hundreds of homeless people when the center of the city was destroyed by fire. The refugee relief was necessarily an emergency affair and like child-feeding in the early days of 1919, was largely a makeshift, a case of hurrying food and clothing by any possible means to the places where these people happened to be collected, and while it did not solve the refugee problem, it did greatly assist the Polish government in refugee repatriation and saved many lives among the

sick and hopelessly impoverished wanderers. When the A.R.A. left Poland in June, 1922, the refugee problem was still acute, so that the P.A.K.P.D.'s first year of child-feeding without American aid was devoted chiefly to the care of refugee children in the East.

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The part played by other agencies than the A.R.A. and P.A.K.P.D. in all this varied relief work has been indicated, but since Polish relief and reconstruction were actually a great cooperative effort of many individuals and societies, it is desirable to summarize their various contributions here. The A.R.A. was transport agency and sometimes distributing agency for most of the American societies, but they all kept their separate identities and interests in relief and while keeping their identities, managed to coordinate their work and dovetail it with that of other agencies and of the Polish government, so that there was relatively little duplication of effort, considering the size of the field, but a great deal of real mutual assistance.

The American Red Cross, one of the largest givers from the start in 1919, concentrated especially on health problems,—typhus work, child-health, sanitation, and the provision of medical aid in personnel-training and supplies for hospitals and institutions,—but turned its hand to adult feeding, clothing relief, and refugee work as the need arose. When it withdrew in the spring of 1922 it had, as described, placed the P.A.K.P.D. child-health work on a permanent footing and left large stocks of medicines and supplies, besides the greatly enlarged corps of trained Polish health workers, nurses and doctors to continue medical relief in Poland in the years to come.

The Jewish Joint Distribution Committee was also one of the first in the field, in fact had contributed large sums for relief in Poland during the war. It made large grants to

the A.R.A. child-feeding funds and for refugee and *intelligentsia* relief, and its workers cooperated in the distribution of food and clothing wherever they were working. It instituted health work and child welfare work especially among the Jews in Poland and, as time went on, turned its attention more and more to reconstructive efforts, such as aid in the reconstruction of homes and businesses, the establishment of Jewish cooperative loan societies, vocational and trade schools, and various forms of agricultural reconstruction. It has continued its work to the present time and reports that it has spent about \$17,850,000 between 1918 and 1927 on relief and reconstruction in Poland.

The Friends (British and American Quakers) were also active in Polish relief from 1919 to 1923. Their work was usually on a smaller scale and more concentrated than that of the A.R.A., A.R.C., or J.D.C., but they engaged in many forms of relief and cooperated with the larger agencies and with the government in every way possible. They operated kitchens for A.R.A. child-feeding wherever their units were at work and engaged in typhus and general relief as well. In 1921, like everyone else, they did special refugee work, and from 1921 to 1923 were interested in agricultural reconstruction and the encouragement of home industries. In Warsaw they engaged in relief for children's homes and cooperated in enlarging and organizing the milk distributing system. In fact, at one time the Friends imported stocks of cotton-seed as fodder to increase the milk-supply. They withdrew from Poland as a unit in the fall of 1923, but in the meantime had arranged for the establishment of an agricultural training school for orphans in Brest-Litovsk as permanent evidence of their interest in Poland's welfare.

During these years the Polish-American societies continued the aid which they had begun to send to Poland in 1914. In 1920 and 1921 the Central Relief Committee and the National Department devoted about \$200,000 to the repatriation of Polish orphans stranded in Siberia. These

children were assembled at Vladivostok, brought to Seattle and then sent on to Poland. The Polish-American committees employed \$400,000 in the repatriation of American Poles in the Polish armies in France and Poland. Altogether the various Polish societies in the United States contributed, according to the estimates of their officials, some \$10,000,000 for relief work during the war and reconstruction periods.

The greatest cooperative effort, however, was in Poland itself, for the whole relief campaign was predicated on self-help, and individuals, societies, towns, cities, and the Government responded with extraordinary enthusiasm. The P.A.K.P.D. succeeded in uniting welfare and charitable societies in the work, and, as described, the distribution of relief was done largely by the thousands of Poles who gave their services either as volunteers or for a small subsistence. Villages, towns, and cities were organized as separate entities for relief and more than once gave evidence of their interest and gratitude by holding community "celebrations of thanks" for foreign aid.

The individual efforts of the Poles can hardly be estimated, but the Government's contribution was concrete and so large as to constitute over one-third of the total expended for children's relief, and probably constituted a vastly greater contribution than even its money value implies. For it was appropriated at a time when the Government budget was always marked by a sad deficit, the constantly changing Ministers of Finance did not know from month to month how the Government was to carry on, and desperate expedients were resorted to in the effort to cover deficits and solve the country's financial puzzle. The very fact that the Polish government did make such extraordinary efforts for children's relief is evidence that a great emergency existed and that no money sent from America was wasted on unnecessary relief.

The government granted, from time to time, \$7,619,280 worth of foodstuffs from the Appropriation Fund, and

\$2,600,000 from the A.R.A. Remittance Fund, besides a \$129,719 credit for Polish administrative expenses of relief.¹⁰ The transport, warehouse, telegraph and other services contributed are estimated at a total value of \$1,474,236, and municipal, local and private donations for relief at \$1,632,892, making a grand total of \$9,879,180, contributed by the Polish government for children's relief between April, 1919, and June, 1922. The A.R.A. on its part delivered \$20,294,380 worth of food and clothing for children, purchased by funds from American sources.¹¹

One interesting result of the close cooperation between the A.R.A. and the Polish government in relief was that during the Russian famine, Poland agreed to transport A.R.A. supplies across her territory free of charge, for the relief of her ancient enemy. About 26,000 tons of supplies were thus shipped from Danzig across Poland on special fast trains to be transferred to the broad-gauge Russian trains at the border, and this transport constituted Poland's contribution to Russian relief since she could not give either food or money. While this transport was going on Polish officials asked the A.R.A. to use its good offices to secure the ratification by Soviet authorities of a railway agreement between the two governments which was in the process of slow negotiation. The A.R.A. was careful to keep out of political debates, but considered this railway pact a matter worth speeding for the benefit of both countries and so consented to discuss it with the authorities in Moscow. They were induced to ratify the agreement and thus out of relief

¹⁰ The administrative expenses were extremely low, partly because many services were given by volunteers, and partly because local committees carried most of their own overhead, except in impoverished communities, either by a small charge to those who could pay, or by rigid economies in distribution. The P.A.K.P.D., for instance, instituted a system of selling empty food-containers, sacks, bales, barrels, wooden cases and even milk tins, and by this means cleared \$83,000 in three years for administrative expenses.

¹¹ For the total value of A.R.A. imports for general relief as well as for children see statistical tables at end of this book.

there came another simplification of transport facilities between two nations.

* * * * *

All the efforts of the Americans in children's relief had, of course, aimed at the erection of a permanent national child welfare association to carry on when the period of emergency foreign aid was over, and the Foundation Council of the P.A.K.P.D. had, as stated, been working to that end, but the two main difficulties were the lack of Polish financial resources and the lack of publicly assumed responsibility for the work by national leaders who could inspire continued public support. The Diet had created the P.A.K.P.D., and the Government had granted funds for its work, but the impetus which drove them to these acts had come largely from the nature of the emergency itself and from the persons most intimately connected with child-feeding—the Americans, because of their great prestige in Poland, and the Polish welfare workers, because of their great enthusiasm for the work. If the P.A.K.P.D. was to lead more than a precarious existence in the future, a greater responsibility for its success must be placed directly on the Government.

Consequently, in January, 1922, when it was known that the A.R.A. would withdraw in June, Philip S. Baldwin, then chief of the A.R.A. Polish Mission, set out on a definite campaign for national support of the work. He first drew up a proposed future program in detail which he presented to the Executive Council of the P.A.K.P.D. for their approval and as a basis for appeals for national support. The Council accepted the program intact. It called for the continuation of emergency feeding for 400,000 refugee and other children until October, 1922, and 300,000, thereafter, until June, 1923, and listed the commodities required, besides estimating the total cost. It further covered the proportion of cost to be carried by the Government and by

the communes, discussed warehouse arrangements, and mapped out the administrative organization necessary to continue the work on the same principles as before, though on a smaller scale.¹²

With the detailed program for another year approved, Baldwin next arranged for an exposition of P.A.K.P.D. work to arouse public interest for the future. This was held in the Diet Building in Warsaw in February and was a great success. On February 24, after considerable effort on Baldwin's part, the Diet passed a resolution summoning the government to work out plans for continuing children's relief under the P.A.K.P.D. with Government funds. The Diet in a burst of enthusiasm also called for a statute conferring honorary citizenship of Poland upon Herbert Hoover.

Meantime, Baldwin had been consulting frequently with the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister and others, so as to secure united governmental action. Indeed, he called personally on every Minister of the government in behalf of the P.A.K.P.D., and everywhere encountered a sympathetic attitude toward the work, which was highly encouraging for the future, but the ready admission that it might be hard to find government credits for even so small a program. The Prime Minister, Antoni Ponikowski, though his tenure of office was short, was especially helpful in furthering the P.A.K.P.D. plans, and Gustav Simon, Vice-Minister of Labor, who had been connected with the organization of the P.A.K.P.D., used his intimate knowledge of it in advocating government support.

As a result of all these efforts, the Economic Council of Ministers on March 30, 1922, finally voted the credits necessary for the next year's P.A.K.P.D. program, as outlined

¹² The Sanitary-Medical division of the P.A.K.P.D. which had conducted the child-health campaign with the A.R.C. also sought to perpetuate itself, and as described above, received a special subsidy for its work in March, 1922, when the Government took over responsibility for the whole P.A.K.P.D.

by Baldwin, thus assuming the responsibility for children's relief and assuring the P.A.K.P.D. a permanent place as the national child welfare association under state protection. As a matter of fact the central government did not finance the whole program, but appealed to the various local governments to subscribe their share, and the local governments were so interested in the work that before long they were contributing not only to local expenses of distribution, but to the provision of food supplies as well.

The A.R.A. formally withdrew from children's relief on June, 20, 1922,¹³ and during June the first supplies bought under the new program were distributed by the permanent Polish management of the P.A.K.P.D., as chosen by its council and confirmed by the Government.¹⁴ The activities of the P.A.K.P.D. as finally developed were directed first, to the distribution of food, and medical supplies, and, second, to the organization and support of institutions for general child welfare—homes, hospitals, sanatoria, shelters, gymnasias, playgrounds, summer colonies, baths, etc.—and for the advancement of professional training in welfare or health work. It was fortunate that at its head there was a man of unusual calibre and prestige, Ladyslas Grabski, former Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Poland, and at this time Extraordinary Commissioner of Refugee Repatriation.¹⁵ The Council also contained representatives of the Ministries of Health, Labor and Social Protection, Religious and Public Education, and Finance, besides various executive officers and members of welfare or religious

¹³ *Intelligentsia* relief and the transport of A.R.A. supplies for famine relief in Russia continued for another year, so that the A.R.A. Warsaw office did not close until June 1, 1923.

¹⁴ The permanent organization in gracious recognition of American help, retained the old name of Polish-American Childrens' Relief Committee, and the American Minister to Poland and two American citizens, chosen from those residing in Poland, were made honorary members of its Council. The A.R.A. in withdrawing naturally gave the P.A.K.P.D. much of its office equipment, motor transport, etc., and also, because of the shortage of milk, guaranteed to supply 640 tons of condensed milk for the year 1922-23.

¹⁵ Mr. Grabski was again Prime Minister in 1924 and 1925.

organizations. The P.A.K.P.D. itself expressed its position as a permanent child welfare agency as follows, in its report of June, 1922:

The high humanitarian and constructive nature of the child relief work has secured for it the full cooperation of all Ministries and Departments of the government. On various occasions each of the Ministries has given instructions to its provincial ramifications to assist each unit of the P.A.K.P.D. organization with all the facilities at their disposal. . . . Thanks to improved agricultural and industrial conditions the action as a purely relief undertaking may be steadily reduced. The principal needs still to be met during the coming year are among children whose parents are still without employment in the large manufacturing centers, and above all children of the destroyed East and the constantly arriving refugees from Russia. . . . The hygienical and medical side will constitute an important phase in the future permanent action and, as previously pointed out, the support of this section of the work is assured for the coming five and a half years.

The P.A.K.P.D., having distributed the enormous quantities of relief material turned over to it during the past three years by the American Relief Administration, American Red Cross, and the Polish Government, now turns its attention more and more towards elevating the general standards of child care. In this field its task will be to conserve and faithfully maintain these precious assets in child life and health which have been built up thanks to the creative idea and most opportune assistance of its friend across the sea.

The aid given by America during these years has not been forgotten by Poland or her children. In 1927, when they learned of the Mississippi Valley floods, the children in Polish schools collected nearly \$2,000 which they sent through the Polish-American Society at Warsaw to Mr. Hoover for the relief of juvenile flood victims. This spontaneous act of sympathy is but one of many evidences of the gratitude which the people of Poland feel for the help which America was able to bring.

CHAPTER XIII

INTEGRATION AND STABILIZATION

THE internal political problems of the new Poland could be solved only by the Poles themselves, and the intervention of foreigners, however well intentioned, was neither necessary nor desirable. But in the realm of finance, industry and commerce Poland, like the other new states, needed the collaboration, technical advice and material aid of friendly states possessing greater commercial experience and economic strength. Under the conditions of the post-war period the United States was better able than any other country to furnish financial aid, and that aid was freely given. The first emergency financing of Poland, as has been seen, involved a rapid study of requirements, the balancing of Polish requirements with those of other nations, the procurement of needed supplies, the organization of transport and technical and material aid in internal distribution. Largely on Hoover's recommendation the United States Government released to Poland credit for food, engineering and other supplies which finally amounted to \$159,666,972.¹ Supplementing these first credits, the people and government of the United States gave direct charitable aid to Poland's children and destitute to the extent of some \$29,000,000. Private credits to industry and public external loans came later when the new state had attained a measure of economic equilibrium.

¹ The Polish debt to the United States Government at the time of funding amounted to \$178,560,000, including interest at 4¼ per cent on the original debt.

American interest and participation in Polish reconstruction did not end when the A.R.A. withdrew and the P.A.K.P.D. under its new charter took over full responsibility for the work which until 1923 had been carried on by Polish and American collaboration.

Some reconstruction relief was continued, notably by the American Joint Distribution Committee which maintained its aid to the Jewish community by the support of cultural organizations, credit associations and relief for the unemployed during the economic troubles of 1925 and 1926. In general, however, Poland had passed the emergency stage in social reconstruction, as a few years earlier she had passed a similar stage in food supply, inland transport and fuel production. Despite this notable progress there remained other reconstruction problems in which recurrent crises had prolonged the emergency period. One of these was economic, primarily the product of financial instability. The other was political, the result of a not altogether successful constitutional experience under the fundamental law of March 17, 1921. Economic stabilization was, however, decisively affected by the course of political evolution, and hence it is desirable to glance at certain aspects of that evolution in the period immediately following the ratification of the Riga Peace and the Upper Silesian settlement of the spring of 1921.

The most notable political events of the year 1921, besides those already mentioned, were, first: the treaties of alliance with France and Rumania² to provide security against Poland's most powerful neighbors and recent enemies,

² The accord with France, signed February 19, 1921, provided for common action in matters of common interest and aid in case either was attacked. This was followed by several special conventions, notably a military convention (June 27, 1922) and a commercial convention (December 9, 1924). In 1925 France and Poland reciprocally guaranteed the pacts signed at Locarno. By the treaty with Rumania, signed March 3, 1921, and renewed March 26, 1926, the two states engaged reciprocally to maintain against all foreign aggression their territorial integrity and political independence.

Germany and Russia; and second, the adoption of a constitution. Constitution-making began in May, 1919, when on the one hundred and twenty-eighth anniversary of the historic Constitution of May 3, 1791, the Paderewski cabinet laid before the Diet a draft drawn up by Stanislas Wojciechowski, then Minister of the Interior and later President of the Republic. The Diet's constitutional commission elaborated a new draft, which it submitted in November, 1919, but there was no general debate until after the military crisis of the Bolshevik war of 1920 had passed. Then came several weeks of vigorous discussion and the adoption of the considerably revised constitution on March 17, 1921.

A general discussion of this interesting document is outside of our scope here, but it is necessary to refer briefly to certain of its characteristics which had an important bearing on subsequent events and to mention some of the influences which were responsible for these characteristics. Preeminent among these influences were: respect for the rights of the individual and fear of arbitrary executive authority, backed by the essential conservatism of the Polish nation reflected in the conservative color of the constituent Diet and the proximity of the Russian experiment in communism.

These factors singly or in combination were primarily responsible for constitutional provisions which guarantee to the individual not only full protection of life, liberty and property, but freedom of religion, of conscience, of the press, of petition, of association and union. They account for the specific protection of property against expropriation without remuneration and of labor against oppression. They are responsible for the recognition of labor's rights to social insurance, prohibition of child labor, regulation of the employment of women in industry and authorization of the establishment of units of economic self-government

consisting of chambers of commerce, industry, crafts and hired labor represented in a Supreme Economic Council to direct the economic life of the nation.

These influences were likewise responsible for the constitutional provisions which establish the supremacy of the popular legislative body, the *Sejm*, over the executive and judicial departments of the government. This was accomplished by placing presidential authority largely in the hands of the cabinet which is responsible to the *Sejm* and by withholding from the courts the right to question the constitutionality of legislative enactments.³

The position of the *Sejm* was further strengthened by the provision that it could be dissolved only with the consent of a two-thirds vote of an absolute majority or by the President with the consent of three-fifths of the Senate.⁴ The legislature could, therefore, as it did subsequently, maintain its existence until the expiration of its five-year term though it had ceased to represent public opinion.

After the adoption of the Constitution of March 17, 1921, the constitutional Diet retained the sovereign power and legislative authority under the provisional constitution of February 20, 1919, for more than a year and a half, when elections under the new Constitution were held. During this time five different ministries⁵ were in authority for brief and troubled periods. Parliamentary majorities were too unstable to permit any constructive legislative action on the pressing internal problems of financial stabilization, agrarian reform and the minorities problem. The greatest achievements were accomplished under non-parliamentary cabinets of Ponikowski and Nowak in the matter of admin-

³ The judicial decisions, on the other hand, may not be changed by the legislature or the executive. Judges are appointed by the President and are removable only by judicial decision.

⁴ The Senate, like the *Sejm*, was elected by secret, direct, and equal suffrage on the basis of proportional representation. It exercises only a suspensive veto on the acts of the *Sejm*.

⁵ A list of Polish Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 1919-1927, is given on page 384.

istrative consolidation, improvement of communications,⁶ housing, education and the enactment of an electoral law (July 29, 1922) in preparation for the elections under the new Constitution.

The 1922 elections produced no fundamental change in the character of the legislature. The Right parties gained slightly at the expense of the Left and Center, but among the eighteen parties represented in the *Sejm* there was no group or coalition with a common program which could muster a majority. The first test of strength between Right and Left groups came when the Senate and *Sejm* met as a National Assembly to elect the President of the Republic. Pilsudski declined to run, and the contest, waged with great bitterness, narrowed to Count Maurice Zamoyski, Polish Minister at Paris, the candidate of the Right, and Gabriel Narutowicz, a member of the Radical Peasant Party, a friend of Pilsudski and the candidate of the Left. On the fifth ballot Narutowicz, thanks to the support of the minority groups, won by a slender majority. In the midst of great excitement and under violent attack in the nationalist press, Narutowicz took office on December 16. Two days later the President was assassinated by a young writer whose act was presumably inspired by the violence of the press campaign, but who had no accomplices. A brief period followed during which the question of civil peace and constitutional order was in the balance, while Warsaw heard talk of civil war and a Pilsudski dictatorship to preserve the peace. The appointment of General Ladislas Sikorski as Premier and Pilsudski as Chief-of-Staff restored public confidence and on December 20 the National Assembly elected Stanislas Wojciechowski President.

When the *Sejm* settled down to business under the new charter it revealed the same lack of coordination, the same inability to enact by ordinary parliamentary methods

⁶ The participation of the American Technical Advisers in these reforms is described in Chapter XI.

vitaly important legislation on hotly contested issues that had so often afflicted the earlier Diet. In the course of its five months in office the non-parliamentary Sikorski ministry restored public confidence so shaken by the Narutowicz tragedy, but it could make little progress with the comprehensive legislative program which it placed before the *Sejm*. In May, 1923, there was a return to parliamentary government under a cabinet headed by Witos⁷ backed by a majority made up of Right and Center groups. The majority was too small to survive the defection of even a few of its constituents, a condition which discouraged action on controversial issues. After six and a half months of generally ineffectual manoeuvring, the ministry fell. By this time Poland was in serious economic straits because of the financial situation; the agrarian situation had become acute; and the status of the minorities was raising internal and external complications. In desperation the *Sejm* returned once more to a non-parliamentary government of experts, headed by Ladislas Grabski. The new premier remained in office from December 19, 1923, to November 13, 1925, a period of service longer than that of any of his predecessors and notably productive in constructive legislation. The Grabski cabinet first turned itself to financial reconstruction.

This stabilization and currency reform attempted in January, 1924, by Ladislas Grabski, was an act of great courage, being an attempt to achieve a balanced budget in the face of an apparently overwhelming Treasury deficit. The liquidation of the Polish State Loan Bank and the establishment of the Bank of Poland on April 1, 1924, was an important step. Part of the plan was the adoption of a new unit of currency, the Zloty, at a par of one gold franc, in place of the then practically worthless Polish mark. The

⁷ V. Witos, leader of the Piast Party, the moderate agrarian group, had been premier in 1920-21, at the head of a Left-Center coalition. The Constitution was adopted during Witos' first ministry.

Government had hardly got the plan well under way, however, before a crop failure descended upon Poland, in consequence of which the Government found itself forced to make large purchases abroad. Internal credit conditions, already supersensitive, became stringent. About the same time the coal agreement with Germany expired and, contrary to expectation, Germany's purchases of Silesian coal practically ceased. A customs war started between Poland and Germany. Coinciding with these misfortunes were political upsets which were anything but helpful. These adverse complications affected all branches of the economic and commercial life of the country. It should not be forgotten that Poland's largest natural market for manufactures, that of Russia, was closed; that the relations with Germany rested on little more than smouldering resentment; and that other neighboring markets or localities of commercial interchange were themselves disorganized and not producing.

Inevitably the State was forced to greater real expenditures, met by the transient remedy of further issues of Treasury notes. Budgetary deficit, instead of declining, increased. In spite of a gradual depletion of the metallic reserve of the Bank of Poland, starting about the middle of 1924, the Bank of Poland and the Treasury managed for nearly a year to keep the newly established zloty up to something near par, but at length in July, 1925, the zloty also started downward. In these two declines, as was characteristic of the Austrian, German, and Russian currency declines, that of the currency was always in lag behind the diminishing proportion of metallic reserves to paper, and it was in this lag that the Government partly financed itself. The real burden of course fell on the masses of the people. By June, 1926, the zloty had depreciated to one-half its par value. Thus inflation again threatened a recurrence of previous evils, already experienced for several years. It incited speculation, demoralized thrift, caused

excessive goods consumption, distorted state expenditures, rendered long-term credits impossible, lowered productive force, and discouraged the people. Side by side with these came the agrarian problem and the equally explosive minority question.

The agrarian question had precipitated innumerable political crises in the Diet and the *Sejm* before 1925. It was an inheritance from Russia and the Dual Monarchy. As has been noted in Chapter I, Prussian policy and Polish economic organization had produced a conservative and prosperous agricultural class of small landowners in German-Poland. In Galicia and the eastern districts of Russian-Poland conditions were quite different. There, beside large estates and prosperous farms of well-to-do proprietors, one found a great number of peasants possessing plots of land too small to support their families. Even more badly off was the landless proletariat, whom neither industry nor agriculture could take care of and which grew as a social problem with the post-war restrictions on Polish immigration into Germany and the United States. In the early days following the Communist revolution in Russia and the wholesale expropriation of estates, Polish peasants demanded a radical redistribution of the land. This radical agitation was not powerful enough to break down the conservative individualism of the Polish nation, but it was important enough to make land reform one of the first matters debated by the constituent Diet in 1919.

After intermittent discussions over a period of three months, the Diet on July 10, 1919, had passed with the narrowest possible majority a bill providing for the nationalization of forests and limiting to 148 acres the amount of land to be held by a single individual in industrial and urban regions, and to 248 acres in rural regions, except in the East where the limit was 988 acres. The land secured by this forced reduction of large estates was to be used to provide holdings for the landless and to increase the size of

existing holdings which were too small to support the families which owned them.⁸ Partly because of the opposition of the landowners, partly because of lack of state funds, and partly because of other internal and external conditions, the bill was never put into effect. The same fate befell another bill providing for expropriation and the distribution of land to soldiers, which the Diet passed on July 15, 1920, in the midst of the Bolshevik war. Again in 1923, the Right-Center coalition minority, headed by Witos, prepared a new bill which would allow private estates, in some cases as large as 2,800 acres, to escape expropriation. This met the approval of Witos' conservative allies, but not of a large section of his own peasant group. It was defeated.

When the Grabski ministry attacked agrarian reform in 1925, it did not enjoy the full power to issue ordinances with the force of laws given by the *Sejm* as in the case of the financial reforms. The bill, which finally survived the storms of the *Sejm* where 603 amendments were offered and of the Senate where it met determined opposition, provided for a gradual process of expropriation and an annual parcelation of 200,000 hectares over a period of ten years. This provision met the economic objections raised against more drastic and immediate changes in the status of landholdings. A further arrangement to permit voluntary partitioning quieted those who feared the establishment of a precedent of general expropriation. The limit of acreage which an owner could retain was raised somewhat above the limits set up in the 1919 bill, particularly in the border provinces. Particularly important were the provisions, lacking in previous bills, to cover the technical and legal aspects of the execution of the reform. Although the measure did not satisfy either the extreme conservative landowners or the radical agrarians, it was a workable

⁸ The Diet had rejected a more radical measure for wider expropriation introduced by J. Dabski, head of the Agricultural Commission.

compromise which removed for a time, at least, one of the most persistently troublesome problems of the Polish state.

Another matter which had become critically in need of legislative action when the Grabski ministry of 1924-25 took office, was the regulation of the position of national minorities. The need of a better-defined, more broadly conciliatory policy on the part of the government was shown by the complaints, demonstrations and general hostility of the minorities. This condition not only disturbed the internal life, but profoundly affected the external relations of the Republic. The minorities question involved Poland's relations with the League of Nations, since the League, by virtue of the Minority Rights Treaty of 1919, was the guardian, so to speak, of the minorities in Poland. It affected relations with Germany and Lithuania, because Germans and Lithuanians live within the Republic's frontiers. It particularly influenced relations with Russia, since there are White Russian and Ukrainian Republics in the Soviet Union, and Moscow, basing its actions on the Treaty of Riga, has interested itself in the affairs of the border peoples living beyond Russia's western frontier. So close, therefore, is this connection between the minorities problem and important phases of the development of Poland's international position, that one must consider this question as a factor in Polish foreign relations.

In order to understand what may be termed the "Soviet" aspect of the minorities question, one must bear in mind that the White Russians and Ukrainians in Poland not only gave excuse for irredentist agitation in the soviet republics, but offered a convenient missionary field for the emissaries of the Third Internationale. It transpired, therefore, that some of the agitation of the minorities has been communist as well as nationalist with some financial support from Moscow. This communist propaganda made insignificant progress among the border peoples, but its existence was sufficient in the eyes of conservatives to taint the program

of the national minorities and so delay the legislation necessary to establish the privileges to which they were legally entitled, and which a large section of Polish opinion desired to give them.⁹

During the years 1921-23 there were some disorders and much dissatisfaction in the eastern borderlands. The attempts of the Left Parties in the Diet and *Sejm* to secure a new minorities policy achieved little, and Poland was charged abroad with failure to fulfill the Minorities Treaty. By the spring of 1924, general recognition of this state of affairs made it possible for Grabski to take up the adjustment of the question with some hope of success. His action was timely from the international standpoint as well, since Germany and Russia both raised the minorities issue. On May 10, 1924, Chicherin complained to Warsaw that Poland in violation of the Riga Treaty discriminated against the border nationalities in land distribution, by fostering illiteracy, by closing churches and by press censorship. A few weeks later a second note reiterated these charges. The Grabski ministry, meanwhile, went forward with its plans, but took the position, in its replies to Moscow, that the Soviet Government was interfering in Poland's internal affairs and that the rights of minorities were established by legislation, rather than by treaties. Three statutes relating to this matter were passed by the *Sejm* on July 10, 1924, establishing parallel use with Polish of the Lithuanian, White Russian and Ukrainian languages in administration and courts in regions where the languages were spoken. The laws also legalized instruction in a "minority" language in private schools, and further provided that in sections where the non-Polish minority amounted to twenty-five per cent, instruction might be given in Lithuanian, White Russian or Ukrainian, if the parents of forty children de-

⁹ Polish nationalists also argued that the minorities would be organized by the Jews and become a menace to the State since the Jews, according to the anti-Semites, were Communists or pro-German, or at best anti-Polish.

sired it. Political opposition delayed temporarily the execution of these statutes, but in 1925 Grabski gave effect to the new policy by instituting the land reform in the East and establishing a number of schools for the minorities.¹⁰

The minorities legislation was an important step toward removing one cause of friction between Russia and Poland, but its effects were not immediately felt. In fact during the late summer of 1924, there were serious disturbances which culminated in a raid on the Polish town of Stolpce, where most of the raiders were captured as they attempted to escape into Russia. The Polish military authorities charged that this and other raids were organized by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party at Moscow. Moscow denied the charge and accused the Polish General Staff of having organized raids in Russian territory. Despite this and earlier diplomatic controversies, Poland and Russia made some progress in 1924 in regulating their intercourse. A railway convention was signed in April, an arrangement was made for the exchange of prisoners, a consular convention was signed in July, and in October the mixed Russian-Polish Commission completed the delimitation of the frontier established by the Riga Treaty. During the winter of 1925-26, there was a better feeling in both countries, and negotiations of a commercial treaty were begun early in 1926. The progress of rapprochement received a sudden check in June, 1927, when the Soviet Minister Voikov was assassinated in Warsaw. Sharp notes

¹⁰ One of the excellent features of the Constitution of March 17, 1921, is its provision, supplemented by a law passed in September, 1922, for autonomy in local administration. The local affairs of the districts into which the country is divided have elective assemblies, which choose an executive committee presided over by a representative of the cabinet at Warsaw. In the eastern regions where the Ukrainians are most numerous there are two local assemblies, one Polish and one Ukrainian, similarly constituted, each dealing with the affairs of the nationality it represents. Both are represented on the executive committees, and on matters of common interest the parallel bodies meet and act together.

were exchanged, but it did not appear that this regrettable incident had destroyed the gains in good feeling accomplished in the last two years.

While the legislation relating to the eastern minorities was under discussion, the cabinet achieved considerable success in dealing with the Jewish minority. A series of conferences between two of the ministers (Stanislas Grabski and Count Skrzynski) and representatives of the Jewish Club in the *Sejm* worked out a general understanding, which was embodied in declarations issued by both sides on July 4, 1925. The Jewish groups declared their firm attachment "to the principle of the intangibility of the frontiers of the Polish state and to its interests as a Power" and their intentions of defending Jewish interests within the limits of the Constitution. The Premier accepted this declaration and promised that the Government would give "greater attention to the needs of the Jewish people in the domain of instruction, culture and economic life." Shortly afterward the Polish government took steps to regularize the legal status of Jewish religious communities, to provide the same linguistic privileges as had been granted to the border peoples, and to legalize the observation of Jewish religious holidays by the Jews. These measures did not, of course, put an end to anti-Semitism in Poland or to hostility to the Polish state among certain Jewish groups, but it was a step in the right direction, a hopeful indication of a less intransigent spirit in Polish-Jewish relations.

The Upper Silesian settlement put an end to the three years of sporadic warfare between Poles and Germans, but it did not end the bitter, suspicious hostility on both sides of the new frontiers. To the German nationalists, the territorial losses in the East—part of Upper Silesia, the corridor and Danzig—were more to be lamented than losses in the West or overseas. They professed to regard the fate of Germans placed under the rule of a nation considered incapable of self-government as unendurable. Organiza-

tions were set up in Berlin to aid in the defense of the rights of German minorities in Poland and elsewhere. The extravagant declarations of German nationalists regarding the revision of the eastern frontiers, the close relations between Germany and Russia, signalized by the Treaty of Rapallo (April, 1922) and the Treaty of Berlin (April, 1926), and the efficient German political organization in Poland made the Poles apprehensive that the way was being prepared for a revival, under new auspices, of the Prussian and Russian Polish policy of the Eighteenth Century. The situation of the Polish minority under German rule furnished another cause of friction. In 1925, difficulties over the treatment of minorities coincided with economic conflict and greatly embittered relations. By the Treaty of Versailles and later arrangements Germans living in Poland had the right to reject Polish nationality, in which case they were obliged to leave Poland within three years. The same privileges and requirements applied to Poles living in Germany. By mutual agreement August 1, 1925, was the date when compulsory removal of certain classes of optants should begin in each country. About 15,000 German families and 12,000 Polish were forced to make a sudden departure in July, incurring great suffering and causing strong public feeling in both countries. In July, also, negotiations of a trade agreement broke down, and German and Polish restrictions on trade virtually suspended commercial relations between the two states. This economic war greatly added to Poland's burdens, and delayed the stabilization of political as well as commercial relations with Germany.

The effects of the customs war with Germany which developed made financial advance particularly difficult. As indicated, the contributory influences in this controversy were so involved that most foreigners, if not many Poles and Germans as well, hardly knew what it was about. Roughly, the trouble found its primary surface manifesta-

tion in Upper Silesia, the loss of which Germany keenly felt, and even after its loss Germans fought with a certain measure of success to retain such industrial and financial power as they could. Control of the great coal and iron industries, however, went over into Polish hands. In the meantime the German residents remaining in Poznan claimed to be receiving unfair political treatment at the hands of the Polish administration. The Geneva Agreement of May, 1922, instituted under the auspices of the League of Nations had provided for export from Upper Silesia to Germany of 1,100,000 tons of coal monthly for a certain period, without customs duty or restrictions, being reduced later to 500,000 tons, also providing reduced tariffs on certain other products. When this agreement expired in July, 1925, Germany sought to bargain for the recognition of German citizenship rights in Poznan and elsewhere in Poland by offering to prolong the agreement, but only for import permits of 60,000 tons of coal monthly. This Poland rejected as confusing economics with politics, and, gaining no concession from Germany, retaliated by issuing a prohibitive decree against import of German products into Poland. This Germany followed by wide tariff increases against Polish goods. On the face of it the issues seem clear enough, but it was the deep-lying animosity of the past in a chain of circumstances and feelings which really gave this trade war the significance it assumed. Both countries suffered.

Set against the minority conflict and the economic war, was one large credit item in 1925. This was the year of Locarno. The pacts signed at this time did not guarantee Germany's eastern frontiers as completely as the western were guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy, but Germany's arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, reinsured by France, diminished decisively the dangers of war in Eastern Europe. By this arrangement Germany agreed not to resort to war to alter her eastern boundaries, and

Poland's security was reinsured by France's guarantee. After Locarno Germany took her place in the League of Nations with permanent membership in the Council. Poland, after a diplomatic flurry, likewise became a member of the Council with a semi-permanent seat.

The "Locarno spirit" and the added security given Poland by the new treaties eased the strain of Polish-German relations, and though the economic war continued to take its toll in material losses and bad feeling, efforts were being made in 1926-27 to liquidate the causes of this conflict. Since these causes include the status of minorities on both sides of the frontier and this status is the subject of the most extravagant nationalist agitation, a complete liquidation seemed to require many years.

Germany's relations with Poland have had their reflection in Danzig-Polish affairs. From the start there has been no mistaking the hostility of the Danzigers and their conservative government, a hostility which the Poles returned with interest. From 1920 to 1925, there was continual friction, with frequent appeals to the League. The latter year opened with a lively controversy over Poland's right to a postal organization in the Free City, decided in favor of Poland by The Hague Court. A few months later the character of the Danzig government changed somewhat, and there was a noticeable *detente* in relations with Poland.

The partition of Teschen between Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1920 did not soothe public opinion in either country. The Czechs felt deprived of territory historically theirs; the Poles were embittered because they had been compelled, while in the midst of the Bolshevik war, to agree to a settlement that gave them less than they believed they were entitled to on the basis of nationality. With public opinion in this state, a dispute in 1922 over the tiny commune of Jaworzyna in the High Tatras assumed serious proportions. This, however, proved to be the last flare-up in the Polish-Czech dispute. When the Permanent Court

at The Hague made its decision (December, 1923) in favor of Czechoslovakia, the issue was closed, and the two states began a new era of conciliation and friendship. Between December, 1924, and May, 1926, their governments signed fifteen conventions and accords regulating their political and economic relations. These understandings do not constitute a defensive alliance, but they recognize, as Dr. Benes has said, that each state is indispensable to the other.

Poland's relations with her northern neighbors were cordial in all cases except Lithuania. Efforts to convert this cordiality into a Polish-Baltic union did not succeed, but conferences took place each year between 1921 and 1927. The conference of 1925 elaborated a convention of arbitration and conciliation which all parties ratified.

The non-participation of Lithuania in the Baltic conferences is unfortunate but inevitable, so long as the Vilna question keeps Poland and Lithuania from friendly relations. Some slight hope of improvement of these relations seemed to be justified after the agreement made at Geneva in December, 1927, by which Poland undertook not to violate Lithuanian independence and Lithuania agreed to take steps to end the abnormal conditions of a state of "warless" war.¹¹

In November, 1925, the Grabski cabinet fell. For two years the partial subordination of party policies to the national interest had permitted capable leaders to give Poland wise and efficient government. This period of calm did not mean that the Constitution and the legislature had been cured of their faults, and immediately the *Sejm* returned to its old practices. Skrzynski's ministry retained its power for five troubled months, and on May 10, 1926, Witos, with the backing of the Center-Right coalition, returned to power for the third time. Two days later

¹¹ The Soviet Government had raised the alarm against Poland, which was said to contemplate the seizure of Lithuania. At Geneva, however, both Russia and Germany gave counsels of moderation to the Lithuanians,

Marshal Pilsudski, supported by troops loyal to himself, marched on Warsaw and demanded the dismissal of the Witos cabinet. Witos refused to resign, President Wojciechowski supported him, and for two days loyal troops fought to uphold the government's authority against the Pilsudski advance. By May 14, the Marshal was the indisputable master of Warsaw, and as it proved, of Poland, for plans to raise troops in the provinces against him were never carried out. On May 15, the Witos cabinet and the President of the Republic resigned; Casimir Bartel, an adherent of the Marshal, became Premier with a cabinet of experts, among whom was Pilsudski as Minister of Military Affairs. The appointment of a new ministry by the acting President signaled the return from revolutionary to constitutional methods. On May 31, the National Assembly elected Pilsudski President, but the Marshal, greatly to the astonishment of his friends and enemies, declined the office. The Assembly then elected Ignace Moscicki, a scholar and industrialist, to the chief magistracy.

In the meantime another American, Professor Edwin Kemmerer, who had previously made a name from his success as financial consultant in several South American countries, was called in as special financial adviser. He first came to Warsaw in December, 1925, at the invitation of the Polish Government. After some recommendations based upon a short stay, he was later invited to make more extended study, arriving again in Warsaw in July, 1926, with a commission of nine members.

After ten weeks' intensive study of Poland's financial situation the commission made a number of specific and rather sweeping recommendations embracing certain phases of government administration. The most important of these recommendations were: (1) Definitely stabilize the zloty at its then level, about nine to the dollar; (2) Flotation of a foreign loan of from 10 million to 15 million dollars; (3) Increase of Bank of Poland's capitalization from 100

million to 250 million zlotys; (4) Certain restrictions on the agricultural and industrial obligations to be held by the Bank; (5) Specific measures for equalization of Poland's taxation burden; (6) Measures to assist equalization of the budget; (7) No further issue of uncovered paper; (8) A number of important improvements of the Government banking system, fiscal control, an organic budget law, customs administration, and Government monopolies, and (9) General coordination of and advice on floating external loans. It was the commission's opinion that Poland would find it necessary to borrow abroad for some years to come, both to repair destruction and for normal development. Professor Kemmerer, however, called attention to the fact that Poland's army called for 36.5 per cent of the total budget expense.¹²

The fundamental causes of Poland's unhappy parliamentary experience, which culminated in the Pilsudski *coup d'état*, were first, political inexperience reflected in the number of party groups, their instability and their opportunism; and second, the constitutional provisions which placed the executive power in the hands of this inexperienced, unstable legislature. The immediate cause of the "revolt" was the struggle between Pilsudski and his enemies to control the army of the Republic. The program announced by the Marshal and his friends was to organize, not destroy, the Polish democracy by utilizing American methods adapted to conditions of Polish life, and to merge the identity of the three parts of Poland. This involved increase of the powers of the executive, separation of the executive and the legislative branches, and a purging of the state administration of incapables.¹³ In August the

¹² If State police and frontier guards were included it would be 45 per cent of the total budgetary expenditures.

¹³ The Marshal's political opponents ascribed less commendable motives to him. It would appear, however, that a considerable section of public opinion, having lost patience with the *Sejm*, received the Pilsudski program of regeneration with relief or enthusiasm.

first steps were taken in realizing this program. Amendments to the Constitution strengthened the executive control of the budget; gave additional ordinance power to the President, particularly in economic and financial matters, and gave the President authority to dissolve the *Sejm* and Senate with the consent of the cabinet. The *Sejm* also gave full powers, as it had to Grabski, to enable the cabinet to carry out administrative and financial measures.

The reforms of 1926 were passed by a *Sejm* in which a majority of the members were anti-Pilsudski, but because the Marshal controlled the army and public opinion supported him, the *Sejm* did as it was told. In September it temporarily reasserted itself, twice defeating the ministry, but the victory was short-lived. Pilsudski himself took the premiership, forming a cabinet of great strength from his supporters in parties of the Right, Center and Left. The government rested not on the support of a group of parties, as previously, but on members of all parties who supported Pilsudski and his policies. This may be the beginning of a new orientation of parties, or it may be the forerunner of greater constitutional changes. These events have revived the talk of a monarchy and have suggested the beginnings of a Polish parallel to fascism.

Following the assumption of control by Pilsudski, the Kemmerer report was presented. While Pilsudski undertook financial reconstruction, on the recognizable bases of the Kemmerer findings, although the recommendations were by no means accepted in entirety.

Later negotiations with an American banking group finally resulted in adoption of an acceptable stabilization plan and the flotation of an international public loan, of which \$47,000,000 were floated in New York, £2,000,000 in London, and \$15,000,000 in France, Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, and Poland. In view of what had gone before, the granting of the loan was accompanied by, and in fact was

contingent upon adoption of certain definite stabilization measures, to be carried out under the general advice and assistance of an American. Charles S. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of the United States Treasury, was accepted for this post. The trade war with Germany naturally had been an obstacle to public flotation of loans abroad, but the reaching of some compromises in the matter at Geneva in the spring of 1927 and later in Berlin opened the way for the 1927 stabilization program.

The proceeds of the \$70,000,000 loan were to be used in varying amounts for increasing the capital of the Bank of Poland; for retiring outstanding Treasury notes; for converting the remaining Treasury notes into silver coin; to liquidate the Treasury's floating debt; to provide reserves or working capital for the Bank; and to be employed for further economic development. A Polish Government decree of October 13, 1927, formally inaugurated the program and established the zloty at a gold value of 11.22 cents which corresponded with the approximate exchange value for about a year past.

The main features of the stabilization program put into force were as follows: (1) Certain measures to assure some 300,000,000 zlotys additional to balance the budget; (2) Agreement to incur no extra budgetary expense for two years; (3) Maintenance of monthly budgets; (4) Financial control over State commercial enterprises; (5) Railways to be placed under separate management; (6) Certain fiscal and banking reforms; (7) Restriction of State loans to banks and municipalities; (8) No long term loans to be made for budgetary purposes for three years; (9) Liquidation of the floating debt; (10) Establishment of a Treasury reserve under control of the Adviser.

Significant of international confidence in the effects of this stabilization was the United States Federal Reserve Bank's immediate action in declaring its readiness to purchase Polish commercial bills to the amount of five and a

quarter million dollars. Besides the Federal Reserve Bank, thirteen other foreign banks of issue cooperated to enable Poland to complete her stabilization.

At the end of its first year, by these and other strong measures, the Pilsudski régime achieved for the first time in the new State's history a balanced budget, a stabilized currency, and a favorable balance of trade. The economic situation greatly improved. All of the principal industries increased their output, and unemployment decreased accordingly. One of the good effects carried over from the Kemmerer recommendations was the first serious step to reduce by mergers and other ways the excessive number of private banks. The merger of the Union Bank and the Bank of Commerce was the first constructive step, carried out with the financial aid of banking groups of New York, Brussels, Milan, and Vienna. About this time some twenty joint stock banks had their charters revoked because their capital was disproportionate to deposits. The accomplishment of stabilization was no easy task. Kemmerer had described the cure as "bitter medicine." It was taken with courage, and the difficult regimen of treatment followed through.

American Government credits to Poland came to an end with the flour credit of March, 1920. The total of these credits, as previously stated, amounted to \$159,666,972. After the refunding settlement of the British debt to the United States had been reached, Poland entered into similar negotiations, and on November 14, 1924, a settlement was reached substantially on the same general terms of the British settlement, and which represented a considerable concession in Poland's favor. The original obligations had been issued to bear an interest of 5 per cent, which subsequent decisions of the United States Treasury Department had reduced to $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. This interest, accrued and unpaid up to December 31, 1922, together with principal,

brought the total debt to \$178,560,000,¹⁴ which the United States agreed could be paid by Poland over a term of sixty-one years.

In this settlement allowances were made for the difficulties of payment in the early stages of Poland's establishment by adopting a low scale of payments of principal and interest at the start. For the first ten years, therefore, 3 per cent interest was agreed upon, and the schedule of principal payments started with a low figure, to gradually increase as Poland would improve her financial position. If this settlement be compared with the amount Poland would have paid at the former interest rate ($4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent) it would represent a reduction in Poland's favor of something close to 20 per cent. A similar calculation on the basis of the 5 per cent interest borne by the original obligations would show a reduction of about 30 per cent.¹⁷

While no complete record is available of the total amounts loaned or given as credits to Poland privately and publicly after her establishment as an independency, the situation at September 30, 1927, will give some indication.¹⁵ Private American credits outstanding then were about \$18,000,000, and public loans or bond issues in the United States were about \$98,000,000.¹⁶ To these must of course

¹⁴ The indebtedness of Poland to the United States was computed as follows: Principal amount of obligations to be funded, \$159,666,972.39; interest accrued and unpaid thereon to December 15, 1922, at the rate of $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent per year, \$18,898,053.60; total principal and interest accrued and unpaid as of December 15, 1922, \$178,565,025.99; paid in cash by Poland November 14, 1924, \$5,025.99; total indebtedness to be funded into bonds, \$178,560,000. See "Combined Annual Reports of the World War Foreign Debt Commission," Government Printing Office, Washington, 1927.

¹⁵ Statistical Bulletin of the Minister of Finances, No. 9, September, 1927.

¹⁶ In this and subsequent figures we have included the respective issues in various countries of the stabilization loan of October, 1927.

¹⁷ See *World War Debt Settlement* by Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolosky, New York, 1926; and "The United States and the War Debts," a memorandum by Lewis Webster Jones, Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1927..

be added the principal of the United States Government credits (\$159,666,972). Thus Poland, in spite of the precariousness of her future (in the eyes of investors) and the numerous disturbances which occurred, was nevertheless availed of American financial confidence to the extent of a round total of over \$275,000,000.

From European countries Poland had outstanding at the same date similar assistance to the extent of about \$124,739,374, consisting of loans from the French Government of \$40,783,145, the British Government \$23,288,579, that of Italy \$4,102,041, and the Governments of Norway, Holland, Sweden and Denmark various credits aggregating \$10,130,930. Private credits or public loans in Europe, not included in the above, then amounted to about \$46,434,679, including the European proportion of the stabilization loan.

Thus Poland had secured sums from her friends for upbuilding aggregating \$400,000,000, of which the American share was \$275,000,000, or almost 70 per cent.

It would be erroneous to assume from the preceding discussion of Poland's financial difficulties that all branches of Polish economic activity were similarly delayed in recovery. In the recovery of the countries of Europe from the Great War, it has proved itself that unless there be large stores of accumulated wealth, productive recovery must and does precede State fiscal stabilization. Poland's realizable wealth was depleted to the extreme. Her productive equipments, while not shattered, as they became in Russia, were badly broken.

The process of the breaking down of Polish industrial equipment, of partial destruction of farm buildings and devastation of farm lands, may be said to have regularly proceeded in all of the four and a half years of the war. By and large, the building up of production or of capacity to produce was accomplished in less time or in no more time than it had taken to destroy. This was so of agricul-

ture, the recovery of which, in spite of lack of fertilizers, depleted implements and man power, was brought back with remarkable rapidity. Coal production, not including the fields acquired in Upper Silesia, by 1922 actually exceeded that of 1913. Similar recoveries were seen in other industries. It is true that certain Polish industries, like that of textiles, only slowly rose toward their pre-war level, but this was not because of incapacity but because the old markets were shut off, notably the Russian market which consumed a large part of Polish textile and other manufactures. The finding of new markets, especially in a disorganized world, is a slow job, but Poland attacked the job well, and achieved notable results.

The rapidity with which major branches of industry were brought up into production was an admirable proof of the will and the capacity of the Polish people for hard work. Whatever the direction of political development in the future, Poland weathered a dangerous political crisis, reminiscent of the Eighteenth Century, reformed her Constitution and secured a more stable administration of her affairs without departing radically from the principles on which she resumed her life as an independent State.

DOCUMENT NO. 1

MR. HOOVER TO SIR EDWARD GREY

London

22 December 1915

SIR,

Knowing your keen desire to mitigate in every possible way the human suffering arising out of the war, I feel justified in bringing before you a suggestion on behalf of the civil population in Poland.

I attach hereto a petition which this Commission has received from the large representative relief committee in Warsaw, and also the report made as the result of personal investigation, at our instance, by Dr. Vernon Kellogg, until lately director in Belgium of our work there.

No added words of mine can darken the picture of misery and despair which these statements depict, representing as they do what would have been the state of Belgium but for the relief afforded under international auspices, with your earnest support.

I have had some informal conversation with German authorities, who assured me that there are cereals and potatoes available in Poland and elsewhere, from which, by mobilisation and organised distribution, some sort of minimum ration can be provided. The other items of dietary do not exist in Poland, and they are critically necessary to preserve health to the strong, life to the weak, and to forefend from the whole population already incipient famine diseases. The shortage of these particular commodities in Germany leaves no hope of help to Poland from that quarter.

I am assured by these German authorities that protection will be afforded to local and imported supplies for the exclusive use of the civil population, also that every facility will be afforded to this Commission in its task of organisation and distribution, under proper guarantees. It appears to us that the deficient fats, beans, etc., together with condensed milk for children, can only

be obtained by imports from overseas, for which there would seem to be a route practicable from the Western Hemisphere to Sweden, with transshipment thence via Danzig or Libau. We could not undertake such a task without the approval and coöperation of the Allied Governments. In the provision of food-supply for these people we should need, not only to rely on charity, but to assemble all the economic resources of Poland and its institutions, in much the same manner as has been done in Belgium; and we should need the permission of His Majesty's Government to facilitate exchange and banking operations.

The painful gravity of the situation in Poland cannot be gainsaid, nor need I apologise for the interest this organisation has taken in the Polish people, in addition to our other very grave responsibilities. We have no desire to add to our burdens, but if the fourteen months of service in Belgium have commended us to the various belligerent Governments, it is our duty to use the confidence thus acquired on behalf of the Polish people, and I wish to add that, if the Allied Governments are prepared to assent to such relief measures, and if any other institution can be summoned to undertake their execution, this Commission would be glad to give any advice arising out of its experience, or, alternatively, we should be glad to incorporate such other body in any organisation we might set up.

I have, etc.,

HERBERT HOOVER.

DOCUMENT NO. 2

POLISH ORGANISATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES TO MR. ASQUITH.

(Telegraphic.)

Chicago, January 8, 1916.

The undersigned duly-elected officers of legally-constituted organisations, numbering 500,000 American citizens, representatives of 4,000,000 Polish-speaking residents of the United States, hereby most respectfully present a unanimous request to His Majesty's Government that the blockade against ships carrying provisions and clothing consigned from the United States, and destined for the war-stricken districts in Poland, be raised, and vessels carrying such cargo be permitted to disembark at the harbour of Danzig or some other suitable port for distribution among inhabitants of that part of Poland devastated by war.

We base this request upon the broadest demands of humanity.

The terrors of war visited upon the innocent peaceful population of Poland have been augmented by famine, pestilence, and death; one-third of a generation, the youngest, has practically ceased to exist; the remaining youths, old men, and women are now upon the threshold of actual extinction by starvation, disease, and exposure.

The world cannot countenance the extermination of an entire nation in such excruciating agony. The ways of diplomatic discourse are too slow in the presence of such calamity: death would win the race. We believe action must begin at once. In this honest belief we appeal most respectfully to the sense of justice and humanity of the great British nation.

Out of the stricken district forming historical Poland, 2,500,000 men have been called to fight for the Allïes' cause; over 1,200,000 soldiers of purest Polish blood have been killed or wounded, and now their families are without food or shelter, suffering far more than any other victims of the war. As the situation there is identical with that of Belgium, the country being almost entirely in the hands of the Central Powers, we earnestly hope and believe that the English Government's magnanimity and your Excellency's wisdom and generosity will accede to our most urgent appeal.

We are prepared to furnish food and clothing for our stricken brethren in Poland, and earnestly request that we be permitted to render our kin in Poland immediate assistance.

It is our desire and earnest hope that the American Commission for Belgium should take charge of the entire relief work, thus offering to His Majesty's Government complete and absolute guarantee that food and clothing will be distributed only and exclusively among Polish sufferers in districts devastated by war.

Now that the very life of the people of Poland depends solely upon Great Britain permitting us to send food, we trust that the Almighty will inspire His Majesty's Government to grant our request.

Anxiously awaiting a favourable reply, we beg, &c.

POLISH NATIONAL ALLIANCE:

K. ZYCHLINSKI, *President*.

J. S. ZAWILINSKI, *Secretary*.

POLISH ROMAN CATHOLIC UNION:

PETER ROSTENKOWSKI, *President*.

J. S. KONOPA, *Secretary*.

POLISH WOMEN'S ALLIANCE:

ANNA NEUMANN, *President.*EMILY NAPIERALSKA, *Secretary.*

POLISH FALCONS' ALLIANCE:

DR. STARZYNSKI, *President.*T. SAMULSKI, *Secretary.*

POLISH ALMA MATER:

JULIAN J. NEJMAN, *President.*M. BROCHOCKI, *Secretary.*

POLISH UNION OF AMERICA:

DR. R. TENEROWICZ, *President.*JACOB DEMBIEC, *President.*

POLISH NATIONAL COUNCIL:

S. ADAMKIEWICZ, *President.*M. MEDWECKI, *President.*

POLISH UNIFORMED SOCIETIES:

F. R. PORZUCZEK, *President.*A. CZECHOWICZ, *Chancellor.*

POLISH CENTRAL RELIEF COMMITTEE:

T. M. HELINSKI, *President.*S. OSADA, *Secretary.*

ST. JOSEPH'S POLISH UNION:

T. POLASINSKI, *President.*A. KAZIERSKI, *Secretary.*

DOCUMENT NO. 3

MR. ASQUITH TO MR. K. ZYCHLINSKI, POLISH NATIONAL ALLIANCE, CHICAGO.

(Telegraphic.)

January 14, 1916.

I have read with interest the telegram representing the views of the Polish organisations in the United States. His Majesty's Government are earnestly considering the question of Polish relief in consultation with the French Government, but they are faced with accumulating evidence that not only is the present shortage of the necessaries of life in Poland due to the systematic

confiscation and export of native stocks by the occupying armies, but also, notwithstanding the deplorable condition of the country to-day, this process of spoliation still continues. The past history of this process was summarised in a report by a leading member of the Polish Independence party published in our own press last November, and evidence of the continuance of these confiscations appears daily in the Austrian press. 4,500 wagon loads of potatoes were to be sent from Lublin to Vienna last October, and a decree of the 23rd December regulates the importation from Poland into Austria of cattle, sheep, pigs, poultry, eggs, meat, tallow, milk, and many other articles. On the 12th November the Vienna press announced the arrival of large shipments of geese from Poland. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that the stoppage of such exports and the replacement by Germany and Austria of the stocks seized in the past would remove the danger of starvation, and that little, if any, importation from overseas is necessary. The first step to be taken in the interests of Poland is the establishment of an organisation on the spot to control all remaining stocks and to obtain from the German and Austrian Governments the guarantee of a daily ration to the population equivalent to the foodstuffs seized in the past. In view of what has happened in Belgium, where the Germans have used every effort to remove all resources of the country not covered by specific guarantees, it is certain that any permission to import from overseas before these steps have been taken would only stimulate the requisitions of the enemy by giving him the assurance of supplies to replace what he takes.

Please accept my assurance of the deep sympathy of His Majesty's Government.

H. H. ASQUITH.

DOCUMENT NO. 4

POLISH ORGANISATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES TO MR. ASQUITH.

(Telegraphic.)

Chicago, January 25, 1916.

Representatives of Polish organisations of American citizens who addressed your Excellency by cable 8th January, at a meeting held this day unanimously agreed to extend to your Excellency, for your courteous and encouraging reply of the 14th January, their profound thanks, realising the importance of our request and the obviously difficult position of His Majesty's Government

in treating this request as one which may in some degree conflict with the purpose of the restrictive measures of blockade as pointed out in your reply. Your Excellency's answer is therefore doubly encouraging as it indicates your own sympathetic and His Majesty's Government's magnanimous attitude.

We learn with great concern from your Excellency's cablegram of the extensive military requisitions made by the Central Powers for cattle, grain, and other foodstuffs, upon the already devastated country and its inhabitants. Recognising the misfortunes of war and the consequences visited upon its victims, we desire to pursue the only course remaining, namely, the undertaking of relief furnished from our own resources, offered spontaneously and unsparingly. We recognise the justice of your Excellency's statement that provisions which have been requisitioned from the Polish population by the invading armies should be returned in proper rations.

We are prepared to send Committees of Polish-American citizens to make these representations and demands upon the Powers now occupying Poland, and to submit to His Majesty's Government list of committees composed of American citizens of Polish blood, who will accompany shipments of food and clothing to the devastated provinces of Poland, and who will guarantee proper and honest distribution of relief among the suffering population in the affected districts, with further guarantee that no portion of such shipments be in the slightest degree diverted for the benefit of the invading Powers.

In making these representations we hope for the co-operation of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, which, as indicated in our former message, has been appealed to for assistance and co-operation.

While we cannot at this time forecast the attitude of the Central Powers upon our request for the return of provisions heretofore confiscated or requisitioned, we believe that binding assurances can be secured which will preclude the abuse of any relief measures undertaken by our associations, and that every ounce of food permitted to be landed in Poland by the gracious consent of His Majesty's Government will find its way only to the real victims of war in Poland.

Sincerely believing in the ultimate success of securing the assurances, may we renew our former plea and in the name of the still living orphans and widows of men drafted into the armies of the Allied Powers most respectfully request His Majesty's Government to magnanimously consent to the raising

of the blockade against ships carrying provisions and clothing to the war-stricken provinces of Poland.

Bespeaking your Excellency's generous and sympathetic assistance, we beg, &c.

For Polish National Alliance, Polish Roman Catholic Union, Polish Women's Alliance, Polish Falcons' Alliance, Polish Alma Mater, Polish Union of America, Polish National Council, Polish Uniformed Societies, Polish Central Relief Committee, St. Joseph's Polish Union.

JOHN F. SMULSKI, *Plenipotentiary*.

DOCUMENT NO. 5

POLISH NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO MR. ASQUITH.

(Telegraphic.)

Detroit, February 2, 1916.

Your Excellency,

The Annual Convention of the Polish National Defence Committee of America, held in Detroit, Michigan, on the 13th and 31st days of January, 1916, feels in duty bound to tender their thanks to the Government of Great Britain for its sympathy to the Polish nation, which you have expressed in your message of the 14th January, 1916, addressed to the Polish Central Relief Committee of Chicago.

We still hope that the blockade in reference to the importation of foodstuffs into Poland, which the American Red Cross [presumably the Commission for Relief in Belgium is meant] endeavours to organise, may be modified in spite of the difficulties.

As a political organisation, formed at the Congress of all the Polish organisations in America, held in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, in 1912—an organisation whose aim is to promote the cause of the independence of Poland—we recognise and accept with a great deal of satisfaction the political legal principle on which the Government of Great Britain endeavours to base the work of relief in Poland, namely, the principle that a recompensation is due to Poland for the Military requisitions and destruction of property by the armies of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary.

Our informants in Poland lead us to believe that the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments are favourably inclined to

assist the relief work in Poland, presumably in accordance with the same principle.

Russia, however, whose troops were compelled to evacuate Poland, is unable to fulfill her obligations in this respect, except through intermediaries.

May we be permitted to draw your attention to the speech of Delegate Swiencicki, delivered at the session of the 17th August, 1915, of the Russian Duma, in which he officially confirmed the enormous extent of the requisitions made in Poland by the retreating Russian armies? This, moreover, was still further confirmed by Mr. Gregory Mason, a correspondent of neutral American "Outlook."

The amount of foodstuffs, clothing, &c., which the American Red Cross will be able to furnish to the sufferers of Poland will be but a small fraction of what is due to the Polish people from Russia in payment for her requisitions and destruction of property during the war.

For these reasons the Convention of the Polish National Defence Committee approves the appeal of the Polish Central Relief Committee addressed to you some time ago.

We have no doubt that, in conformance with the principle recognised by you in your above-mentioned message, and conformably to the tenets of international law guided by the principles of justice and humanity, the Government of Great Britain will assist the generous endeavours of President Wilson and American Red Cross to relieve the inconceivable suffering in Poland.

We are sure that the Central Powers would be willing to give the same guarantees as to the inviolability of the supplies as in the case of Belgium.

The blockade of the Central Powers by the Allied fleets results in the fact that the Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary have not sufficient store of foodstuffs to enable them to repay in kind for their requisitions in Poland.

The repayment in specie naturally will not relieve the lack of provisions in Poland if there will be no importations of foodstuffs from abroad. Only the admission of food from America and elsewhere may even partially replace the admittedly enormous amounts of grain and other supplies requisitioned in Poland by Russia; nothing else will save the Polish people from extinction from hunger.

Thanking you once more for your words of sympathy for the Polish nation, we trustfully and anxiously await the day when

a modification of English blockade for the purpose will enable the American Red Cross to begin the work of relief in Poland.

DR. J. P. ZALESKI, *President*.

S. RAYZACHER, *Secretary*,

1225 North Ashland Avenue, Chicago.

DOCUMENT NO. 6

MR. ASQUITH TO DR. ZALESKI AND MR. SMULSKI.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 15, 1916.

Your telegram of the 26th January (1st February) has received my most earnest consideration. The decision of His Majesty's Government is embodied in the letter to Mr. Hoover, Chairman of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, which has now appeared in the press, in answer to the appeal received from him, which I believe has your full concurrence. I believe the stipulation that any discussion of this question shall be preceded by comprehensive guarantees, covering stocks of foodstuffs still remaining in Poland, on the part of the German and Austrian Governments, is in the best interests of the Polish people, and forms the only sound basis on which any relief work can be instituted.

DOCUMENT NO. 7

SIR EDWARD GREY TO MR. HOOVER.

Foreign Office, February 5, 1916.

Dear Mr. Hoover,

I have carefully considered your letter of the 22nd December regarding the proposed scheme for the relief of Poland.

In face of the accumulating evidence of German and Austrian requisitions in Poland, some mention of which you will find in the enclosed telegraphic correspondence with Polish organisations in the United States, I fear it would be impossible to enter into any arrangement with you in regard to any scheme of relief until the German and Austrian Governments have prohibited the export of all foodstuffs from Russian Poland, and have guaranteed that native stocks of foodstuffs shall not be drawn upon to maintain the occupying armies.

If and when this were done it might be possible to come to an arrangement with you for allowing the importation of certain

articles into Poland in return for undertakings on the part of the German and Austrian Governments to supply an adequate ration of other necessary articles, and to give you a free hand in the distribution of all stocks of foodstuffs thus made available. But the prohibition of export and the guarantee mentioned above must be regarded as conditions precedent to any further discussion, since these measures are demanded by the situation now existing, quite independently of the question of imports, and the fact that they have not yet been put into force constitutes evidence that the German and Austrian Governments will never co-operate in any work undertaken in the interests of the population of Poland.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

DOCUMENT NO. 8

SECRETARY BAKER TO THE DIRECTOR, ASSOCIATED POLISH PRESS

Washington, D. C.

10 June 1918

To the Director of the Associated Polish Press

MY DEAR MR. WHITE:

Now that the Polish National Committee and its coördinate National Department in this country have actually succeeded in organizing and dispatching to Europe a large body of troops for the Polish Army, which is to coöperate on the Western front with the Allied Armies there defending the principles of liberty and justice, I take this occasion to congratulate you upon the achievement.

This American contingent of the Polish Army is made up of volunteers who are not covered by American draft regulations. The men in it are, therefore, moved by the inspiration of the principles involved on the Allied side in this conflict, and their presence on the Western Front, representing both their adherence to America as the country of their adoption, and Poland, free and self-governing, as the country of their extraction, will be a stimulating and inspiring sight.

Through the medium of your newspapers you have an opportunity of making known to the people of the United States the extent of the voluntary sacrifice which these men are making, and it will be only a just appreciation for them to have it known. In the meantime, it will be wholesome to have the people of the

United States realize the circumstances under which the Polish contingent is formed in order that they may more widely understand and appreciate the high motives which have animated these fellow-citizens of Polish extraction who, up to this time, have formed a part of the population of the United States.

With cordial regards, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER, *Secretary of War.*

DOCUMENT NO. 9

SECRETARY LANSING TO MR. ROMAN DMOWSKI

Washington, D. C.

1 November 1918

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of October 18 and October 25, requesting the Government of the United States to associate itself with the Government of France and Great Britain by recognizing the Polish Army, under the supreme political authority of the Polish National Committee, as autonomous, allied and co-belligerent.

In reply I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States has not been unmindful of the zeal and tenacity with which the Polish National Committee has prosecuted the task of marshalling its fellow countrymen in a supreme military effort to free Poland from its present oppressors.

This Government's position with respect to the Polish cause and the Polish people could hardly be more clearly defined than was outlined by the President in his address before the Congress of January 8, 1918. Therefore, feeling as it does a deep sympathy for the Polish people and viewing with gratification the progress of the Polish cause, this Government experiences a feeling of genuine satisfaction in being able to comply with your request by recognizing the Polish Army, under the supreme political authority of the Polish National Committee, as autonomous and co-belligerent.

DOCUMENT NO. 10

SECRETARY LANSING TO MR. PADEREWSKI

I. J. Paderewski, Esq.

New York

SIR:

With the understanding that you will perhaps wish to make

public statement regarding the recognition given by this government to the Polish national committee at Paris as an official Polish organization, I beg to inform you that on October 19, 1917, the American Ambassador at Paris forwarded the request of Mr. Dmowski, president of the Polish national committee there, that the United States government recognize that committee as an official Polish organization. On November 10, 1917, I took pleasure in instructing the American Ambassador at Paris to extend the desired recognition of the government of the United States.

DOCUMENT NO. 11

RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE BY SENATOR LODGE November 18, 1918

Resolved, That in the opinion of the Senate an independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

In support of his resolution Senator Lodge, as quoted in the Congressional Record (vol. 56, No. 259, page 12678), said:

Mr. President, the words of that resolution are identical with the words of point 13 used by the President in his 14 points. That statement is very brief and very explicit and I think it will be very well at this time for the Senate to join itself with the President in the statement on that point in regard to Poland.

The reason why I say that is this. You will observe that the President speaks of access to the sea. That access to the sea can only be at Danzig at the mouth of the Vistula. The Vistula is inhabited entirely along both banks by Poles, but Danzig is a German city and I have already seen attempts to say that as a German city they must continue to hold it and give certain rights to the Poles. The access to the sea that the Poles will get if Danzig is held will not be worth having. Guaranties can be given to the people of Danzig. I think nothing is more important than the President's proposition about access to the sea.

My other reason for offering and hoping the Senate will adopt the resolution is that I have information which I think good that there is a movement on foot, a strong movement, though underground, here and abroad, to prevent the establishment of a strong

independent Poland. They want to break it up for some reason and have a small State, with a German or a Hapsburg prince, and probably a small State with a republican form, but with tendencies to defeat it. I thought at this moment it would be well to show that the Senate is with the President in his statement in regard to what should be done for Poland, which was absolutely explicit.

DOCUMENT NO. 12

SECRETARY LANSING TO PRIME MINISTER PADEREWSKI

Paris

22 January 1919

The President of the United States directs me to extend to you as Prime Minister and Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Polish Government, his sincere wishes for your success in the high office which you have assumed and his earnest hope that the Government of which you are a part will bring prosperity to the Republic of Poland.

It is my privilege to extend to you at this time my personal greetings and officially assure you that it will be a source of gratification to enter into official relations with you at the earlier opportunity; and to render to your country such aid as is possible at this time, as it enters upon a new cycle of independent life which will be in due accord with that spirit of friendliness which has in the past animated the American people in their relations with your countrymen.

DOCUMENT NO. 13

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE RELIEF OF SUCH POPULATIONS IN EUROPE, AND COUNTRIES CONTIGUOUS THERETO, OUTSIDE OF GERMANY, GERMAN-AUSTRIA, HUNGARY, BULGARIA, AND TURKEY, AS MAY BE DETERMINED UPON BY THE PRESIDENT AS NECESSARY.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That for the participation by the Government of the United States in the furnishing of foodstuffs and other urgent supplies, and for the transportation, distribution, and administration thereof to such populations in Europe, and countries contiguous thereto, outside

of Germany, German-Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey: *Provided, however*, That Armenians, Syrians, Greeks, and other Christian and Jewish populations of Asia Minor, now or formerly subjects of Turkey may be included within the populations to receive relief under this Act, as may be determined upon by the President from time to time as necessary, and for each and every purpose connected therewith, in the discretion of the President, there is appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, \$100,000,000 which may be used as a revolving fund until June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and nineteen, and which shall be audited in the same manner as other expenditures of the Government: *Provided*, That expenditures hereunder shall be reimbursed so far as possible by the Governments or subdivisions thereof or the peoples to whom relief is furnished: *Provided further*, That a report of the receipts, expenditures and an itemized statement of such receipts and expenditures made under this appropriation shall be submitted to Congress not later than the first day of the next regular sessions: *And Provided further*, That so far as said fund shall be expended for the purchase of wheat to be donated preference shall be given to grain grown in the United States.

Approved, February 25, 1919.

February 25, 1919.

[H. R. 13708.]

DOCUMENT NO. 14

EXECUTIVE ORDER BY PRESIDENT WILSON

In pursuance of an Act entitled "An Act providing for the relief of such populations in Europe and countries contiguous thereto outside of Germany, German Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, as may be determined upon by the President as necessary" approved February 24, 1919, I hereby direct that the furnishing of foodstuffs and other urgent supplies and the transportation, distributing and administration thereof, provided for in said Act, shall be conducted under the direction of Herbert Hoover, who is hereby appointed Director General of the American Relief Administration with full power to determine to which of the populations named in said Act the supplies shall be furnished and in what quantities, and further to arrange for reimbursement so far as possible as in said Act provided.

He is hereby authorized to establish the American Relief Administration for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of said Act and to employ such persons and incur such expenses as may be necessary for such purpose, to disburse all sums appropriated under the aforesaid Act or appoint a disbursing officer with that power; and particularly to employ the Food Administration Grain Corporation, organized under the provisions of the Food Control Act of August 10, 1917, as an agency for the purchase, transportation and distribution of foodstuffs and supplies to the populations requiring relief.

He is hereby further authorized in the carrying out of the aforesaid Act of February twenty-fourth, 1919, to contract with the Food Administration Grain Corporation or any other person or corporation, that such person or corporation shall carry stocks of food in transit to Europe, and at points in Europe, in such quantities as may be agreed upon and as are required to meet relief needs, and that there shall be paid to such person or corporation in advance from the appropriation made in the aforesaid Act of February twenty-fourth, 1919, any sums which may be required for the purchase and transportation of foodstuffs and maintenance of stocks.

WOODROW WILSON

The White House
February 24, 1919.

[No. 3035-B]

DOCUMENT NO. 15

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE RELIEF OF POPULATIONS IN EUROPE
AND IN COUNTRIES CONTIGUOUS THERETO SUFFERING FOR
WANT OF FOOD.

[Public—No. 167—66th Congress. H. R. 12954.]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, for the participation of the Government of the United States in the furnishing of foodstuffs to populations in Europe and countries contiguous thereto suffering for the want of food, the United States Grain Corporation is hereby authorized, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to sell or dispose of flour now in its possession, not to exceed five million barrels, for cash or on credit at such prices and on such terms or conditions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act and to relieve populations in the countries of Europe or countries contiguous

thereto suffering for the want of food: *Provided*, That an audited, itemized report of the receipts and expenditures of the United States Grain Corporation for the purposes authorized by this Act shall be submitted to Congress not later than the first Monday in December, 1920.

Approved, March 30, 1920.

DOCUMENT NO. 16

Text of Resolutions Passed Unanimously by Representatives of P. A. K. P. D. Committees at the Congress Held in Warsaw on March 4th and 5th 1922.

1. In appreciation of the great humanitarian work accomplished in Poland during three years, the congress expresses its deepest gratitude to the American nation and its representatives acting in Poland for their hardships and sacrifices toward the improving of the fate of Polish children.
2. Taking into consideration 1. that the American Relief Administration is liquidating its work in Poland on June 1st, 1922; 2. that the conditions in the majority of Polish provinces are not yet normal, and therefore the children who have the least power of resistance, suffer the most; 3. that the question of bringing up a healthy and strong generation is of the utmost importance for the future of our state,—the Congress resolves to submit a motion to the Government as to their taking over the child feeding action beginning June 1st, 1922, in an extent proportionate to actual needs, namely: to feed 400,000 children up to October 1st, 1922, and 300,000 from October 1st, 1922 to June 1st, 1923, war orphans, refugee children, children in the devastated territories in the Eastern districts, children in institutions, and the neediest children in large industrial centers being first of all taken care of; this action to be a foundation of a systematic, permanent relief for children and mothers, both as regards physical care and educational work.
3. In order to work out a plan of the future action in changed conditions, in cooperation with the Government, American Relief Administration and the Executive Committee of the P. A. K. P. D. Foundation, the Congress elects from among its members a commission of 5 members and 5 substitutes;

the commission will do everything possible to prepare the plan of future child feeding not later than April 15th, 1922, and that funds necessary for the carrying out of this plan be guaranteed by the Government.

DR. E. BOBROWSKY,
President of the Congress.
A. SZCZESNIAK,
Secretary.

DOCUMENT NO. 17

A. R. A. WARSAW TO A. R. A. NEW YORK

"Warsaw
3 April 1922.

At the session of the Economic Council today the Polish Government definitely guaranteed to assume the responsibility to feed 400,000 children from June 1st to October 1st 1922 and 300,000 children from October 1st 1922 to June 1st 1923. Poland's excellent past cooperation is evidenced by

1. Her contribution of some 52,000 tons foodstuffs for our childfeeding action which with expenses of warehousing and transportation totals approximately \$11,000,000.
2. Her guaranteeing that all foodstuffs imported from America for needy children actually reach beneficiaries even to the replacement of foodstuffs lost at the difficult period of the invasion by the Bolsheviks.
3. Her affording free transportation of our Russian relief supplies across Poland and free warehousing of Russian relief foodstuffs at Danzig; Poland's decision to perpetuate as initiated by A. R. A. is only another conclusive proof of her appreciation and gratitude to Hoover and Americans."

DOCUMENT NO. 18

MR. HOOVER TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT

"My colleagues and myself are deeply interested and appreciate the action of the Polish Government in assuming complete responsibility for the feeding of its needy children. The relief that this administration has been able to give to the children of your republic during the past three years has been sent you as a gift from America. It has always been the policy of our organization to act only in cases of emergency. In Poland the

necessities created by years of devastating warfare have been met for your children largely by the efficient action taken by yourself with the help of American aid. Since the inception of our work your Government has given continual increased evidence of your ability and desire to care for your own problems. This has been most gratifying to the members of the A.R.A. and now when your Government is able to see the end of the necessity for external emergency aid we beg to confirm our withdrawal from Poland on June first next. These many months of cooperative work when American aid has been of assistance to you, have we feel sure, more firmly cemented the bonds of friendship between our two great republics. This latest evidence of your goodwill in deciding officially to continue the children's relief unaided, on the lines of our joint effort, will be recognized by every friend of Poland as further evidence of Poland's recovery from the results of the great war. On behalf of those Americans who have made possible our work I wish to extend to the Polish Government and people our congratulations and good wishes (signed) Herbert Hoover."

April 20, 1922

DOCUMENT NO. 19

PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE MINISTERS OF POLAND

Warsaw

7 May 1922

The American Relief Administration Mission to Poland, which has brought constant relief to our children during the past three years, will cease its activities on June 1st, 1922. At the time immediately following the world war and during the economic crisis of our country the relief action initiated by Mr. Hoover and conducted by the A.R.A. Mission under his direction rendered immense services to Poland. This work has meant health and life to over one and a half million children, thus preserving a generation for Poland which in large part would otherwise have perished during the hard days through which our country struggled after the war.

The entire population of Poland worships the name of Hoover and surrounds with gratitude and esteem all his countrymen who have coöperated with the relief action in Poland. The feeling that the work initiated by Mr. Hoover will not be interrupted, but will be carried on by our nation itself, will be their

best reward at the moment of their departure from Poland.

As the economic and agricultural conditions of the country have gradually become normal we are in a position, and we consider it our duty, to take over the work carried on up to date by the generous American people.

A widespread and efficient organization, known as the P.A.K.P.D., has been established with the coöperation of the Polish Government. This organization will continue the relief action, in order to save thousands of needy children from hardships and misery and to help them to become strong citizens of their country.

The Polish Government has destined large funds for the above purpose but it is unable to cope with this immense problem unaided. The district governments and the communal authorities, as well as the central government, owe their full coöperation to this relief work. The entire population of the country should give their support to the organization of the P.A.K.P.D. which, based upon rational principles and with its country-wide system of distribution, is able to reach the neediest children in every part of Poland, especially those children in the Eastern areas, the unfortunate victims of war and plague.

Let us remember that the future of our country depends upon a solution of this problem as only well-fed, healthy children can grow up and become intensive workers and defenders of their country in case of necessity. The communal authorities and the district governments should not hesitate to furnish both material and moral help to the P.A.K.P.D. We cannot permit that this work maintained up to now, thanks to help from abroad, should be for naught when that help is withdrawn and the work left in our own hands.

(Signed) ANTONI PONIKOWSKI,
President of the Ministers.

DOCUMENT NO. 20

PREMIER SLIWINSKI TO COLONEL BARBER

Warsaw

29 July 1922

Translation

COLONEL A. B. BARBER

DEAR COLONEL:

In the name of the Polish Government I feel that I must express to you, before you quit the soil of our country, the

gratitude which Poland owes you for what you have accomplished during the three years that you have spent among us.

You arrived in Poland at the moment when the state, which had just been reconstituted after a century of foreign oppression and a war of long duration, was still struggling with a thousand political and economic difficulties. Under these difficult circumstances you brought to bear the effective aid of your experienced ability in the organization of the state railways. It was due to the normal functioning of the railways, to which your advice and intervention largely contributed, that Poland, during very perilous times, was able to avoid disaster due to lack of coal and food and to develop uninterruptedly her reborn commerce and industry. Neither would I fail to mention the services which you rendered to Poland both at Genoa and at Geneva during the various conferences dealing with the economic reconstruction of Europe and the organization of the economic system of Upper Silesia.

The rôle which you have played in all political and economic questions relating to Poland cannot but contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of the excellent friendly relations which exist between Poland and the United States of America, and I am sure that your departure will not in any way break the ties which you have formed with us and that you will remain always a true bond of union between our two countries.

ARTHUR SLIWINSKI,

President of the Council of Ministers.

DOCUMENT NO. 21

MR. BALDWIN TO MR. HALLER

August 13th, 1922

A. HALLER, Esq.,

Representative of Ministry of Interior and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Warsaw.

DEAR MR. HALLER:

We beg to submit herewith for the information of the Polish Government a detailed statement of the A.R.A contributions in foodstuffs, automobile and office equipment and cash donations to the future child relief operations of the P.A.K.P.D. subsequent to June 1st, 1922. This donation, amounting to a total of \$329,-

548.31, which at the current rate of exchange equals over two milliards of marks, is a token of our appreciation of the step which the Polish Government have taken in assuming responsibility for the child relief operation.

We take this opportunity of again expressing our satisfaction at the fine attitude the Government has evinced in undertaking this responsibility. On behalf of the A.R.A. and the American people who have contributed to the A.R.A. relief operation in Poland, we wish to extend our very best wishes for the success of the future operation.

That the P.A.K.P.D. may develop into a permanent organization for the furtherance of child welfare in Poland is our most sincere hope.

Very sincerely yours,
AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION,
EUROPEAN CHILDREN'S FUND MISSION TO POLAND.
By: P. S. BALDWIN,
Chief of Mission.

STATISTICAL TABLES

TABLE I

MAJOR EXPENDITURES FOR POLISH RELIEF

Congressional Appropriation of February 25, 1919:	
General Relief	\$63,191,316.61
Children's Relief	6,025,682.03
European Children's Fund.....	16,769,305.53
American Relief Administration: Warehouse, Draft, and Bulk Sales.....	1,315,644.79
Contribution of Food by Polish Government.....	7,619,280.26
Donation of Warehouse Space by Polish Govern- ment	90,000.00
U. S. Army Liquidation Bond Sales	59,365,111.97
U. S. Grain Corporation Sales	24,353,590.97
Total	<u>\$178,729,932.16</u>

TABLE II

RELIEF FURNISHED TO POLAND UNDER CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION OF FEBRUARY 25, 1919

QUANTITIES IN METRIC TONS

Commodity	General Relief	Children's Relief	Total
Wheat Flour	124,273.8	858.2	125,132.0
Cereal Flour	8,345.7		8,345.7
Wheat Grain	12,393.5		12,393.5
Rye Grain	69,478.0		69,478.0
Beans and Peas.....	8,586.3	2,898.2	11,484.5
Rice	8,041.2	2,077.3	10,118.5
Pork Products	9,088.6	765.0	9,853.6
Lard	7,600.5		7,600.5
Lard Substitute	5,108.2		5,108.2
Milk, Condensed and Evaporated	2,100.8	6,284.2	8,385.0
Sugar	49.2	1,647.1	1,696.3
Cocoa	2.0	766.3	768.3
Miscellaneous Food... ..		20.3	20.3
Cotton	5,775.4		5,775.4
Soap		441.6	441.6
Clothing		826.7	826.7
Total	<u>260,843.2</u>	<u>16,584.9</u>	<u>277,428.1</u>

TABLE III

FOOD RELIEF FURNISHED TO POLAND BY THE EUROPEAN
CHILDREN'S FUND AND THE A.R.A. WAREHOUSE SALES

	Quantities in Metric Tons
Wheat Flour	8,259.8
Corn Grits	1,689.4
Beans and Peas.....	16,523.8
Rice	10,463.3
Pork Products	5,003.3
Milk, Condensed and Evaporated.....	15,121.7
Sugar	5,740.9
Cocoa	1,265.5
Miscellaneous Food	456.3
Soap	263.7
Other Miscellaneous	10.0
Total	64,797.7

TABLE IV

RELIEF DONATED BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT

Commodities	Metric Tons
Flour	48,325.7
Rice	531.0
Peas and Beans.....	728.0
Pork Products	852.0
Sugar	1,205.9
Total	51,642.6

TABLE V

SALES TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IN 1919 BY THE
U. S. ARMY LIQUIDATION BOARD FROM SURPLUS
ARMY STOCKS IN FRANCE

Commodity	Approximate Metric Tons
Food and Subsistence	44,360.0
Clothing and Textiles	13,719.0
All Other Commodities	49,047.0
Total	107,126.0

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¹ This classification is very roughly made. Many titles might be properly placed under more than one heading.

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- Col. William R. Grove on Polish-German difficulties. No. XVI, p. 25-26.
- "The Financial Situation of Poland." J. J. Kann. No. XVI, p. 33-36.
- "Hard Times in Eastern Poland." W. R. Grove. No. XVII, p. 23.
- Letter from Col. William R. Grove to Premier Paderewski recommending that the Polish Republic administer the distribution of relief. No. XVII, p. 23-24.
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- Memorandum from Mr. Hoover to the Supreme Economic Council on typhus relief in eastern Europe. No. XXII, p. 6-8.

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- "The Polish American Children's Relief Committee Foundation." No. XI, p. 14-39.
- "Children's Relief and Democracy." Herbert Hoover. No. XV, p. 1.
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- "Aspects of Polish Relief." No. XX, p. 26-28.
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- "America in Poland." Maurice Pate. No. XXII, p. 46-50.
- "Continuation of Child Feeding in Poland." No. XXIV, p. 34-54.
- "Polish Government Furtherance of Child Feeding." No. XXVIII, p. 58.
- "Poland's Refugee Problem." P. S. Baldwin. No. XXIX, p. 58-67.
- "Child-feeding in Poland, 1922-1923." No. XL, p. 67-68.
- "America and Poland, 1915-1925." Sidney Brooks. No. XLIV.

CHIEF EXECUTIVES, PRIME MINISTERS AND MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF POLAND, 1919-1927.

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Joseph Pilsudski, Chief of State.....Nov. 15, 1918-Dec. 16, 1922.
 Gabriel Narutowicz, President.....Dec. 16-18, 1922.
 Stanislas Wojciechowski, President....Dec. 20, 1922-May 15, 1926.
 Ignace Moszicki, President.....June 4, 1926-

II. PRIME MINISTERS

A. Moraczewski.....Nov. 18, 1918-Jan. 16, 1919.
 I. Paderewski.....Jan. 17, 1919-Dec. 9, 1919.
 L. Skulski.....Dec. 13, 1919-June 23, 1920.
 L. Grabski.....June 23, 1920-July 24, 1920.
 V. Witos.....July 24, 1920-Sept. 13, 1921.
 A. Ponikowski.....Sept. 19, 1921-March 5, 1922.
 A. Ponikowski.....March 10, 1922-June 6, 1922.
 A. Sliwinski.....June 28, 1922-July 7, 1922.
 J. Nowak.....July 31, 1922-Dec. 14, 1922.
 L. Sikorski.....Dec. 16, 1922-May 26, 1923.
 V. Witos.....May 28, 1923-Dec. 15, 1923.
 L. Grabski.....Dec. 19, 1923-Nov. 13, 1925.
 A. Skrzynski.....Nov. 20, 1925-May 5, 1926.
 V. Witos.....May 10, 1926-May 14, 1926.
 C. Bartel.....May 15, 1926-Sept. 30, 1926.
 J. Pilsudski.....Oct. 2, 1926-

III. MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

L. Wasilewski.....Nov. 18, 1918-Jan. 16, 1919.
 I. Paderewski.....Jan. 16, 1919-Dec. 15, 1919.
 S. Patek.....Dec. 16, 1919-June 22, 1920.
 E. Sapieha.....June 23, 1920-May 19, 1921.
 C. Skirmunt.....June 12, 1921-June 27, 1922.
 G. Narutowicz.....June 28, 1922-Dec. 9, 1922.
 A. Skrzynski.....Dec. 16, 1922-May 26, 1923.
 M. Seyda.....May 28, 1923-Oct. 29, 1923.
 R. Dmowski.....Oct. 30, 1923-Dec. 18, 1923.
 M. Zamoyski.....Jan. 9, 1924-July 17, 1924.
 A. Skrzynski.....July 27, 1924-May 5, 1926.
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
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